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ABSTRACT
This thesis focuses upon the writings of the contemporary North American feminist 
theologian Mary Daly. It takes the form of a critical study of Daly’s thought in terms of five 
tributary influences. It represents a contribution to two areas of research: the history of 
feminist ideas, and the ongoing methodological debate within feminism as to the possible 
relationship between feminist theory and ‘conventional’ theory.
In chapter one Daly’s political thought is introduced through a discussion of the 
influence of the tradition of radical feminism. The principle aim of this chapter is to clarify, as 
far as possible, the dual process of influence that exists between her thinking and the work of 
certain radical feminist theorists.
In chapter two the influence of Beauvoirian existentialism upon Daly’s thought is 
examined in the wake of the claim that in drawing from Simone de Beauvoh’s feminist 
existentialist analysis of women’s situation, in The Second Sex, Daly assimilates Sartrean 
existentialist assumptions which are problematic from a feminist perspective.
In chapter three turn to address Daly’s philosophical- theological debt to Thomas 
Aquinas and the Thomist tradition. I trace the history of Daly’s dealings with Thomism, 
including her criticism, and briefly evaluate her continued feminist engagement with its 
ontology.
In chapter four Daly’s utilisation of Peter L. Berger’s sociological theory is explored. I 
discuss Daly’s feminist criticism of Berger’s theory of ‘worldbuilding’ and proceed to 
evaluate her subsequent attempts to use Berger’s work as the starting-point for a new feminist 
sociology of knowledge.
In the fifth and final chapter the abiding influence of Christianity to Daly’s 
‘revolutionary’ theological agenda is highlighted and explored with reference to the 
contemporai-y division of theological labour between so-called ‘reformists’ and 
‘revolutionaries’.
The thesis ends with a few concluding remarks about Daly’s methodology with regard 
to ‘conventional’ theory.
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Introduction
This thesis represents an encounter with the work of Mary Daly on the part of a student of feminist 
theology. It takes the form of a critical study of the relationship between Daly’s feminist theory and 
five major theoretical frameworks.^ Daly is radically eclectic, drawing upon an assortment of 
sociological, philosophical, political and theological sources in her effort to create a 
philosophy/theology of liberation. As Marsha Hewitt has noted: ’Despite theflamboyant and 
intensely metaphoric language Daly uses in her later work, her underlying philosophical theory is 
steeped in the Western intellectual tradition in which she was formed’ ?
In this thesis I have elected to discuss Daly’s intellectual debts to radical feminist theory, 
Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist feminism, Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist tradition, Peter L. 
Berger’s sociology of knowledge and Christian theology .One could equally well put a case for 
exploring the influence upon Daly’s thought of a number of otherintellectual frameworks. Reseai'ch 
has already been cai'ried out on the importance to Daly’s theory of Paul Tillich’s theologÿ,Herbert 
Marcuse’s critical theory^ and R. D. Laing’s existential psychiatry? Even this list is not exhaustive. 
One could also analyse the influence upon Daly of, for example, the philosophy of Nietzsche, the 
Process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, the liberation philosophy of Paolo Freire, 
ecofeminism or the linguistic philosophy of Suzanne Langer. My decision to explore the five
1 I employ the term ’theory’ throughout the thesis in the general practical sense of a set of ideas that both 
attempt to explain the world (through stretching the imagination, making generalisations about individual 
experiences etc.) and sometimes also to envision ways in which to transform it.
2 Hewitt, Marsha Aileen Critical Theory of Religion: A Feminist Analvsis (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1995) p.l33.
3 See for example Mary A. Stenger A  Critical Analysis of the Influence of Paul Tillich on Mary Daly’s 
Feminist Theology' Encounter 43: pp. 219-239, Summer, 1982; and Laurel C. Sneider 'From New Being to 
Meta-Being: A Critical Analysis of Paul Tillich's Influence on Mary Daly' Soundings 75, no. 2/3,
(summer, 1992).
4 See the chapter entitled 'Herbert Marcuse, Mary Daly, and Gynocentric Feminism' in Hewitt, op. cit., pp. 
113-45.
5 Meyer-Wilmes, Hedwig 'About the Schizophrenia in Women's Beings: A Re-Reading of Mary Daly' 
Feminist Theology: the Journal of the Britain and Ireland School of Feminist Theology No. 6 (May, 1994), 
pp.647-81.
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discourses indicated owes partly to the paucity of research into their respective impact upon Daly’s 
theorising, and partly to my own personal interests.
The primary intention of my analysis is to clarify Daly’s feminist theory and practice? A 
clarification of Daly’s methodology is important as a prolegomenon to a ’dialogic’ evaluation of the 
extent and nature of her significance for contemporary feminist theology. I use the term ’dialogic’ 
because I think that the value of what Daly has to say will only emerge through a feminist 
communal process of assessment which, whilst underway, is not yet complete. Moreover, the 
clarification of feminist theological perspectives in general is crucial to academic theology as a 
public discipline. As the North American theologian Sallie McFague notes: it is only when each 
theologian strives ’to identify as clearly as possible the perspective from which she or he reflects, the 
tradition out of which he or she comes, and the sensibility which prompts one chosen perspective 
rather than another’ that a ’conversation with other perspectives’ can proceed and ’inadequacies,
limitations, and possible errors’ in one’s own position be mitigated^ In particular the thesis is 
presented as a contribution to two areas of research.
Firstly, it is a study of Daly’s feminist theology, a research into work now regarded as one of
8the ’classic’ products of second-wave feminist theology (in a manner analogous to the study of the 
writings of Simone de Beauvoir by feminist philosophers and Virginia Woolf by feminist literary
9critics). This is not simply to yield to the present ’star’ system in feminism. Daly played a major role
6 I employ the term feminist theory to mean a collectivity of theories that may diverge radically from each 
other on questions of the sex-gender distinction, of the nature of oppression and of strategies for liberation. 
It is still useful to bring these theories under a common umbrella for a number of reasons, although 
continued reflection on what it means to think ’as a feminist’ is imperative.
7 McFague, Sallie Metaphorical Theologv: Models of God in Religious Language. (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1982), p.x.
8 That feminist theory has now moved beyond criticism of the conventional classics to a critical position 
regarding its own ’classics’ is a measure of how critically self-reflexive it has become in a relatively short 
period of time.
9 Feminist philosophical literature on Beauvoir is now extensive: see for example Toril Moi Feminist 
Theory and Simone de Beauvoir (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); and Mary Evans Simone de Beauvoir: a 
Feminist Mandarin (London: Tavistock, 1985). The literature on Woolf has become equally prodigious: see 
for example Elaine Showalter A Literature of Their Own: British Women Writers from Bronte to Lessing 
(London: Virago, 1978); and Jane Marcus (ed.) New Feminist Essays on Virginia Woolf (London: 
Macmillan, 1981).
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in the birthing-process of contemporary feminist theology in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the
10publication of Gvn/Ecologv: the Metaethics of Radical Feminism (1978) Daly has paid little heed
to the formal and material conventions of contemporary theological scholarship. Yet this book and
11those subsequent to it - Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophv (1984), Webster s’ First New
12Inter galactic Wickedaiv of the English Language 0989) and Outercourse: The Be-Dazzling
13Vovage - may still be read profitably as works of theology. It may be that Daly’s preoccupation 
with creating an alternative format for feminist theology represents a challenge to the received 
orthodoxies of established scholarship. One aspect of the training of a theologian is learning to 
reproduce an accepted theological ’style’ (though this may vary according to which subdiscipline of 
theology - fundamental, practical or systematic - one is engaged in). What is deemed ’acceptable’ by 
university and ecclesiastical authorities is partly a matter of tradition. Yet ’tradition’ may veil power 
relations at work in the norms for ’appropriate’ theological discourse. I submit that, whilst Daly 
makes no claim to be engaging in theology in the classic Christian sense of being a rational 
exposition of ’revealed’ knowledge, it is still possible to read her work in terms of the formula of 
fides quarens intellectum in the sense that it is the product of a mind struggling to explore 
rationally a fundamental ’faith’ or ’trust’ in the deep sources of existence. In so far as this is true, the 
concept of theology as ’faith seeking understanding’ is an appropriate appellation for Daly’s work.
A fundamental presupposition underlying the present work is that, in order to assess Daly’s 
significance for contemporary feminist theology, an awareness of the complex ideological 
background from which she draws is crucial. It is, of course, a commonplace that theologies and 
philosophies do not emerge mysteriously from vacuums, but are spatio-temporally located and 
conditioned. No system of thought can be properly understood until it is viewed in the light both of 
its historical Sitz im Leben and in the light of its connection with other intellectual systems. This 
proposition applies to any author. How can one understand adequately the thought of Augustine
10 Daly, Mary Gvn/Ecologv: the Metaethics of Radical Feminism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978).
Subsequent references will be to the fifth British edition (London: The Women’s Press, 1991).
11 Daly, Mary Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophv (London: The Women’s Press, 1984).
Daly, Mary Websters’ First New Intergalactic Wickedarv of the English Language (Conjured bv Marv 
Dalv in Cahoots with Jane Caputil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987). Subsequent references will be made to the 
to the English edition (London: The Women’s Press, 1988).
13 Daly, Mary Outercourse: The Be-Dazzling Vovage. Containing Recollections from Mv Logbook of a 
Radical Feminist Philosopher (Be-ing an Account of My Time/Space Travels and Ideas - Then. Again. Now 
and How) (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993).
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and what induced him to take up the positions he did, unless one is also aware of the impact upon 
him of the thought of Plato and Plotinus and the gnwsifi of Mani? How can one understand why 
Barth launched the ’bombshell’ of his commentai^ on ’The Epistle to the Romans’ into ’the 
playground of the theologians’ unless one knows something of the course of nineteenth century 
liberal Protestantism and of the historical importance of the Great War? And so it is with all 
theologians - including Daly - whose writings cannot be comprehended adequately unless one 
knows something of both the socio-historical context and the discourses that inform her thinking. 
This said, it may well be that Daly does not owe as much as has been thought to certain intellectual 
frameworks. In which case my analysis will take issue with one or another interpretation of Daly’s 
work that seeks to prove the existence of a theoretical debt that does not exist (or else is not as 
extensive, nor as problematic, as one might at first think). In my examination of Daly’s debt to de 
Beauvoir’s existentialist feminism I shall argue, contra one Dalyian scholai', that Daly does not 
assimilate de Beauvoir’s (Sartrean) existentialist ontology and that therefore her work does not fall 
prey to the problems that such an ontology brings for feminists.
A second, albeit subsidiary, aim of this thesis is to contribute to the developing debate 
regarding feminist methodology with respect to feminist use of male-authored and/or purportedly 
’male-stream’ theory, that is, theory that mirrors male desires, objectives and activities whilst
14veering away from the concerns and practices of women. Carole Pateman ailiculates the central 
issue in this debate in the question: ’ [Wjhat is, and should be, the relationship of feminist theorists
15to the classics and to conventional theoretical methods?’ The importance of the debate regarding 
the propriety and efficacy of feminist use of male-stream theory attaches to the ongoing necessity 
for feminists to be critically aware of the sources of their theories. It has been argued both by Daly 
and, more recently, by Betty Friedan that Anglo-American feminist theory - out of which both 
Daly’s writing and this thesis emerge - has now entered ’a second theoretical stage’ (Friedan), one 
that arises out of a changed socio-political context in which different questions and problems have 
emerged to those which preoccupied the early second-wave feminists (including Friedan herself). 
Friedan alludes to a kind of gap that exists between women such as Daly and a younger generation 
of women, a gap that is measured not temporally but discursively. (There is, for example, a far
14 The term ’male-stream’ is taken from Mary O’Briehfhe Politics of Reproduction (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1981) p.5.
15 Pateman, Carole ’Introduction; The Theoretical Subversiveness of Feminism’ in Pateman and Elizabeth 
Gross (eds.) Feminist Challenges : Social and Political Tlieorv (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 
1987; originally published in Australia by Allen & Unwin Australia, 1986) p.3.
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greater awareness of difference now than when Daly first began to write).The second theoretical
stage is characterised by the recognition that the purely critical phase of feminist theorising has
16receded before the demands of re-construction. It is undoubtedly the case, as Friedan says, that 
feminist criticism has matured over the last thirty years. However, it is important to be mindful of 
the ongoing necessity for feminist criticism. If feminism is to continue to function as a political 
movement which is subversive and marginal to the dominant social order, then the feminist 
community needs to constantly hone the skills of criticism and self-reflexivity. The point is 
articulated by Toril Moi, who counsels that feminists have ’to be very much more aware than the 
ruling powers of what we’re doing, simply in order to avoid, as far as possible, trapping ourselves in
17the traditional power structures’. Thus, whilst the imperative to create a worldview consonant with 
feminist convictions has now come to the fore (a practice that is encapsulated in Daly’s exhortation 
to women to ’Name’ their sense of themselves, the world and ’God’) such an envisioning must be 
continually chastened by unceasing effort to expose patriarchal values wherever and whenever they
surface. As well as investigating the substantive textual connections between Daly’s thought and the
18five selected discourses, then, I shall reflect upon this practice, where appropriate, in terms of the 
relation between feminism and male-stream theory.
A useful classification of possible feminist approaches to male-stream theory is provided by
19Moira Gatens in her paper ’Feminism, Philosophy and Riddles without Answers’ . Gatens isolates 
three distinct approaches: firstly, theoretical separatism which relinquishes or simply ignores all 
male-authored theory; secondly, a project of extension which seeks to include women in pre­
existent theoretical paradigms; and thirdly, an approach that recognises the bias of male theory and 
which seeks to challenge and subvert it in certain ways. I shall briefly describe each of these 
approaches in turn before commenting on Daly’s practice.
Feminist advocates of the first approach, that of theoretical separatism, wish to question the 
theoretical wisdom of drawing from male-authored texts and traditions in any way whatsoever. This 
is not a widely held stance, though it does possess legitimacy in some radical feminists circles, most 
particularly in the lesbian separatist movement. Gatens holds up the work of Valerie Solanas - the
16 Lilburne, Geoffrey R. ’Christology: In Dialogue with Feminism’Horizons 11 (spring, 1984), pps.7-27.
17 Moi, Toril Feminist Theory and Simone de Beauvoir (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) p.95.
18 This does not apply to my treatment of radical feminism, which originated as a critique of political theory 
qua androcentric theory. See chapter five of this thesis.
19 Gatens, Moira ’Feminism, Philosophy and Riddles without Answers’ in Pateman and Gross, op. cit., 
pp. 13-29. Gatens analysis is confined to philosophy. Here I extend her classification to theory in general..
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author of the notorious S.C.U.M. Manifesto - as representative of one strand of this approach. 
Implicit in Solanas’ rejection of male theory is the notion that theory per se is intrinsically and 
inevitably masculinist, and that feminism is not so much a form of theory as unadulterated praxis. 
Solanas' advocacy of some kind of unsullied practice (whatever that may mean) does not challenge 
directly the processes by which patriarchal texts are generated and constructed in the first place.
This is seen by Gatens to be a serious methodological limitation. Gatens' suspicions about 
theoretical separatism centre upon what she perceives as its utopianism. Specifically, she believes
that this agenda 'runs the serious risk of reproducing, elsewhere, the very relations which it seeks to
20leave behind'. In other words, the theoretical separatist may be prone to unconsciously reinscribing 
patriarchal values into their praxis even whilst consciously committed to their eradication.
The second feminist approach to theory, that of extension, views only the content and not 
the general framework of traditional theory to be the main problem. Theory is not necessarily 
oppressive in and of itself (as Solanas thinks). Indeed it is basically sex-neutral. There are thus no 
inherent methodological barriers to overcome. The task of feminist thinkers is duly understood as a 
process of filling the lacunae in theory caused by the omission of women, thereby correcting the 
bias. This basically amounts to extending frameworks so as to include women. By doing this it is 
hoped that an androcentric theory will become representative of all human beings. Gatens cites as 
examples of such an approach Mary Wollstonecraft's appropriation of the discourse of 
egalitarianism and Simone de Beauvoir's application of Sartrean existentialism. Gatens argument 
with respect to the second approach is simply that it is an illusion to think of any theoretical 
framework as sex-neutral. She writes: 'Feminists who have attempted to extend or alter the content
of these philosophies have done more than add up and "tidy up". They have also, often, modified the
21framework of the philosophy they employ, though in a way that is not always readily visible'. In an 
illustration of her point Gatens shows how Sartre later took up Beauvoir's idea of woman as being 
perceived and perceiving herself as an object, an idea that represented an important modification of
Sartre's account of 'human' subjectivity in Being and Nothingness wherein the other is always for
22themselves a subject. Beauvoir does not then simply apply Sartre's conceptual grid to the situation 
of women, as is often supposed, but rather amends it in certain respects so that it is able to account 
for women's experiences.
20 Gatens in Pateman and Gross, op. cit., p. 16.
21 Ibid., p.22.
22 Ibid., pp.21-22.
7
The third and final type of relation between feminism and theory listed by Gatens is not 
unlike theoretical separatism in as much as theory is not perceived as neutral, nor is the problem of 
theory for feminists simply a matter of content or subject-matter. This approach differs from 
theoretical separatism, however, in its response to the problem. As we have seen, some feminists 
who advocate theoretical separatism hold that theory itself should be dropped or ignored because it 
is an irrevocably ’male’ pursuit, women’s interests being oriented to more pragmatic horizons. 
Feminists who advocate the third approach ai'gue, however, that theoretical traditions must be faced 
and challenged. Thus Gatens (who includes her own work under this rubric) writes:
By self-consciously demonstrating that any philosophical paradigm is not neutral, 
these feminists make themselves, both as philosophers and as women, visible . By 
making themselves visible, they in turn throw into question the legitimacy of claims and 
assumptions in philosophy that have been taken as axiomatic. In so far as this approach 
questions the very foundation and status of philosophy it also reveals the investments 
and concerns of philosophy. It does this by demonstrating not only what is excluded 
from a particular philosophy but also why it is crucial, for the very existence of that
23philosophy, to exclude it.
In other words, the process of structuring theory itself becomes the focus of feminist analysis. As 
Gatens realises, this approach gives us more information about male subjective, intellectual 
proclivities than about women. Nevertheless, such an emphasis may be necessary if women are to 
avoid falling into the same pitfalls that have beset male theorising.
Gatens classifies Daly as a theoretical separatist, though she distinguishes Daly’s view (of 
philosophy) from that of Solanas. The group of which Daly is seen by Gatens to be representative is 
said to acknowledge that a relationship between feminism and theory exist, but that ’it is 
historically, and necessarily, an oppressive one ... that philosophy [as an example of theory] is, 
necessarily, a masculine enterprise that owes its existence to the repression or exclusion of
24femininity and as such it is of no use to feminists or their projects’. As Gatens argues, this attitude 
to philosophical theory is inadequate because it is predicated upon a reified conception of 
philosophy ’as a discipline or an activity’ that ’coincides with its past’, whereas in fact philosophy is
25’a human activity that is ongoing’. The same can be said, of course, with regard to other disciplines 
such as theology or sociology. In what follows no attempt will be made to use Gatens’ typology as a 
Procrustean bed in which to try to ’fit’ Daly’s use of say, Peter Berger’s sociology, but it will provide
23 Ibid., p.25.
24 Ibid.,p.l5.
a useful point of reference for a discussion of Daly’s practice. Let us turn now to the project at hand. 
Given the twin foci of my research what is the best way to approach Daly’s writings?
The most appropriate method for arriving at an adequate understanding and assessment of 
Daly’s thought is that of historical ’archaeology’. Here the philosophical and theological roots of 
categories, concepts and themes are painstakingly disentangled and analysed. Such a method is not 
itself immune to a certain arbitrariness. Mindful of this problem I shall nevertheless attempt to bring 
out certain lines of influence. Such an approach is not blind to the risk of forfeiting the organic unity 
of Daly’s thought as it is given in her nairatives. This is indeed a very real danger and one which 
must be continually borne in mind. An even greater hermeneutic calamity would ensue, however, 
should analysis fail to appreciate the sophistication and subtlety of Daly’s synthesising activity.
The thesis is organised so as to reflect this archaeological methodology. Each chapter 
encapsulates a discrete strand within the body or ’text’ of her life-work. The word ’text’ - and its 
semantic relative ’textile’ or cloth - is derived from the Latin term ’texere’ which means ’to weave’. 
The metaphor of weaving and its associative tropes of spinning and quilting are all activities which 
have figured prominently in women’s historical practices. These activities have been assigned great 
symbolic importance by many in the women’s movement as metaphors for the multi-dimensional 
processes of creativity. The feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith, for example, sees the work of 
quilting as part of a ’submerged folk tradition of a true art sustained and perpetuated by women
when the emergence of high art excluded them and surely excluded distinctively womanly
26materials’. She explains:
A quilt was made to be used. It was integrated into paiticulai'istic relations - the piece of 
her grandmother’s dress, her daughter’s pinafore - and was sometimes made by a group of 
women working together. The maldng itself and the friendships were built into the design, 
the collection of fabrics, the stitching. A quilt was not a piece of art, therefore, to be seen in 
isolation from its history and the social relations of its making. It was not made to be set in 
the high walls of a gallery or museum. It was always a moment in the moving skein of
27family and tradition, raising suspicion against time and its powers of separation.
Another passage, from Adrienne Rich's poem 'Transcendental Études', illustrates the fertile uses to 
which the extended metaphor of text/weaving is often put by feminist theorists. Of women's 
attempts to reconstitute their lives Rich writes:
25 Ibid.
26 Smith, Dorothy E. The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1987) p.23.
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Vision begins to happen in such a life as
if a woman quietly walked away
from the argument and jargon in a room
and sitting down in the kitchen, began turning in her lap
bits of yarn, calico and velvet scraps,
laying them out absently on the scrubbed boards
in the lamplight, with small rainbow-colored shells ...
Such a composition has nothing to do with eternity,
the striving for greatness, brilliance -
only with the musing of a mind
one with her body, experienced fingers quietly pushing
dark against bright, silk against roughness
pulling the tenets of a life together
with no mere will to mastery,
28only care ...
Such images of women’s work provide an evocative portrayal of feminist scholarship as it seeks to 
knit new designs from threads of contemporary experience and other perhaps more ancient sources.
In application to the format of the present study the metaphor of ’text’ retains many of these 
semantic nuances. My purpose here is not to dissect Daly’s work; rather do I speak of strands which, 
talcen together, form a paiticular pattern, a living intertextual design. Each thread is given its own 
chapter. Each is distinguishable from the others, possessing its own vitality, its own ’texture’, ’shape’ 
and ’colour’. Yet each is simultaneously interdependent with the rest so that during the course of the 
narrative each thread invariably crosses over others, becoming intertwined with different strands. 
Ontological questions, for instance, are in no sense separate or separable from the socio-linguistic, 
spiritual and political discussions to which they give rise. Rather are all of these strands interwoven 
in a complex tapestry of reciprocal influences.
In the chapter one the reader is introduced to Daly’s political thought through an analysis of 
her interaction with ’radical feminism’. Daly identifies herself as ’Radical Feminist’ and hework has 
been received as such by other feminists both within and outside that theoretical orbit. The aim of
27 Ibid.
28 Rich, Adrienne 'Transcendental Études' in The Fact of a Doorframe: Poems Selected and New 1950-84 
(N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1984) pp. 268-69. See also the meditation upon the creativity of the spider in 'Natural 
Resources' in the same anthology, p.261.
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the chapter is firstly to ’place’ Daly within the theoretical corpus of radical feminist theory. This is 
important in as much as radical feminism is a more diverse movement of thought than is often 
realised. I shall show that Daly commits herself to the central ’signature’ features oân already 
extant body of radical feminist theory during the eai'ly 1970s. One such feature of early radical 
feminism is a suspicion of ’male-engendered’ political theory. In this respect the present chapter 
provides the political philosophical criteria that govern Daly’s dealings with ’male-engendered’ 
theories in general, an issue that is discussed in each of the following chapters. In tracing Daly’s 
utilisation of each of these features of radical feminist discourse I shall argue that her principle 
contribution to the radical feminist corpus lies in her unremitting focus upon social knowledges and 
their transmission through the sphere of culture. The analytic emphasis upon ’culture’ has attracted 
criticism from some feminists who argue that in downplaying the economic and ’material’ realities 
of oppression she falls into a dangerous idealism. I shall defend Daly in the face of such criticisms 
by calling attention to two things: firstly, her aims in emphasising the sphere of culture, and 
secondly, the political desirability of a division of theoretical labour in the feminist community.
Chapter two is entitled ’Existentialism’, though I shall focus upon the relationship between 
Daly’s feminist thought and a particular' form of the philosophy, namely, the feminist existentialism
29of Simone de Beauvoir as it is given formulation in The Second Sex. Only one study has been 
published to date of de Beauvoir’s influence upon Daly’s writings (and I shall take issue with the
30interpretation of Daly’s work given therein). I shall argue that Daly draws principally upon de 
Beauvoir’s empirical analysis of female oppression, rather than upon the existentialist philosophical 
apparatus. I shall challenge the view of one feminist scholar* who has recently alleged that in her 
appropriation of ideas in The Second Sex Daly becomes involved in perpetuating certain 
’masculinist’ assumptions that permeate the de Beauvoir’s existentialist feminist philosophy. In 
recent years some feminists have criticised de Beauvoir for replicating Sartre’s dualistic
29 Beauvoir, Simone de The Second Sex translated and edited by H.M. Parshley. (London: .lonathan Cape, 
1972; originally published in France as Le D euxièm e Sexe  : L ibra ir ie  G allim ard , 1949). The Second S ex is 
generally considered to be a work of feminist theory in spite of the fact that Beauvoir rejected ’feminist’ as a 
self-identification until 1972. See Anne Whitmarsh Simone de Beauvoir and The Limits of Commitment 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981] pp. 154f; and Reneé Winegarten Simone de Beauvoir: A 
Critical View [Oxford: Berg, 1988] pp. 92ff.
20 Korte, Anne-Marie Een P asie  v o o r  tran scen den tie: F ém in iste th éo log ie en m odern ite it in h er denke van  
M ary D a ly  (English abstract).
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31understanding of reality and his conflict-view of the self-other relation. The question is whether 
these weaknesses in de Beauvoir’s analysis may also have carried through to Daly’s work. In 
response to this suggestion I shall demonstrate that, whilst Daly draws extensively from de 
Beauvoir’s criticism of religion and her analysis of femininity, she does not thereby enter 
surreptitiously into Satrean ’precommitments’; rather to the contrary, in her later writing she is 
critical of de Beauvoir’s ’patriarchal’ existentialist assumptions. An analysis of each writer’s view of 
woman/women and her/our oppression suggests that the origins of Daly’s feminist philosophical 
presuppositions are to be found in to her Roman Catholic background, specifically in her earlier 
assimilation of Thomist philosophy and theology.
32In chapter three I focus in detail upon Daly’s feminist engagement with Thomism. Of the 
intellectual influences discernible in Daly’s work, that of Thomism is perhaps one of the most long- 
lasting and profound. There are, however, no published studies of the relations between Daly’s 
feminist thought and Aquinas and/or his followers. I shall argue that the attempt to formulate a 
’revolutionary’ feminist theology based on women’s experience of the ’intuition of being’ cannot be 
adequately understood without a prior appreciation of her negotiation of Thomistic ontology. I begin 
by tracing Daly’s philosophical-theological background. Like other Catholic theologians formed in 
the years before the Second Vatican Council, Daly’s education was conducted in a theological- 
philosophical atmosphere dominated by Aquinas’ thought. Indeed she completed two doctorates on 
Thomistic questions at the University of Fribourg between 1960-65: The Problem of Speculative 
Theologv: a Studv in St. Thomas, and Natural Kuowledge of God in the Philosophv of Jacques 
Maritain. Daly abandoned the Thomistic matrix between 1968-71 when she concluded Aquinas’ 
work was the product and reflection of a male-stream culture. However, when faced with the 
problem of ’theology after the death of God the Father’ she attempted a creative feminist re­
engagement with certain elements in Thomistic thought, including the concept of ’the intuition of 
being’. Yet this attempt to reclam the concept of the intuition of being is problematic in certain 
respects. The major question concerning Daly’s retrieval of ideas, principally the concept of the 
intuition of being, is that in bringing the idea into play in a feminist theoretical context it either loses 
the intelligibility conferred upon it by its original Thomist conceptual framework (and thus the 
project of ’Plundering’ is a sham) or else it brings along with it major elements of that framework.
31 Hartsock, Nancy Money. Sex and Power (N.Y: Longmans, 1983);. p. 286; Whitmarsh Simone de 
Beauvoir and The Limits of Commitment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 150.
32 Thomism is defined as the schools and systems of philosophy and theology which take the teachings of 
Thomas Aquinas as their authoritative source.
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which may pose other problems given the ’masculinist’ nature of the discourse. This anomaly I shall 
ai'gue, remains unresolved in Daly’s writings.
The fourth chapter is entitled ’Sociology’. Here the focus of my enquiry falls upon the 
relationship between Daly’s feminist theory and a specific branch of sociological theory, namely, the 
sociology of knowledge of Peter L. Berger. The connections between Berger’s sociology of 
knowledge and Daly’s understanding of the operations of patriarchal society are striking. A primary 
objective of Daly’s work has been to uncover the ways in which the system of male domination 
actually operates in society so as to oppress women. Ultimately this task involves discovering the 
rules and criteria that are used in the generation and codification of social ’knowledge’, for it is by 
virtue of such ’knowledge’ that social reality is structured such that men come to dominate and 
oppress women in their everyday world. This theoretical necessity makes Berger’s sociological 
theory a natural resource. With respect to the question of the methodology of feminist appropriation 
of male-stream sources I shall argue that, although Daly exposes Berger’s false universalism and 
male bias (disguised under the cloak of scholarly objectivity), her challenge does not result in any 
thoroughgoing sociological criticism of his constructs (such as ’world-building’ or ’legitimation’). 
However Daly does succeed in bringing to light certain ’masculinist’ presuppositions in Berger’s 
theory. Moreover her highly creative feminist ’reversal’ of Berger’s ’reversal’ goes some way to 
defining the possible shape and contours of a radical feminist sociology of knowledge.
The fifth and final chapter is called simply ’Christianity’, The critical edge of the chapter lies 
not in further reflection on the sexism of traditional religion, nor in identifying ways to ’purify’ 
Christian theological discourse of its structural, ideological ’pollutants’, but rather in the insistence 
on taking seriously Daly’s constructive insights regarding a feminist theology that is oriented to a 
spiritual horizon transcending Christianity. Broadly, my argument is to the effect that the relation 
between Daly’s revolutionary theology and the ’male-stream’ Christian tradition is far more complex 
than is usually supposed. Essentially, her move towards other more metaphorical designations does 
not enable her totally to transcend her Christian heritage, as she would have her readers believe. 
There are strong indications to suggest that, whilst she has clearly moved out of the fiduciary (as 
well as the institutional) embrace of the Church, her thought remains committed to the fundamental 
’rules’ that govern Christian ’God-talk’. I shall show how both Daly’s ’revolutionary’ criticisms of 
Christianity as well as her attempts at theological construction are both predicated on a grammar of 
divinity (an understanding of God’s absolute distinction from the world) that she inherited through 
the Christian tradition. In my discussion of this fact I shall argue that far from being regarded as a 
limitation, in feminist ’revolutionary’ terms, Daly’s continued dependence upon the structuring
13
realities of Christian theism represents an opportunity for renewed dialogue between women on 
both sides of the reformist/revolutionary divide.
The discourses treated here are huge. Needless to say each of the frameworks I have selected 
could be explored in greater depth and in a better way by ’specialists’ in their respective disciplines. 
Inevitably, within the confines of a single chapter not every concept or insight that Daly ’plunders’ 
from Berger’s writings for use in the project of feminist reconstruction can be explored. But this is 
not necessaiy in as much as the present analysis is not intended as an inventory of conceptual 
’survivals’. My purpose here is exploratory and clarificatory rather than definitive: I seek to open up 
new terrain and to suggest fields for further research. Moreover my aim is to incorporate the broad 
sweep of the development of her thought rather than one phase. Given such a scope it is relatively 
easy to hit upon certain features which do not receive an in-depth treatment here. Daly’s theory of 
language is one example. The intricacies of her understanding and practice of language are 
important elements in any interpretation of her work. Moreover a clarification of the difference 
between her approach and that of other contemporary feminist theorists is much needed. I am
33thinking in particular of influential writers in the French tradition such as Julia Kristeva , Luce
34 35 36Irigaray, Hélène Cixous and Monique Wittig. Through their plurality of linguistic approaches 
these women have pioneered the exposition and criticism of a Western 'masculine' or 'phallocratie' 
economy. Like Daly, each considers their 'writing' to connect issues of subjectivity with the 
concerns about power, social structure and meanings. Beyond this common focus upon language, 
however, there are considerable philosophical and political differences both among these women 
and between them as a group and Daly. Daly's feminist thought operates primaiily, not from the 
traditions of Continental philosophy and psychoanalysis, but from a more pragmatically oriented 
Anglo-American intellectual tradition. A research into the differences between Daly and the French 
feminisms would also allow further clarification of Daly's position in the contemporary debates 
concerning modernity and postmodernity, a subject that currently occupies many in the (academic) 
feminist community. Whilst I shall touch upon certain aspects of her view of language here (notably
33 Kristeva, Julia Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (Oxford, 1980).
34 Irigaiay, Luce Speculum of the Other Woman (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985). and This 
Sex Which is not One (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
35 Cixous, Hélène 'The Laugh of the Medusa' in Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron (eds.) New French 
Feminisms (Brighton: Harvester, 1981; originally published in Amhert: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1980).
36 Wittig, Monique Les Guérilleres translated from the French by David Le Vay (Boston: Beacon Press,
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her view of language as the medium for the externalisation of subjective meanings) a 
comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis.
To support my arguments in the thesis I have drawn upon all the six feminist books 
published to date by Daly, that is: The Church and the Second Sex, Bevond God the Father, 
Gvn/Ecologv. Pure Lust, the Wickedar v and Outercourse. I have also consulted many of the articles
37that have been published by Daly since 1965, though many of these works are only marginally 
helpful in that frequently they contain material that later appears in her books (or vice versa, 
material that has already been published in one of her books). In chapter one, ’Thomism’, I make 
reference and quote from two of her three doctoral theses, namely, The Problem of Speculative 
Theologv: A Studv in St. Thomas and Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophv of Jacques
38 39Maritain. The latter work is published in its entirety. Access to the first thesis is limited; it is 
unavailable through inter-library services and is obtainable only in a condensed version published, 
in 1965, by the Thomist Press in Washington. Although it would have been more satisfactory for me 
to have analysed this thesis in its entirety, I do not believe that the research has been seriously 
hampered by having only the (forty seven page) abstract with which to work. A comprehensive list 
of the secondary literature on Daly’s work that I have consulted, as well as the literature (both 
primary and secondary) on the theories that I examine, is given in the bibliography.
1985; originally published in London: P. Owen, 1971).
37 See the bibliography.
38 Daly’s first Ph.D. was in Religion at St. Mary’s College, Notre Dame, Indiana. SeeOutercourse p.50.
39 Natural knowledge of God in the Philosophy of Jacques Maritain (Rome: The Catholic Book Agency, 
1966).
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Chapter 1: Radical Feminism
Mary Daly’s development as a feminist theorist has been marked by a creative engagement with a 
distinct body of radical feminist philosophical assumptions and political constructs. A two-way 
process of influence exists between Daly’s thought and the tradition of radical feminism. On the one 
hand, her political understanding of the nature and dynamics of sexual oppression has been heavily 
influenced by the work of other radical feminist thinkers. On the other hand, she herself has made a 
significant contribution to the evolution of the radical feminist theoretical corpus. A key objective, 
in the present chapter, will be to elucidate the nature and extent of this dual process of influence.
This project is of interest from the perspective of the history of feminist ideas. ’Radical 
feminism’ is often portrayed as a cohesive, unified field of theory discrete from the two other 
branches of feminist theory in Anglo-American feminism: ’liberal’ feminism and ’socialist-Marxist’
feminism.^ However, the boundary lines between the different ’types’ of feminist theory often gloss 
over profound similarities and shared concerns between feminists of different theoretical 
persuasions. Moreover, methodological and theoretical differences aie common between those who 
identify (or who have been classified as) radical feminists. It is hoped that the attempt to ’place’ Daly 
within the theoretical orbit of radical feminism will manifest the problematicity of such typologies.
A review of Daly’s interaction with the tradition of radical feminist theory will also facilitate 
a discussion of the political criteria that govern her attitude to the theories described in the 
following chapters. For the critical approach to the intellectual products of Western ’male-stream’ 
culture that has governed Daly’s feminist writings since 1973 is in part determined by the radical 
feminist critique of political theory that emerged in the United States during the mid-to-late 1960s.
What then is radical feminism? Radical feminism is, like other strands of feminist theoiy, 
notoriously difficult to define. It is not a monolithic body of discourse, though some commentators, 
in an attempt to smooth over discursive differences for taxonomic purposes, would have us believe
otherwise: Alison Jaggar’s characterisation of radical feminism in her paper ’Political Philosophies
2of Women’s Liberation’ being a case in point. Indeed, far from being a unified and consistent 
theoretical corpus, radical feminism encompasses an airay of competing and often incompatible 
positions.
 ^ See, for example, Alison Iagger Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Brighton: Harvester, 1983).
2 Jaggar, Alison ’Political Philosophies of Women’s Liberation’ irFeminism and Philosophv ed. Mary 
Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick A. Ellston and Jane English (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 1985; first edition 1977), pp.12-15.
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Let us take the issue of class as an example. Some commentators consider an indifference to 
the issue of class to be a hallmark of radical feminist discourse. Daly is often held up as a 
representative figure by proponents of this view of radical feminism because she is perceived to 
neglect ’class’ as an issue that is integral to patriarchy’s functioning. But Daly’s apparent indifference 
to class as an important feminist political indicator is not shared by certain other radical feminists.
For example, Charlotte Bunch highlights the importance of class as a factor in her radical feminist
3conceptualisation of oppression. Not all radical feminists hold the same view of the relative 
importance of class in understanding women’s social situation; certainly not all radical feminists 
disregard it in constructing their theories. A second example concerns the oft-mooted radical 
feminist idealisation of reproduction. On this issue Jaggar writes definitively:
The radical feminist claims that the roots of women’s oppression aie biological. She believes 
that the origin of women’s subjection lies in the fact that, as a result of the weakness caused 
by childbearing, we became dependent on men for physical survival. Thus she speaks of the 
origin of the family in apparently conservative terms as being primarily a biological rather
4than a social or economic organization.
This kind of generality is unhelpful and simply inaccurate as a description of certain radical 
feminists’ positions: Daly, for one, does not conceive of the origins of women’s oppression in 
naively biological terms, but rather in terms of a fundamental bifurcation or split in consciousness.
The point that I wish to make by citing this example is that radical feminist theory is not 
characterised by anything like discursive uniformity or even ’uni-praxis’. As the lesbian feixiinist 
philosopher Julia Penelope points out there are ’at least seven or eight ideologically distinct
factions’  ^co-existing under the umbrella of radical feminism. This heterogeneity is partly 
accounted for by the influence of several tributary streams that have flowed into radical feminism 
since its inception: such as socialism-Marxism in the mid-to-late sixties, lesbian theory in the 
seventies, and ecofeminism in the eighties.
Any effort to define radical feminism, then, can only hope to identify certain common 
critical topoi which, generally speaking, are characteristic of radical feminism. What are these 
topoil Theorists operating from a radical feminist approach do not view the basis of women’s 
oppression to lie, as in the ’liberal’ approach, in a lack of legal and political ’rights’; or, as in the
2 See Bunch, Charlotte Passionate Politics. Essavs 1968-1986. Feminist Theory in Action (N.Y.: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987).
4 Jaggar in Vetterling-Braggin et. al, op. cit., p. 12.
2 Penelope, Julia Call Me Lesbian: Lesbian Lives. Lesbian Theory (Freedom, California: The Crossing 
Press, 1992), p. 138.
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socialist-Marxist approach, in the institution of private property and class oppression. A ’signature’ 
feature of the ’radical’ approach is said to be the belief that the oppression of women is the oldest 
and most fundamental form of oppression, a system of exploitation which serves as the paradigm 
for all other forms, including oppression by virtue of race, class or sexuality. Radical feminists are 
convinced that the other major alternatives in the Anglo-American tradition fail to acknowledge and 
theorise the nature and pervasiveness of male power. Radical feminists have as a result sought to 
reconceptualise the nature of male power which they see as transcending the ’public’ sphere of 
conventional political activity and embracing the ’private’ world of ’personal’ relations, the family 
and sexuality.
In what follows I shall begin by attempting to map out five theoretical topoi or 
commonplaces of Daly’s radical feminism through a brief history of her intellectual relationship 
with the nascent radical feminist theory of the 1960s and early 1970s. These topoi are; first, the 
criticism of conventional political theory; secondly, consciousness-raising as the privileged method 
of analysing women’s experience; thirdly, the postulation of’women’s experience’ as a unified 
political category; fourthly, separatism as a strategy for women’s liberation; and, finally, lesbianism 
as a conduit for new value. Such an approach will enable me to bring out the way in which, in some 
areas, Daly’s contribution represents a consolidation of extant presuppositions, ideas and research, 
and the way in which, in other areas, her contribution has perhaps been of a more original and 
formative nature.
Let me begin by discussing the first ’signature’ feature of radical feminism, namely the 
suspicion of male-engendered theoretical frameworks. In order to set this in context it is necessary 
to say a few words about the origins of radical feminism. Radical feminism came into existence in 
the United States during the 1960s. The impetus for its emergence was the disillusionment of some 
women active in radical political movements such as the movement for Civil Rights, pacifist
campaigns, the New Left and student movements with conventional political methods. These 
women began to reflect upon the fact that membership of radical political organisations did not 
protect them from being perceived by the men in the group through the haze of the ’feminine 
mystique’ (Betty Friedan). In such organisations women tended to be assigned to the roles of
6 Broadly speaking socialist feminism view women’s oppression in and through the complex 
interconnections between class, race and sex/gender. Their analyses is therefore more nuanced than 
traditional Marxist analysis which tends to confine itself to the related categories of property-relations and 
economic class. Like the Marxist feminism, however, the socialist feminist maintain that the destruction of 
the capitalist economy holds the key to female liberation.
 ^For a more detailed accormt of the emergence of radical feminist movement see Judith Hole and Ellen 
Levine The Rebirth of Feminism (New York: Quadrangle, 1971) and Maren Lockwood Carden The New 
Feminist Movement (New York: Russell Sage, 1974).
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secretary, housewife or sex object, servicing the political, domestic and sexual needs of male 
activists. They began to vocalise their experiences of alienation and unease about the ’second class’ 
treatment they were receiving from their male ’comrades’ in structures and political organisations
ostensibly devoted to equality, peace and justice.^ As early as 1964 women members of the Student 
Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (S.N.C.C.) began to meet together to talk about their 
position. Ruby Doris Smith Robinson even presented a paper to an S.N.C.C. conference on the 
theme: ’The Position of Women in S.N.C.C.’.In February 1965, Anne Koedt wrote a speech entitled 
’Women in the Radical Movement’ in which she protested the treatment of women by men. In the 
same year Mary King and Casey Hayden, two members of the S.N.C.C., contrasted the egalitarian
9ideals of the protest movement with the continued adherence to rigid sex roles inside it. They 
began to consider that ’theory’, as it was then formulated, was blind to women’s inferior social 
position in relation to males. In particular they came to think that prevailing political frameworks 
failed to acknowledge and theorise the nature and pervasiveness of male power as they experienced 
it.
When these women began to protest at their treatment by the men, and to argue for inclusion 
in decision-making procedures, they were met with silence, ridicule or contempt. Indeed, when 
women members of the Student Democratic Society demanded a plank for women’s liberation at the 
annual conference they were pelted with tomatoes and thrown out of the convention. Why these 
apparently ’progressive’ ’radical’ men were so hostile to women who voiced discontent at their 
treatment is not clear, though as the feminist historian Olive Banks has noted, at that time the New 
Left was heavily influenced by a ’macho’ ethos that drew sustenance from male heroes in the black 
power movement and in the Cuban revolution.
The radical feminist ’movement’began in earnest in 1967 when a small group of women, 
including Jo Freeman and Shulamith Firestone, left the ’National Conference for New Politics’ in 
Chicago in protest at the way in which women and their concerns were being treated by the mea 
These women formed the Westside group’. In October, 1967 Firestone moved to New York where, 
along with Pam Allen, she founded New York’s first feminist group: ’Radical Feminists’ 
(subsequently called the ’New York Radical Women’). As women networked similar groups spread 
rapidly to other major North American cities. In October, 1968 Ti-Grace Atkinson resigned from the
 ^C.f.: Marge Piercy ’The Grand Coolee Dam’ in Robin Morgan (ed.lSisterhood is Powerful: An Anthology 
of Writings from the Women’s Liberation MovementlN.Y.: Random House, 1970). This book also contains 
a collection of exceipts from some of the most important documents to emerge from the early radical 
feminist groups. See also Anne Koedt, Ellen Levine and Anita Rapone (eds.) Radical Feminism (N.Y.; 
Quadrangle, 1973), pps. 318-21.
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presidency of the National Organisation of Women (N.OW.) in protest at its hierarchical structure.
Atkinson wanted greater participatory democracy in the organisation though there were also
ideological differences (she thought for example that N.G.W.’s abortion policy was not radical
enough). She went on to found a group known as ’The Feminists’ which published a manifesto
setting out many of the ’doctrines’ of radical feminism. In the autumn of 1968 manifestos from
other groups began to appear, many of which argued that women as a class must band together
against men as a class. The ’New York Radical Feminists’ was brought together in December 1969
by Firestone, Anne Koedt, Diane Crothers and Celestine Ware. This collective was the first to issue
a declaration, ’The Redstockings Manifesto’, that women’s oppression is the result of psychological
10rather than simply economic factors.
In the new groups women began to use their own experiences as the basis for generating 
political analyses of their own relations as a group with men as a group. A critique of conventional 
political theory progressively emerged. The ensuing analytic transformation was later summed up in
the phrase: ’the personal is the political’.^   ^ Out of these groups there emerged a call for a theoretical 
shift in political theory in which of the field of ’politics’ and the concept o f’power’ were to be 
reconceptualised so as to position at centre-stage those ’private’ aspects of women’s experienc^uch 
as domestic labour, familial structures and sexuality, that had been hitherto neglected. Central to 
traditional political philosophical models, ranging from liberalism to socialism and Marxism, was a 
division between the ’public’ realm of employment, party politics and finance and the ’private’ realm 
of the home and domesticity. It was the former that was identified as the sphere in which ’power’ is 
generated and exercised. It was, moreover, a ’man’s world’; women’s experiences were seen as 
marginal to ’public’ political discourselt is difficult now to appreciate the radical shift in political 
conceptuality that the phrase ’the personal is the political’ demanded.Yet never before in political 
theory had the power disequation between women and men been used as the central analytic 
category in theory-generation. The feminist critique of the structuration of conventional political 
theory along the lines of the ’public/private’ dichotomy had a major impact upon the thinking offhe 
early radical feminists. There ensued an explosion of radical feminist political analyses by 
individuals such as Kate Millet, Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt as well as by nascent radical 
feminist groups which reflected the new holistic approach.
9 See Sara M. Evans Personal Politics: The Roots of the Women’s Liberation Movement in the Civil Rights 
Movement and the New Left (N.Y.: Vintage, 1980) pps. 98-99.
See ’The Redstockings Manifesto’ inMorgan op. cit. p.533-36.
 ^  ^ The slogan ’The personal is the political’ was coined by Carol Hanisch. See ’The Personal is the 
Political’ in The Radical Therapist ed. Jerome Agel (N.Y.: Ballantine Books, 1971), pp. 152-57, cited in 
Hester Eisenstein Contemporarv Feminist Thought (London: Unwin, 1984) p. 12.
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Daly was living in Europe at the time when the first stirrings of discontent began to sound 
amongst politically active women in North America. She spent the years 1959-1966 teaching and 
undertaking doctoral research at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland, a world far removed 
from the political and cultural upheavals that characterised American life in the first half of the 
1960s. She returned to the United States in September, 1966, after completing her doctoral work, 
arriving in Boston in time to take up her new teaching post in the Faculty of Theology at Boston 
College. For the next two years she immersed herself in teaching and writing. She had signed a 
contract to write a book on the subject of women and the Church in 1965 and, though most of the 
reseai'ch and writing for the book was completed in Fribourg, she continued to work on the 
manuscript as and when her teaching timetable allowed. Doubtless her feminist convictions at this 
point would today be described as ’liberal’ in as much as she viewed the basis of women’s 
oppression to lie in a lack of legal and political ’rights’. In the book conceived during this phaseThe 
Church and the Second Sex, she argued for an extension to women of the political rights and social 
and religious privileges accorded by men. Apart from attending a number of peace movement 
gatherings, however, she did not involve herself in any overtly political activities. Her primary 
concern during this period was not with the situation of women so much as the broad question of 
Church renewal in the aftermath of the second Vatican Council. Of the six articles published
between 1966-1968, for example, only one was concerned explicitly with the oppression of
12women.
Daly’s shift away fromthe concern with equality to the more radical position being 
pioneered by the women’s groups occurred at some point between 1968-70, in the aftermath of the 
publication of The Church and the Second Sex. In the winter of 1968 Daly was given a terminal 
contract by the authorities at Boston College. She interpreted the move as an expression of 
ecclesiastical disapproval about the book. After a vigorous campaign by students and others on her 
behalf, however, she was eventually granted promotion and tenure. The experience, she later recalls,
13transmuted her understanding of education. More importantly, she writes; ’I began to understand 
more of the implications of the feminist insight that "the personal is the political". The
interconnections among the structures of oppression in a patriarchal society and the destructive
14dynamics which these structures generate in their victims became more and more visible’. Daly’ 
altered perception manifested itself in greater political activism. She began to attend meetings of
Daly, Mary ’Antifeminism in the Church’.hiformation Documentation on the Conciliai' Church, no. 68-44 
(Rome/Geneva: IDO-C, 1968).
13 ‘Feminist Postchristian Introduction’ The Church and the Second Sex p. 13.
14 Ibid.
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N.O.W. ill Boston and Worcester, Massachusetts and became active in its task force on women and 
religion. Gradually her allegiance to the institutional Church was brought into question. She spent 
the period 1969-70 hard at work on a manuscript of a book about the uncertain future of 
Catholicism: the book was never published and in 1971 she finally left the Church.
The extent of the shift that had taken place in Daly’s feminist consciousness is revealed in 
Bevond God the Father. The central thesis of the book is that women must somehow move beyond 
the confines of the ’patriarchal’ mind-set. In setting out her position she reformulates theexisting 
radical feminist suspicion of male-engendered theory in terms of ’methodolatry ’.’ Methodolatry’is 
predicated upon the (unconscious) desire to maintain the subject ’man’ and his experience at the 
centre of the social world. In order to sustain this state of affairs, Daly argues, the parameters of ’ 
male method’ are set so as effectivelyto ignore or suppress data that may threaten the credibility of 
’man’s’ central position. The tyranny of ’methodolatry’ hinders new discoveries. As she writes:
It prevents us from raising questions never asked before and from being illumined by ideas 
that do not fit into pre-established boxes and forms. The worshippers of Method have an 
effective way of handling data that does not fit into the respectable categories of questions 
and Answers. They simply classify it as non-data, thereby rendering it invisible.'^ 
Conventional methods are thus seen by Daly to be severely limited and unable to help women to 
understand their plight, still less to remedy it. The methodologies of disciplines like philosophy, 
theology and sociology have allowed male scholars to gloss over women’s experience. Women ’have 
screened out experience and responded only to the questions considered meaningful and licit within
the boundaries of prevailing thought structures, which reflect sexist social structures’. This 
approach has been reverenced and legitimated by all of the major cultural institutions. Indeed it has 
been accorded such a high status that it is described as one of the ’false gods’ from which women 
must now liberate themselves.
The major issue here concerns the question of methodological ’space’. In Dalÿs view the 
starting-point of a ’method of liberation’ is for women to refuse ’to limit our perspectives,
17questioning, and creativity to any of the preconceived patterns of male-dominated culture’. Bevond 
God the Father is itself billed as ’an effort to begin asking nonquestions and to start discovering, 
reporting, and analyzing nondata’ The autonomous female externalisation valorised by Daly will 
be deviant by (patriaichal) norms because it involves the transgression of orthodox methodological
Beyond God the Father p. 11
16 Ibid., p.7.
17 Ibid.
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conventions. Indeed, she goes so far as to say that the ways in which women’s ’self-birth’ is
19occurring is and will remain ’nonspeech in the terms of our culture’. Female self-actualisation will 
take forms that are unrecognisable according to traditional academic standards.
The commitment to ’methodicide’or the murder of ’male’ methodis maintained throughout 
Daly’s later writings. Thus she writes that, sinceGvn/Ecologv ’confronts old molds/models of
question-asking by being itself an Other way of thinking/speaking, it will be invisible to those who
20fetishize old questions - who drone that it does not "deal with" their questions’. Likewise Pure
21 22Lust is promoted as a ’Work of Feminist Erraticism’ , ’a Mistake’. There is in Daly’s work, then,a 
deliberate emphasis in her work upon waywardness, on wandering and deviation from the norm. 
Much of Daly represents a sustained reflection upon this divergence from ’conventional’ theory, 
though in essence it sits squarely with the insights of the earliest radical feminist groups.
One of the key methodological tenets to aiise out of Daly’s radical feminist commitment to 
methodicide is the elevation of the category of women’s experience to epistemic primacy in the 
generation of feminist, theory. Like the early radical feminists Daly argues, in Bevond God the 
Father, that women need to confront masculinist methodology that draws exclusively upon male 
experience in the construction of theory. Women can do this, Daly thinks, by making that which 
was mai’ginal central, that is, by valorising women’s experience over all other sources of knowledge. 
As she writes: ’The essential thing is to hear omown words, always giving prior attention to our
23own experience, never letting prefabricated theory hdiVQauthority over us’. (Author’s emphasis). 
She charges that patriarchal intellectual history has been marked by an indifference to women’s 
perception of their own experience. On the basis of this she argues that women cannot rely upon the 
opinions of ’experts’ in any field of enquiry Women must ’listen’ to their own experience, for it is 
out of their experiences of oppression that new political analyses, concepts and strategies will 
emerge. She writes: ’Males have posed the questions ... They have hidden the Questions. The task 
for feminists now is con-questioning, con-questing for the deep sources of the q u e s t io n s I t  is
25imperative that women become the ’subjects and not mere objects of enquiry’. The ’Gyn/Ecological
Ibid., p. 12.
Ibid., p.151.
Gvn/Ecology p.345.
21 Pure Lust p.viii.
72 Ibid., p.30.
23 Bevond God the Father p. 189 
25 Ibid., p. 10.
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method’ that she gpes on to develop is ’about women a-mazing all the male-authored "sciences of 
w o m ank ind"and  about restoring women to the centre and to a positive valorisation. It is ’women’s
27experiences, past and present’ that constitute the ’primary sources’ of the ’Gyn/Ecological’ method. 
Women’s experience thus becomes the chief source of feminist theoretical legitimacy and authority.
In order to come to knowledge of their situation, then, in order to ’see’ (heoria), women 
must reflect on their experience. Yet she recognises that part of the problem for women lies in 
actually getting to the point at which a woman can perceive ’reality’ as patriarchalShe attributes the 
fact that many women do not so recognise their oppressed state as due to the complex and intricate 
workings ’patriaichy’, which is a ’Male Maze’ that operates through myriad patterns of deception and 
channels its ’messages’ through subliminal pathways that make it difficult to see and confront.
One of the chief aims of Daly’s writing is to bring women to the threshold of awareness of 
their oppression through a particular radical feminist process of reflection: consciousness-raising.
This is the second ’signature’ feature of radical feminist theory to which Daly ascribes One can 
hai'dly overestimate the importance of consciousness-raising to her feminist work. It is her 
privileged mode of analysis, her method of practice and her theory of social change all rolled into 
one. Moreover it follows directly from her radical feminist commitment to a policy of 
’methodicide’. The rationale behind consciousness-raising is that there exists a discrepancy between 
the ’appearance’ of the social world and its ordering mechanisms - a perception that is the result of
the social process of conditioning - and the ’reality’. As Daly acknowledges: ’ ... there is no ’one-shot’
28cure for a lifetime of conditioning to dependency’. However:
Women can raise each other’s consciousness of i% and encourage each other to take the risks 
necessary to become free. The process of discovering and analyzing the social mechanisms 
that reinforce tliis state is itself liberating and opens the way to creativity of a radical so rt...
At least implicitly, there is understanding that here, among women, is the source of 
independent challenge to ’the way things have always been’. This beginning to be together is
29the beginning of the end of female dependence.
This action is not mere exhibitionist ’therapy' the point of the exercise is for a woman to come ’into
knowledge of her anger, which means getting ready for action. Consciousness-raising is not 
’navel-gazing’: it isabout identifying the parameters, the gaps and contradictions of androcentric
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p.27.
28 Beyond God the Father p. 55.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., pp. 336-37.
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society as a prelude to the discovery that it is not the only possible social organisation, not the whole 
’world’, that there is more than this in actuality and in possibility. The ultimate promise of 
consciousness-raising is thus the intimation and visioning of other realities other than that of the 
status quo.
The importance of consciousness-raising in Daly’s workclearly mirrors the practice of the 
early radical feminist groups. The method of consciousness-raising was pioneered by the New York 
Radical Women in 1968. The group began hold ’rap’ sessions in which women were encouraged to 
talk about their personal experiences. These sessions may have been influenced by the Maoist
31practice of ’speaking bitterness’ or the ’Guatemalan guerrilla approach’. Women would listen to 
each others worries, their unspoken desires, their fears and unfulfilled needs and investigate the 
specific causes of their malcontent. Through this kind of analysis they discovered that what they 
tended to consider their own personal idiosyncrasies were better understood in terms of women’s 
social roles. A ’personal’ problem was seen to have a social cause and thus a political solution.
32Relating the personal to the political became the method of discussion in the group.
This kind of analysis was controversial, however, and not generally accepted amongst 
feminists in 1968. A group led by Peggy Dobbins splintered from the New York Radical Women, 
for example, in protest at the ’rap’ method. These women were more interested in plitical actions 
than in what they considered to be feminist ‘navel-gazing’. They formed a group entitled 
W.I.T.C.H. (Women's International Conspiracy from Hell) which carried out a number of actions, 
including hexing the New York Stock Exchange on Halloween 1968.
Notwithstanding such developments the influence of consciousness-raising slowly gained 
legitimacy. On Thanksgiving weekend, in 1968, Kathie Saiachild, a member of the New York 
Radical Women, presented a paper at the first Women's Liberation Conference in Chicago entitled 
'A Program for Feminist "Consciousness-Raising"'. In the paper Sarachild formalised the process 
that the New York women had been using. There was a heated debate about its use as a political 
method, but gradually it was taken up by other groups. In 1969 the Redstockings committed 
themselves to using the method of consciousness-raising. In their 'Manifesto' (7 July, 1969) they 
articulated what they took to be its function, purpose and process. They argued that the aim of 
feminist consciousness-raising is to challenge women's socialisation and ingrained thought patterns. 
Women are encouraged to manifest their anger, to direct it towards the source of the problem (male 
supremacy) to seek to challenge it. The process itself often reveals not only the depth of women's 
socialisation but also the quite remarkable capacity of women to 'see through' it.
31 Eisenstein, H., op. cit., p.35.
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More than any other radical feminist writer Daly has mapped out the terrain covered by 
women coming to radical feminist consciousness. The novelty of her approach consists in the 
attempts to ’mythologise’ the process, thereby elevating a political strategy to spiritual, ontological 
status. The process of ’ A-Mazing’ the ’Labyrinthine’ deceptions of prevailing social reality and 
entering into a new ’postpatriarchaT consciousness is imaged in terms of a ’Journey’ or soul quest 
through different ’passages’ or ’spheres’ to an ’Otherwoiid’ that is located above/beneath/beyond the 
male-engendered world. Women who embai'k upon the Journey are ’Spinsters:their purpose is to
33’spin and weave, mending and creating unity of consciousness’. As women ’Spin’ they whirl and 
twirl the ’threads of life on the axis of our own be-ing’, dis-covering ’the lost thread of
34connectedness within the cosmos, repairing this web as we create’. The basis of Daly’s hope lies in
35the fact that ‘perfect programming is rare', and that women possess native reserves of 'gynergy' 
(Emily Culpepper), 'the female energy which both comprehends and creates who we are; that
impulse in ourselves that has never been possessed by the patriarchy nor by any male'.' The goal of 
the Journey is to 'Realize' (and to inspire other women to Realize) 'active potency', the 'power to
37act'. On Daly's view women have been coerced and/or seduced into 'forgetting' these 'Archaic' 
powers. The task before them is, she avers, to 'unforget' , to 're-member' (put back together) the 
fragments that once were whole. Fundamental to this agenda is the supposition that 'This has not 
always been a man's world'; in other words, that 'reality' has not always been framed through 
patriarchal constructions.
Journeyers/Spinsters will encounter blockages and obstacles on the route to liberation. For 
example women can be 'Spooked' by tacit messages in the language, behaviour and institutions of
39patriarchal males, by the behaviour of other women who function as 'tokens' , and by countless 
'unnamed fears'. In order to strengthen themselves for their encounters with patriarchal 'demons' that 
'block' 'Voyaging' women must 'separate' themselves from the old patriaichally-defined patterns of
32 See Hole and Levine, op. cit., p. 125.
33 Gvn/Ecology. p. 386.
34 Ibid., p.390. C.f.: Nelle Morton’s vivid account of a vision of the Spider Woman in ’The Goddess as 
Metaphoric Image’ in Judith Plaskow and Carol P. Christ (eds.) Weaving the Visions: New Patterns in 
Feminist Spiritualitv (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1989) pp. 114-115.
35 Pure Lust p. 165.
36 Culpepper, Emily ’Female History/Myth Making’The Second Wave volume 4, no.l (spring, 1975), 
pp. 14-17. Cited in the Wickedarv p.77.
37 Daly treats the distinction between active and passive potency in Pure Lust p.63.
38 Ibid., p.20.
39 See the analysis of the ’Painted Bird’Gvn/Ecoloev pp. 317-8.
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’stunted’/ ’feminine’ behaviour through the cultivation of ’good (that is life-affirming) qualities
40(operative habits)’ or ’virtues’ which facilitate movement through the gateways and towards 
liberation. Thus she believes that women can combat the obstiuctions by ’Spooking/Speaking’ back.
41They can learn ’methods of dispossession’. As they Journey deeper women begin to develop new 
cognitive capacities such as ’ positive paranoia’ , the power to perceive connections between
42different phenomena.
Some feminists view the metaphor of the Journey with suspicion, citing its associations with 
(patriarchal) religion and, in particular, with the practice of ascesis. For Daly, however, it represents 
a peculiarly apt heuristic device through which to map out her politico-ethical proposals. The aim of 
her discourse is to inspire women to release the ’spring of Be-ing’, such that they can ’move’ out of 
’patriarchal reality’ by engaging their wills in certain ways. By depicting life as a journey thr ough 
hazards and dangers - cognitive moral and physical - which women meet and overcome, she is 
enabled to identify modes of behaviour and personal qualities that either help or hinder the 
possibility of a successful journey.
Other critics have put forward the view that Daly’s depiction of the psychological dynamics 
of consciousness is inadequate and misleading. For example, the British philosopher Jean 
Grimshaw claims that in her writing: ’Psychic life ... has no endemic or intrinsic complexity, 
ambivalence or contradictions. Tangles, knots, and spirals would all disappear if only the violence 
and brainwashing to which women are subjected could be removed. Self-knowledge could be
43wholly unproblematic’. I think this is an unsympathetic and unfair reading of Dalyfe method and 
agenda. In fact, she holds a far less positivistic understanding of women’s psychic growth than 
Grimshaw is willing to concede. Daly is clearly cognisant of the suffering undergone by women
44during the consciousness-raising process. Paradoxes, barriers and contradictions are all marked 
features of the Journey. Moreover, the Journey is not straightforwardly linear; one can be paralysed 
into immobility or even go backwaids. Daly maintains of course that most of the suffering that 
women presently experience is due to the system of sexual domination. But she recognises that 
whilst injustice can be vanquished, human conflict and natural limitations cannot be removed. In
40 Pure Lust p.262.
41 Ibid., p. 318.
42 Ibid., p. 316.
43 Grimshaw, Jean Feminist Philosophers: Women’s Perspectives on Philosophical Traditions (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf, 1986), p.9.
44 Pure Lust p.296.
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other words, some of the psychological ’tangle’s and ’knots’ that characterise human life will 
remain.
Grimshaw further argues that the métaphorisation of consciousness-raising in terms of a 
Soul Journey presents women with an otherworldly hope that bears little or no relation to the hard 
realities of political life. She writes: ’The breakthrough into new redms of the Spinsters’ weaving of 
cosmic tapestries is really a retreat from the world. Daly offers us an exhilai'ating and strenuous
45myth of female salvation, rather than any hope of common or effective political action’. In other 
words, Daly’s ’spiritualisation’ of the consciousness-raising process effectively depoliticises it. What 
Grimshaw means by ’common or effective political action’ here is uncleaiTn defence of Daly, 
however, one might point out that, as her analysis of patriarchal myth reveals, the act of myth­
making can be profoundly political in an important sense. Any cross-cultural analysis of creation 
stories and myths manifests the important role they play in the creation of human ’worlds’. Yet most 
of these stories have been the products and reflections of male-dominated societies. Women have 
seldom had their experiences lifted to mythic levels, except where it is filtered through the male 
perspective. Whilst Daly’s mythologising activities do not provide feminists with blueprint for the 
good society or, indeed, with a detailed political plan, it does perform certain important political 
functions. Notably, the mythologisation of consciousness-raising can politicise women by 
awakening them to the reality of their subjugation and inspire them to revolt.
I submit that Daly’s project to 'mythologise' the consciousness-raising process represents an 
important contribution to the radical feminist theory of consciousness-raising. In terms of content 
she brings to the fore, as perhaps no other radical feminist before, that feminism's role in effecting
46psycho-social transformation centres upon its ability to rearrange female energy patterns.
specifically to re-align female will and behaviour. For Daly feminism is thus 'not merely an issue
47but rather a new mode of being'. Other social theorists, such as Herbert Marcuse, have noted the 
need for deep psychic change, but Daly's contribution lies in her protestation that the required
48psychic change is connected to overthrowing the system of sexual oppression. It is axiomatic that: 
'No social revolution, however "radical", that falls short of metapatriarchal movement can break the
49circles of repetition'. Moral and intellectual re-alignments that do not take sexual alienation into 
account are thus inadequate if we are to move into a reality in which oppression per se is to end.
45 Grimshaw op. cit., p.24.
46 Beyond God the Father p.xx.
47 Ibid.,p.ll3.
48 Ibid., pp.98-99.
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In terms of form  Daly has led the way in creating another mode of feminist political 
discourse. She has shown that poetic narrative can play an important rhetorical role in bringing 
women to the threshold of political awareness, and in maintaining energy and political momentum 
once women enter the demystification process. Through such a narrative women are enabled to 
structure an often complex or even chaotic epistemological process. Moreover, it structures 
women’s experiences in a way that enables us to persevere in the face of seemingly intractable 
obstacles and in the face of great social pressure to conform to the standard ways of looking at the 
world. This is partly achieved by the emphasis upon women’s native energy and powers the power 
of women’s connections with each other, and the eulogising of a certain wildness in women which is 
ever beyond the domestication of men. Other radical feminists such as Susan Griffin have since 
followed Daly’s refusal to follow the lineaiformat of male-stream political theory and gone on to
50explore a more poetic, metaphorical mode.
Daly’s mapping of the terrain of feminist consciousness illustrates a third feature of radical 
feminism: the conviction that ’women’s experience’ is a unified political category. This in turn is 
predicated upon the assumption that women’s situation is basically the same the world over. For 
Daly this situation is simply the product of present social arrangements. She uses the overarching 
concept of ’patriarchy’ - which means literally ’the rule of the father(s)’ - to conceptualise the way in
which female oppression is organised. Her use of this concept systématisés a number of distinct 
ideas but, in general terms, she conceives of patriarchy as a system of structures, institutions, and 
ideology created by men in order to sustain and recreate male power and female subordination. The 
term ’patriarchy’ was used by Virginia Woolf and Simone de Beauvoir, but was introduced into
52radical feminist theory by Kate Millett in her influential book Sexual Politics. Millett argued that 
the system of male domination or patriarchy is a universal phenomenon. In other words, she 
considers it to be a fact that in any given empirical culture, and in terms of power and value, women 
are ’the second sex’ in compaiison to men.
Following Millet Daly views patriarchy as a universal phenomenon. One of the earliest 
formulations of this idea comes in Bevond God the Father wherein she writes:
50 Griffin, Susan Made From This Earth (London: The Women’s Press, 1982).
51 The term ’patriarchy’ has been part of the vocabulary of political theory since the seventeeenth century 
debate about the function of the monarchy. During this debate suppoprters of the absolute right of the 
monarch argued that the power of the monarch over the masses was essentially the same as that exercised by 
a father over his family: both were sanctioned by both God and nature. See Valerie Bryson Feminist 
Political Theorv: An Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1992) p. 184.
52 Millett Sexual Politics (London: Virago, 1985; originally published 1970).
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There exists a worldwide phenomenon of sexual caste, basically the same whether one lives 
in Saudi Arabia or in Sweden. This planetary sexual caste system involves birth-ascribed 
hierarchically ordered groups whose members have unequal access to goods, services, and
53prestige and to physical and mental well-being.’
Whilst the specifics of women’s oppressions may vary according to socio-historical and geo­
political factors, women are oppressed as women cross-culturally. In other words patriarchy is an 
overriding feature of contemporaiy global society. This state of affairs, whilst operating through 
myriad, complex social processes is predicated upon a unified logic. According to this logic 
structural inequalities such as racism, socially constructed poverty and war aie interpreted as 
deformities within patriarchy. As Daly puts it: sexism is the ’root and paradigm of the various forms
54of oppression’. Thus can she speak about the experiences of exploited female workers in the Third 
World, war, ’environmentally caused ill-health’ and the ’rape’ of the earth and its animal and plant 
species, all under the rubric of ’patriarchal oppression’.
There is no suggestion that the political mechanisms supporting male social domination and 
female subordination are not heterogeneous and complex. Indeed, Daly’s analysis of patriarchy is 
characterised by its emphasis upon making connections between multi-levelled, diverse phenomena. 
In Gvn/Ecolo g V and Pure Lust, for example, she brings to critical attention the intricate connections 
between different aspects of the Western socio-cultural edifice, linking religious myth with nucleai* 
technology, and the institution of heterosexual ’love’ with male social dominance.
Thus Daly argues that whilst factors in woman’s situation such as class, race or ethnic group 
may modify the fundamental sex oppression, it is both possible and necessary to describe the forces 
in such a way as to make sense of the experiences of women across these boundaries. Such forms of 
exploitation are conceptualised as mere ’variations in style, method, and degree of overtness’ of 
patriarchal oppression. The insistence that patriarchy is as it were sui generis and not reducible to 
any other social phenomenon, such as economic relations, raises the question of how it first arose. 
But she is not preoccupied with this question and concentrates instead upon the fact that males 
wield power over women both now and veiy far back into history. She believes that it is the 
practical question as to how males maintain this power that needs to be analysed.
The conviction that all forms of exploitation are extensions of male supremacy is well 
attested in early radical feminist literature. In the ’Fourth World Manifesto,’ for example, women are 
viewed as a colonised group, with war and national imperialism being described as male-
53 Bevond God the Father p. 2.
54 Ibid., p. 56
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supremacist institutions.'”’*^ The same ’universalisé idea of male domination occurs inTi-Grace 
Atkinson’s influential book Amazon Odvssev^^  which was published a year after Bevond God the 
Father, and in the work of other radical feminist writers such as Adrienne Rich^^ and Andrea 
Dworkin.^9
When we flesh out Daly's concept of patriarchy we find that her writing represents a 
continuation and development of some pre-established elements in former radical feminist work, 
and a movement away from other elements. In Gvn/Ecologv. for example, she follows and extends 
the practice of other radical feminists in putting forward political analyses of domestic and sexual 
violence against women, 'cultural practices' such as cliterodectomy, suttee/sati, footbinding, 'witch-
burning', and institutions such as modern medicine. Each of these practices have been analysed by 
scholars either before or since the publication of Gvn/Ecolo gv.
Whilst Daly focuses critical attention upon male power at such sites as women's control of 
their bodies, physical and sexual violence and sexuality, however, her main contribution has been 
directed toward an analysis of the 'psychic' violence done to women through the sphere of 'culture'. 
For Daly believes that the patriarchal context is one in which physical violence is present, but in 
which 'mind-rape' is more potent, in terms of social control, than the rape of women's bodies.
Again, the analytic emphasis upon the psychological aspects of oppression was already a 
feature of much radical feminist writing. The tai'geting of 'culture' as the medium for the 
transmission of androcentric thought forms was always a radical feminist strategy. From the 
beginning radical feminists sought to interrogate the common depiction of women in the received 
canon of classic and contemporary literature. One early example of this is the work of The 
Feminists on Children's Media group which examined and criticised sex stereotyping of the 
characters in children's literature. Another more famous example is Millett's analysis of culture in 
Sexual Politics. Millett examines the way in which female 'consent' to subordination is somehow 
engineered through social conditioning into sex roles rather than simply through a crude use of 
force. She singles out Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic theory for vilification, especially the notion 
of 'penis-envy', which she sees as part of a male backlash against the gains made by first-wave
55 Ibid., p.xvii
56 See Barbara Burris et al. ’Fourth World Manifesto’ in Ann Koedt, Levine and Raponeop. cit. pp.322- 
357.
57 Atkinson, Ti-Grace Amazon Odyssey (N.Y.: Links, 1974).
58 Rich, Adrienne Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (London: Virago, 1977; 
originally published in New York: Norton, 1976).
59 Dworkin, Andrea Woman Hating (N.Y.: E. P. Dutton, 1974).
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campaigners and suffragettes.^^ She also analyses the political dimension of descriptions of erotic 
love in a number of influential male writers such as D. H. Lawrence and Norman Mailer. Of course, 
this focus upon male assumptions and conceptions of sexual desire would not formerly have been 
seen as legitimate material for political analysis, sex being perceived as belonging to the realm of
the ’personal’ rather than the ’political’.
Whilst Daly builds upon the precedent radical feminist analysis of culture, her contribution - 
particulaiiy to the radical feminist development of the concept of patriarchy - is nevertheless quite 
distinctive. Like other radical feminists she exposes and condemns the physical violence that is 
enacted against women in the name of ’cultural practices’ . But she emphasises that such atrocities 
do not exist in isolation, but are part of a whole discourse or system of social knowledge. She goes 
beyond the analysis of the individual practices in the theorisation of a link between them: the ’sado- 
ritual syndrome’. The seven chaiacteristic features of this discourse are: ’an obsession with purity’; 
’total erasure of responsibility for the atrocities performed through such rituals’; ’an inherent 
tendency to "catch on" and spread’; ’the use of women ’as scapegoats and token torturers’; 
’compulsive orderliness, obsessive repetitiveness, and fixation upon minute details, which divert 
attention from the horror’; the normalisation and even normatizing of ’behavior which at other times 
and places is unacceptable’; and, finally, the ’legitimation of the ritual by the rituals of "objective"
64scholarship - despite the appearances of disapproval’. This syndrome is represented as a major 
feature of global patriarchal power.
Daly’s analysis of the sado-ritual syndrome leads her to reason that<2 // women are affected 
by a global context in which the physical abuse, mutilation and murder of some women is defended 
through the anthropological rhetoric of ’cultural practice’, ’custom’ and ’rite’. This conclusion follows 
from an the conviction that such atrocities have a systemic function. The central issue here is one of 
social control. The various ’atrocities’ are not carried out, Daly says, ’on a one-to-one basis’ but are
’inflicted by the representatives of patriar chy upon vulnerable individual women,’ and not every 
woman suffers in the same way. Moreover women themselves are often recruited to physically carry 
out the atrocities. Indeed, in many of these practices mothers are led into participation in the 
mutilation of their own daughters. As she writes: ‘It is important to remember that in patriai'chy
61 Ibid., pp.94-106.
62 Millett, op. cit., p. 189
63 See also Anne Koedt ’The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm’ in Koedt op. cit. ppl 98-207.
64 Gvn/Ecolo gv pp.131-133.
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6 6women are vehicles that incarnate the male presence’. This should not blind us, however, to the 
over all context in which women seek to regulate other women’s behaviour (often within the 
discursive framework of initiation into ’femininity’ or ’womanhood’ and family domesticity). These 
female practices thus serve to reinforce the system of patriarchal control, though insofar as women 
are acting against each other the patriarchal nature of these forms of social control are obscured.
By highlighting the harmful effects of social entities not conventionally regarded as ’violent’ 
Daly extends the boundaries of what, in common parlance, may be included under the rubric of 
’violence’ to encompass the subtle péjorations of language, and the way in which different forms of 
coercion - ideology and physical brutality - interact to force women to act in ways that inhibit or 
hinder their self-expression. In her use of the concept of violence, then, a number of cultural 
artefacts (like myth) and institutions (like heterosexuality) are exposed as forms of social control. In 
her later work the effects of patriarchal violence are extend from women to non-human nature in its 
myriad forms. Thus, in a manner analogous to women, other creatures and non-animal nature suffer
from patriarchal stereotyping and objectification.^^ The earth ’herself is mutilated and abused.
The emphasis that Daly places upon the realm of the symbolic, that is culture, in women’s 
oppression has attracted criticism from some feminists. Susan Thistlethwaite is representative of 
this critical perspective when she writes:
There are women who, because of their economic, social and racial location, have no access 
to any of the spheres Daly describes. There can be no reintegration of nature and histoiy 
without confronting the vast differences in women’s historical conditions and making a 
methodological shift in the light of those differences. We cannot ’Leap with Wanderlust’ 
over poverty, over racism, over real history ... contact with the voices of historical difference 
and a confrontation with them as different is as crucial to our survival and God’s as is the 
reintegration with nature.*^ ^
Likewise Daly’s methods of consciousness-raising have drawn criticism from certain quarters for the 
emphasis on the ’psychic’ or ’spiritual’ aspects of oppression to the neglect of the material realities of 
most women’s lives. As the British philosopher Jean Grimshaw writes ’the routes Daly offers us to 
achieve female freedom are problematic, and the sort of "freedom" she invites us to realize may
69have little connection with the practical and material struggles of many women’s lives’. Whilst
66 Pure Lust p. 143.
67 Ibid., pp. 123-24.
68 Thistlethwaite, Susan B. J. ’God and Her Survival in a Nuclear Age’ Feminist Studies 4:73-88 (spring 
1988, p.85.
69 Grimshaw, op. cit., p.2-3.
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both writers are undoubtedly correct in pointing to the dangers of an ahistorical, idealist account of 
oppression, it should not be concluded that Daly dismisses of the value of economic analyses in the 
understanding of women’s situation. One must recognisq however, the particular* theoretical 
contribution that she sees herself as making. She openly acknowledges her specialisation in the 
analysis of myth, language and other cultural artefacts. The particular theoretical perspective 
adopted in her radical feminist writings is built upon the assumption that power is not localised in 
economic structures, but rather diffused throughout the cultural sphere. She writes:
While economic impoverishment is an enormous factor in holding women down, it is not a 
complete explanation of female oppression, for women’s minds are possessed. It is crucial 
that feminists constructing economic analyses of the condition of women focus attention on
making these interconnections between psychic oppression and economic oppression 
It is true that she privileges changes in subjectivity over changes in economic and political systems. 
But she does not ignore economic realities; she simply exercises a choice (one informed by her 
pai'ticular talents and interests) as to which aspect of the patriarchal system to ’deconstruct’.
Clearly, in systematic terms Daly undeiplays the way in which material inequalities are 
linked to ideological practices. There is now a sense in the work of ethicists and theologians of the 
importance of the establishment of economic justice as a precondition for ’liberation’ and full 
personhood. As Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza points out, in In Memorv Of Her, women's power, 
independence and freedom cannot be solely nor even primarily formulated in tei*ms of personalist-
71individualist and biological female power ... it has to be socio-political. Whilst we fail to find in 
Daly’s social ethics a commitment to any recognised form of political economy, such as capitalism 
or socialism, feminist analysis, as Dale Spender observes, cannot simply be reduced to the question 
as to whether it is language and culture or economic factors that cause oppression for they are 
interconnected in their operation. As she writes: 'One cannot be transformed without the other if
72women are to be liberated and patriarchy is to be prevented from persisting^. From Daly's 
perspective it is quite possible for some (token) women to gain economic liberation but still 
function according to patriarchal norms and values.
Whilst taking up and developing strands within an extant body of radical feminist literature 
Daly distances herself from certain other strands of early radical feminist writing in her unremitting 
emphasis upon the realm of culture. These strands emphasise socio-economic organisation and
70 Pure Lust p.94.
71 Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth In Memorv of Her: a Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian 
Origins (London: SCM Press, 1983) p. 18.
72 Spender, Dale Man Made Language (London: Pandora, 2nd edition, 1992) p.6.
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reproduction as the most important sites for feminist activism. For example, one of the chief and 
abiding concerns of second-ivave feminist theory has been to understand the relation between 
women’s reproductive roles and their physical and psychological oppressions .For example, 
Shulamith Firestone in The Dialectic of Sex shows how the political institution of motherhood 
helps to re-produce patriarchal social relations. Firestone argues that reproduction is the root cause 
of women’s subordination by men and that women need to regain control over their bodies. She
73claims to develop ’a materialist view of history based on sex itself, by taking Marxian analysis 
’one step further to its roots in the biological division of the sexes’. In Firestone’s conception radical 
feminism represents not an abandonment but a development of Marxist class analysis. In this
74scenario women constitute a ’sex class’. Human biology and those socio-political institutions
75designed so as to protect its determining power, such as the family, constitutes the ’material’ 
foundation of history, but technological changes have now made it possible and viable for women to 
take control of their biology and their reproductive capacity in a way analogous to Marx’s argument 
that changes in capitalist production would provide the labouring masses with the opportunity to 
escape from bondage. Though Firestone has been attacked for being technologically determinist (it 
is quite possible that artificial reproduction could be used to enhance male domination) her work is 
important in analysing the role played by the family and marriage in the oppression of women. Her 
fundamental thesis was later elaborated in a different way by both Dorothy Dinnerstein and Nancy
Chodorow.^^ In Daly’s writings however, there is very little discussion of the family as one of the 
major forces that link women to compulsory heterosexuality, economic dependence, and the 
patriarchal ideology of motherhood.
Because Daly - like Millett and other radical feminists - holds the oppression of women to 
be universal, crossing race and class boundaries ’sisterhood’ becomes an empowering concept. 
Women are supported, in the early stages of consciousness-raising, by the recognition that they are 
not alone, that other women aie experiencing the same kinds of discontent and anger. This connects 
with sisterhood for healing and liberating action cannot take place in isolation. She writes:
73 Firestone, Shulamith The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (N.Y: Wiliam Morrow, 
1970), p.5.
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society, via changes in the modes of production and exchange, with the resulting creation of classes and of 
class struggle’. Hester Eisenstein op. cit., p. 16.
76 Dinnerstein, Dorothy The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (N.Y.: 
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The individual’s sense of reality depends upon some kind of communal consent. It wouldbe 
absurd to think that singly a woman can win the struggle for psychic wholeness. The sense 
of reality that such an individual is trying to sustain would be pitted against a system with 
enormous resource for persuading her of her error, sinfulness, or mental illness ... The 
’bonding’ phenomenon among women, expressed by the word ’sisterhood’, is therefore
77essential to the battle against false consciousness.
The term ’women’thus constitutes a unity for Daly: ’a Cosmic Commonality, a tapestry of
connectedness which women as Websters/Fates are constantly weaving’. Indeed, her life-work 
may be interpreted as an address and an exhortation to all women in the name of sisterhood.
Daly’s presupposition of the fundamental sameness of women’s position is disputed by 
feminists with different analytic priorities. They allege that she is guilty of presenting an 
unnecessarily limited and limiting view of ’women’s experience’, failing to give an accurate account 
of the facts of women’s diverse situations both in terms of ’western society’ and in terms of the 
’global’ context.Instead of illuminating the concrete realities of oppression her analysis often falls 
into abstraction. For example in emphasising the injustices suffered by women it tends to encourage 
a view of women as innocent and powerless victims of male violence, rather than of women as the
79agents of political resistance and historical change. In Daly’s view patriarchy is predicated upon a 
view of men as 'the enemy', a view which leads inexorably to lesbian sepaiatism - which is never
going to be a live option for most women. Thus men, who are conceived as potential partners in
the project of the attainment of human androgyny depicted in Bevond God the Father, come to
personify ontological parasites upon women's be-ing in all its manifestations. It has been suggested
moreover that the horrific experiences suffered by some women (for example genital mutilation) are
undermined by Daly’s attempts to link it in with other forms of oppression (for example fashion).
81Whilst her political aims may be laudable such a practice elides vast differences in experience. In 
sum Daly's theory of patriarchy is ahistorical: it fails to track the presence of patriarchy through 
specific socio-economic and political forms. Ultimately, patriarchy is viewed as a static 
phenomenon because she fails to show how it develops and changes.
77 Bevond God the Father p. 50.
78 Pure Lust p.26
79 See Bryson, op. cit., p. 186; Hester Eisenstein, op. cit., p.xii; and Lynn Segal Is the Future Female? 
Troubled Thoughts on Contemporarv Feminism (London: Virago, 1987), p.xi.
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Clearly, the division of sex represents only one of many bifurcations deserving of political 
scrutiny by feminists. I have already alluded to the fact that Daly’s theory of patriarchy is based 
upon different analytic priorities to certain other strands of radical feminist writing and that Daly 
has been criticised for her relative neglect of socio-economic factors in perpetuating oppression. She 
has been similarly criticised for allegedly eliding the experiences of women of colour. She was 
attacked, most famously, by the African American feminist poet Audre Lorde in the late 1970s for 
not providing an analysis of the function of racial factors in the global mechanisms of capitalist
patriarchy and for not utilising the knowledge that has been generated from black women.^ This 
criticism was later developed and applied to a whole generation of white feminists. Linda Nicholson 
points out the irony of the fact that from the late 1960s to the mid-80s feminist theory whilst 
theoretically encouraging differences and denouncing universalist tendencies, in fact tended to issue 
from white, middle class women of North American or European origin. This tendency is explained 
by the fact that when 'radicals' like Daly began to engage in feminist theory the strategies and targets 
for action were relatively well-defined and clear. As we approach the end of the twentieth century, 
however, it has become clear that feminists are pursuing different targets and strategies. Feminist 
theory is now more sophisticated, of course: it is certainly more prolific in terms of publications - 
varying widely from complex explorations into subjectivity and a range of therapeutic practices, to 
better awareness of and engagement of the multifarious differences between women. As bell hooks 
notes, it was primarily 'bourgeois white women, both liberal and radical in perspective, who 
pioneered the idea of common oppression'.A lthough Daly is correct in her aim of trying to 
promote political solidarity amongst women, her view of sisterhood as based on a common 
oppression is dangerously simplistic. Sisterhood is not something that is 'found' automatically when 
a woman comes to consciousness. Rather is it something that must be struggled for, as experience 
and its interpretation are checked by critical conversations with women occupying different socio­
cultural locations (race, class, ethnicity) and with other disciplines (women's history, literature, 
psychology and anthropology).
Critics have argued, then that the attempt to forge a 'Cosmic Commonality' dissolves or
84elides all differences between women. Daly is seen by many to be guilty of 'universalising' from 
her own perspective as a white, middle class lesbian, of transposing her knowledge about her own
situation onto that of other women. This results in an inability to conceptualise adequately other
82 Lorde, Audre ’An Open Letter to Mary Daly’ inSister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Freedom, 
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forms of exploitation or dehumanisation as basic structures of women’s oppression.The inattention 
displayed in her writings to the role played by race and class in the oppression of ^ om en means 
that, paradoxically, her analysis may in fact function so as to maintain the caste-status of women 
and other oppressed groups to the male, white, middle-class ’norm’Her theory is thus a form of
cultural imperialism.
In Daly’s later writings - such asGvn/Ecology, Pure Lust and the Wickedarv - a change in 
emphasis and rhetoric regarding the question of nature has been interpreted by some critics as 
evidence of ’essentialising.’ Specifically, it is alleged that a naive ’Manichean’ ontological dualism is 
operative, in her ’gynocentric’ writings, in which ’woman’ simply replaces ’man’ as the privileged 
signifier. That Daly advocates such a position has become something of a critical commonplace in
feminist theory. The North American feminist Marsha Hewitt links this perceived tendency to 
certain strands of critical theory. She writes:
In like fasliion with Hegel and those elements of critical theory that address the woman 
question, Daly also reproduces and sustains reified, idealized concepts of ’woman’ that arise 
out of an identity logic that marks most of this philosophical tradition. The core structure of 
her feminist philosophy conceptualizes an authentic female Being to which all women 
ultimately correspond, but from which they have become alienated through the dominating 
and repressive practices of patriarchy 
The reification of female being in a feminist theory is a serious charge to make. If the accusation can 
be validated then the interpretation of Daly’s thought that I wish to put forward is wrong. Moreover 
it would expose a serious contradiction in Daly’s thought which claims participation in dynamic Be­
ing as its goal. It is relevant therefore to address this question before proceeding any further.
I shall try to tackle the problem head on by analysing a passage, in Pure Lust, which could be 
argued to exemplify Daly’s essentialist tendencies. Daly writes:
Metapatriarchally moving women not only experience now but continue to choose to 
develop our differences from those who consciously and willingly perpetrate these horrors, 
and we recognize these differences as not merely accidental, but mihor essential. The 
traditional concept of ’species,’ especially of ’the human species’ does not adequately 
encompass the differently oriented lives supposedly contained therein. I refer primarily to its
85 See Bryson op. cit., pp.l90f.
86 See for example Jean Grimshaw’s paper ’Autonomy and Authenticity in Feminist Thinking’ in 
Grimshaw op. cit; Hester Eisenstein, op. cit., p.l Iff; Lynn Segal Lynn p.lSff; Ross Kraemer ’Review of 
Gyn/Ecology’ Signs 1979 volume 5, no.3, pps. 254-56.
87 Hewitt, Marsha Aileen Critical Theorv of Religion: A Feminist Analysis (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1995), p. 134.
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grotesque blurring of differences between those whose intent and behavior is radically 
biophilic and those whose desensitized/decentralized, soulless and berserk (dis)orientation 
manifests ’gross inability to communicate’ and fundamental enmity toward Life itself.^
It cannot be doubted that Daly’s more extreme rhetoric concerning the ’biophilic be-ing’ of women in 
contrast to the ’necrophilic be-ing’ of patriarchal males does not facilitate understanding of her 
cause. Nevertheless, I am not convinced that passages such as the above necessarily mean that Daly 
has (inexplicably) changed her feminist tack. Let us look closer at what she actually says. 
Fundamentally she is making the point that the classical philosophical terminology of ’species’, 
conceived in static terms, is an inadequate framework in which to articulate the vast differences 
between beings ’whose conscious behavior is wholly oriented in opposite directions’^ .^  The 
emphasis is not upon innate chai'acteristics but upon the tendency to act in a certain way. It is a 
mistake to infer from this that ’all women are biophilic and therefore good’ and ’all men are 
necrophilic and therefore evil’ for, as Daly insists, the kind of distinction that she is trying to make ’ 
is not a simplistic bifurcation on the basis of gender. Patriarchy here is ... a disease attacking the 
core of consciousness in females as well as males’?® Fundamentally I read Daly as saying that all 
’human’ beings are born with the capacity to function ’biophilically’, that is, ... but that this tendency 
may be ’blocked’ or ’blighted’ by the impact of patriarchal social conditioning. When Daly writes of 
the ’corpse-like, necrophilic "natures" of these [patriarchal] men^* it is to the tendency to actualise 
values that are inimical to the flourishing of life that she refers, not to ...
With respect to women, it is not that Daly neglects differences (as some commentators 
allege), rather she incorporates them as important in defining the nature of women’s oppression as 
women. In Pure Lust, for example, Daly writes:
To simplify differences would be to settle for a less than Dreadful judgement of the multiple 
horrors of gynocide. It would also impoverish our imaginations, limiting our vision of the 
Otherwoiid Journey’s dimensions ... Acknowledging the deep differences among 
friends/sisters is one of the most difficult stages of the Journey and it is essential for those 
who are sparking in free and independent friendship rather than merely melting into
92mergers.
Daly’s position cannot without the grossest misinteipretation be labelled ’essentialist’. Her view of 
’woman’ shows similarities with what has since become known as ’social constructionism’. Yet
88 Pure Lust p. 351
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unlike some proponents of this view Daly wants to affirm both the possibility and desirability of 
claiming the concept of ’woman’ as a site for feminist politics, specifically as a ’centre’ for emergent 
female subjectivities, a matrix for the generation and emergence of difference. This position I shall 
argue would appear to be most conducive to feminist theorising. The feminist theologian is acutely 
aware of the damage done to females by stereotypes and the patriarchal denigration and denial of 
our subject-status. We are also aware, however, that to dispense with the subject ’woman’ would be 
to expose feminism to the danger of political self-annihilation.
The charge of essentialism is often made with little or no explanation of what the term 
’essence’ means within particular philosophical discourses (e.g. an Aristotelian or Lockean context). 
When we turn to the substance of Daly’s thought on the matter, moreover, the charge of essentialism 
does not stick. As we shall see, her position is certainly not an essentialist theory in the Aristotelian 
sense and is, in fact, far more subtle than her critics give her credit for. Yet, to be labelled an 
’essentialist’ is, in the current feminist climate, to be guilty by association and, insofar as the 
acceptance of this view has become almost a critical topos of Dalyian scholai'ship, philosophically 
uninformed interpretation has become enshrined as valid, and part of a tradition which some 
feminist theologians, in reading such appraisals, have assimilated and propagated in their own work.
It is likely that critical misinterpretation has followed as a result of Daly’s laterstrategic 
political choice for Otherness. Daly later seems to want to reclaim the female (though not the 
feminine). In the ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’ to the second edition offhe Church and the 
Second Sex Dalv comments on her former position in support of androgyny. She writes: ’Like de 
Beauvoir, she [herself] expressed the wish that "men and women can leain to ’set their pride beyond 
the sexual differentiation’... The time had not yet arrived when women would learn to set our pride 
not only beyond but in the sexual differentiation - not in the differentiation as defined by the
93patriai'chs ("the eternal feminine’), but as defined by us ’. She later speaks of deviance ’from the
94"norm" which was first imposed but which can also be chosen on our own terms’. ’Woman’ thus 
becomes a site for a politics. The coherence of ’woman’ derives not from its immutability and 
predictability but from its ’strategic efficacy’ as a symbolic actor in the fight against oppression. 
‘Woman’ may be informative but not binding. Daly affirms our right to construct (and take 
responsibility for) our gendered identity, our politics, our choices. But she does realise that gender 
structures our subjectivity, i.e. we come to an awareness of ourselves through social roles - we can 
be critical but there are real constraints imposed by our embeddedness across a variety of social (and 
psychosexual) contexts.
93 ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’ The Church and the Second Sex p.47.
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Daly’s writings declare themselves openly as radical feminist pieces. In some senseit makes 
her easier to criticise because her presuppositions are laid bare. We do not have to identify an 
underlying prejudice through the facade of ’objectivity’ or ’neutralityIt may be that, with respect to 
the question of essentialism, Daly is being attacked as a radical feminist. It may be that a certain 
’politics of criticism’ is at work in the critical reception of her work. A glance through some of this 
literature thi'ows up certain common rhetorical tendencies that depict Daly’s work as representative 
of a strand of radical feminist theory that has fallen into disfavour and disrepute amongst academic 
feminists. As we have already seen, she has attracted opposition from many quarters, being 
frequently seen to measure up at the wrong end of the rule of ’political correctness’. This kind of 
misunderstanding is often motivated by political factors, most especially the politics of 
representation operative in current feminist theory with regard to ’old-style’ radical feminism of the 
type Daly is seen to advocate. Radical feminists are popularly represented (increasingly in 
purportedly feminist reviews) as something of a bad hangover from the seventies - man-hating, 
dungaree-wearing dykes who cling to outmoded, unsophisticated ’universalist’, ’essentialist’ analyses 
of male oppression. This kind of stereotyping constitutes, at best, uninformed interpretation and, at 
worst, systematic political erasure. This caricature of radical feminism - a depiction through which 
Daly’s work is often viewed - is, I argue, not entirely fair and needs to be deconstructed in order for 
any adequate ’dialogue’ to take place.
Undoubtedly, greater attention on the theoretical level to the sexual division of labour and 
the capitalist economy (with its attendant legal system) which structure the complex ways in which 
the ideology of male supremacy and domination affects women’s concrete lives, would protect 
Daly’s analysis against charges of ’idealism’ .A fully systematic feminist analysis would require 
some modifications of Daly’s radical feminist method.Such a method would have to take into 
account the social, economic, political, cultural, racial and psychological contexts of female 
oppression of either a limited geo-political reality (for example ’western society’) or the wider global 
situation. For whilst it is perfectly legitimate for Daly to orient her analysis to the ideological realm 
the need for a careful analysis of the social sphere cannot be underestimated. This will involve 
looking through the eyes of those who suffer injustice, those who struggle to live amidst perverted, 
demonic structures. In the personal realm an equally complex intei-play of psychological, social, 
economic and ’unaccounted for factors’ (Mary Hunt) are continuously at work What is needed then 
is an in depth social analysis in order to unmask the truth about women’s plight across diverse socio­
economic and political situations.
94 Ibid., p.50.
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This means that Daly’s work itself must be subject to the ’demystification’ process as part of 
the movement into theological maturity. Much work has already been done on exposing Daly’s 
prejudices by Audre Lorde, Elizabeth Spelman and others for example. Daly needs to be sensitive to 
such criticisms. That diversity and multiplicity must be a fundamental datum of feminist theology in 
practice stems from the recognition that gender is a cultural construction with multiple and 
simultaneous identities (in Daly’s case white, lesbian and working class) Feminist theology needs to 
be sensitive to the interplay of such factors in analysis if we are to name the oppressions that 
constrain us.
Given Daly’s understanding of the operation of patriarchal power, the question arises as to 
the kind of approach women may adopt in order to alter the current situation and effect real change 
in society. Here we shall move into a discussion of the fourth feature of radical feminist theory to 
which Daly has made a contribution. Daly supports the authors of the ‘Fourth World manifesto’ in 
their contention that for a woman to 'submerge' herself in some male-dominated organisation or
95movement is 'self-defeating'. Fundamentally she calls for a realignment of female energies (i) 
away from men (ii) and towaids themselves and other women. This realignment represents a refusal 
to participate in the patriarchal 'game', which is predicated upon the re-routing of female energy 
towards individual men, to the maintenance of their physical and emotional well-being, and the 
perpetuation of andiocentric society. In Daly's writings this strategy is called separatism.
The theme of separatism is a common though by no means ubiquitous theme in radical 
feminist writings. The particulai* form espoused by Daly is influenced by several strands of 
separatist theory. The first strand derives from an earlier generation of feminist activists, notably
96Virginia Woolf and her concept of an 'Outsider's Society', and from the 'first-wave' feminist theory 
of 'bad conduct'. For Woolf separatism means to move outside a given society, to become a stranger 
to it. The theory of bad conduct emerged out of the nineteenth centuiy women’s campaign for the 
vote. At first such women tried to gain the acceptance of influential males and to stay within the 
bounds of 'social respectability'. They failed in the sense that the socially powerful males remained 
unwilling to give up their power over women. Indeed these women were still mocked and ridiculed. 
It was the 'Suffragettes' who initiated a theory of bad conduct, realising that, as Dale Spender writes, 
'men would yield power only when they had to, only when they were so inconvenienced by retaining
97it that it was easier to give it up'. Radical feminists in the 1960s developed similar a t t i t u d e s i n
95 Beyond God the Father p.53
96 Woolf, Virgina A Room of One’s Own/Three Guineas edited with an introduction by Morag Shiach 
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part by looking back to this extant tradition of feminist resistance and in part by learning from the 
movement for Black liberation in 1960s which used separatism in the pursuit of its political 
objectives.
As both Gvn/Ecologv and Pure Lust show, Daly has been influenced directly by Marilyn 
Frye’s essay ’Some Reflections on Separatism and Power^? Following Frye, Daly argues that by 
denying men access to themselves and their energies women not only deny men a substantial ‘flow 
of benefits’ but also assume power for themselves. For women control who has access to them and 
their energies and under what conditions. Such a move is at the same time an exercise in self­
definition. The politics of separatism are thus founded upon the view that one way to change the 
distribution of power, in a given situation, is for those who are presently powerless to separate off 
and empower themselves. This kind of rhetoric is, however, misleading for it implicitly begs the 
question: separate from what or from whom?
Let us look at the definition of separatism given by Daly in theWickedarv. Separatism is: 
'Theory and actions of Radical feminists who choose separatism from the Dissociated State of
patriarchy in order to release the flow of elemental energy and Gynophilic communication; radical
100withdrawal of energy from warring patriai'chy and transferral of this energy to women's selves'.
We immediately note the language in which this definition is couched. To begin with it is not a 
credal statement for 'segregation'. It is important to distinguish between separatism ( a political 
strategy originated and pursued by those suffering oppression) and segregation (the involuntary 
sepai'ation of a minority or subordinate group from the dominant group, for example: the Warsaw 
ghetto in which Polish Jews were confined, the segregation of black and white people in the 
southern states of the United States, and the South African policy of apartheid). Daly's definition 
does not even suggest a self-imposed segregation. Nor does it specify in any detail when and where 
feminists should physically separate themselves from males and androcentric institutions.
There are basically two aspects to Daly’s understanding of separatism. The first aspect 
involves a withdrawal of allegiance from males and patriarchal institutions and androcentric 
practices (e.g. heterosexuality). The second aspect concerns the affirmation of other women and 
'gynocentric' practices ('Lesbianism). Let us look at each of these aspects in turn.
See The Fourth World Manifesto’ in Koedt, Levine and Rapone, op. cit.
Frye, Marilyn 'Some Reflections on Separatism and Power' in The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist 
Theory (Trumansburg, N.Y: The Crossing Press, 1983), pp.95-109.
100 The Wickedary p.96.
101 Daly capitalises 'Lesbian' when referring to women who are 'woman-identified, having rejected false 
loyalties to men on all levels'. (It is debatable whether, in patriarchal society, Daly thinks it possible that any 
woman could ever have an 'equal' relationship with a man, whatever that may mean). This she asserts is the
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Firstly, Daly’s theory of separatism stresses the exorcism of false identities. She writes:
Crone-logically prior to all discussion of political separatism from or within groups is
the basic task of paring away the layers of false selves from the Self ... It is Crone-logical to
conclude that internal separation or separatism, i.e., paring away, burning away the false
selves encasing the Self, is the core of all authentic separations and thus is normative for all
102personal/political decisions about acts/forms of separatism.
Women's decisions as to whether to withdraw their presence and energies from patriarchal 
structures, and even from some or most males, must be taken as part of a feminist disengagement 
from male-defined values and response patterns. For the 'unity' of women's experience is disrupted 
in as much as women suffer a duality of consciousness between their selves and their social roles. 
Separatism, in Daly's sense, is so effective because it means confronting the externalised structures 
and internalised images of patriarchy that have disabled women politically and have hindered our 
capacity to participate fully in history.
Moreover, as Daly acknowledges, the extent to which one engages in separatism, and the 
kinds of acts defined thereunder, is contingent upon many factors in a woman's life. Thus women 
who embrace separatism do so each in their own way, and in keeping with the conditions and 
rhythms of their own, irreducible personal 'Life Times'. Commenting on this phenomenon Daly 
writes:
It should not be too surprising that women with fiercely focused feminist consciousness 
have widely differentiated interests. A woman who is known as a 'separatist', for example, 
may have friendly communication with some men, without any compromise of her integrity. 
She may read, with profit, male-authored books, using these as re-sources for her own 
original analysis ... She is not paiticularly chagrined at this seeming inconsistency - 
although it may cause her to grin and cackle quietly to herSelf. Unity in complexity is, after
103all, a far-out phenomenon.
The separatist then may sometimes choose to stay in contact with men or to hold positions within 
patriarchal institutions (as, for example, Daly chooses to remain a faculty member in Boston 
College).
’correct’ sense. She employs the lower case ’I’ ’when referring to the male-distorted version reflected in the 
media’, that is, those more aequately named ’gay’ or ’female homosexual...who, although they relate genitally 
to women, give their allegience to men and male myths, ideologies, styles, practices, institutions, and 
professions’. Gvn/Ecologv pp. 25-26.
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Secondly, whilst Daly’s concept of separatism does suggest some level of withdrawal, this is 
not its primary focus. The emphasis of this definition is rather on the re-alignment of women’s 
energy from patriarchy to women’s selves. Women have been encouraged to mistrust each other 
historically. In liberation, Daly argues, women discover that the patriarchal conditioning that we 
receive, which teaches us not to value other women, to see other women as competition for men’s 
attention, and later for men’s protection, is destructive of our deepest selves. By contrast separatism 
empowers women in their quest for Selfhood. When women separate, and hence create power for 
ourselves, certain men are deprived of power they would otherwise have had, that is, their power 
over these particular women. But the women’s power is not, as this analogy might appear to 
suggest, 'seized' from men, it is created by the women for ourselves. Indeed for Daly it is in the 
white heat of this connection that women can begin the task of re-inventing themselves, their 
structures, relationships and lifestyles anew.
To say that the politics of separatism centre on the connections between women is not, 
however, to say that men are left completely unaffected. Implicit in Daly's approach is the separatist 
conviction that patriarchal reality cannot continue to maintain itself once women withdraw their 
acquiescence. That women are rejecting the old methods and declaring themselves legitimate 
sources and 'centres' of 'reality' means that the whole patriarchal hierarchical order is brought into 
question. For who, it may then be asked, stands at the margins of what? Men will find themselves 
hard-pressed to convince themselves of their dominance over women if women refuse point blank 
to give credence and legitimacy to this absurd and obscene belief. It is in this sense that Daly
104regards women's experience to be the key to full human liberation. In Bevond God the Father 
Daly analyses women's feminist experience in terms both of women’s existential expansion and the
subsequent impact upon men.'^^ Drawing upon Woolfs metaphor of women as mirrors who project 
men's reflections back to them at twice their actual size, Daly argues that once men are denied the 
'projection screens' provided by women, they will have to face an analogous and potentially 
redemptive experience of 'nothingness'. She writes:
Men, looldng out, would have to see real people out there. Rushing, terrified, inside again, 
what would they see? They would see the source of all the projections, like the dirty niggers, 
the nai'cissistic females, the Chicanos, the greedy Jews, the 'perverted' faggots and dykes, the
^04 Beyond God the Father pp.25, 42, 50. 
Ibid., pp.41-42.
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dirty communists and all the ’under developed’ Third World. And what would they do when
106they perceive that the enemy is themselves?
In both Bevond God the Father and Gvn/Ecologv. however, Daly plays down the liberatory 
potential of separatism for males. She argues that the call for ’human’ liberation all too often fails to 
confront the depths of sexism at work in the most radical political movements and underestimates 
the ’polarization, tensions, risks, and pain’ that are necessary steps on the road to justice for women.
To summarise Daly’s argument; the logic of separatism is the logic of an unusual and 
potentially revolutionaiy choice, one which diverges from the choices made by the most radical of 
reformists. This choice involves a rejection of strategies that merely challenge the political system 
from within. For to issue a direct challenge to the system from 'inside' is effectively to bestow upon 
it some degree of legitimacy or plausibility. To 'separate' is, however, to do something different. 
Separatism does challenge the political system but it does so by refusing, as it were, to play the 
game: the separatist through her actions refuses to abide by the 'rules' and gameplan' established and 
legitimated in the current political regime for these are held in dispute.
As a strategy for social change Daly's theoiy of separatism is perhaps more flexible and 
nuanced than one might suppose. Certainly it is far removed from any idea of 'escapism' or of 
attaining some kind of feminist 'purity', as critics so often charge. The recognition that there is no 
'pure' separatist space does not mean that acts of separatism have no impact upon the balance of 
power in patriarchy. For if it is true to say that ‘patriarchy is everywhere’ it is equally true to say, 
from Daly’s perspective, that women are everywhere subverting and sabotaging it.
Does Daly's recommendation of separatism mean that all efforts at reforming the legal 
system and other social apparatus aie redundant? Daly thinks that to dismiss the value of such 
struggles is simplistic. Whether men will change if women advance their claims for 'equality' in 
terms of 'reason' and/or 'mutual interest’ remains a matter of debate. But at the very least we can say 
that there is in fact very little evidence to date to suggest that men will surrender the cultural 
privileges they currently enjoy. Indeed the contemporary explosion of institutionalised misogyny 
thi'ough media dissemination of pornography, the brutal realities for many women (and the 
omnipresent feai' for the rest) of rape, and physical abuse suggest otherwise. Moreover evidence 
collected by feminists suggests that the (male) establishment has consistently engineered a 'backlash' 
against (Second-Wave) feminism and the improvements in (some) women's living conditions that it
107has brought. Yet, even in her most radical 'separatist' book. Pure Lust, she maintains that it is not 
'that women should not seek 'equal pay' or the "Equal Rights Amendment'". For clearly, 'Such
^06 Daly ’Radical Feminism: The Spiritual Revolution’ The Sophia Lyon Fahs Lecture.
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108measures may indeed lead to some relief of oppression and improve some conditions’ . However 
she counsels that ’One should not be misled by such misnomers. To believe that such changes will 
bring about real ’equality’, while failing to understand the need for almost ineffable changes at the
109very heart of consciousness, is to settle for potted "justice"’. What must be kept in mind here is 
the final aim of Daly (and others who advocate separ atism). These women are not so interested in 
advancing the cause of women in society as we now know it, but in changing society (though they 
may not spurn all efforts at reform). Daly rejects all forms of hierarchy. Just what this would cash 
out as in terms of a vision of the good society is debatable, of course, and (like many other radical 
feminists on this point) Daly has little to say.
Certainly Daly’s account of change and how it is to be effected diverges in many respects 
from mainstream ’liberal equality feminism’Significantly, she believes that women should exercise 
a healthy scepticism with regard to the goals of the struggle for sex-equality and, indeed, all 
mainstream political activity. Unlike ’liberal equality feminists’ who wish to be treated like men and 
justify it on the grounds of ’androgyny’ (women’s ’adequate similarity’ to men: the idea that there are 
no socially significant differences between men and women that merit any form of sex- 
discrimination) she is relatively uninterested in achieving ’equality of opportunity’. This may not be 
as reactionary as it appears, for ’equality of opportunity’ in liberal equality feminism may simply 
mean equality of opportunity in an elitist or stratified society. Moreover, the public-private split is 
reinforced by such feminists’ emphasis upon action in the public sphere, often with the onset of the 
'double' or even 'triple' shift for many working women. Daly, on the other hand, is concerned with 
the more radical idea of abolishing oppression in all its forms. For Daly, simply granting women 
access to what contemporary men have access to - academia, the professions, blue collar work, the 
military - will not give them the power they need to solve the fundamental problem, which goes far 
deeper than social benefits and employment opportunities. As we have seen for her the feminist 
imperative is to reclaim the 'energy "stolen" from women' in order they women may be self­
determining, rather than they be 'equal' (in the sense of sameness) with men.
The kind of separatist practice Daly proposes is inherently political, though it is undoubtedly 
problematic to link Daly's scheme, as some critics do, to more conventional concepts of social 
change or 'revolution'. In her book Contemporarv Feminist Thought Hester Eisenstein includes 
Daly's work under the rubric of 'cultural feminism' which, she writes (in the past tense) 'eschewed 
an explicit political or economic program altogether and concentrated on the development of a
^07 See Susan Faludi Backlash (N.Y.: Crown, 1991).
Pure Lust p.221.
109 Ibid.
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separate women’s culture’!'^ Such criticisms completely miss the radical feminist idea that the 
creation of ’womanspace’ is a profoundly political act in itself To castigate Daly’s avowal of 
separatism because it does not fit in to what is conventionally termed ’political action’ is 
fundamentally wrong-headed, for she makes no pretence at offering women such a proposal. Indeed, 
her understanding of separatism is founded upon the perceived necessity of rejecting reformism 
because it does nothing to tackle the question of oppression per se.
One of the most important ways in which Daly thinks that women can begin to create new 
value is through the adoption of a ’Lesbian’ position This is the fifth and final feature of Daly’s 
radical feminist theoiy that I shall discuss. In the Wickedai v Daly defines Lesbian as: ’n: a Woman-
Loving woman: one who has rejected false loyalties to men in every sphere’!^  ^Here we can see that
Daly’s definition of the Lesbian encompasses both aspects of separatism, that is, withdrawal of
energy from males, and the primacy of female community. For Daly the Lesbian is a model for
feminist praxis; a concept which conjures a ’community of female be-ing’, a fund of ethical and
political possibilities. In her writings to identify as a Lesbian includes the recognition that one’s
identity as a woman is not defined primarily by one’s relation to a male world and male traditions
but that powerful bonds between women are a crucial factor in one’s life. The Lesbian is also a
] 12model of creative autonomy in her work. She cross references ’Lesbian’ with ’Amazon’, a ’Labrys- 
wielding Female Warrior who Sees and Names phallic deception, cutting through the layers of lies
113intended to baffle Journeyers’. Another synonym for Lesbian is ’Spinster’: ’A woman whose
occupation is to Spin, to participate in the whirling movement of creation; one who has chosen her
Self, who defines her Self by choice neither in relation to children nor to men; one who is Self-
114identified; a whirling dervish. Spiralling in New Time/Space’. This is interesting in as much as it 
challenges the conventional metaphors for creativity - lover, androgyne, mother - all of which 
exclude lesbian sexuality and privilege heterosexuality. In privileging the category ’Lesbian’ in this 
way Daly makes the point that female-identified sexuality is good and positive and therefore crucial 
to redrawing the parameters of female autonomy and creativity.
1 Eisenstein, Hester, op. cit., p.xx.
 ^1  ^ The Wickedary p.78.
 ^ See also Adrienne Rich ’It is the Lesbian in us...’ inOn Lies. Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose 1966- 
78 (N.Y.: Norton, 1979) pp. 111-202; and Monique Wittig The Lesbian Body translated by Dayid le Vay 
(N.Y.: Avon, 1975).
117 The Wickedary p. 105.
114 Ibid., p. 167.
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Daly has not always held the same view of Lesbianism, In Bevond God the Father, for 
instance, she maintains that feminists should refuse to accept the sexual categories of either 
’heterosexuality’ or ’homosexuality’ (which here includes Lesbianism). She writes; ’The point should 
be not merely to deny that one is a lesbian, in the sense of withdrawing oneself from a category 
which remains uncriticized, or on the other hand merely to defiantly box oneself in this category, 
but rather to criticize and exorcize the label itself, which in fact makes sense only within the mad
world of phallic categories’. ' Tliis view is somewhat at odds with lesbian political writings of the 
early seventies which argued that lesbians suffered a greater degree of oppression than other women 
and that lesbian ’invisibility’ as a group (even within the women’s movement)vas indicative of their 
taboo status.
In Gvn/Ecologv, however, it becomes clear that her views on Lesbianism have altered 
dramatically. She abandons the term ’homosexuality’ which, it is implied, is qualitatively different to 
’Lesbianism’. Daly now speaks of Lesbianism in terms of ’separatism’ and ’gynocentric be-ing’ rather
than simply in terms of sexual preference.' Similarly, in Pure Lust, she argues that, in patriarchal 
society, there exists a ’Total Taboo against Women-Touching women’. Daly uses ’Touching’ here 
in a broad sense rather than restricting its use to ’physical contact’ (though it will encompass that 
meaning)."^ In both of these works Lesbianism is seen as a choice rather than a genetic 
predisposition. Moreover, it is a choice that most or all women can make. Daly dedicates
i 19Gvn/Ecologv to ’the Lesbian Imagination in All Women.’ Thus the implications of Daly’s concept
of Lesbianism extend beyond the parameters of those women who already identify themselves as
Lesbians, for she believes that there is the potentiality within every woman to expand and intensify
her relations with other women to the point that the term Lesbian becomes appropriate. The manner
and degree to which each woman will actualise this potential, however, depends upon her Self
alone. It is, as Daly acknowledges; ’For each individual Journeyer to decide/expand the scope of this
[Lesbian] imagination within her. It is she, and she alone, who can determine how far, and in what
way, she will/can travel. She, and she alone, can dis-cover the mystery of her own history, and find
120how it is interwoven with the lives of other women’.
 ^ Bevond God the Father p. 126
 ^ Gyn/Ecologv ’Preface’ p.xlviii.
 ^17 Pure Lust p.250.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., p.xlix This phrase is the subtitle of the feminist journal Sinister Wisdom.
120 Ibid.
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This formulation of lesbian being owes much to Adrienne Rich’s influential concept of a
Tesbian continuum’, ranging from those who may be in relationships with men but have emotional
ties to other women, to those with full emotional, sexual and political commitment to women. For
Rich Lesbianism is about more than sexual preference, it blossoms forth from a primary woman-
identification. Following Rich’s example Daly seeks to remove Lesbianism from its position as an
issue of ’sexuality’ alone, a position into which it has been placed by theological, medical and social
scientific discourse. The word ’lesbian’ did not come into usage until the mid-nineteenth century.
Before that time terms such as ’invert’, ’tribades’ or ’fricatrices’ were employed as part of the
theological rhetoric of ’unnatural lust’. This rhetoric of course owes directly to Christian moral
theology in wliich non-procreative sexual pleasure was deemed ’sinful’ and ’against the natural order
of things’. The definition of lesbians in the medical terminology of ’pathology’ was pioneered by
121Edward Carpenter in his book Love’s Coming of Age and Havelock Ellis in his seven-volume 
Studies in the Psvchologv of Sex. Ellis - who was influential in forming British opinion on these 
issues - distinguished between ’true’ and ’pseudo-inverts’. Ellis’ followers were the sex reformers 
Stella Browne and Marie Stopes, the latter of which wrote Enduring Passion (1923). In these 
manuals lesbianism was portrayed as a deviant form of sexuality, an ’abnormal’ sexual orientation. 
Carpenter - who was himself homosexual - sought to poetry homosexuals not as inferior but simply
different. However in doing so he lumped Lesbians with homosexuals and called them an
122’Intermediate Sex’. Carpenter believed that a small number of women and men were ’congenitally 
deviant’ in this way. Kraft-Ebing mPsychopathia Sexualis (1886) however was less reticent. He 
also thought homosexuality and Lesbianism were also congenital, but tended to associate them with 
an inherited disposition to degeneration and vice (like other perversions).
In contrast to the medical tradition Daly warns feminists against sexualising Lesbianism per 
se as it both trivialises and depoliticises it as a form of woman-bonding. She writes: only ’if 
violation of the Total Taboo encompasses and transcends the sexual sphere’ are women enabled to
123’Touch and Move’. She goes on to criticise the currently fashionable ’gay’, ’social club, sexually 
liberated lesbianism’ that is ’disseminated in the populai’ media, in pornography, and in pseudo-
124Lesbian books, magazines, graphics, films, and videos’ as an offshoot of so-called ’sexual 
revolution’ of the sixties, itself a product of phallocratie culture. Drawing upon Herbert Marcuse’s 
theoiy of ’sexual desublimation Daly writes: ’The reduction of potentially powerful, gynergizing
2^1 Carpenter, Edward Love’s Coming of AgefLondon: Methuen, 1906). 
*22 Carpenter, op. cit., p. 124.
*23 Pure Lust p.253.
124 Ti^ e Wickedary p.68.
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connections between women to only the sexual sphere in a climate of patriarchal permissiveness 
that would restrict women to this male-defined "sexual deviance" is...only repressive desublimation. 
"Liberated" women who are merely "gay" remain bound libidinally to the institutionalized
125fathers’. ' This restriction of Lesbian being is ultimately politically reactionary. To sexualise 
Lesbianism is inevitably to reduce it, to stunt its revolutionary potential because it may obscure the 
political consequences of the primary bonding of woman with each other. It also obfuscates the 
nature of women’s bonding with males who are, in Daly’s radical feminist discourse, the oppressor 
’class’. (As Coralyn Fontaine writes: ’the sexualization of lesbianism simultaneously hides the
political nature of heterosexuality’).'^^  Indeed it may well be that in political terms the Lesbian 
occupies a privileged position in that she is able to see the pervasiveness of heterosexism.
In the Wickedarv Daly draws upon Janice Raymond’s terms ’hetero-reality’ and ’hetero­
relations’ to describe the nature of this institution. ’Hetero-reality’ connotes ’the world view that
127woman exists always in relation to man’; whilst hetero-relations’ are ’the wide range of affective,
128social, political, and economic relations that are ordained between men and women by men’. 
Heterosexuality is then the set of values and structures that assumes heterosexuality to be the only 
natural form of sexual and emotional expression. Building upon Frye’s contention that male access
129to females is ’the patriarchal imperative’, Daly argues that women constitute a ’Touchable Caste’. 
Women are ’touchable by those who aie in possession of a penis...all women in patriarchy aie 
touchable by males and have no acknowledged right to refuse this role, for this is the role of
130women and nature within the phallocratie caste system’. What is distinctive about Daly’s approach 
is that she views hetero-reality as merely the foil for homo-reality in which men get the sustenance 
they need (and do not get from other males) from women. Whilst hetero-standards are promoted by 
what Gramsci called the ’ideological state apparatus’ (family, church, schools, state) what really 
supports patriarchy, Daly says, is male power bonding. In patriarchal society male bonding is 
primary (the Trinity symbolises this), also the exchange of women by and amongst men. This
*25 Pure Lust p.253.
126 Fontaine, ’Teaching the Psychology of Women’in Margaret Cruikshank (ed.) Lesbian Studies (N.Y.: 
The Feminist Press, 1982), p.74.For an insightful analysis of the possible parameters of the meaning of ’sex’ 
for Lesbians see Marilyn Frye ’Lesbian "Sex"’inWillful Virgin: Essays in Feminism 1976-1992 (Freedom, 
California: The Crossing Press, 1992), pp. 109-119.
*27 Raymond, Janice A Passion for Friends (Boston: Beacon, 1986) p.3.; cit.The Wickedarv p.205.
*28 Raymond, op. cit., p.7; cit. The Wickedarv p.78.
*29 Pure Lust pp.232.
*30 Ibid.
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bonding though it has an erotic component is made more effective by virtue of the fact that it is
13Jconcealed and denied.
In arguing that the full expression of women’s community with each other is stymied by the 
political institution of heterosexism Daly is part of a now well-established tradition of Lesbian
132theory. Early radical feminists concentrated upon love as a dangerous delusion that was used as 
method of enslaving women. This discussion gave way to discussions revolving around the politics
133of sexuality. The preliminary analysis of heterosexuality as a ’political institution’, which must be 
maintained by the repression or stigmatising of those who challenge it, was formulated by Charlotte 
Bunch in ’Learning from Lesbian Separatism’ in the feminist magazine Ms. in November 1976. But 
this was taken further by Anglo-American women, including Daly, who began to move towards the 
creation of new Lesbian values in Lesbian communities. 1980 saw a notable contribution to the 
debate from Adrienne Rich in her article ’Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence’. For 
Rich heterosexuality is ’something that has to be imposed, managed, organized, propagandized and 
maintained by force’. In its argument that male supremacy has been bolstered by institutional 
heterosexuality, as well as sex role conditioning and economic privilege, it remains the classic 
statement of heterosexuality as political institution.
It has been noted that Daly’s position in a sense makes all women Lesbian and erases the real 
oppression and hardship experienced by those women whose orientation to other women was 
primarily sexual. Moreover Daly’s position must not be taken as indicative of all lesbians. Not all 
lesbians agree in their choice of value system, (though significantly all those who espouse ’ a lesbian 
perspective are united in their understanding of lesbianism as what Sarah Hoagland calls ’a starting
point of denial and resistance’). Hoagland, for example, refuses to define the term. She writes; ’To 
define "lesbian" is, in my opinion, to succumb to a context of heterosexualism. No one ever feels 
compelled to explain or define what they perceive as the norm. If we define "lesbianism", we invoke
135a context in which it is not the norm’. There are, then, many questions regarding the ’Lesbian’ 
identity that Daly leaves unanswered. Is one born a Lesbian? Have there been Lesbians at every
* 31 Gyn/Ecology p.63
*32 See Bryson op. cit., p.213ff
*33 Lillian Faderman uses the term ’heterocentrism; Janice G. Raymond employs ’tetero-reality’ or 
’heteropatriarchy’; Adrienne Richuses ’compulsory heterosexuality’; and Sarah Hoagland’prefenred term is 
’totalitarian heterosexuality’. Cit. Cruikshank op. cit., p.xiii.
*34 Hoagland, Sarah ’Introduction’ to Penelope op. cit., p.xii.
*35 Hoagland, Sarah Lucia Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Palo Alto, Calif.: Institute of Lesbian 
Studies, 1988), p.8.
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period in history? Or is the concept of the Lesbian socially constructed? Which is to say, was the 
’emergence’ of the Lesbian as a social category linked to a particular set of social conditions'^
For Daly Lesbianism is definitely a choice. I support this view. Coming out as a Lesbian 
woman involves both discovery and creation. As Joyce Trebilcot writes: ’The experience is one of 
Acknowledging, of realizing what is already there, and at the same time of creating something new,
137a new sense of oneself, a new identity’. A woman can decide to become Lesbian because she has 
influence over her feelings and her sensual-emotional experience. Trebilcot writes: ’Many women 
who want to experience lesbian sexuality in fact do reorient their feelings in terms of this desire; 
they teach themselves - usually, no doubt, with the help of other women - to have lesbian
138feelings’. Thus it clearly is possible ’To understand... heterosexual identity not as a fate 
irrevocably determined by genital sensations, but as a choice... made on the basis of a variety of 
factors, a choice pushed upon [us], to be sure, by the power of the institution of heterosexuality, but
139also one which [we] might not have made and might yet revoke’. Curiously, the element of choice 
in one’s present and future sexual orientation - cleaiiy discernible in Daly’s writings - has received 
relatively little attention from feminist commentators, including feminist theologians. The same 
applies to the related issue of heterosexuality as a political institution. This is regrettable. For 
heterosexuality has had consequences in terms of the material realities of women’ lives. 
Heterosexuality is a whole cultural universe that is legitimated by rituals, histories, art, literature and 
religious and social ideology. Fundamentally, heterosexuality has meant ’men first’. It has led to the 
assumption that every woman is defined by and is the property of men. Thus women’s oppression is 
clearly bound up with the institution of heterosexuality both in the work place (where many women 
still receive second-rate wages on the assumption that they are tied to men) and in the home 
(because heterosexuality upholds the family as an economic and personal unit). Changing women’s
140place in our society therefore means engaging the structures of heterosexism. This is clearly 
difficult for many women to perceive. It is perhaps understandable in as much as ’heterosexual 
privilege’ reveals that women have a real stake in male supremacy in so far as it keeps us (relatively) 
safe and (relatively) secure.
136 For a critique of Foucault’s influential history of sexuality (which largely ignores lesbianism) see 
Penelope Call Me Lesbian pp.25-27.
*37 Trebilcot, Joyce Dvke Ideas p. 100.
*38 Ibid.,p.l05.
*39 Ibid., p. 107.
*40 For substantive research on the material consequences of hetersexuality for women see Gill Dunne 
’Difference at Work: Perceptions of Work from a Non-Heterosexual Perspective’ inWorking Out: New 
Directions for Women’s Studies ed. Hilary Hinds, Ann Phoenix and Jackey Stacey (London: Palmer 1992).
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In this chapter I have briefly discussed five selected features of Daly’s radical feminist 
theory. Whilst the analysis provided is by no means exhaustive I hope to have highlighted several 
areas in which Daly’s contribution to the radical feminist corpus has been marked, and several in 
which she has simply extended the analysis of previous radical feminist thinkers. This has laid bare 
some of the deep theoretical differences that exist within the radical feminist movement, as well as 
between feminists of competing theoretical approaches. Such diversity is not necessarily a 
drawback. Different analytic priorities throw up different findings. This can have positive political 
effects. For example, though it has been much criticised in recent years the shaied radical feminist 
emphasis upon the common bonds between women has brought forth a vibrant women’s culture in 
the United States. An effective rejoinder to the practitioners of what I have called the politics of 
representation with regard to radical feminist theory, then, might focus upon the elasticity of 
feminist theoretical positions. Critiques which focus upon Daly as a pre-eminent representative of 
an ideal type ’radical feminism’ tend to gloss over the ambiguities and complexities of ’lived’ 
politics. For example, feminists of all persuasions find themselves within institutional contexts 
fighting for change (such as fighting for the criminalisation of rape within marriage). This reality 
complicates the previously drawn distinctions.
This chapter has also served to introduce the political philosophical rationale behind the 
suspicion of male-engendered theoiy across the disciplines that conditions Daly’s writings from 
Bevond God the Father onwaids. It is to an examination of four such theoretical frameworks that the 
remainder of the thesis will be devoted.
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Chapter 2: Existentialism
In this chapter I propose to examine several aspects of the relationship between Mary Daly’s 
feminist theoiy and the existentialist feminist thought of Simone de Beauvoir. The research 
presented here is intended as a contribution to the history of feminist ideas. Both de Beauvoir and 
Daly have been influential in mapping out the contours of second wave feminist theoretical activity 
in the respective fields of philosophy and theology. Like other feminists Daly acknowledges a debt 
to de Beauvoir for her pioneering work The Second Sex. Moreover in her first feminist work, The 
Church and the Second Sex. Daly draws directly upon de Beauvoir’s analysis of women’s situation, 
paiticularly upon her description of the role played by the Roman Catholic Church in oppression.
De Beauvoir’s attack on the Church set a precedent which feminists such as Daly later followed to 
great theological effect. Negative critiques of religion existed before The Second Sex, of course, but 
de Beauvoir’s study was the first to put forward in detail the way in which religion functions in 
concert with other social agencies to maintain the social dynamics of male dominance/female 
subordination.
The importance of the task of unravelling the connections between Daly’s writings andThe 
Second Sex is not limited to the history of feminist ideas. There are deeper philosophical issues to 
be considered that may affect the viability of Daly’s œninhuûonqua feminist theory. As a number 
of contemporary feminist scholars have demonstrated, serious structural problems attach to any
feminist appropriation of Sartrean existentialist philosophy.' In particular, the dichotomy of 
transcendence-immanence that is central to Beauvoir’s account of woman as the Other is 
inextricably connected, in Sartre’s existentialist thought, with the category of sex. The question that 
arises is as follows; in drawing upon The Second Sex does Daly re-produce its major philosophical
positions and, if so, does she also inadvertently reinscribe Sartre’s negative assumptions regarding
2the female sex? At least one commentator answers this question in the affirmative.
I was able to raise the question of the relationship between Daly’s feminist thought and
existentialism in a conversation with Daly at her home in Newton Center, Massachusetts. I asked
* Gatens, Moira Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995) p.51 ; Nancy Hartsock Money. Sex and Power (N.Y: Longmans, 1983), p. 286; 
Anne Whitmarsh Simone de Beauvoir and The Limits of Commitment (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1981), 
p.150.
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her about the extent to which her own work has been shaped through an encounter with de 
Beauvoir’s existentialist feminism. To my surprise, Daly denied ever having been influenced by 
existentialism. I was left feeling somewhat perplexed. I was aware of the reticence, on Daly’s part,
to dwell upon those thinlcers whose work had facilitated the formation of her own theory. Whenever
1 attempted to probe the question of her intellectual influences, however, she dismissed my inquiry 
with the statement that ’Nature’ was the primary source and matrix of her thought. Any interest in 
exploring the relation between her writings and established intellectual frameworks, she intimated, 
was ’bore-ing’ (penetrating and invasive - the implication is - like a male) and symptomatic of
’ Academentia’ (a condition afflicting intellectuals that is characterised by an obsession with 
irrelevant minutiae to the detriment of larger questions).^ In the end I dropped this particular line of 
questioning. Later, however, I began to investigate the matter further by turning to Daly’s self- 
confessed ’dialogue’ with de Beauvoir inThe Church and the Second Sex. The questions that I 
sought to address in my examination of this work were as follows. Is Daly’s agreement with de 
Beauvoir’s analysis of the situation of women inThe Second Sex suggestive of a much closer tie 
with existentialism than that afforded by the general intellectual Zeitgeist! In particular, is there
4evidence to show that Sartrean existentialist ideas and assumptions were mediated to Daly through 
her reading of The Second Sex? The argument that I shall put forward in response to these questions 
is structured in the following way.
Firstly, I shall seek to clarify which elements of The Second Sex Daly takes up and 
develops in her own writings. I shall argue that, in substantive terms, de Beauvoir’s legacy to Daly 
consists principally in the functionalist criticism of the historic role of the Church in the oppression 
of women. One critic argues that Daly also assimilates the critique of gender stereotypes that is 
founded, for de Beauvoir, upon existentialist philosophical assumptions and that this then makes 
Daly’s theory problematic from a feminist perspective. I shall take issue with this claim, though I do 
not wish to rebuff the argument entirely. The argument that I shall defend is that, whilst Daly shares 
Beauvoir’s conclusions regarding the destructiveness of the ideology of femininity, the philosophical 
route by which she arrives at these conclusions is not the same as that travelled by de Beauvoir. For
2 Korte, Anne-Marie Een Pasie voor transcendentie: Féministe théologie en moderniteit in her denke van 
Mary Daly (English abstract).
3 For Daly’s definition of ’Academentia’ see thdVickedarv p. 184. C.f. Daly’s profile of ’Prof. Y’ in the 
’Cat/egorial Imperative’Pure Lust pp.412-415.
4 For the argumunt that Beauvoir in contributed far more than is sometimes thought to the formation of 
existentialism, specifically that ’Sartrean existentialism is really Beauvoirian existentialism’, see Edward 
Fullbrook ’Beauvoir: the Mother of Existentialism’The Times Higher (December 3, 1993). This article 
encapsulates the central thesis of the book Fullbrook co-authors with Kate Fullbrook entitled Simone de
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de Beauvoir, the assertions that there are no immutable ’nature(s)’ and that, to all intents and 
purposes, ’woman^ is the product of social conditioning, derive from her existentialist philosophical 
assumptions; for Daly, however, the same conclusions are ai'rived at by working from an altogether 
different ontological base: one provided for Daly by the Thomism in which she had trained.
My second task will be to develop the last point further. The apparent contiguities between 
Daly and de Beauvoir’s feminism should not deceive us into assuming that Daly’s work is thereby 
stamped indelibly by the alleged ’masculinist’ presuppositions that pervade de Beauvoir’s 
existentialist thought. I have argued that Daly finds certain aspects of de Beauvoir’s theory useful in 
illuminating the situation of women both in the Church and in wider society, her views diverge from 
those of the French writer on the most fundamental feminist philosophical questions. In order to 
illustrate this further - and thereby vindicate the position mapped out above - 1 shall distil each 
writer’s response to the two fundamental questions that informThe Second Sex, namely: ’What is 
woman?’ and ’Why is woman the Other?’. I shall endeavour to show that Daly differs from 
Beauvoir both with regard to working assumptions and to her approach to the problem of women’s 
oppression and the strategies women may adopt in order to liberate themselves. As a result of this 
analysis it will, I hope, become evident that Daly does not simply re-produce Beauvoir’s theory of 
the Other. On the contrary, I shall contend that Daly may be read as taking up a critical posture 
relative to Beauvoir’s existentialist feminism, especially with regard to her theory of female 
Otherness.
Thirdly, and finally, I turn to engage with an important critique of Daly’s work by the 
Australian feminist Meaghan Morris. In a review of Daly’s rhetorical practice Morris unveils the 
presence, in Daly’s writing, of a symbolics of Otherness in which certain ’good’ women aie 
rhetorically pitted in battle against other ’bad’ women and all males; the latter functioning in Daly’s 
writings as the ’Other’ over and against whom she (and other ’Amazon’ women) must prevail. Morris 
argues that a ’structural necessity FOR a symbol of the Other’ is part and parcel of Daly’s politics in 
a manner analogous to the structural requirement for an Other in Sartre’s existentialism? Whilst 
Morris does not explicitly attribute Daly’s compulsion towards the setting up of an ’Other’ to her 
appropriation of Beauvoir (indeed she does not account for its origins) her criticisms threaten the
Beauvoir and Jean Paul Sartre: The Remaking of a Legend (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
5 Beauvoir, following Sartre, speaks only of ’woman’ in the abstract singular, indeed of ’woman’ as 
she is categorised by men, instead of the concrete plural ’women’ which alone can form the starting 
point for a coherent feminist theory which is faithful to the diverse experiences of women across 
diverse spatio-temporal locations.
6 Morris cites Michèle Le Doeuff who argues that the infamous imagery of 'holes and slime' in Sartre's 
philosophy represents the 'counter-figure' that is essential to the existentialist framework. See Meaghan 
Morris The Pirate's Fiancée: Feminism. Reading. Postmodernism (London: Verso, 1988) p.45. For Le 
Doeuff s position see L ’Imaginaire philosophique (Paris: Payot, 1980).
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interpretation of Daly’s work that I have put forward. In response to Morris I acknowledge a 
disposition in Daly’s textual practice to construct an ’Other’ or ’Others’, but argue that there may be 
cogent political reasons to account for such a strategy in certain circumstances. Fundamentally, 
however, this tendency does not amount to a ’structural necessity’ in Daly’s work. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the predilection to situate other groups as Other to feminism is fundamentally 
anomalous, rather than consistent, with her fundamental ontology.
Let us begin then by identifying those elements in The Second Sex that have been taken up 
and developed by Daly in her feminist writings. The primary resource will be The Church and the 
Second Sex for it is here that Daly considers de Beauvoir’s feminist theory qua existentialist 
theory. As the argument develops, however, I shall have cause to refer to Daly’s later writings in 
order to illustrate that her position with regard to de Beauvoir’s existentialist philosophical grid 
remains the same throughout her career.
In The Church and the Second Sex Daly is careful to distance herself from de Beauvoir’s 
philosophical apparatus. What is appropriated is not the existentialist framework, but certain 
empirical features of de Beauvoir’s analysis which Daly uses as a base from which to conduct her 
own research. Of particular importance is the functionalist analysis of the Church. Daly’s response 
to de Beauvoir’s criticism of the Church is to put to one side the philosophical issues that divide 
them and to concentrate instead upon the task of gathering ’empirical’ data to see whether the 
charges that de Beauvoir levels against the Church are borne out by the historical facts. Her 
research is extensive, embracing the areas of biblical history and interpretation, ecclesiastical 
sociology, the history of theology, and papal history.
The first aspect of de Beauvoir’s functionalist criticism of religion is the role of deception 
in masking oppression. De Beauvoir argues that the Church has always opposed measures 
designed to alleviate the suffering of women, such as improvements in their legal status, because 
the preservation of a male-dominated Church hierarchy requires women to be socially 
subordinate. In order to disguise this oppressive situation she contends that the Church masks or 
disguises it by using various strategies designed to deceive women; for example, by distracting 
women’s attention away from their situation through the promise of a reward for their sufferings in 
the afterlife. As an atheist de Beauvoir considers the idea of an afterlife to be false, yet it has 
functioned so as to reinforce the prevailing (and unjust) social arrangements by encouraging 
female compliance to the rules laid down by the male-dominated Church. This, in turn, reinforces
68
7the tendency for women to remain politically passive. Another example of deception is the 
Church’s promotion of the idea that ’equality’ is already achieved in the eyes of God. To de 
Beauvoir this kind of equality (if it exists) is ’insubstantial’ since women are still despised by men 
as sexual beings. But again what matters is not whether the belief is true (in the sense that it has 
any correspondence with reality) but rather what effect the belief has in social and political terms. 
For de Beauvoir the idea is powerful in the sense that when a woman internalises such a belief her 
energy is affected: potential rebellion is stifled by the suggestion that, in the most important 
respects, there is nothing to fight for since equality is already established. Women’s perception of 
their lot may also be affected by the way in which ’woman’ is exalted symbolically by the Church 
at the same time that she is socially humiliated by her subservience to ’man’. This tendency to exalt 
women to an unrealistic level, she ai'gues, stems partly from the guilt that men experience at the 
benefits that they derive from women’s subordination and partly from the desire in men to bestow 
a ’high’ status on those things that they ’conquer’ and ’possess’. It is therefore another form of male 
self-glorification.^
The second aspect of de Beauvoir’s reproach of the Church is her criticism of dogmas that 
tacitly affirm the idea that women are inferior to men. In particular, she interprets the 
’displacement’ relation, in the Jewish and Christian traditions, of the cultof the ancient mother- 
goddess by a symbolic regime centred around the father-son as an attempt to break the symbolic 
potency of the maternal aspect of female existence. As de Beauvoir writes: ’It was as Mother that
9woman was fearsome; it is in maternity that she must be transfigured and enslaved’. In Roman 
Catholicism the symbol of Mary has been effectively stripped of symbolic power for women. In 
the myth and ait of the Virgin Mother - in which Mary is depicted kneeling in subjection before 
her own son, receiving her glory from him - we witness the symbolic humiliation of the maternal. 
By encouraging women to identify with Mary, de Beauvoir argues, the Church leads women into a 
state of self-abnegation and servility before their men.
The third aspect of Beauvoir’s treatment of the Church is the criticism of moral theology. 
The Church is, she argues, fundamentally antisex, and hatred and fear of the body is linked to 
misogyny, for it is not the human body that is reviled but only that of the woman. ’The flesh that is 
for the Christian the hostile Other’, de Beauvoir writes, ’is precisely woman. In her the Christian
7 Ibid., p.58; c.f. Simone de Beauvoir The Second Sex translated and edited by H. M. Parshley (London: 
Pan Books Ltd, 1988; originally published in France as Le Deuxième Sexe: Librairie Gallimard, 1949) 
p.633f.
8 Ibid, p. 60.
9 De Beauvoir op. cit., p.203; cit. The Church and the Second Sex p.61.
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finds incarnated the temptations of the world, the flesh and the devil’. Other aspects of moral 
theology which de Beauvoir considers unjust are the Church’s prohibition of abortion, contraception 
and its discouragement of gainful employment for women. Women are, as a result, effectively 
enslaved to their biological functions in an era when the advancement of technology has provided 
both women and men with means by which to liberate themselves from this bondage. Behind all of 
these Christian policies, de Beauvoir argues, lies the cultural amalgam of Hebrew tradition and 
Greek philosophy. Christianity emerged from the womb of Judaism - itself the product of a 
patriai'chal culture - and the notion of female sinfulness and inferiority that emerged from the Jewish 
tradition was ratified by the insights of Scholastic/Aristotelian biology and the Aristotelian 
philosophy of fixed natures. The coalescence of these ideas meant that women’s place in the order of 
society was transposed into the order of nature. Female ’nature’ was thus fixed and moreover fixed 
in a subordinate position relative to male ’nature’.
The fourth and final aspect of de Beauvoir’s feminist criticism of the Church is her assault 
upon discrimination against women in the Church hierarchy. She criticises the Church for 
prohibiting women entry into the ecclesiasiastical offices. This exclusion generates concrete feelings 
of inferiority in girls and women in the Church for no matter what talents and merits they may 
possess they can never identify with authoritative figures in the Church. The masculinity of these 
figures is moreover bolstered by identification with divinity itself, which is also seen as male. There 
may even be some confusion between the priest/confessor and God himself; the mediator blurs into
the mediated - the male is god.
In The Church and the Second Sex Daly agrees with de Beauvoir about the political impact
12of women holding such beliefs in a male-dominated society. Following de Beauvoir, Daly argues 
that women have become subject to a process by which they have been coerced into internalising 
male projections of themselves and thence to acting out such ’predestined’ roles. The Church has, 
she argued, played a major role in this coercion. With the help of modern Catholic literature, the 
Church has woven a mythology of the ’eternal feminine’around women. In this body of literature 
’the Eternal Woman’ is said to possess, in Daly’s words!A vocation to surrender and hiddeness; 
hence the symbol of the veil. Self-less, she achieves not individual realization but merely generic 
fulfilment in motherhood, physical or spiritual (the wife is always a "mother to her husband" as well 
as to her children). She is said to be timeless and conservative by nature. She is shrouded in
De Beauvoir op. cit., p. 199; cit Daly The Church and the Second Sex p.63. 
* * c.f.: The Church and the Second Sex p.65-66
*2 The Church and the Second Sex p.71.
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13"mystery", because she is not recognized as a genuine person’. These stereotypical roles, Daly 
argues, effectively destroy the virtues of intellectual independence, the ability to disassociate 
ourselves from others, ’dominance’ and ’initiative’ which both Daly ande Beauvoir see to be 
necessary for creativity and productivity to flourish. Instead of fostering these virtues, women have 
been encouraged instead to think of themselves in wholly and exclusively relational terms. (The role 
of mother, for instance -in both a physical and a spiritual sense - has been seen to encapsulate the 
’essence’ of what it means to be a woman). The continued imposition of the role of the Eternal 
Feminine upon women is, she maintains, holding up the course of human evolution. It is, she writes, 
’the enemy of the individual woman looking for ... creative expansion of her own unique
„ 14personhood .
It is not only women, however, who suffer from sexual stereotyping; the humanity of men is 
correspondingly diminished. The Eternal Masculine - the counterpart and complement to the mythic 
Eternal Feminine - traps males in the perversity of roles which emphasise a maschismo ethos: 
strength without gentleness, courage without compassion and rationality cut off from due deference 
to proper ends. Moreover the fostering of such models hinders the possibility for what Daly calls 
’genuine complementaiity and personal encounter’ between men and women. Men look at women in 
vain for a life partner, for real partnership is short-circuited by the destructive dynamics of 
discrimination and oppression which leave women in a state of subjection and utter dependence.
With respect to the criticism of moral theology - abortion, contraception. Daly concurs 
with de Beauvoir’s criticism ofhaimful moral teachings which she analyses in terms of an 
amalgam of Greek philosophy with Hebraic myth. Such teachings have promoted the legitimacy of 
female subordination. In Aquinas’ philosophy, for example, the idea of immutable essences as this 
had been promulgated by Aristotle, was coupled with the old biological claims that the female 
element was passive during the process of reproduction. The female was said to provide only the 
inert matter, whilst the semen issuing from the male was said to provide the active form that made 
the child what it was. Female children in this scheme were taken to be, quite simply, deviants from 
the norm set by nature. Taken together with the ancient Biblical stories of the origins of the human 
species and of the special female susceptibility to, and culpability for, sin these ideas ’made it seem 
that the sociological fact of women’s subordination was ascribed in the heavens’?”'
Daly agrees with the French writer that, whilst religion has been an important factor in 
perpetuation of female social subordination, that state is not caused directly or solely by religion.
*3 Ibid., p. 149.
*4 Ibid., p. 150. 
15 Ibid., p. 63.
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Oppression is a result of ’convergent influences’; its dynamics are complex, subtle and interweaving. 
The Church is, she writes in The Church and the Second Sex, only ’one factor in the complex 
context of patriarchal structures, of which it is both product and perpetrator. Rather than being the 
cause of women’s unfortunate condition, religion appears rather as a superstructure, as an instrument 
of oppression and deception appropriate to a culture with given thought-patterns ’ !  ^It is the ethical 
duty of women, according to both writers, to refuse to acquiesce in the grand deception anymore, to 
cast off the docility which has clothed them for so long and to assume the mantle of adulthood that 
is now properly theirs.
In Daly’s later writings de Beauvoir’s idea of the Mai^y image as the usurper of the ancient 
symbol of the mother goddess is developed. She deconstructs the image of the meek and 
compliant theotokos as a masochistic model for women to fo l low .T he  image of Mai'y is ’bland 
and monolithic’.'^  It epitomises the ’state of perfect femininity’'.^  Marian dogma is attacked as an 
assault upon women. The dogma of the Virgin Birth is reread as a prototypal rape of the Goddess 
in which ’female presence’ is replaced by ’male femininit)^^ the Assumption depicts the 
’rehabilitation’ of the Goddess through her defeat and humiliation before her Son; and the 
Immaculate Conception becomes one of the stiategies of tokenism.^* With de Beauvoir she 
recognises that the Church is not the only proponent of the maschismo ideology that adversely 
affects women and men. Advertising, the media (particularly women’s magazines), education and 
psychological theory (e.g. Freud’s idea of ’penis-envy’) are all sources for the Eternal Feminine
syndrome. Nevertheless the Church is an ’especially potent’ vehicle for this ideology, Daly
22suggests, because ’it surrounds itself with an aura of alleged divine approval’. The subjugation of 
women thus comes to be seen as part of ’the divine plan’. She later uses this kind of analysis to
23great effect as part of her continuing criticism of Christianity.
A significant difference in the two writers’ approaches is that, unlike de Beauvoir who is 
predominantly critical of religion, Daly looks to retrieve the more positive, constructive aspect of 
functional analysis. Let me give two examples. Firstly, Daly argues - like de Beauvoir - that the 
’God of Otherworldliness’, who encourages women to be content with their lot by holding out the 
lure of a reward after physical death, is one of a number of idols or false Gods who must be
16 The Church and the Second Sex, p. 69.
*7 Gvn/Ecology pps.86-88.
* 8 Beyond God the Father p. 131.
*9 Gyn/Ecology p. 231.
9 0  T. - j  _ m20 Ibid., p.87.
21 Pure Lust pp. 109-11
22 Ibid., 157.
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’dethroned’ for women to progress through the liberation process. Unlike de Beauvoir, however, 
who regards any belief in transcendent deity as error or delusion, the displacement of the God of 
otherworldliness does not signal a victory for atheism or seculaiism. Daly salvages the idea of an 
otherworld and puts it to work in her feminist discourse to describe the ’real’ world that is the
24object of the feminist spiritual ’Journey’. Secondly, Daly develops de Beauvoir’s identificationof 
Mary with the Mother goddess in a radical way. In Bevond God the Father, for instance, she writes 
that there are ’elements in the Mary symbol which, when "selectively perceived", have ... managed 
to convey a message (partial and blurred) of women’s becoming’?'”’ The symbol has functioned as a 
labrys or two-edged sword. In order to function in this way, the idea must be ’taken out of its 
context’ in Christianity?^ and allowed to operate as a ’free-wheeling’ symboF In tandem with her 
critical reading, then, she explores deeper ’"sub-intended" dimensions in Marian dogmas’. Thus the 
doctrine of the Virgin Birth is explored in terms of associated images of female autonomy and 
independence; and the dogma of Immaculate Conception is interpreted to mean that since the 
female (Mary) was conceived free of sin there is thus no need to be ’saved’ by the male (Christf.^ 
This is later developed into defence of the myth of the parthenogenetic g o d d ess .T h e  symbol of 
Mary, Daly suggests: ’paitially and distortedly reflected the spark of female Elemental be-ing^.' 
However one assesses Daly’s readings of Marian dogma one cannot but applaud the rationale 
behind her attempts. For unlike Beauvoir, Daly considers it of paramount importance that women 
retrieve the stories and myths which have been utilised so skilfully against our interests.
In the later ’radical feminist’ writings Daly develops de Beauvoir’s analysis of ’deception’ 
beyond the sphere of religion. In Gyn/Ecologv and Pure Lust Daly extends the range of the 
functionalist analysis across the board to include all cultural beliefs, images and symbols.
Particulai' significance is assigned to the analysis of ’myth’. IiGvn/Ecologv Daly devotes a chapter 
to the ways in which patriarchy works its deception through ’myth’, which she defines in terms of 
paradigmatic models or patternings of male domination-female subordination that are 
continuously reactualised through performance throughout culture. Examples of myth in this sense 
are the messages conveyed by an unlikely assortment of phenomena including: ’patiiaichal
23 See this thesis p .161-169.
24 Pure Lust p. 10.
25 Beyond God the Father p.83
26 Ibid., p. 84
27 Ibid., p. 87; c.f. Gvn/Ecologv pps.85, 87-88.
28 Beyond God the Father p. 84.
29 Ibid., p. 87.
3b Gvn/Ecologv p. 102-103.
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scholai'ship’, Greek myth, the media, children’s literature, and the psycho-sexual cult of sado­
masochism. In each of these phenomena Daly discerns the presence of patriarchal ’myths’ which 
promote dualistic thinking; which extol the themes of male-bonding (predicated on the exclusion 
of women), female self-loss and self-deprecation; and which eulogise ’boundary violations’ of all
32kinds from rape to genetic engineering.
But even here there are resonances with de Beauvoir who also operates with a broad 
concept of ’myth’. In Part III ofThe Second Sex de Beauvoir argues that man’s attitude to women 
is governed by a certain ambivalence. She illustrates this by drawing attention to the diverse 
concepts and associations surrounding ’woman’ that have developed through the centuries. Thus 
the fact that women symbolise the power of Nature, in its double-edged role of matrix of life and 
the abyss of destruction and death, is a cause for ambivalence. The same is true for the myths 
about female sexuality (woman is both virgin and whore), of the myths of maternity (which 
express both tenderness and disdain) and of the ’Eternal Feminine’ stereotype which is seen to be 
static and confining for women.
Daly’s treatment of ’myth’ falls prey to the same or similar objections as have been made 
against de Beauvoir. Both use the term ’myth’ in a broad sense to denote any perceivable 
patterning of ideas and attitudes towards women on the part of a man or group of men. Although 
Daly seems to draw extensively from a variety of mythological and religious sources, her 
treatment of myths is not an empirictil investigation. Daly comes to the study of myth with certain 
philosophical and political assumptions which colour her perspective in a particular way. This 
may sound obvious, but the point that I wish to make is that Daly uses myths, as de Beauvoir, to 
illustrate a certain view of man rather than to analyse ’myth’ in its own right.
Intrinsic to Daly’s assimilation and development of de Beauvoir’s analysis of the ’myths’ 
surrounding ’woman’ is her acceptance of de Beauvoir’s critical feminist distinction between sex 
and gender. Central to both de Beauvoir’s feminist writing and to Daly’s project is the question of 
what constitutes the fundamental ’nature’ of ’woman’ and her subjectivitypbe question that thus
33arises was posed in stark terms by de Beauvoir as ’Are there womeq really?’.
De Beauvoir’s characterisation of woman’s position is given in and through existentialist 
conceptuality. Following Sartre, de Beauvoir distinguishes between two realms of being: the 
’being of phenomena’ or the thing perceived is called by SaxXx^retre-en-soi ’ (’being-in-itself ), 
whilst the ’being of consciousness’ is caW^diretre-pour-soi' (being-for-itself). These two aspects
31 Pure Lust p. 154
32 See Gyn/Ecology pp.43-105.
33 De Beauvoir, op. cit., p. 13
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of being are distinct and yet each can only be fully understood in the light of its relation to the 
other, that is, in the light of ’being-in-the-world’. The terminology that Sartre uses is important for 
grasping what he means by each pole. In describing brute existence as ’in-itself he means to draw 
attention to the fact that things/matter possesses a certain unity. A tree has no project, no process 
of becoming what it should be. Its being does not stand under question; it has no relation with 
i t s e l f . I n  describing human consciousness as ’for-itself, however, Sartre signals that human 
beings have no pre-established substance or unity; rather must we seek to carve out our identity by 
perpetually transcending ourselves, relating all manner of things and their utility toward ourselves. 
Thus, with regard to human being de Beauvoir writes: ’Every subject... achieves liberty only 
through a continual reaching out towards other liberties. There is no justification for present 
existence other than its expansion into an indefinitely open f u t u r e I n  choosing a project an 
individual shapes her/his identity, and thereby builds a position from which to interpret the world, 
to assign meaning and value to things. There is, however, nothing ’essential’ or given about this 
project or position, which must be perpetually re-engaged by us. De Beauvoir continues: ’An 
existent is nothing other than what he does; the possible does not extend beyond the real, essence 
does not precede existence; in pure subjectivity, the human being is not anything’?^  In as much as 
we lack a fixed nature, then, we are ’condemned’ to freedom.
De Beauvoir reasons that: since God does not exist, there are no fixed essences and thus no 
human ’nature’ ; the set of human characteristics and virtues grouped together under the rubrics of 
’masculinity’ and ’femininity’ are therefore the products of socio-historical and cultural processes 
rather than ’nature’. She also argues, partly on the basis of the preceding assumptions, that the 
dichotomy between ’masculine’ and ’feminine’ is alienating The Second Sex is about the 
existential struggle of the individual woman qua ’inessential object’ to transcend her immanence, to 
rise up into full subjectivity and finally to attain both freedom and authenticity. She writes:
(What) peculiarly signalizes the situation of woman is that she - a free and autonomous 
being like all human creatures - nevertheless finds herself compelled to assume the status 
of the Other. They propose to stabilize her as object and to doom her to immanence since 
her transcendence is to be overshadowed and forever transcended by another ego 
(conscience) which is essential and sovereign. The drama of woman lies in this conflict
34 C.f. Sartre Nausea trans. Robert Baldick (London: Penguin, 1965; originally published as La Nausee by 
Douvelle Revue Française, 1938). p. 178.
35 De Beauvoir, op. cit., p 27.
36 Ibid., p. 264; c.f. Sartre Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (London: 
Methuen, 1957; first published as L'Etre et Le Néant by Gallimard, 1943) p.25.
37 The Church and the Second Sex p.70.
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between the fundamental aspirations of every subject (ego) - who always regards the self as
38essential - and the compulsions of a situation in which she is the inessential.
Once the existentialist position is staked out de Beauvoir proceeds to interpret many different 
things in terms of it. But fundamentally de Beauvoir utilised the fruits of her research into 
anthropology, biology, psychology, sociology, literature and history to reinforce her fundamental 
existentialist schema. As Teriy Keefe notes, whilst biology and economics provide the context for 
male dominance ’the key factor was a metaphysical one, namely the thrust for transcendence that 
characterises the human species’?^
Daly is quick to acknowledge de Beauvoir’s distinction between sex and gender?'^ and her 
argument that the gender constructs ’masculinity’ and ’femininity’ are historically and culturally 
contingent, and makes them the foundation of the attack upon the ideology of femininity that 
marks all of her feminist writings. A large part of Daly’s criticism of the Church inThe Church 
and the Second Sex is contingent upon the distinction between the female sex and femininity: for 
example, in her attack upon the promotion of the stereotype of the ’Eternal Feminine’ in 
theological texts and other cultural media concerning ’woman’. The issue of difference is 
formulated in Daly’s work in terms of the proposition that the symbolic crucible from which all 
forms of patriarchal discourse (including theology) and socio-political economy emerge, is an 
idealised, abstract asymmetry between the ’masculine’ (seen to be represented and embodied by the 
signifier ’men’) and the ’feminine’ (seen to be represented and embodied by the signifier ’women’). 
The postulation of a symbolic difference between women and men does not necessarily infer, in 
and of itself, the superiority of one side of the sexual equation over the other. However, as Daly 
shows ’the fixed images of masculine and feminine have been used to further her [woman’s]
exploitation’!" In her criticism of the history of Christian theological discourse in The Church and 
the Second Sex, she shows that the symbolic gender asymmetry postulated to exist between the 
sexes has been traditionally organised in hierarchical terms, such that women’s ’sexual difference’
42from males has become a mark of negativity and péjoration.
This is a position from which Daly never fundamentally wavers. In Bevond God the Father 
she roundly rejects the rhetoric of ’innate characteristics,’^ '^  recording her support for the work of 
the radical feminist Ann Koedt who re-asserts the insight that ’biology is not destiny’ and that
38 De Beauvoir, op. cit., p.29.
39 Keefe, Teny Simone de Beauvoir: A Study of her Writings (London: Harrap, 1983) p.98.
40 See the distinction between sex and gender in Gvn/Ecolosv pps. 26-27, p. 168.
41 The Church and the Second Sex p.72.
42 A fact noticed in earlier centuries by so-called ’first-wave’ feminists.
43 Beyond God the Father p. 121.
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’male and female roles are learned’?'^  In the ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’ that accompanies 
the 1975 re-edition of The Church and the Second Sex. Daly writes that ’the polaiization of the 
sexes into "aggressive" as opposed to "passive" personalities is primarily the effect of socialization 
processes, which have created exaggerated and mutilating "psychological" differences between the 
sexes, having little or no causal basis in innate biological differences’?^
Daly’s position is coincident with the political position of early radical feminists who 
tended to emphasise the point that biological differences have no determining effect upon 
personality traits and should not be socially significant. In the late 1960s in fact groups such as the 
New York Radical Women and the Redstockings, as well as such writers as Shulamith Firestone, 
Kate Millett and Grace Ti-Atkinson stressed that the similarities between men and women are 
greater than the differences, that men have used the differences arising in reproduction to oppress 
women and to define them in inferior terms. In this early radical feminist view women must fight 
to end this male supremacy and work toward a society in which gender distinctions lose their 
social significance.
One senses that Daly, like other feminist writers, draws sustenance from the sheer weight 
of evidence that the French writer maishals, from across the spectrum of disciplines, in support of 
her claims that women’s existence in society is confined and limited in ways that are oppressive to 
them. The method of unearthing, organising and bringing into critical focus materials ^^at in many 
cases have not been deemed worthy of scholaiiy attention is now a standard feminist approach. 
However, in the late 1940s - when The Second Sex appeared - such an approach to the ’women’s 
question’ was novel. Indeed, the unprecedented range and depth of de Beauvoir’s probing partly 
explains both the discomfort and the acclaim that the book aroused on publication. (In France the
46book was placed on the Roman Catholic Index of forbidden works). In The Church and the 
Second Sex Daly is clearly influenced by the systematicity with which de Beauvoir uncovers and 
synthesises the social facts concerning women’s historic oppression. Though her own 
philosophical roots lay in another tradition, she plays down the philosophical differences between 
herself and de Beauvoir. She considers it pointless to attempt to combat Beauvoir’s abstract
44 Ibid., p. 124. The politics of early radical feminism may have re-confirmed Daly’s conviction that 
biological differences have no determining effect upon personality traits and, therefore, should not be 
socially significant. For a more contemporary restatement of the argument that the belief in innate difference 
is no part of radical feminist theory see Catherine MacKinnon ’Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: 
Toward a Feminist .Turisprudence’ Signs: A Journal of Women. Culture and Societv volume 8, no.4 Summer 
1983 p.639.
45 ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’The Church and the Second Sex p.34. C.f.: Beyond God the Father 
p.121. For a discussion of the scientific basis for this view see Ann Oakley Sex. Gender and Societv 
(London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972).
46 See Reneé Winegarten Simone de Beauvoir: A Critical View (Oxford: Berg, 1988) p. 82.
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existentialist theses from the perspective of an alternative ontology, because this would not alter 
the fundamental facts of the matter: for women would still constitute the ’second sex’.
In The Church and the Second Sex Daly is clearly aware of the danger that her Christian 
faith may bring her into conflict with de Beauvoir. For de Beauvoir, as for Sartre (and Nietzsche 
before them), the denial of God’s existence is crucial in securing the freedom and transcendence 
that distinguishes human existence from ’mere being’Indeed, religion is seen in this philosophical 
system as one of the classic ways in which human beings have alienated themselves by abrogating 
the responsibility that their basic freedom brings. That they have done so is due, in large measure, 
Sartre thinks, to the way in which theologians have encouraged the idea that, once created by 
God, the ’essence’ or ’nature’ of human being is static, fixed and immutable.
The foundational atheism that lies at the heart of Sartrean existentialism has never been a 
live option for Daly (either before or after her departure from the Church). Whilst acknowledging 
the conflict of assumptions and interests between herself and de Beauvoir, however, Daly 
forswears any ’a priori’ rejection ofThe Second Sex simply on the grounds that it a product of 
atheism. Such a ’defensive stance’ would, she avers, be ’naive and pietistic^^ In fact she considers 
several of de Beauvoir’s existentialist ideas to be ’salient’ to ’the problem of women’.
Let us return to The Church and the Second Sex. Whilst Daly considers several of de 
Beauvoir’s existentialist ideas to be ’salient’ to ’the problem of women’, she is very careful to 
dissociate herself from de Beauvoir’s existentialist philosophical perspective. So: it is Inodern 
evolutionary theory' rather than existentialist philosophy that makes the notion of an immutable 
human nature untenable,'^^ As she writes:
Believing Christians also see man as an evolving being. Moreover, even if it is 
legitimate to speak of a human ’nature’, this does not imply possession of an exhaustive or 
even exact knowledge of this ’nature’ through some mysterious process of abstraction of 
essences. Man’s knowledge of man is also continually evolvingf^
Note here the ambiguity with regard to the discourse of ’nature’. On the one hand, Daly disputes the 
existentialist presupposition that belief in God commits one to the idea of an immutable or fixed  
human nature, though she does not develop a supporting argument.^° She points out that some 
Christians also consider human being as open-ended and liable to change and even transformation. 
She is critical of those who attempt to read off from ... the content of what they perceive as different 
male and female natures. On the other hand, she is cautious about jettisoning the concept of ’nature’
The Church and the Second Sex p.
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altogether.^^ She is not convinced, as de Beauvoir, that the discourse of ’nature’ is entirely vacuous; 
there is a sense in which she wishes to retain the discourse, albeit in a radically modified form. (In 
an earlier passage, for example, she is quite happy to write that what is most characteristic of the 
human being is the ’vocation...to dominate "nature"Fol lowing  on from this Daly grounds her 
agreement with de Beauvoir, on the question of the socio-historical and cultural origins of gender, 
by a similaiiy empirical appeal to ’developments in modern philosophy and in the social sciences 
and psychology’?^  She writes: ’... our awareness of the profound and subtle effects of conditioning 
upon the human personality is continually increasing. There is an impressive stock of evidence in 
support of de Beauvoir on this point,... the concept of woman is changing whether one is 
existentialist or not’ Moreover, the fact that polarity between ’masculinity’ and ’femininity’ has 
been an important factor in the oppression of women is ’demonstrable, as de Beauvoir among others 
has shown’ - the implication is through their gathering of empirical evidence across a number of 
fields.
In Daly’s writings afterThe Church and the Second Sex Daly continues to re-affirm the idea 
that feminists must remain ’open to the data of experience’?^  In the ’Feminist Postchristian 
Introduction’ , for example, she admits that ’it is still unknown’ whether ’genetic factors dispose boys 
to be more aggressive than girls’?^  Thus Daly’s view concerning the relative roles played by ’nature’ 
and ’nurture’ is supported by an appeal, not to the tenets of existentialist philosophy, but to what is 
’known’ (the inference is) by science.
What is significant for our purposes is not that Daly should concur with de Beauvoir on 
these ideas, then, but the grounds upon which she does so. Daly thus grounds these ideas not in any 
tacit acceptance of de Beauvoir’s existentialist schema, but in the ’stock of evidence’ provided by the 
natural and human sciences. That the foundations for Daly’s support for a distinction between sex 
and gender are provided by empirical science, rather than by the assumptions of existentialist 
philosophy, is significant in as much as it implies the existence of serious philosophical differences 
between de Beauvoir and Daly. I submit that both Daly’s appeal to ’science’ and empirical evidence 
and the ambiguity with regard to jettisoning the concept of nature altogether suggest that Daly’s 
work is underpinned at this point by a prior commitment, to the Thomist theology and philosophy
^0 Ibid.
51 The Church and The Second Sex, p. 71. Whilst Daly uses the name of science to justify her position she 
does not rehearse the scientific arguments in any detail.
The Church and The Second Sex, p. 55.
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with which she was then engaged in researching in Fribourg. The influence upon Daly of Aquinas’ 
thought will be explored in detail in the chapter three. Here, however, I simply wish to point out the 
significance of the fact that during the 1960s Daly was firmly entrenched in a Thomistic 
philosophical-theological worldview.
In the thesis in Sacred Theology, entitled The Problem of Speculative Theolosv ( 1963). Daly 
argues, on strict theological grounds, that theologians have a responsibility to take into account 
whatever truth comes from scientific study in the formulation of theological propositions (the 
question of woman’s nature being a part of theological anthropology)?^ This conclusion is grounded 
in her attempts to mediate a rapprochement between theology and the ’secular’ science, both human 
and natural. The raison d'etre for such a rapprochement is to be found in Aquinas’ conception of the 
’speculative^^ nature of theology, particularly in his idea that creatures can be ’sources of theological 
k n o w l e d g e T h e  attempt to build up a rapport between theology and the scientific enterprise, as 
well as with ’profane’ culture’ is not just a possibility but ’an obligation of the theologian’. As Daly 
explains: ’for a theology which is "open" to the natural world is by this fact committed to an 
acceptance of whatever relevant truth may become available from this level’ There can be no 
isolation for the theologian in Scripture, in other words, no flight from the challenges of the natural 
sciences and philosophy. Theology must be fully and truly oriented to the world. In order to 
formalise a theological anthropology of ’woman’, then, it is necessary not only to consult the work of 
past and present theologians but also to take heed of the evidence and conclusions emanating from 
contemporary scientific studies.
To summarise the argument: with regard to the question ’what is woman?’ there is, on one 
level, complete unanimity between de Beauvoir and Daly. In The Church and the Second Sex Daly 
agrees with de Beauvoir’s renunciation of the idea of immutable ’nature(s)’ and her affirmation that 
to all intents and purposes, ’woman’is the product of social. I have also argued, however, that there 
are no grounds for assuming, purely on the basis of this, that Daly also accepts Beauvoir’s 
existentialist presuppositions. For whilst both writers arrive at the same conclusion the route each 
follows in order to get to this position is quite different. This is, I think, significant. De Beauvoir 
begins with the existentialist schema and produces empirical evidence to support her conclusions.
It is significant, for example, that her commitment to the ontological assumption that, in Sartre’s
57 Ibid., p.25
Speculative’ theology is theology that is concerned mainly, though not exclusively, with the attainment of 
an intellectual knowledge of God.
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words, ’existence precedes essence’?^  precedes her empirical enquiry in The Second Sex. Once 
stated de Beauvoir proceeds to interpret many different kinds of things in terms of this apparatus.^^ 
In recording her agreement with Beauvoir on the issue of immutable natures and the 
accompanying issue of the importance of sex-role socialisation in the construal of ’woman’, 
however, Daly adopts a cautious and critical attitude with respect to the existentialist ontology that 
underpins Beauvoir’s reasoning. Whilst Beauvoir uses empirical evidence to bolster her pre- 
established existentialist presuppositions, Daly relies solely upon the former. As I have indicated, 
however, this attitude may be underpinned by a prior commitment to Thomist assumptions which 
may mean that Daly draws upon empirical evidence to reinforce her interpretation of certain 
Thomistic presuppositions (for example that ’nature’ is not static but dynamic and open to 
transformation).
Thus far I have argued that what is appropriated by Daly is not de Beauvoir’s existentialist 
ontology but the more ’empirical’ aspects ofThe Second Sex, particularly the criticisms of the 
Church’s role in perpetuating female oppression. I want now to address the work on one 
commentator who has put forward a contrary aigument, viz., that, in her reading o fThe Second Sex. 
Daly does assimilate de Beauvoir’s upon existentialist philosophical assumptions.
In a doctoral thesis entitled Een Passie voor transcendentie: Féministe théologie en 
moderiteit in her denke van Mary Daly, the Dutch scholar Anne-Marie Korte claims that Daly has 
assimilated certain key philosophical assumptions from Beauvoir’s existentialist thought. Korte 
focuses her enquiiy on the philosophical continuities that exist between Dalv’sThe Church and the 
Second Sex and The Second Sex, though she contends that Beauvoir’s ’existential-philosophical 
feminism has been determinative for the development of Daly’s feminist questions both earlier and 
in her later works’ P  (My italics). Whilst there is no evidence to suggest that Daly has been directly 
influenced by Sartre’s philosophy, Korte argues that Sartrean existentialist ideas and assumptions 
were mediated to her through her reading o fThe Second Sex. Korte’s thesis has radical 
implications. She argues that Daly’s interaction with Beauvoir’s work involves her in perpetuating 
certain ’masculinist’ assumptions that are embedded in the Sartrean existentialist frameworl^'’^ 
Specifically, the Sartrean dichotomy of transcendence-immanence, that is central to Beauvoir’s
61 Sartre, op. cit., p.25.
Keefe, op. cit., p.99.
63 Korte, op. cit., p.413.
64 For a discussion of the masculinist assumptions pervading existentialist discourse see Moira Gatens, op. 
cit.; Margery L. Collins and Christine Pierce ’Holes and Slime: Sexism in Sartre’s Psychoanalysis’ in Carol 
C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation (Perigree); 
Caroline Whitbeck ’A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology’ in Carol C. Gould (ed) Bevond Domination: 
New Perspectives on Women and Philosophv (Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1984), pp. 64-85; and
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account of woman as the Other, is inextricably connected, in Sartre’s thought, with the category of 
sex.^^
Korte’s principle idea is that Daly builds upon Beauvoir’s use of the dichotomy 
’transcendence/immanence’ as ’an interpretative framework for understanding and reflecting on the 
situation of women from their own perspectives’?^  In this framework human life is conceived of, 
Korte writes, as ’a dialectics of "being free to" [freedom] and "being conditioned by" [facticity]’. 
Korte recognises the utility of a framework which is able to ’interpret women’s existence in terms of 
restrictions and transcendence thereof, but alleges that poses problems for feminists. She links the 
source of these problems back to Sartre upon whose ontologv The Second Sex is predicated. She 
writes:
In Sartre’s thinking, the oppcsition transcendence/immanence is connected in various ways 
with the category of ’sex’. The basic ontological relation between consciousness and being, 
as well as the borderline concepts in his ontology, God and ’the slimy’, are presented in terms 
of masculine versus feminine.
In Sartre’s thinking the ’slimy’ represents neither the transparent fluidity of water (which may 
symbolise the dynamism and lucidity of the ’for-itself’) nor the opaque mass-ive quality of rock 
(which may symbolise the inert facticity of the ’in-itself). Instead the slimy symbolises the 
possibility that the ’in-itself might absorb the ’for-itself. Thus iiBeing and Nothingness Sartre 
writes of the slimy in terms of ’ a soft, yielding action, a moist and feminine sucking’?^  The thought 
of the ’for-itself being sucked in to the slimy, down to the realm of facticity, horrifies him. He 
unravels what he calls the ’ snare of the slimy’ in terms of ’a fluidity which hold me and which 
compromises me’?^  Slime is thus ’the revenge of the In-itself. A sickly-sweet, feminine revenge 
Sartre talks of ’revenge’ here because the usual relation of the For-itself to the In-itself is for the 
former to absorb the latter in its pursuit of value. In the case of that quality of being designated as 
the slimy, however, the opposite tendency applies and the For-itself is in permanent danger of being 
drawn down into its ’clinging softness’?'
Nancy Hartsock, op. cit., p. 286ff.
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This connection between the dualism of transcendence/immanence and the category of ’sex’ 
is reproduced by de Beauvoir in The Second Sex. Here Beauvoir links the female and her sex desire 
to qualities which align her to the ’in-itself. Thus the feminine is described by de Beauvoir in terms 
similar to Sartre’s description of the slimy. Feminine desire is, she writes: ’the soft throbbing of a 
mollusc ... woman lies in wait like a carnivorous plant, the bog, in which insects and children are 
swallowed up. She is absorption, suction, humus, pitch and glue, a passive influx, insinuating and 
viscous... ’ 7^  Masculine desire is something altogether different and reminiscent of the ’for-itself. 
She writes:
A man reaches out towaids his partner, but he himself remains at the centre of this activity, 
being, on the whole, the subject as opposed to objects that he perceives and instruments 
that he manipulates; he projects himself towaids the other without losing his independence; 
the feminine flesh is for him a prey, and through it he gains access to the qualities he desires, 
as with any object.
Even here, then, in the most intimate aspects of human being woman is seen to be tied to 
immanental being whilst man’s desire is consonant with the quest for transcendence that Beauvoir 
wishes to valorise.
In re-producing the hierarchical dualistic notion of transcendence-immanence, Korte argues, 
Daly inadvertently reinscribes Sartre’s negative assumptions regarding the female sex. Whilst she 
does not use the term ’male-stream’, her argument is to the effect that Sartrean existentialism is a 
product and reflection of what I have called male-stream culture and that Daly’s dependence upon 
Beauvoir (and, by implication, Sartre) makes her own work inherently problematic from a feminist 
perspective.
Does Daly tacitly assimilate the existentialist schema as Korte suggests? I do not believe so.
I have already shown that in The Church and the Second Sex Daly distances herself from de 
Beauvoir’s existentialist philosophy. In order to fully establish my case I shall now extend my 
analysis to embrace Daly’s subsequent feminist works.
As we have seen, the linchpin of Korte’s argument is the stipulation that Daly replicates de 
Beauvoir’s conception of ’transcendence’. In a way analogous to de Beauvoir, Daly wishes to see 
women realise their capacity for ’transcendence’. However, the meaning of this term, in Daly’s 
writings, is quite different to the meaning put forward by de Beauvoir in The Second Sex. This 
difference is to be explained by the fundamentally different ontological frameworks within which
72 De Beauvoir, op. cit., p.407.
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each writer operates - a fact to which I have already alluded. Let us look first at the ontological 
framework in which de Beauvoir’s idea of transcendence acquires meaning.
As we have seen, for Beauvoir the concept of transcendence finds its meaning in a 
thoroughly dualistic ontology in which it is valorised over and against immanence. Yet this is only 
one of a whole series of dualisms that pervade the Sartrean existentialist framework. Other pairs 
include authenticity/bad faith, freedom/ compulsion, subject/object, culture/nature, 
essential/inessential and, of course, masculine/feminine. This dualistic understanding of the 
structure of reality follows in the philosophical trajectory of Georg Hegel, and Saitre, and in the 
wake of the social anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss (whose Elementarv Structures of Kinship 
was published in the same year as the first volume o fThe Second Sex). Strauss’ principle thesis that 
the transition from a state of nature to a state of culture is characterised by the development of a 
consciousness of what feminists now call ’binary opposition’. For Lévi-Strauss duality, alterity, 
opposition are fundamental and immediately given data of social reality. De Beauvoir draws upon 
each of these thinkers in setting out her philosophical stall. Thus, following Lévi-Strauss she 
considers otherness to be a fundamental category of human thought.^"  ^De Beauvoir accounts for this 
structuralist phenomenon in terms of the Hegelian dialectic. She writes: ’Things become cleai... if, 
following Hegel, we find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility toward every other 
consciousness; the subject can be posed only in being opposed - he sets himself up as the essential 
as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object’?^  Following in the footsteps both of Sartre and 
of Hegel, then, she posits an original aspiration to dominate the Other within consciousness. On this 
account it is only by playing itself off negatively against others that self-consciousness can be 
established. She writes:
At the moment when man asserts himself as subject and free being, the idea of the Other 
arises. From that day the relation with the Other is dramatic: the existence of the Other is a 
threat, a danger. Ancient Greek philosophy showed that alterity, otherness, is the same thing 
as negation, and therefore Evil. To pose the Other is to define a Manichaeism.^^
Yet the process of attaining subjectivity is not wholly unproblematic for: ’The other consciousness, 
the other ego, sets up a reciprocal claim’^  ^In other words, the Other - the objectified consciousness - 
is also a subject self struggling to affirm itself.
In her illustration of the process of objectification de Beauvoir employs Sartre’s 
phenomenology of ’the look’?^  likening the subject self to ’the native travelling abroad’ who ’is
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shocked to find himself in turn regarded as a "stranger" by the natives of neighbouring countries’!® 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre defines the subject-as-object in connection with the possibility of 
’being-seen-by another’. This other fixes one under its ’loot® such that one cannot enjoy authentic, 
autonomous subjectivity. When we internalise what the look conceives us to be we are effectively 
trapped by another consciousness. He writes: ’It is in and through the revelation of my being-as- 
object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject. For just as 
the Other is a probable object for me-as-a-subject, so I can discover myself in the process of 
becoming a probable object for only a certain subject’?' Thus he writes: ’It is by the very fact of 
being that I exclude the Other. The Other is the one who excludes me by being himself, the one 
whom I exclude by being myself’?^  One comes to see the Other as the embodiment of all the 
negative qualities which one wishes to do away with, or, as Sartre has it: ’The Other becomes then 
that which I make myself not-be’?^  In the quest for self-identity, therefore, one comes to perceive 
the Other as the repository of all the negative qualities that one despises.
In her critique of cultuie and society de Beauvoir applies Sartre’s dialectic of consciousness 
as part of her account as to why society is male-centred (andi'ocentric) and male-dominated. Now it 
should be noted that, for de Beauvoir, it is not the inherently conflictual nature of consciousness that 
constitutes the crux of the problem for women. For conflict is simply a ’given’ of consciousness and 
must be accepted. So de Beauvoir writes: It is easy to see that the duality of the sexes, like any 
duality, gives rise to conflict. And doubtless the winner will assume the status of absolute’?''Some 
degree of friction between men and women is therefore to be expected by virtue of the fact that men 
and women constitute each other as others. This in itself does not constitute the essence of the 
problem of women’s status as Other.
The real problem, she considers, is that the duality has not been marked by reciprocity; on 
the contrary, there is an absoluteness about the collective Otherness of woman in comparison to 
other social groupings. Referring to these groups de Beauvoir notes: ’... wars festivals, trading, 
treaties, and contests among tribes, nations, and classes tend to deprive the concept Other of its
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absolute sense and to make manifest its relativity... [such that] willy-nilly, individuals and groups 
are forced to realize the reciprocity of their r e l a t i o n s [ M y  emphasis]. Reciprocity of a kind - that 
is, one forged ’sometimes in enmity, sometimes in amity, always in a state of tension^^ - is able to 
emerge, de Beauvoir thinlcs, if and when the two human categories that aspire to impose their 
sovereignty upon the other ’are able to resist this imposition’?^  De Beauvoir notes that women have 
never been able to resist men’s imposition of their sovereignty and wonders why this should be?  ^
Comparing the oppression of women with the status of minority groups - ’the American Negroes’, 
’the Jews’ and ’the proletariat’ - she claims that whilst the oppression of these groups is the result of 
historical events the relegation of women to the status of the Other has a primordial aspect to it. She 
believes that the androcentric categorisation of women as Other transcends both history and culture. 
Women have been subordinated to men ’throughout history’ such that ’their dependency is not the 
result of a historical event or a social change’ but was instead symptomatic of an ontological 
dualism^® such that: ’This has always been a man’s world®? Women have, she thinks, ’no past, no 
history, no religion of their own; and they have no such solidarity of work and interest as that of the 
proletariat’.®* Moreover they are scattered among the male population; separated economically from 
each other because their primary allegiance is not to each other but to men, especially men of their 
own class because their social status is derived from these men. Women thus find themselves ’living 
in a world where men compel her to assume the status of the Other’ Women are forced into the 
role of being-in-itself; men assume the autonomous standpoint of the for-itself. Man attempts ’to 
stabilize her as an object and to doom her to immanence since her transcendence is to be 
overshadowed and forever transcended by another ego ... which is essential and sovereign’?^  
Beauvoir rereads the history of human society in terms of this model. In this paradigmatic 
interpretation of history woman is: ’defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with 
reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, 
he is the Absolute - she is the Other’ .®^*
When we turn to Daly’s writings it becomes evident that the concept of transcendence 
acquires its meaning as part of a completely different, non-dualistic philosophical-theological
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context in which ’Be-ing’ has no ’over against’ or ’Other’. (In Daly’s feminist thought, of course, ’Be­
ing’ is synonymous with that which she formerly termed ’God’ and now calls, among other things, 
the ’Goddess’). She writes: ’This Verb - the Verb of Verbs - is intransitive’, that is, ’It need not be 
conceived as having an object that limits its dynamism’?^  In Daly’s view of reality there is nothing 
that can stand opposed to ’Be-ing’. ’Be-ing’ is not a member of any class or genus for, in so far as it 
connotes the very giv-ing of existence, it is absolutely transcendent to every-thing that is ’in’ 
existence. It is quite simply ’nonreifiable’!  ^Even ’nonbeing’ or ’nothingness’ (in Daly’s vocabulary) 
does not stand over against Be-ing, for nonbeing is a privation of being rather than its negation.
Interestingly, Daly articulates the idea of ’Be-ing’ as that which has no Other by making a 
contrast between Sartre’s notion of humankind’s desire to be God and her own understanding of the 
human connection to God or Be-ing. For Sartre man instantiates ’the desire to be God’ in the 
attempt of the ’for-itself to attain unity with the ’in-itself. Sartre sees this phenomenon at work in his 
analysis of ’possession’!^  Commenting upon Saitre’s formulation of this desire Daly writes:
When Sartre wrote that ’man [sic] fundamentally is the desire to be God,’ he was saying 
that the most radical passion of human life is to be a God who does not and cannot exist.
The ontological hope of which I am speaking is neither this self-deification nor the 
simplistic reified images often lurking behind such terms as ’Creator’, ’Lord’, ’Judge’, that 
Sartre rightly rejects. It transcends these because its experiential basis is courageous 
participation in being.
Be-ing is not some-thing ’graspable’ or ’manipulable’ by us, but rather a ’Verb in which we 
participate’.®® For Daly, then, the quest for transcendence is implicit in our participation in Be-ing.
This non-dualistic ontological scheme is reflected in Daly’s construal of the problem of 
female Otherness. Let us begin then by considering Daly’s position inBevond God the Father. Daly 
maintains that for the patriarchal mindset women as a group represent the ’Other’, ’the primordial 
scapegoat’, ’The Enemy’ to be fought, captured and subjugated by men. The roots of this 
conceptualisation, she suggests, lies in ’an alienative opposition of opposites’, an ’"On top" thinking, 
imagining, and acting’*®® or ’machismo ethos*®* that has penetrated into the depths of the human 
psyche. This ethos, she argues, ’creates a web of projections, introjections and self-fulfilling
95 Bevond God the Father p. 34
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prophesies. It fosters a basic alienation within the psyche that is then projected onto "the Other'”
The question arises, of course, as to what engendered the myth of female Otherness in the first 
place. Drawing upon the work of Erich Neumann in depth psychology'®^ Daly summarises the 
(pathological) 'psychological climate' that spawns such an attitude. She writes:
For 'mass m an '... evil cannot be acknowledged as one's own evil, since consciousness is too 
weakly developed to deal with such an internal conflict. Therefore, evil is experienced as 
something alien. The outcast role of the alien is important as an object for the projection of 
the 'shadow' (our own unconscious counterpersonality), so that this can be exteriorized and 
destroyed.'®'*
Daly goes on to argue that patriai'chal males direct their 'negativity' or self-hatred outside 
themselves and project it onto women. 'Woman' becomes the original objectification of evil, the 
primordial alien that must be destroyed. The pejorative value that is thereby assigned to women by 
men becomes part of the store of cultural 'knowledge' which is internalised by women, such that 
women actually come to see themselves in negative terms (the 'vicious circle'). It is in this way that 
women become 'colonised', 'divided' beings, who are, 'at the same time themselves and the 
oppressor whose consciousness they have internalised'.'®**
Daly's general term for the tendency towards objectification of another being is 'rapism'. The 
fundamental dynamic involved in 'rapism' is 'adaptable to national, racial, and class differences'.'®® 
The pathological tendency manifests itself also through 'genocide' and 'war', (which together with 
'rape' constitute The 'Most Unholy Trinity' of patriarchy).'®^ In an article published in 1975, entitled 
'A Short Essay on Heaiing and the Qualitative Leap of Radical Feminism', Daly argues for a direct 
'causal connection' between the 'socialization of males to sexual violence 'rapism', and 'the rape of 
the land and water, the rape of the poor, of Blacks, of the Third World' and so on.'®  ^ 'The logical 
extension of the mentality of rape', she writes, 'is the objectification of all who can be cast into the 
role of victims of violence'.'®® But she believes that whilst historically other social groups and
102 Ibid.
103 Neumann Depth Psychology and a New Ethic translated by Eugene Rolfe (N.Y: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
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Nature ’herself are denigrated and exploited as Other, it is male domination of women that functions 
as the primary model and paradigm for every other form of domination.' '®
In Gvn/Ecologv Daly speculates that patriarchal males sense ’something lacking in ... 
themselves’,' ' ' that male subjectivity is characterised by a fundamental awareness and fear of its 
own ’emptiness’ or ’sterility’. She writes: ’This awaieness of emptiness has a causal relationship to 
the rigid role definitions required by patriarchal males, for the male, sensing his inner barrenness, is 
"deeply dependent on the structure of society to define his role"’!'^ Again, at the heart of male 
projection, it is suggested, lies a consciousness that is ’split against itself. Such a consciousness 
’suffers from an inability to reach beyond externals’, it is powerless ’to reach beyond appearances’ 
tending, instead, to try to reduce and fragment the ’be-ing’ that ever evades its grasp'.'** Just as the 
rapist ’breaks into matter, rips and tears, yet moves further from the be-ing of his victim’ so 
patriarchal male impotence ’manifests itself in attempting to penetrate, to pierce into an inner reality 
which the invader yeains to destroy, but cannot even find’.""* The culture that has arisen out of the 
dynamics of this ’split consciousness’ is the ’S and M Society’, the culture of sado-masochisiii'.® 
Sado-masochism is, she writes: ’the normal mode of existence of the patriarchal male, who is unable 
to relate to the inner mystery, integrity, Self of the Other, unable to connect with originally moving 
be-ing’."® Such a dichotomising-reifying-projecting consciousness poses an immediate threat to 
others for: ’To consider a person .... an object’, she writes, ’is fundamentally an egoistic and hostile 
act’.' For Daly it is precisely the hostile tendency to objectify others that has led to the social 
oppression of women and the exploitation of Nature.
Thus far I have shown not only that each writer puts forward a distinct ontology of the 
’Other’ , but that Daly’s theory runs directly counter to that put forward by de Beauvoir in significant 
ways. Indeed, what we actually witness, in the evolution of Daly’s work, is not the absorption of de 
Beauvoir’s conflictual dualism but, on the contrary, a developing critique of this dynamic both in 
human social life and in the relationality between human culture and ’Nature’.
Whilst they both consider the problem of women’s subordinate status to bem some way 
connected to their objectification by males, each construes the causes of female Otherness in 
different ways. The difference between the two writers centres around hierarchical or conflictual 
dualism, that is, the tendency to view reality as a process of conflict and ’death-struggle’ between
110 Ibid., p.46.
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opposing elements."^ The logic that undeipins this structure predicates a hierarchical, non­
reciprocal relationship between the two terms that effectively privileges one term over and against 
another, making its opposite contingent upon it. For de Beauvoir the process of making another 
being ’Other’ is relatively unproblematic, it is a ’given’ that cannot be altered bn an individual level. 
The problem of women as the ’Other’ arises for her because women’s objectification is collective 
and absolute. For Daly, however, it is conflictual dualistic thinking and behaving in and of itself that 
is the crux of the problem of female Otherness. What is for de Beauvoir a characteristic of 
consciousness itself and hence relatively innocuous is, for Daly, a deep-rooted ontological 
pathology.
The term that Daly uses in her ’gynocentric’ writings to describe this pathology is
119’necrophilia’ or ’hatred for and envy of life’. It is a ’telic’ disorder at the very heart of
consciousness. The concept of ’necrophily’ (and its corresponding term ’biophila’) derive from the
writings of Erich Fromm, In his book The Heart of Man Fromm writes:
While life is characterized by growth in a structured, functional manner, the necrophilous
person loves all that does not grow, all that is mechanical. The necrophilous person is
driven by the desire to transform the organic into the inorganic, to approach life
mechanically, as if all living persons were things ... Memory rather than experience;
having, rather than being, is what counts. The necrophilous person can relate to an object - a
flower or a person - only if he possesses it; hence a threat to his possession is a threat to
himself; if he loses possession he loses contact with the world ... He loves control, and in
120the act of controlling he kills life.
Like Paolo Freire who also utilised Fromm’s concept, Daly believes that the presence of necrophily
in the soul makes those who suffer it unable to accept or to recognise the ’be-ing’ of the ’ Other’ in
its integrity. As Freire writes: ’Oppression - overwhelming control - is necrophilic; it is nourished by
121the love of death, not life’. The only way a necrophilous person can relate to the Other is through
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mastery, control and possession. For Daly necrophilia is hierarchical dualism: the quintessence of
122’phallocracy’. Moreover the core of this destructive tendency is ’woman-hating’.
In sum Daly perceives the kind of the self-other relation advanced by de Beauvoir to be 
symptomatic of patriarchal relations. The Sartrean view of the self-other relation as an attempt to 
overcome subjective alienation by invading and subordinating the Other - which Beauvoir employs 
in her theory of woman as the Other - is precisely the view of self-other relations that Daly criticises 
as ’ sado-masochism’. With regard to human sociality it will be remembered that for de Beauvoir, 
whilst we need others in order to come to self-consciousness, we cannot really attain genuine ’inter­
subjectivity’ ; that is to say, we cannot really meet that person in his/her own subjectivity. But we 
find this difficult to bear and try instead to make the other into an object to be manipulated (an 
attitude that Daly argues is sadistic), or we try to make ourselves into objects, we allow ourselves to 
be possessed and used (which Daly argues is masochistic). The only hope for peace between the 
warring categories lies in the hope that each will somehow be able to maintain its subjectivity in the 
face of objectification by another. In Daly’s thinking the very dynamic of ’transcendence’ that 
objectifies another individual or group is considered to be ’demonic’'.^  ^Transcendence is, for Daly, 
not primarily or exclusively about struggle against another. As she writes in Bevond God the Father, 
the feminist myth of transcendence cannot be one of ’conflict and vindication’. Transcendence 
cannot be reduced to fighting another (the ’enemy’ - though active struggle against oppression is 
necessary) because this makes ’perpetual oppression necessary’ Rather, the key to change is 
’integration and transformation’ of the divided selfl^ ® So she writes: ’Our liberation consists in 
refusing to be ’the Other’ and asserting instead "I am" - without making another "the Other". Unlike 
Sartre’s "us versus a third" (the closest approximation to love possible in his world) the new 
sisterhood is saying "us versus n o n b e i n g I n  contrast to de Beauvoir Daly believes that it is both 
possible and necessary to transcend the objectifying consciousness of what she calls, following 
Buber, ’I-It’ and approach the intersubjective communion of ’I-Thou’. Like Buber, Daly thinks that 
there is clearly a social necessity for ’I-It’ or ’technical’ knowledge and thus for some objectifying 
thought. But she believes that such an attitude should not dominate social relations for, when it is 
cut off from ontological reason (’I-Thou’) it ’degrades its object and dehumanizes the knowing 
subject’. Such an experience can only be transformed ’through encounter with another subject, an I 
who refuses to be an It’. She writes:
^22 Gvn/Ecologv p.62.
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If, however, the encounter is simply a struggle over who will be forced into the position of 
It, this will not be ultimately redemptive. It is only when the subject is brought to a 
recognition of the other’s damaged but never totally destroyed subjectivity as equal to his/her 
own, having basically the same potential and aspiration to transcendence, that a qualitatively
127new way of being in the world and toward God can emerge.
128For Daly ’... feminism is not merely an issue but rather a new mode of being’, one that ’portends 
transcendence, not only of the sexism, but also of the conflict’. New possibilities for social 
relation and also for the relation between human culture and the world of nature emerge when 
women refuse to be objectified and instead affirm being.'**® Women must exorcise the demonic 
power in the psyche - the ’masculine subject within’ - that reduces the self to an object'.*" This 
cannot occur all at once; it requires time and a supportive community (’sisterhood’)'.**^ Liberation 
thus comes to be synonymous withpresentization or the coming-forth of women’s be-ing from the 
patriai'chal hinterland of silence, absence or fragmentation.
Daly wants to move in some sense ’beyond opposition’ altogether, a move which is 
impossible for Beauvoir in whose philosophy duality is an ’original’ category. That human beings 
are capable of moving beyond such combative relations follows from her implicit assumption that 
the dynamics of conflictual opposition are not in any way ’original’ to consciousness, as Beauvoir 
holds. There is no doubt that Daly employs the language of transcendence. The essential question is 
does she assimilate the meaning of the word as it is given by Beauvoir, that is, the meaning of the 
word when placed within its semantic context in the web of related signs in the universe of 
discourse known as ’Sartrean existentialism’? I have shown that the answer to this question in the 
negative. By transcendence Daly understands a certain movement, a ’going beyond’ what is already 
attained. This much she (and all others who utilise the word) have in common with Beauvoir and 
Sartre. But beyond this superficial resemblance there is in fact little similarity. As I have shown the 
concept of transcendence in Daly’s writings acquires its meaning - as indeed, does the related 
concept of ’creativity’ - from a philosophical context in which the generous and effusive nature of 
Be-ing is a marked feature. Clearly, then, there are fundamental disparities between the ontologies 
of the two writers that make any argument for their coalescence (such as that advanced by Korte) 
untenable.
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Given the fact that there is no indication in Daly’s writings that she ever actively absorbed 
elements from existentialist ontology how do we account for the allegation that hierarchical 
dualism is present in those parts of Daly’s work in whichshe sets up certain individuals and groups 
as Other? As Marjorie Suchoki observes: ’For all the rhetoric and rationale, it is possible to read 
Gyn/Ecology with a sense of re-projection of alien otherness, now upon males, and hence a
133continuation in the name of feminists of the devastating effects of dualism’. This is potentially 
very serious because: ’Any system which rests upon the annihilation or subjugation of the other, all 
the while paradoxically re-quiring the continuation of the other in order that the attempt to subjugate 
and so remain dualistic might continue, is essentially death dealing, death feeding, and death
loving...By dancing with dualism in any form, do we not court the corollary, necrophilia?’ 
a claim is true it might perhaps mean that Daly is guilty of what I, in my argument, have shown 
Beauvoir to be doing, namely failing to get beyond the dynamics of hierarchical dualism that have 
caused the problem of Otherness in the first place.
In showing precisely how Daly construes otherness in her texts I turn to describe the critique 
of Daly’s work made by Meaghan Morris in a chapter in her book.The Pirate's Fiancée,'**® entitled 
'A-mazing Grace: Notes on Mary Daly's Poetics'. Morris maintains that Daly operates within a 
dualistic framework in which 'good' women are opposed to males and 'bad' women, and that this 
duality between Feminist Selves and non-feminist Others is reinforced through Daly's rhetorical 
practice. Perhaps most poignantly Morris shows that 'at the end of Daly's voyage through the 
maze/haze of patriarchy's deceptions..[we find] yet another image of the evil of Other women':'**® 
the token, the fembot, Athena, the Painted Bird, the totalled woman. The crux of Morris’ aigument 
is that Daly's use of language cannot be sepaiated from a certain politics for: 'the coherence of 
Daly's position is such that the pleasure of the text is bound up with the pleasure of participating in 
the political scenario of the Feminist Western, where good {some women) battles evil (males + 
'fembots'), and where Athena wears the black hat while Artemis wears the w h ite '.'M o rris  gives 
two examples of the way in which the generation of symbolic female Others in Daly's texts in 
reinforced by her rhetorical practice. Both examples draw attention to the way in which an elitist 
structure is woven into the very fabric of Daly's presentation in Gvn/Ecologv: a book in which Daly 
'creates a self-enclosed and self-justified system of thought which disarms criticism by prejudging
^23 Suchoki, Marjorie ’The Challenge of Mary Daly’Encounter volume 41 (autumn, 1980), p.309. 
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her critics and denying their legitimacy. To disagree with her is to put oneself outside the circle of 
the elect for whom the book is written. The critic is, by definition, one of the enemy’
The first example concerns something that happened at a lecture given by Daly in Sydney in 
August 1981. Daly’s speech was interrupted by a woman who called out: ’Mary, you’re not speaking 
to me...'. In response to the woman’s interjection Daly presented her with the choice of either staying 
(and, as Morris elaborates, accepting the speech) or leaving (and rejecting it). What is noteworthy, 
Morris argues, is that Daly refused point blank to ’change rhetorics’ or ’to change the mode of 
énonciation to deal with this new "I" that had emerged by posing Mary Daly as the "you"’',**® That 
is, she refused either to ’address the new "1" on its own terms, or to modify thewe-ness of her 
address in any way’, a strategy Morris describes as ’a schoolroom tactic’, a version of ’identification- 
games’."*® This manoeuvre is ’perfectly consistent with the idea at work inGyn/Ecology that 
discourse is a way of distinguishing those who are For you from those who are Against. Those who 
are For you can share your speech, those who are Against cannot’1'"
The second example afforded by Morris centres upon the passage in Gvn/Ecologv entitled 
’The Dissembly of Exorcism’'.'*^  This passage is an attempt by Daly to ’Dis-Spell’ the Procession of 
patriarchal demons who try to ’blend their voices in our Hearings,’''*'* unweaving their deceptions. 
Daly represents each band of demons as ’ghostly personifications (masks of the Deadly Sins of the 
Fathers’.''*'* Each group addresses the ’Dissembly’ in turn, trying to seduce the Amazons with a 
variety of inducements including offers of help (through psychotherapy, religion, affirmative-action 
etc.), security (health insurance, retirement plans etc.) and the allurements of ’Job Opportunities for 
Assertive Women’. The list goes on. At the end the demons are all undone; some are engulfed in a 
huge cobweb spun by members of the ’Convocation’, others are stopped in their tracks simply by the 
’roaring of the Revolted Hags’ whilst yet other unravel into nothingness. Commenting on this 
passage Morris writes: ’This is not only about the impossibility ofdialogue (between males and 
females, evil and good) but also about the idea that discourse tells you who people ’are’, and if you 
know who they are then you can’t be deceived by their discourse - including their attempts to share, 
to join, to make contact or connect with your speech’.''*® Daly’s discourse is, in other words, marked 
by ’a celebration of Complete Closure constituted by ihtGyn/Ecological speaking-position’."*®
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Morris argues that such a strategy holds affinities with ’romantic theories of the redemptive function 
of Art, and the special nature of Be-ings called Artists’.''*^
Endemic to Daly’s politics, then, is the ’structural necessity FOR a symbol of the Othei'**^  
whether this be ’males’ or certain categories of women. In this Daly’s writing is symptomatic of a 
tradition of (patriarchal) philosophical discourse that produces its own identity ’by projecting an 
image of an Other who lacks that same identity (thus creating that Other in the process)’.''*® Whilst 
Morris does not attribute the generation of a symbolics of otherness in Daly’s writings to Daly’s use 
of Beauvoir’s existentialist philosophy, she makes an interesting and pertinent comparison between 
the function of the image of the Painted Bird in Daly’s writing to that of the imagery of ’holes’ and 
’slime’ in Sartre’s work. She adduces that the projection of the image of evil in other women is 
indispensable to the Gyn/Ecological peaking position’ in the same way that Sartre’s holes and slime 
imagery provides ’the counterfigure which is indispensable to the existentialist system’'.®® Monis 
goes no further than to suggest a structural similarity between Daly and Sartre; she makes no 
attempt to show that the presence of symbolic otherness in Daly is in fact derived from Sartre 
through Daly’s use ofThe Second Sex.'®' Nevertheless the issue of Otherness clearly impinges on 
the subject-matter of the present chapter in as much as it points back to a structural similarity 
between Daly’s work and that of Sartre ... that Daly’s writings are marred by the presence, at various 
levels in the substance and structure of her narratives, of dualism in the form of a symbolics of 
otherness which is structurally isomoiphic with that at the heait of Sartre’s philosophy. Some 
explanation of Daly’s practice is therefore warranted.
What could possibly account for Daly setting up other Others that function as the adversary 
for ’Wild women’? One is hard put to formulate any kind of defence of Daly in response to Morris’ 
critique. Daly is clearly aware that she sets up certain groups as opposite and as Other (to the 
Amazon-subject). It is however a tendency that developed relatively late in her writing career. In 
The Church and the Second Sex Daly incorporates Beauvoir’s idea that women need to escape their 
Otherness by ’raising up their own image’ and attaining historical subjectivity. This strategy 
proceeds from the aspiration to gain what men have enjoyed for centuries, that is, full and non­
derived sLibject-status acknowledged in both law and custom. Later, however, Daly distances herself 
from this Beauvoirian position and begins to advocate that women should embrace ’strategic
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Otherness’, that is, to identify and support those aspects of women’s experience that are potentially 
sources of power and strength. the ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’ to the second edition of 
The Church and the Second Sex (1975) Daly comments on her former position in support of 
androgyny:
Like de Beauvoir, she [Daly] expressed the wish that ’men and women can learn to ’set their 
pride beyond the sexual differentiation’ ... The time had not yet arrived when women would 
learn to set our pride not only beyond but in the sexual differentiation - not in the 
differentiation as defined by the patriarchs (’the eternal feminine’), but as defined b>«5.'®^  
She later speaks of deviance ’from the "norm" which was first imposed but which can also be 
chosen on our own terms’.'®** Feminist women, she contends, enjoy an ’intuition’ of their ’radical 
Otherness’ from patriarchal males and their ’forms/shapes of consciousness, speech and behavior'®" 
that is ontologically positive and psychically therapeutic. Daly thus posits the choice to be Other as 
a strategic political strategy. It is a ’differentiation[that] is affirmed by a series of conscious 
choices’. In Daly’s later writings, then, thet^n^^ women signifies aporgnhaf unity, for it is 
contingent upon ongoing, consciously made choices. It is moreover a unity which arises out of the 
recognition of women’s fundamental difference(s) from the old patriarchal definitions.
To be fair to Daly here there is indeed a ’warrior’ aspect to feminism. As she writes of the 
Amazon: ’The point is that she did not create The War, but rather finds herself in a set-up in which 
fighting is necessary for Surviving. An obvious consequence of this situation is the fact that 
patriarchal males are the enemies of women’.'®® Thus ’besieged F u r i e s f i g h t  back. There is, then, 
an element in Haggard bonding which is "us versus a third", and which is Positively furious, yet 
Crones know that this warrior aspect of Amazon bonding becomes truly dreadless only when it is 
focused beyond fighting’.'®^ But she is quick to point out that the focus of feminists must be beyond 
the fighting. As she says: ’The fighter role of Furies is a derivative status, necessitated by the fact 
that women are the primal objects of patriarchal attack ...The fighting of Furies is effective only to 
the extent that we succeed in reversing the reversal that reduces our Selves to the condition of The 
Enemy’ .'®^
Does this mean that for Daly ’feminism’ is constituted solely by the ideologically pure in 
heart? I think not. As she herself puts it: ’Feminism’, Daly writes, ’is a Name for our
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moving/movement into Metabeing’.'®® This conception of feminism is perhaps the most inclusive of 
any that I can readily summon to mind. And Daly recognises all too acutely the profound differences 
that characterise the women’s movement. Thus she writes:
Since women have a variety of strengths and since we have all been damaged in a variety of 
ways, our yes-saying assumes different forms and is in different degrees. In some cases it is 
clear and intense; in other instances it is sporadic, diffused, fragmented. Since Female- 
identified yes-saying is complex participation in be-ing, since it is a Journey, a process, there 
is no simple and adequate way to divide the Female World into two camps: those who say 
’yes’ to women and those who do not'.®®
It may well be that as Caroline Whitbeck puts it in addressing the same problem:
In arguing that reality should not be understood dualistically, I am not arguing that 
oppositional thinking is never helpful in the continuing struggle to liberate our thinking. It 
may sometimes be important to temporarily reorganize one’s experience in terms ofan 
opposition of the self and the oppressive other in order to liberate oneself from fatalistic 
acceptance of oppression.'®'
If this is the so, then, there is no active contradiction between Daly’s political practice, in which 
from time to time she finds it necessary to encounter other groups as Others against whom she must 
struggle, and her nondualistic ontology.
The significance of the present chapter has been in clarifying the fundamental philosophical 
difference between de Beauvoir and Daly. Of particular importance for Dalyian scholai's is the fact 
that Daly is at no point drawn into accepting existentialist precommitments along with de Beauvoir’s 
criticism of sexual stereotypes. Indeed, the evidence that I have presented so far with regard to 
Daly’s points in quite another philosophical direction. Moreover I have shown Daly’s later alleged 
’essentialism’ to be a misinterpretation of her position. ThroughoutGvn/Ecologv and Pure Lust 
Daly’s analytic emphasis remains focused upon the disastrous effects of sex-role conditioning that 
lead patriarchal individuals to think and act in ways that are profoundly anti-life. The hierarchical 
dualism that pervades de Beauvoir’s thought has never been a simcimdXnecessity in Daly’s theory, 
as it is in Sartrean existentialism though, as I have shown, on occasion Daly - for purely political 
reasons - does indeed set up certain groups (most notably the group signified by the term ’patriarchal 
males’) as the Other to women who are struggling for liberation. In this sense, then, one can say that
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Daly has not engaged with the male-stream tradition of Sartrean existentialism in any significant 
way.
This does not mean that Beauvoir has not been influential upon Daly’s thinking in other 
ways. As I have shown Daly was particularly inspired by the French writer’s functionalist criticism 
of Christianity as patriarchal ideology, most particularly her analysis of the ’myths’ of femininity, a 
theme that went on to feature prominently in Daly’s later woiicBevond God the Father. Gvn/Ecologv 
and Pure Lust. In these writings Daly continues to salute Beauvoir’s work. InPure Lust she writes 
that Beauvoir’s work ’functioned as a beacon among women seeking to understand the connections 
among the oppressive evils they experienced...[it] helped to generate an atmosphere in which 
women could utter their own thought’.*®^ In other words, Beauvoir functioned as a precedent: once 
the unspeakable had been uttered other women were able to begin to think through the problem of 
our subordinate status vis-a-vis men in the social hierarchy. Daly’s assessment is undoubtedly 
accurate. A whole generation of feminist theorists would not have written what they did, in the way 
that they did, had it not been for Beauvoir’s contribution. In the sheer breadth of her analytic vision 
Beauvoir set the feminist research agenda for over three decades and helped to create the conditions 
for a new tide of feminist awareness and activity. Similai'ly, in the Wickedarv. Daly cites The 
Second Sex as an example of the work of ’Be-Friending’: the ’weaving [of] a context/atmosphere in 
which Acts/Leaps of Metamorphosis can take place’.'®® Such a view is plausible and quite 
legitimate; for one may recognise the historical-political importance of a text without necessarily 
sharing its philosophical presuppositions.
162 Pure Lust p.374.
163 The Wickedarv p.64.
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Chapter 3: Thomism
In the third chapter I shall investigate the nature and extent of Mary Daly’s feminist interaction with
Thomistic philosophy and theology. Aquinas was a towering intellectual presence in the Roman
Catholic institutions through which Daly received her early education, and his writings later
provided the subject matter for the two doctoral studies in Thomist theology and philosophy that
she submitted at the University of Fribourg between 1959-66. The theses are available for scholars
to study. Yet the influence of Thomism upon Daly’s work is an aiea of reseai'ch that has remained
largely neglected by feminist commentators. Whilst certain writers have picked up the importance
1of Catholic discourse and worldview in explaining the fundamental disposition of Daly’s thought, 
none have taken the trouble to delve down to the philosophical roots of this worldview (particularly 
in the realms of ontology and epistemology) which lie, for Daly, in an interaction with the 
philosophical theology of Thomas Aquinas and the writings of his later expositors.
2In recent work, Daly has acknowledged the importance of her background in Thomism. She 
notes, first of all, that the philosophical habitus, the intellectual rigour and discipline, that enabled 
her feminist writing was acquired as a result of her Thomist training at Fribourg. Indeed: ’Without 
this training/experience’, she states, ’I could not have 'wiittenBeyond God the Father, Gyn/Ecology,
3Pure Lust, the Wickedary, or Outercourse ’. The schooling in Thomist thinking that she 
undertook between 1959-66 is described as her intellectual ’Labrys’ (a double-headed axe wielded
4by the legendary Amazons), which allows her to ’cut through man-made delusions’. But as she goes 
on to argue, the significance of her study of medieval scholastic philosophy and theology is not
5confined to ’the acquiring of a mere instrument of destruction’. What she terms the ’athleticism of
the mind’ that she developed as a result of her studies functions not only as a critical weaponbut
6also as ’a way of positively reclaiming what was deep and valuable in the tradition’.
1 See, for example, Carter Hey ward ’Ruether and Daly: Theologians Speaking and Sparking, Building and 
Burning’ in Christianity and Crisis volume 39, No. 5 (April 2, 1979), pp.66-73; Lynn Segal, op. cit., p. 18.
2 Daly has also been influenced by St. Augustine, notably his idea that one may seek for knowledge of God 
in the recesses of memory (which in turn reflects the influence of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence and 
the pre-existence of the soul). See the similarity between this idea and Daly’s description of the process of 
anamnesia in Pure Lust p.85.
3 Outercourse p. 59.
4 Ibid., p. 75. C.f.: p. 60.
5 'New Intergalactic Introduction' Gvn/Ecologv p.xxix.
6 Ibid.
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Textual evidence for such a linkage is not hard to find. The most cursory readings of her 
feminist texts shows a clear vein of discursive continuities with Thomism running throughout her 
feminist texts. As we shall see in Bevond God the Father Daly takes up Thomistic constructs (such
7 8as Maritain’s concept of the ’intuition of being’and the notion of final causality) that she 
considered to be useful in illuminating both the politics and the ontology of women’s experiences of 
oppression and liberation. Later, in Pure Lust - which marks a return to an explicitly ontological
9analysis of women’s situation after the ’metaethical’ focus oGvn/Ecologv - she reworks other
10features of Thomist discourse, notably Aquinas’ theory of moral virtue and the theory of angelic 
11substances.
The encounter with Thomism gives a particular stamp to her feminist oeuvre, particularly 
her overt ontological focus which sets her apart from many of the other leading feminist 
theologians. Ontological issues, such as the nature of the real, form an important part of her 
message and this in itself makes her work unusual amongst contemporary feminist theologians. 
When one turns to the listing for Be-ing in the Wickedarv, for example, one finds a 
characteristically Dalyian appropriation of classical Western philosophical language. Be-ing is, she 
writes: T: Ultimate/Intimate Reality, the constantly Unfolding Verb of Verbs which is intransitive,
having no object that limits its dynamism 2: the Final Cause, the Good who is Self-communicating,
12who is the Verb from whom, in whom, and with whom all true movements move'. The idea of Be­
ing in this 'definition' stands to some degree in affinity with classical Western metaphysical notions. 
From Plato, for example, she understands Be-ing in terms of the self-diffusive form of the Good. 
With Aristotle she contends that Be-ing, as the Good, acts in the manner of final cause, drawing 
finite be-ing unto itself wherein it finds it fulfilment and completion. The language in which Daly 
articulates her understanding of reality is not confined, however, to the portfolio of words and 
concepts which are the conventional stock-in-trade of traditional metaphysicians. As her work 
develops she begins to experiment with metaphor and symbols in an effort to evoke, rather than 
simply conceptualise, the ultimately real. Synonyms for Be-ing include the 'Wild', the 'Unfolding' 
and the 'Goddess'. The philosophical tapestry which results from weaving these terms into the fabric 
of metaphysical discourse is powerful, imaginative and compelling.
7 Beyond God the Father p.32.
8 See for example Pure Lust pps. 132, 238.
9 Outercourse p.252.
10 Pure Lust pp., 216-218.
11 Ibid., pp.309-10.
^2 The Wickedarv p.64.
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Within the context of the present study an inquiry into the connections between Daly’s 
feminist theory and Thomism performs two important functions. Firstly, it offers a good example of 
the way in which Daly criticises a prominent Western intellectual tradition in terms of its 
’androcentrism’ (what I have termed male-stream bias). Secondly, it provides evidence for my thesis 
that the interaction between the development of Daly’s feminist theory and male-steam theory is 
more complex than is sometimes thought. For whilst Daly’s criticism of Aquinas is radical, in as 
much as the aforesaid bias penetrates right down to the level of Aquinas’ metaphysical assumptions, 
she continues to draw intellectual sustenance from Thomism and to ’play’ with elements in Aquinas’ 
conceptual grid. Her continued engagement with this paid of her heritage thus lends support to the 
idea that Daly’s understanding of feminist separatism does not preclude an engagement with the 
male-stream intellectual heritage.
The scope for discussion in the space of one chapter is obviously limited. It would be 
impossible to discuss in detail every Thomistic 'survival' that is embedded in Daly's feminist 
writings. I can do no more here than begin a process of excavation which, it is hoped, will go part 
way to filling a gap in contemporary Dalyian research, as well as opening up a vein of possibilities 
for further exploration. In what follows I shall focus attention upon one particular element in Daly's 
feminist thinking: the theme of natural theological knowledge. I have chosen to highlight this aspect 
of her interaction with Thomism because it is crucial to her present feminist theological framework 
and provides a good example of both her synthesising ability with respect to discrete theoretical 
frameworks and the problems attending this activity.
The chapter is structured in the following manner. First, I shall give a brief introductory 
account of the training in Thomistic theology and philosophy undertaken by Daly at the University 
of Fribourg between 1959-66. Thomism was, and remains, a broad movement. A clarification of 
Daly's theological position a this point in her career is important. For though Daly moved away 
from the Thomistic method, the training that she received at Fribourg provides the context for her 
later attempts to bring Thomistic assumptions, concepts and themes into play in her feminist theory. 
The aim of the first part of the chapter is then to provide the reader with some indication of the 
nature of Daly's position within the 'Thomistic spectrum'.
Secondly, I shall move into a discussion of Daly's feminist criticism of Aquinas' 
androcentrism. Daly's first criticises Aquinas' work in the Christian feminist work The Church and 
the Second Sex. She was aware, when writing the book, of misogynist statements in Aquinas' 
writings (for example, that women aie 'misbegotten males'), but she tends to dismiss such 
statements as 'incongruous' with the fundamental spirit of St. Thomas' thought which she considered 
to be essentially supportive of a ‘liberal’ feminist agenda. By the time Bevond God the Father had 
been published , however, a far more serious rupture with Aquinas' thought becomes appaient in her
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criticism of the ’static worldview’ . Ths mentality is precipitated from the idea, central to Aquinas’ 
metaphysics, that true being is coterminous with immutability. It has functioned in a politically 
conservative way because it has facilitated an understanding of ultimate reality as fixed and 
changeless. Later, in Gvn/Ecologv and Pure Lust she extends her criticism of Aquinas' 
androcentrism to encompass his view of the Trinity, which she interprets as an ideologising of male- 
bonding, and the distinction between the orders of grace and nature, which she sees to be 
symptomatic of a 'patriai'chal' subjectivity that takes flight from the concrete and the natural.
Thirdly, I shall turn to address Daly's constructive feminist retrieval of Thomistic 
philosophical-theological ideas, themes and concepts. This 'Plundering' activity, it should be noted, 
talces place in concert with the ongoing criticism of Aquinas. In certain respects her Plundering is 
problematic. Her attempt, in Bevond God the Father, to develop a feminist natural theology utilising 
Maritain's concept of the 'intuition of being' offers a good example. Daly takes up the concept of the 
intuition of being as part of her phenomenological description of feminist consciousness. The
13intuition, she avers, may be interpreted by women as a 'signal of transcendence'. In other words, it 
suggests and evokes the possibility of an order of being which grounds and is yet utterly 
transcendent to women’s existence. Aside from technical incongruities regarding the cognitive 
status of the intuition of being in her work the main difficulty with this appropriational strategy 
centres upon the utilisation of the concept as part of a phenomenological approach. Phenomenology 
begins with the data of consciousness and cannot move behind it to uncover the framework of 
interaction that makes an analysis possible. In other words the phenomenological approach is not 
equipped to explain the conditions of possibility for the encounter between the knower and the 
known that is the subject of description. As I shall attempt to show, Daly makes no attempt to offer 
a philosophical explanation of these conditions but simply refers back to a quasi-Thomistic 
framework of interaction.
Let us begin, then, by considering briefly the background against which Daly was later to re­
engage with Aquinas' thought. Daly first encountered Aquinas' work in 1952. The thought of the 
Angelic Doctor formed part of the required course of study for the doctorate in Religion that she 
undertook at St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana. From that point on, Daly recalls, Aquinas
14became 'my teacher'. It was not until 1959, however, that she was finally able to devote herself to 
an in depth study of Aquinas' thought. In that year she gained a place to study for the higher degrees 
in Catholic theology at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. She had already applied, and been
 ^3 See p. 148 in this thesis. 
14 Outercourse p.51.
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15refused admission to Notre Dame. (Women were forbidden access to courses that led to these
degrees in Roman Catholic universities in the United States). The University of Fribourg, however,
was state-controlled and therefore could not legally exclude women from entrance into the higher
degree programmes. Daly duly completed the Baccalaureate in Sacred Theology in 1960 and the
Licentiate in Sacred Theology in 1961 after which she embarked upon a doctoral dissertation in
Sacred Theology, the subject of which was the question of ’speculative theology’ in Aquinas’
writings. The final examination for this degree took place in the summer of 1963. Daly passed
summa cum laude. On completion of the project she enrolled on the course leading to the doctorate
in philosophy. The ensuing dissertation, on the subject of ’natural’ theology in the work of Jacques 
16Maritain, was defended in the spring of 1965.
Daly trained in Thomistic theology and philosophy at a time when the ’ Neoscholasticism’ of 
the Angelic Doctor reigned supreme in Roman Catholicism. The Thomistic ascendancy in the 
Church was at its height during the 1950s. Since the renewal of ’Christian philosophy’by pope Leo
17XII, in the encyclical Aefemz Patris (4 August, 1879) Aquinas’ work had exceptional and
unprecedented status in canon law, being elevated above all other philosopher-theologians in the
18Roman Catholic curriculum. The Thomistic sun was to set only in the aftermath of the Second 
Vatican Council. Until that point the ’Neoscholasticism’ chiefly represented by Thomism provided 
the explanatory framework for the Catholic world-view or collective ’philosophy of life’. As the 
Catholic historian Philip Gleason writes: ’Neoscholasticism constituted the technical philosophical 
system that could be called on to explain, justify, and elaborate the interlinked, but technically 
informal, set of beliefs Catholics held concerning the nature of reality, the meaning of human 
existence, and the implications of these beliefs for personal morality, social ethics, political policy
19and so on’. During the period 1879-63, then, the Roman Catholic Church employed variations on 
the Thomistic method in framing its response to modern politics and society in papal encyclicals, in 
seminaries, in Catholic educational institutions, and in public proclamations which have great 
significance in major areas of Catholic life. Aquinas’ work had not always found such favour in the 
Church. His writings enjoyed great influence amongst the Catholic hierarchy at the Council of Trent
15 Ibid., p.53.
16 Daly Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophy of Jacques Maritain (Rome: Catholic Book Agency,
196&X
17 The establishment of Aquinas as the patron of studies in Catholic schools actually took place a year after 
Aeterni Patris , on 4 August, 1880 in the encyclical entitled Cum hoc s it .
18 Canon 1366, para. 2; c.f: 589, para. 1 states that; Tn the study of systematic philosophy and theology and 
in the formation of candidates for the priesthood in these subjects, profesors are to follow entirely the mind, 
doctrine and principles of the Angelic Doctor and to consider these principles as sacred’.
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(held at various intervals between 1545 and 1563 ) where they were considered a yardstick for 
Roman Catholic orthodoxy: the Summa even being placed on the alter, along with the Scriptures 
and the Decretals, in order to counsel, guide and inspire the conclave?^ However, his work was then 
largely neglected, along with the whole tradition of medieval scholasticism, as idealist philosophies 
and rationalist philosophies of Cartesian inspiration came to prominence in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Thomism tended to be 
caught between two stools: being perceived by the post-Caitesian rationalists as lacking in 
’scientific’ reason, and by the traditionalists (who were seeking a consolidation ofihe faith after the 
upheaval of the French revolution in 1789) as far too rationalist.^’
A clear picture of the nature of Daly’s theological and philosophical views during the period 
of her training can be gleaned by examining the two doctoral dissertations submitted at the 
University of Fribourg. In The Problem of Speculative Theology: a Studv in St. Thomas Dalv 
defends Aquinas’ ’intellectualist’ approach to theology, criticising the ’antipathy for speculation’ that 
she perceived in the writings of some influential Catholic theologians. Though she does not single 
out a particular theologian, the thesis can be read as a rejoinder to certain ‘voluntarist’ strains of 
metaphysics, notably Maurice Blondel's philosophy of action, with its stress on the 'willing will', 
and the 'intuitionism' of Henri Bergson. From another perspective The Problem of Speculative 
Theology may be interpreted as a response to Barth's famous challenge to 'natural' theology, which 
was still being felt in Catholic circles in the 1950s and 1960s. (Barth, of course, rejected every 
attempt to formulate a natural theology, all philosophical 'proofs' for God's existence, and every 
appeal to the analogy of being or so-called 'analogia entis' (a phrase often used in connection with 
Aquinas' work but which was never employed by Aquinas, the term being popularised by Suarez)P 
Contra this theological position Daly argues that metaphysical speculation, including the inquiry 
into the possibility of 'natural' knowledge of God, functions as an indispensable supplement to
Gleason, Philip Catholic Commission and Intellectual and Cultural Affairs Annual (University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988) pp. 15-25, at p. 18.
20 Aeterni Patris The Studv of Scholastic Philosophy p. 51.
21 For more detail on the decline of Thomism from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries see Leonard 
Boyle ’A Remembrance of Pope Leo XIII: The EncyclicalAefem/ Patris ’ One Hundred Years of Thomism
22 Barth writes: T regard iheanalogia entis as the invention of anti-Christ, and think that because of it one 
cannot become Catholic. Whereupon I at the same time allow myself to regard all other possible reasons for 
not becoming Catholic as short-sighted and lacking in seriousness’. Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark) I, 1, viii-ix. Barth thought that analogia entis meant that with being as a common denominator man 
and God could be placed within the same genus. For Barth’s position see Credo: a Presentation of the Chief 
Problems of Dogmatics with Referenceto the Apostles’ Creed translated from the German by J. Strathearn 
McNab (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1936) (N.Y, 1962) pp.l 1-12, 40; Church Dogmatics II, 1 86-139, 
149-58, 182-93. (tr.63-178). For a response to Barth and useful summary and defence of of analogia entis 
see Henri Bouillard The Knowledge of God translated by Samuel D. Femiano (London; Herder and Herder, 
1969) p.104-112.
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23Scriptural revelation in the theological enterprise. In defence of this position Daly draws upon
24Aquinas ’intellectualisé conception of theology as ’principally speculative’, that is, theology 
understood primarily in terms of the attainment of an intellectual knowledge of God. In doing so she 
accepts implicitly philosophical method and conceptual grid that together make up the metaphysical 
substructure of Aquinas’ thought.
The method of this philosophical approach begins with the common data of human 
experience, the everyday round of observable facts and phenomena. In defending Aquinas’ idea of 
theology as a ’speculative’ enterprise then, Daly does not champion any form of ’rationalism’.
Aquinas was not a theological rationalist. He did not think that the existence of God was self-
25evident. Indeed, he spurned Anselm’s Ontological argument and rejected Platonic epistemology 
with its assumption that the ideal world of Forms is somehow more real than particular objects . 
Instead he worked on the presupposition that all knowledge begins in sense experience. Although he 
could not be classified as an empiricist in the modern sense of the word, the foundations of his 
metaphysics are thoroughly empirical. The aim of the Thomist approach adopted by Daly is to arrive 
at the root causes of things or substances by reasoning beyond (meta) the physical to universal, 
necessaiy first principles. These principles are thence able to illuminate the meaning of being to a 
certain degree. The attainment of a natural knowledge of God, in paiticular, depends upon the 
intrinsic ability of concrete things to point beyond themselves. For Aquinas, and also for Daly at this 
point, the process of reflection and reasoning that takes us beyond the physical can lead to a 
disclosure of the 'existential' dependence of finite entities upon transcendent Being (‘God’). So 
whilst we cannot deduce the existence of God from the word ‘God’ qua Anselm , we can infer the 
existence of God from the structure of the natural visible world (through the categories of motion,
causality, contingency, hierarchy of beings, functionality etc.). This is the so-called 'outer' path to
26God, encapsulated in the famous 'Five Ways' or 'proofs' for the existence of God.
Daly's utilisation of the Thomist metaphysical methodology implies in turn an acceptance of 
the conceptual substructure of Aquinas thought. In lending her support to the notion of 'speculative' 
theology she tacitly accepts, without any real question, a host of philosophical distinctions between 
Being and beings {ipsum esse and entia), and between essence and existence {essentia and esse) in 
created things, between matter and form, substance and accidents, act and potency etc. In fact Daly
23 The Problem of Speculative Theology p. 1.
24 Ibid., p.3.
Summa Theolosiae: Latin text and English translation , introductions, notes, appendices and glossaries 
(ed.) Thomas Gilby and Thomas C. O’Brien (London; Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964-76) la, 2, 1, sed. 
contra.
Aquinas, op. cit., la, 2,3.
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is heir to a host of concepts including: a view of reality in terms of ’a hierarchy of orders of being 
and perfection’; a conception of the beings-Being relation in terms both of participation (which 
means that creatures are wholly dependent of the first cause for their existence) and efficient 
causality (which presumes that creatures are the discrete effects of God’s causal activity and are
27therefore ’real’, ’distinct entities’ with an ’intrinsic ontological principle of stability’)
The mode of Daly’s defence of Aquinas’ conception of ’speculative’ theology allows us to 
place her work in a tradition of Thomist research. During the twentieth century renaissance of
Thomistic thought a range of different interpretations of Aquinas’ writings proliferated within the
28’school’ of Thomism. Daly’s work at this point can be located as lying within the tradition initiated
29by Pierre Rousselot, whose pioneering w ovkU Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas located Thomas 
firmly in the 'intellectualist' camp with respect to his theology of beatitude and his theory of love?’^ 
On a political level Daly used The Problem of a Speculative Theologv as a vehicle to 
criticise anti-modernist tendencies with Neoscholasticism itself. For Daly the conception of 
theology as primarily speculative (rather than practical) functions as a safeguard against the notion 
that Catholic theology can in any way be introverted from the wider social realm. As she writes: 
'Speculative theology in its most profound sense is totally incompatible with ultra-conservatism (the
31"heresy" par excellence because it is most opposed to the life of the spirit) '. As I have already 
indicated, one of Daly's aims in elaborating the idea of speculative theology is to show that 
theological enterprise is intrinsically 'open to the real world, the world of experience' and th a t, as a
32consequence, she argues, theologians must acknowledge the 'need for growth and change'. Viewed 
within the historical theological context of Roman Catholicism during the late 1950s/early 1960s 
then, the thesis can be read as an assault upon the theological stasis that was then associated with 
the forces of reaction within the Roman Catholic Church.
The metaphysical approach defended by Daly in The problem of Speculative Theologv is 
reaffirmed in the thesis in philosophy: Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophv of Jacques 
Maritain. Building upon the foundations laid in her first thesis she inquires as to whether 'the
33possibility of a truly metaphysical knowledge of God' has been adequately established by Maritain.
27 The Problem of Speculative Theologv p.18.
See Helen James John The Thomstic Spectrum (N.Y: Fordham University, 1966).
29 Rousselot, Pierre L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas (Paris: Beauchesne, 1924).
30 For a discussion of this debate within the context of early twentieth century Thomism see Gerald McCool 
From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (N.Y.; Fordham University Press, 1989) pp. 
39-56.
31 The Problem of Speculative Theologv p.47.
32 Ibid., p. 47. See this thesis p.69.
33 Ibid., p. 10.
96
She considers Maintain’s approach to a natural knowledge of God in general, including his addition 
of a ’Sixth Way’ to the ’Five Ways’ of Aquinas and his formulation of the ’Ways of the Practical 
Intellect’. But her principle focus is upon Maritain’s concept of ’the intuition of being’She adopts a 
standpoint basically in support of Maintain’s approach. As inThe Problem of Speculative Theologv 
she finds his affirmation of the possibility of attaining a positive natural knowledge of God
34’authentically Thomist’. Moreover her defence of Maritain is once again contingent upon a prior 
acceptance of the structural features of Aquinas’ system. Indeed, her only criticisms of Maritain’s 
theory of the intuition of being occur in those areas where his adherence to Thomist method and 
principles is in doubt. For example, she holds that Maritain is ’ambivalent’ in what he understands as 
the relation of the intuition of being to traditional Thomist metaphysics. The intuition seems to be 
vital for the metaphysician, yet, in itself, the experience transcends metaphysics altogether.
Maritain’s theory of intuition seems to be, on the one hand, ’pre-philosophical and attainable by non­
philosophers’ and yet, on the other hand, ’it is super-philosophical and transcends the proper sphere
35of metaphysics’. In her response to this anomaly Daly defends the method and approach of 
traditional metaphysics and criticises the apparently facile way in which Maritain appears to think
we can know God (’It is enough that things exist for God to be unavoidable’)?^ She is critical of his 
implicit suggestion that the intuition of being might act as a ’substitute’ (Daly’s term) for the rigours 
of philosophical reasoning in attaining the object of metaphysics (that is. Being qua Being) on the
37grounds that this contravenes Aquinas’ conception of the order of knowledge. As a remedy for 
this problem she suggests ’the development and application of a theory of induction’ pointing out
38that ’there is a basis for this in Thomism’.
In the doctoral theses completed at the University of Fribourg, then, Daly accepts, without 
question, the Thomist metaphysical substructure. Indeed, in Natural Knowledge of God in the 
Philosophv of Jacques Maritain she continually ’tests’ Maritain by comparing his statements and 
philosophical positions with those of Aquinas. It is as though Aquinas is seen by her to be the 
benchmark by which theological orthodoxy and philosophical sense are to be measured. This 
approach to the ’authority’ of the Angelic Doctor reflects the hegemony of Thomist metaphysics in 
Roman Catholic theology and philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century.
34 Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophy of Jacques Maritain. pp. 49-53, p.60.
35 Ibid., p. 40, 44ff.
36 Ibid., p. 126.
37 See Summa Contra Gentiles I, c.4 which again speaks of metaphysics as the last in a list of disciplines to 
be studied and mastered. See also Summa Theologiae 1,1,1.
38 Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophv of Jacques Maritain pps. 47, 130.
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I turn now to my second task, which is to examine Daly’s feminist criticism of the 
’androcentric’ bias ofh&xmagister. The first public expression of opprobrium with regard to 
Aquinas occurs three years after the submission of the thesis in philosophy, in The Church and the 
Second Sex . though she had largely written the book, in draft form, whilst she was living in 
Fribourg. What is important to note is that the criticism of Aquinas, in the book, is conditioned by 
her continuing theological and philosophical fidelity to Catholic tradition.
As an example of Aquinas’ prejudice Daly cites the statement that women are ’defective’ in 
the sphere of individual nature. Aquinas asserted that women were ’misbegotten males’ whose 
existence was due to a fault in the male seed (which was seen as the active formal force in 
reproduction, woman providing passive matter) or to a material disorder or even to external agents 
such as the influence of the south wind. Women are included by Aquinas in general human nature
39but their importance is seen entirely in terms of their role in the reproductive process. She further 
criticises the Angelic Doctor’s idea of marriage and his defence of the exclusion of women from 
Holy Orders on the basis of the ’state of subjection’ that, it is alleged, is natural to the female by 
virtue of her innate intellectual inferiority to men (a state that was not incurred at the Fall but was
40written into the order of the universe).
Commenting on such a view of ’womai’ Daly writes that Aquinas’ ’whole mode of argument 
reveals a naïvely androcentric mentality which assigns what is properly human to the male and
41views sexual union as merely "carnal". Woman is seen as a sort of anomaly'. Nevertheless woman 
had to be absorbed by Aquinas into his system in some way. The result is awkward and ill-fitting, as 
Daly shows in her analysis of his statements regarding imago dei. Aquinas thought that the image 
of God which is found in both men and women is, in a secondary sense, not found in woman: 'for
42man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature'. The 
parallel between the sets man/woman and God/creature is intrinsically unacceptable and clashes 
violently with his original claim that the image of God in its chief sense is found in both sexes. As 
she writes:
If woman has an intellectual nature, then her end cannot be man, for intellectuality is the 
radical source of autonomous personhood ... It is abundantly clear, therefore, that even 
according to Thomas's own principles, the alleged defectiveness of women, both as to their 
role in generation and considered as products of the generative process, becomes extremely 
difficult to uphold. Indeed, in the light of these principles it becomes impossible to uphold.
39 The Church and the Second Sex p. 92.
40 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
41 Ibid., p. 93.
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According to Thomas, it is the intellectual soul which makes the human person to the image 
of God. This is neither caused by the male, nor is it essentially different in man and
43woman.
But the effects of this criticism are muted by Daly’s claim that such statements are incongruous with 
Aquinas’ system considered as a whole. Ultimately, Daly argued, Aquinas’ fundamental principles
44are ’radically on the side of feminism’. She writes:
The discord between the philosopliical anthi'opology of Thomas and his androcentric 
statements is due to the then commonly accepted biblical exegesis, Aristotelian biology, and 
the prevailing image and social status of women. The deep roots of Thomas’s thought - his 
philosophical conceptions of the body-soul relationship, of intellect, of will, of the person, 
and his theological ideas of the image of God in the human being and of man’s last end - 
clearly support the genuine equality of men and women with all of its theoretical and 
practical consequences ... Today, fidelity to truth and justice requires that thinkers who are 
aware of these implications make them explicit, rather than parroting as ’Thomistic doctrine’ 
harmful and untenable ideas which Thomas surely would not propose, were he alive
45today.
At this point, then, Daly continued to defend the integrity of Aquinas’ system over and against what 
she saw as isolated and discordant remarks. Indeed much of her defence of Christianity is based on 
an appeal to Thomistic philosophical concepts of natural law and natural justice above and beyond
46ecclesiastical structures.
By 1973, however, Daly had severed her connections with the institutional Church and had 
rejected the Thomist metaphysical approach. In Bevond God the Father the ideal of equality 
between women and men is retained as a universal moral imperative, but references to Aquinas 
work are more muted and he is no longer treated as an ’authority’ in theological or philosophical 
matters. Indeed, he is treated in the same manner as other religious authorities such as Augustine, 
Martin Luther, John Knox and Karl Barth whose ’crudely dehumanizing texts concerning women’
42 Aquinas Summa Theologiae I 93, 4, ad. 1 ; c.f. The Church and the Second Sex p. 93.
43 The Church and the Second Sex p.94.
44 Ibid., p. 95.
45 Ibid.
46 Roman Catholicism utilises the concept of natural law to decide moral and social issues not directly 
addresed in Scripture. One definition of natural law is ’the belief that there exists in nature and/or human 
nature a rational order which can provide intelligible value-statements independently of human will, that are 
universal in application, unchangeable in their ultimate content, and morally obligatory on mankind. These 
statements are expressed as laws or as moral imperatives which provide a basis for the evaluation of legal 
and political structures’. See Paul Sigmund Natural Law in Political Thought (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Winthrop, 1971).
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47are also criticised. In this and subsequent works, then, there is no attempt at special pleading on 
Aquinas’ behalf and he is criticised in the same manner as other allegedly ’patriarchal’ theologians.
What had happened in the intervening years to make Daly change her mind about the 
’liberatory’ potential of Aquinas’ system of thoughtWhy did the once passionate Thomist now 
forsake her former intellectual commitments? There aie, I believe, two major reasons to account for 
Daly’s shift away from the Thomist framework position: the first concerns the burgeoning impact of 
the new ’radical’ feminism upon her perception; the second concerns the theological implications of 
her departure from the Church.
Firstly, during the period 1968-71 Daly’s feminist consciousness underwent a process of 
radicalisation, partly as a result of her own personal experiences, and partly as a result of her
48exposure to developments in feminist political theory. One consequence of this was a shift in 
Daly’s intellectual allegiances. ’Theory’ across the disciplines was being questioned by radical 
women who found themselves excluded or existing only at the margins of traditional political 
philosophical writing. She began to doubt the capacity of the Thomist metaphysical approach - as
49well as more ’ modern’metaphysical approaches such as Process thought - to address the many 
theological and political questions that were only then beginning to surface among feminist women. 
In such a way she was led to question the whole Thomistic metaphysical schema in a way that 
would have been unthinkable only a few years earlier.
Secondly, Daly’s suspicions regading male-engendered ’theory’ extended to the male- 
dominated institutions of Catholicism. The initial optimism generated in Daly by the aggiornamento 
of the Second Vatican Council gradually dissipated as she began to doubt the capability of the 
Catholic Church qua religious institution to transform itself into the kind of radical community 
envisaged in The Church and the Second Sex. In 1971, she finally left the Church. Daly’s ’exodus’ 
from the Church, coupled with her disillusionment with the methods of Christian theology, 
cemented a radical theological shift away from the biblical context in which Aquinas thinking was 
rooted and through which it was sustained. In Aquinas’ writings Scriptural revelation is viewed to
50be fundamental to sacra doctrina. The perception that Thomism appears to endorse the 
legitimacy, to a limited degree, of 'natural religion' and 'natural theology' is thus only ostensibly true.
47 Bevond God the Father p.22.
48 See this thesis pps.20-21.
49 See her later article: ’The Courage to Leave: A Response to John Cobb’s Theology’ in D. R. Griffin and 
T.J.J. Altizer (eds.) John Cobb’s Theologv in Process (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977).
50 For a comprehensive monograph on the issue of the sources and methods of ’theology’ (encompassing 
both ’theologia ’ or first philsoophy and 'sacra doctrina ’ or ’instruction proceeding from divine revelation’) 
see Per Erik Persson Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas translated from the Swedish by 
Ross Mackenzie (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970).
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Following authorities like Augustine, Aquinas believes that revelation provides the starting-point 
and rationale for theological work. Natural knowledge of God does have a place in sacra doctrina 
because it is not simply a necessary presupposition of revelation but is also confirmed, renewed and 
corrected by revelation. But supernatural revelation gives to theology a content that transcends the
51limitations of philosophy. Aquinas has no place for ’natural’ theology, if by this is meant 
speculation that would take precedence over revelation or exist independently of it and, as it were, 
go half-way before giving way to revelation.
Daly’s disillusionment with the Thomistic synthesis refbcted a wider discontent within 
Roman Catholicism. In the wake of the Second Vatican Council some Catholic thinkers began to 
move in alternative philosophical directions. This phenomenon had been preceded by 
developments both internal to Thomism and in the wider intellectual sphere, in the 1940s and 
1950s, which worked against the Thomistic hegemony in Roman Catholicism.
In the wider intellectual sphere the impact of personalism, of phenomenology and 
existentialism on Catholic theology and philosophy for example was considerable at this point
52(notably in the influence of such thinkers as Heidegger, Jaspers and Sartre). These philosophical 
movements launched a critique of essentialism and promoted a subjective and descriptive approach 
rather than the ’objective’, analytic approach to reality traditionally the preserve of systematic 
metaphysics. The work of the Catholic philosopher Gabriel Marcel offers a good example of how 
existentialism, in particular, was affecting Thomist philosophy in the 1940s and 1950s.
Internally Thomism was coming to be seen more in terms of a spectrum of different 
philosophical and theological positions rather than the monolithic philosophical bulwark which
53acted as guarantor to the Roman Catholic social and political world-view. Thus, whilst the first 
half of the twentieth century can be seen as something of a renaissance in Thomistic studies, the 
emergence of a multitude of different approaches and schools of thought within Thomism weakened 
its authority. The publication, in 1939, of a fifth edition of Etienne Gilson’sLc Thomisme, with its 
new chapter on existence, and of Joseph de Finance’sE/rg et Agir, brought the dynamic act of 
existence to the forefront of Thomistic research. The widespread influence of these works signalled 
that the early conceptualism and essentialism that dominated the early renaissance of Thomistic
51 For Augustine’s view of the respective roles of Scripture and philosophy in theology see Concerning the 
Citv of God Against the Pagans A New Translation by Henry Bettenson with an Introduction by David 
Knowles (Harmonsworth; Penguin, 1972; first published 1467) XI, 2+ 3. For Aquinas’ view see Summa 
Theolosiae I. 1,1;  Summa Contra. Gentiles I, 4; and De Veritate 14, 11.
52 See W. Norris Clarke ’Thomism and Contemporary Philosophical Pluralism’Modern Schoolman 
LXVII/2, pp.123-139.
53 See Gerald A. McCool’s analysis of four stages in Thomistic history in this century (1900-1914, 1918- 
1939 and 1945-1962) in ’Twentieth Century Scholasticism’Journal of Religion volume 58, pp. 198-221.
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philosophy in the first few decades of the twentieth century was coming finally to be replaced by the 
centrality of the dynamism of the act of existence itself in Thomistic interpretations of Aquinas’ 
work. Other philosophical developments in the interpretation of Aquinas’ work included a renewed 
interest in importance of Neoplatonic elements, principally the notion of participation, in the 
writings of Cornelio Fabro, Ferdinand van Steenbergen and, in the United States, W. Norris Clarke; 
and the post-Kantian turn to the subject in the transcendental Thomism founded by Joseph Maréchal 
and Pierre Rousselot.
It was partly as a result of these philosophical developments that Thomism came to be 
dethroned as the dominant force in Catholic culture. The process reached its climax during and after 
the Second Vatican Council, whose ’Decree on Priestly Formation’ omits direct reference to Aquinas
54and mentions only ’the perennially valid philosophical heritage’.
What is novel about Daly’s situation relative to that of other Catholic thinkers at this time is 
that it is a sustained recognition of Aquinas’ sexism that provides the impetus for criticism of his 
whole framework. We have already examined The Church and the Second Sex. Let us turn now to 
consider Daly’s treatment of Aquinas iiiBevond God the Father. Here she singles out for criticism
55Aquinas’ views on prostitution, and regurgitates her former criticism of his view of women’s
56deficiency with regai*d to reason. She argues that in the prevailing social and intellectual climate, 
wherein those engaged in the practice of academic theology are under pressure to bow to the 
wisdom of such ’experts’, these misogynist incongruities have either been disregarded oielse
57glossed over as trifling and immaterial rather than being seen to indicate ’a serious credibility gap’.
In The Church and the Second Sex she had excused Aquinas’ description of women as ’misbegotten 
males’ as inessential, even contrary, to the rest of his system.In Bevond God the Father, however, 
she views the patriarchal context of these kinds of statements as ’deeply relevant to the worldview in 
which such "authorities" have seen other seemingly unrelated subjects, such as the problem of
58God’. In other words, she now considers Aquinas’ view of women to say something about his 
fundamental worldview which, in turn, raises questions about their conceptualisation of everything - 
including God.
Towards the end of Bevond God the Father Daly gives a concrete indication as to the way in 
which she thinks that the substructure of Thomist metaphysics is out of joint. Her central claim is 
as follows: in his understanding of the concept of Being Aquinas draws upon the Parmenidean idea
54 Optatam Totius, art. 15.
55 Bevond God the Father pp. 60-61.
56 Ibid., p.101.
57 Ibid p.22.
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of ti'ue being as essentially immutable. This idea, Daly suggests, encourages a ’static’ understanding
59of God which has then functioned politically so to inhibit social change. This conception of being, 
she argues, mirrors and produces a patriarchal perspective.
Daly focuses her critical attention upon the understanding of ’efficient’ and ’final’ causality in 
classical metaphysics. The concept of the final cause is originally of Aristotelian provenance and 
forms part of the theory of the four causes by means of which philosophers analysed the 
metaphysical question of change and becoming. The four causes are material, formal, efficient and 
final. The material cause is the ’stuff out of which a thing is made, as the wood out of which a table 
is created. The formal cause constitutes that which makes a thing what it is; the ’tableness’ of a table 
is given in a paiticular kind of shape or design plan. The efficient cause concerns the agent of the 
action; so the carpenter is the efficient cause of a table. The final cause is that purpose behind the 
action; in the case of the manufacture of a table the final cause is the goal of having a structure at 
which to eat one’s meals. Another name for the final cause is first cause since it initiates the agent’s 
movement.
The theory of the four causes is, she maintains, the product of ’a society encased in a static
60worldview, lacking any sense of evolution’. In Aristotelian philosophy, for example the efficient
61cause/agent actualises ’a potential that is already present’. Thus it is only by virtue of the fact that
cold water already has the potential to become hot that it can become so. Daly^ point is that such a
62philosophical context forbids the idea that there can be any ’qualitative leap into the future’. Within
63this metaphysic, she writes: ’there is literally nothing new under the sun’. There is a certain 
dynamism, to be sure, but it is circular and nonprogressive.
The same is true of the conception of final causality. The reason why the final cause attracts 
or instils a desire in the agent to act towards a particular end is that the end is apprehended as a 
good. As Daly observes, this idea of final causality would seem to be intrinsically dynamic. In the 
’static worldview’, however, the metaphysical categories of being and becoming form a dichotomy. 
’The Greeks’, she writes, ’ identified the concept of "the good" with the Parmenidean conception of
64"true being", which is changeless and already present’. This means that: T he goal of every action.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., pp.l80-185. C.f.: The Church and the Second Sex p.183.
60 Ibid.,p.l81.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., pp. 181-182.
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65therefore, already is. The future is essentially closed’. This metaphysical schema was appropriated 
by Aquinas who acknowledged a mental though not a metaphysical distinction between good and 
true being. In his understanding of the way in which creatures create Aquinas reproduced the 
Aristotelian view that one can only create from extant matter and only insofar as the innate 
potentiality of the object allows. Daly acknowledges that in his understanding of divine causality 
Aquinas comes closer to a more dynamic view. For, according to his Christian philosophy God 
creates ex nihilo, out of nothing, and sustains creatures in their existence. Indeed, there is no 
distinction between God’s creating and sustaining energies: the essence of God and the exercise of 
God’s powers are identical. The only distinction that pertains here is in the human mind rather than 
in God. God’s causal activity is not therefore dependent, as is that of creatures, upon pre-existing 
matter. This would seem to offer the prospect of an infinitely open future. In Daly’s view, however, 
this implicit dynamism is hindered by the identification of God/Being as the immutable source from 
whom all things emanate and towards which all thing ultimately return.
This worldview represented by Aquinas and the whole classical metaphysical tradition is 
stagnant and immobile. The metaphysics summarised in the phrase 'there is nothing new under the 
sun' has, in turn, encouraged a static society. It does this by 'domesticating' becoming 'under the 
reign of reified "being" which can represent "things as they are" to the consciousness of the
66 67privileged who want it that way', thereby helping to perpetuate political conformity.
Such a metaphysics reflects the Weltanschauung of what anthropologist Margaret Mead has
termed a 'postfigurative culture' in which, as Daly puts it, 'one could look to one's grandparents and
68parents as models, seeing one's own future being acted out in their lives'. But this worldview is 
now culturally redundant. Mead's 'postfigurative culture' belongs to the past. In contemporary, 
culturally pluralist society individuals are more free to create their own life-styles and to formulate 
their own values and goals, often in sharp contrast to those advocated by their forebears. In Daly's 
view the new sense of freedom-toward-the future which has taken hold of the Western imagination 
since the Enlightenment, and particularly in the wake of Darwin's theory of evolution in the mid­
nineteenth century, requires an equally liberating metaphysical base. For she believes that it is only 
by moving towards an understanding of Be-ing as that 'in which we participate actively by a 
qualitative leap of courage in the face of patriarchy", then 'the magic collar that was choking us is
65 Ibid., p. 182.
66 Ibid., p. 184.
The utilisation of the classical philosophical terminology of ’essence’ and ’nature’ in debates to counter 
progressive political arguments with respect to the freedom and rights of women and other persecuted 
groups well illustrates the reactionary uses to which classical metaphysics has been put, C .f.: Pure Lust 
pp.29-30.
68 Bevond God the Father p. 184.
104
69shattered’. Hence her desire, in Bevond God the Father, to change ’the conception/perception of
70god from "the supreme being" to Be-ing’. Out of the ashes of Daly’s criticism of the metaphysics 
of immutable being arises a new understanding of Be-ing. In counterposition to this view of Being 
Daly thinks that the fundamental dynamism of the final cause will only be shown, in terms of 
ontology, when philosophy is liberated from the ’Parmenidean delusory dichotomizing of becoming
71and being’ . In effect this means an abandonment of the Thomist metaphysical grid.
In Gvn/Ecologv Daly continues to criticise the static worldview in terms of the exitus-reditus
72scheme that was central to the work of Aquinas and other medieval Clii'istian thinkers. Here the 
political ramifications of the ontology are developed. She selects Aquinas’ doctrine of the Trinity 
for special attention, reading the 'processions' within the Godhead as 'a circular pattern for muted
73existence : separation from and return to the same immutable source'. But she amplifies this 
criticism by reference to the three 'Persons' of the Trinity all of whom she sees as symbolically male 
(even the allegedly 'feminine' symbol of the Holy Spirit). In her critical reading Daly contends that 
the processions of the Divine Persons is '"sublime" (and therefore disguised) erotic male 
homosexual mythos , the perfect all-male marriage, the ideal all-male family, the best boys' club, the 
model monastery, the supreme Men's Association, the mold for all varieties of male monogender
74mating'. Not only is the Trinity symbolic of the static worldview but this worldview is, in turn, a 
thoroughly masculinist conception. It is both a product and a reflection of the social phenomenon of 
male-bonding. The essential 'message' that it mediates is that social networking and relationships 
between men are validated by reference to ultimate reality. There is, of course, no corresponding 
model for women in their relationships with each other.
In Pure Lust Daly singles out other aspects of Aquinas' work for criticism. In particular she 
attacks Aquinas' concept of beatitude post-mortem and the distinction between nature and grace,
75both ideas that she had defended in her doctoral theses. She notes that for Aquinas perfect 
happiness consists in 'man' employing his 'highest' power (intellect) in order to know its 'highest' 
object (God). But since a knowledge of God's essence is not possible through natural reason an 
'infusion' of grace is needed in order to 'elevate' reason such that it can attain its object. Criticising 
this notion Daly writes:
69 Ibid., p. 189.
70 Ibid. ’Original Réintroduction’ p. xvii.
71 Ibid., p. 183.
72 Gvn/Ecologv p.37.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., p.38.
75 Pure Lust p. 144.
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This idea of happiness after death is a confession and legitimation of male impotence. It is 
by no means a woman-originated doctrine. Women do not experience a need for a 
supernaturally stimulated eternal erection. As impotent beings patriarchal males do have this 
need, which they have erected religiously as the requirement for happiness. It will be noticed 
that the eternal copulation under scrutiny here is a male homoerotic relationship. The sons 
seek union with their male god, who is frozen forever as the dominant partner in this
76pathetically unequal union.
Daly appears to be suggesting here that the traditional Christian doctrine of supernatural grace is a 
reflection of a fundamental and pathological lack in ’patriarchal males’, a lack that makes them seek 
’happiness’ beyond the natural realm of which they are members. This desirds connected 
rhetorically with dominant aspects of male sexuality, specifically with erection and copulation. The 
hoped for union however is between males of different rank, implicitly it is an incestuous 
relationship between father and son. By contrast Daly is more interested in ’the unfolding of our
77own native capacities’. She continues:
... women become increasingly aware that the impediments to our attainment of happiness 
are not innate deficiencies. Wild women do not share the phallocratie male’s problem of 
impotence and thus do not have the need to fantasize an eternal connection with an 
omnipotent being. Metamorphosing women recognize that our happiness is indeed a life o f 
activity . In a special way happiness is activity of the mind, or contemplation. It can include 
many activities: artistic creation, political action, development of spiritual powers, athletic 
activities. These are a few facets of our many-sided Unfolding, our holistic Realization of
7RBe-Longing, that is, our Happiness.
A distinction is made then between the subjectivity of ’patriarchal males’, which is seen as incapable 
of experiencing be-ing in and through the course of their own practical and intellectual activities, 
and ’women’ who are coming precisely to experience the ’Unfolding’ of Be-ing through their own 
acts.
It is in Pure Lust that Daly attacks the self-definition of metaphysics or first philosophy as 
the science of being qua being and questions the way in which philosophers and theologians in the 
Western tradition have attempted to conceptualise or to ’think’ Be-ing (as Heidegger might say). She 
writes: ’Traditionally it [first philosophy] has attempted to deal with the most primary philosophical 
questions. Yet the questions have been framed/confined within parameters that fail to express
76 Ibid., p. 339.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., pp.339-340.
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79biophilic intuitions. They are framed by the word being itself’. What is it in the word ’being’ that 
blocks the most fundamental philosophical enquires? It is the implicit and perhaps subliminal 
reduction of the ultimate verb to the level of finite entity or noun. ’Thought that starts with the noun,
being ’, she writes, ’cannot go behind it - cannot transform/transfer itself into Realms of Metabeing.
80Such thought is stuck, fixated, fixed and thus does not actively participate in Powers of Be-ing’.
She rejects the metaphysical privileging of being over becoming in the Parmenidean tradition in
favour of a metaphysics in which the two are seen in terms of each other. ’Be-ing’ - as she now
frames it - is thus understood to be inherently dynamic, superabundant and constantly unfolding.
Why must "God" be a noun?’, she asks:
Why not a verb - the most active and dynamic of all? Hasn’t the naming of ’God’ as a noun
been an act of murdering that dynamic Verb? And isn’t the Verb infinitely more personal
than a mere static noun? The anthropomorphic symbols for God may be intended to convey
81personality, but they fail to convey that God is Be-ing.
Be-ing encompasses and engulfs with healing power the false dichotomy between "true being" and
82becoming, revealing its unreality. Daly rejects the notion of God as ’hypostasized transcendence’, 
as a being - even a Supernatural Being - which would simply make God an item within the 
universe, a thing among other things, drawing instead upon the language of God as dynamic verb, 
the continual overflowing of Being though ceaseless action.
What then of Daly’s constructive retrieval of Thomistic concepts? In the search for a way 
forward theologically Daly turned back, not unnaturally perhaps, to explore further the central ideas 
in her doctoral theses regarding natural theological knowledge of God. Of special importance to 
Daly's agenda in Bevond God the Father is Maritain's concept of the 'intuition of being' which she 
uses as a way by which to forge a link between ultimate reality and what she perceived as the 
fundamental dynamics of the feminist movement.
To begin with Daly employs the concept of the intuition of being within a broadly 
phenomenological rather than metaphysical frame of reference. Undoubtedly Daly's search for 
alternative theological method and criteria was influenced by the demand for a more 'existential' 
rather than a speculative approach to theological questions that was then voicing itself in liberal 
theological circles, both Protestant and Catholic. Evidence of such a methodological shift is 
discernible in an article, in 1969, entitled 'Return of the Protestant Principle'. At this time Daly still
7QPure Lust p.29.
Ibid., pp. 29-30
81 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
82 Ibid., p. 183.
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identified as a Thomist, yet here she explores the work of the German Protestant theologian Paul 
Tillich in the context of a discussion of the future shape of Christianity. In this article she takes up 
Tillich’s idea of a ’theonomous synthesis’ of Protestant principle and Catholic substance. The central 
problem of faith, Daly writes, is ’the problem of discovering transcendent meaning within limited
83and changing forms of thought and action, within our culture’. Revelation thus presupposes a 
’plane of insight which enables us to discover transcendent meaning in our concrete situation, and to
84transform our situation so that it becomes more transpaient to this transcendent meaning’. The 
plane of insight that Daly refers to here is not made clear, but it would seem to refer to some kind of 
phenomenological approach, that is, an approach that investigates the ’concrete situation’ (described 
by phenomenologists as the Lebenswelt or the lived experience of being in the world) in order 
precisely to uncover the hidden, submerged and obscure structures and characteristics of human
85being.
In Bevond God the Father Daly takes up such an approach as an alternative to the
methodology of speculative metaphysics. Unlike Tillichean phenomenology, however, Daly ’s
phenomenological mapping (later metaphorised under the rubric of the Soul Journey) consists in a
philosophical meditation upon the meanings inherent in the experiences of a particular community,
namely, the ‘women’s movement’. This is because what has hitherto counted as human experience
has in fact been exposed by feminists as a reflection of male experience only. The feminist enquiry
with regal'd to Being then (feminist ontology) will be grounded in the structures of being made
manifest in and through the lived experiences of women, most particularly in the set of experiences
undergone by women in the feminist process of 'consciousness-raising'. This phenomenology
provides an alternative justification for women's continued use of religious-theological language.
The key claim advanced is that the continued use of religious and theological language for
postchristian women is legitimated by the conviction that a manifestation or disclosure of the
'sacred' (ontophony) occurs in and through women's struggle for personal and collective liberation.
The ontological experience through which this disclosure occurs involves an 'intuition of
being'. In Bevond God the Father uses Maritain's concept to describe the second moment of a
unique ontological experience. She writes: 'This experience in its first phase is one of nonbeing. In
its second phase it is an intuition of being which, as Jacques Maritain described it is a dynamic 
86intuition'. Note the order: we experience the shock of the lack of the fullness of being in
83 Daly, ’Return of the Protestant Principle’Commonweal 90 (6th June, 1969), pp.339.
84 Ibid.. pp.339-40.
85 For a description of phenomenological hermeneutics see Langdon Gilkey Naming the Whirlwind: the 
Renewal of God- Language (Indianapolis and New York; Bobbs Merrill, 1969) p. 192, n.2.
86 Beyond God the Father p.32
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consciousness before we are led to an awareness of our participation in being. As Daly noted in her 
doctoral thesis in philosophy, the experience of the intuition of being may follow certain 
experiences, including those such as ’anguish’ and ’fidelity’ that have been analysed by the 
existentialist ontologists like Martin Heidegger and Gabriel Marcel. In Daly’s writings the intuition
87may also follow certain ’ limit-experiences ’ thalshe believes are a feature of feminist living. These
ooexperiences give to women what she calls (following Peter Berger) ’signals of transcendence’:
Daly encourages women to look at their experiences of ’nonidentity’ in patriarchal society in 
ontological terms as the experience of ’nothingness’ or ’nonbeing’. The experience of nonbeing is 
concretised in loss of jobs, friends, social approval, health, meaninglessness etc. Women must face 
these experiences by questioning those roles which have given them such security at the price of 
their inner alienation. Once women perceive nothingness in themselves they are correspondingly 
able to grasp intuitively that this state is not simple negation of Being but rather ^privation , that is, 
it is a lack of ’something’ (Being) that ought to be there. The only way out of nothingness is then
89’self-actualization in spite of ever-present nothingness’.
Daly goes on to show the religio-theological implications of these experiential situations in 
women’s lives. They bear huge symbolic significance insofar as in and through them a world of 
sense beyond oppression is revealed, another dimension to reality reveals itself. This is encapsulated 
when she writes: What I am proposing is that the emergence of the communal vocational self- 
awareness of women is a creative political ontophony . It is a manifestation of the sacred 
{hierophany ) precisely because it is an experience of participation in being, and therefore a
90manifestation of being {ontophony )’. Another way of articulating this point is to say that women’s 
experience of the intuition of being functions as a new affirmative way to knowledge of God. In 
Aquinas’ rendering of the affirmative way God is assumed to exemplify every perfection enjoyed by 
creatures and that therefore any perfection found in creatures that is not by definition limited (such
91as goodness and wisdom) may be predicated of God. This argument is contingent upon an 
acceptance of God as the first cause of everything in existence and also the idea that effects in some
87 The phrase ’limit-experience’ is useful in unravelling Daly’s approach and allows the reader to identify 
the locus of her approach with some clarity. My usage of the the term owes to David Tracy’s work in 
Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theologv (New York: Seabury Press) p. 105-109. For the 
delineation of ’limit’experiences’ in the everyday realm sedPeter L.Berger A Rumour of Angels:Modern 
Societv and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural (London: Penguin, 1969).
88 C.f. this thesis p. 148-149.
89 Bevond God the Father p. 23
90 Ibid., pp.34-5.
91 Ibid., p.38.
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way resemble their causes. In Daly’s neo-affirmative way Daly posits a ’living analogy of being’ in 
the experience of courage that attends women’s struggle for liberation. She writes:
[What] I am pointing to by the use of the expression ’analogy of being’ is the experience of 
the dynamic content of the intuition of being as experienced in existential courage. Women 
now have a special opportunity to create an affirmative way that is not simply in the arena 
of speculation, but especially in the realm of active self-affirmation. Since through the 
existential courage now demanded of us we can have consciousness of being toward the 
image of God, this process can give us intimations of the Be-ing in and toward which we
92are par ticipating. That is, it can be in some sense a theophany or manifestation of God.
In the ’ontological affirmation of self that Daly sees as intrinsic to feminism there is a ’dynamism’
93that ’reaches out toward the nameless God’.
The confrontation with non-being in the feminist process is not the only arena for the 
experience of the intuition of be-ing. In Outercourse Daly testifies that she has possessed, from an 
early age, a quasi-mystical sense for the miracle of ’Be-ing’ in the realm of nature. Indeed, with 
hindsight she thinks that her desire to study Maritain’s Thomist philosophy was really a ’subliminal’ 
desire ’to understand the meaning and implications of my own intuition of be-ing for my own
94philosophical Quest - for my own be-ing’. She relates instances of what she later interprets as the 
experience of this intuition in her childhood and early adulthood. Whilst she lay on the grass one 
summer day, for example, a clover blossom, ’Announced its be-ing to me. It Said starkly, clearly,
95with utmost simplicity: "I am." It gave me an intuition of be-ing.’. On another occasion she had a 
similar experience: ’This time the Speaker was a hedge on the campus [of St. Mai'y’s College, Notre 
Dame] ... The hedge added to the message given me years before. It not only Announced its be-ing
96to me. The hedge Said: "Continued existence"’. Commenting on this ’revelation’ Daly writes: ’The 
words imply something like "I was, and am, and will be.'” . The communication from the hedge was, 
she states, a harbinger of Metamemory, the ’Deep, ecstatic Memory of participation in Be-ing ... 
Spiraling into the Past, carrying Vision forwai'd; memory that recalls Archaic Time, Re-Calling it
97into our be-ing ...’.
There are certain problems with Daly’s feminist theological employment of Maritain’s 
concept. In particular there are difficulties surrounding the use of the intuition of being within the
92 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
93 Ibid., p. 33.
94 Outercourse n.3, p.418.
95 Ibid., pps.23, 41.
96 Ibid., p.51.
97 Ibid., p.52.
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context of feminist consciousness raising. There is no mention, in Daly’s account, for example, of
the ’three intellective leaps’ that together constitute Maritain’s intuition of being: the leap to sheer
existence as it exists independently of me; from this existence to my own existence teetering on the
noedge of nothingness; and from this threatened state to pure or absolute existence. By contrast the 
’ontological experience’ that Daly refers to is seen to occur in two phases: in the first phase the 
experience is one of nonbeing, in the second phase moves over into an experience of the intuition of 
being. It is through the latter that she thinks we are able to gain an immediate apprehension of the 
analogy of being and thus, in some sense, of Being itself. But it is unclear how the first phase of 
Daly’s experience is related to the intellective leaps that constitute Maritain’s intuition of being. The 
experience of nothingness is part and parcel of Maritain’s conception of the intuition. Daly fails to 
specify how the two ’moments’ of the ontological experience that she describes gel together.
The major philosophical problem, however, concerns Daly’s uncritical reference back to 
Thomistic structures which are seen to secure the possibility of the experience of the intuition of 
being. In itself Daly’s phenomenological approach can only describe what is already given in 
consciousness. It cannot show or elucidate the very conditions that allow the kind of encounter 
described by Daly in terms of the intuition of being. As the Thomist scholar Norris Clarke has 
pointed out, phenomenology is not equipped to deal with fundamental questions such as: ’How 
come there is a framework at all of this actually existing world {ov Lebenswelt, if you wish) plus a 
self-conscious knowing subject, so intrinsically attuned to one another that one can be known by the
99Other’. This framework of interaction between the knower and the known must be assumed or
presupposed before analysis can begin. ’For, to recognize the presentation of the object in
consciousness as the sign of a real being presenting itself, the mind must interpret the action and
point back through it, in an act of interpretive judgement to the real source existing in itself beyond 
100our consciousness’. This takes us into the realms of a metaphysics of being and knowledge. In 
Daly’s case the conditions that allow for the possibility of an encounter with Be-ing are not treated 
in any systematic manner. What is striking is that Daly makes no ’original’ attempt to offer a 
philosophical explanation of these conditions but simply ’Plunders’ the Thomistic framework of 
interaction that was given in outline in the summary of The Problem of Speculative Theologv - a 
framework that includes the conception of the creator-creature relation in terms both of 
participation, efficient causality and final causality and a realist epistemology.
98 See Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophv of Jacques Maritain p. 11-12.
99 Clarke, W. Norris, op. cit., p. 130-31.
100 Ibid.
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Thus Daly continues to work with a quasi-Thomist understanding of our relation to Being in
101terms of the principles of participation and efficient causality. For Daly ’God is Be-ing,’ elsewhere
she conceptualises God/Goddess in terms of ’the power of being’ in whose potency we 
102’participate’. Moreover as well as the notion of participation Daly presumes something like
103efficient causality in her understanding of free, robust creatures existing in their own right whilst 
yet remaining wholly dependent upon the creating, sustaining activity of their first cause (God).
This idea would appear at first sight to be something of an anomaly. In Aquinas’ system, however, 
not only is the power of God compatible with freedom of the creature, it is indispensable to it. The 
manner in which the divine causality operates is indicated by Aquinas in Summa Contra Gentiles 
III, 70 where he writes: ’The one and the same effect is produced by the subordinate cause and by 
God, directly by both, though in a different way’. God then is intimately present in the midst of 
change and movement which is the hallmark of the created world in the interplay of cause and 
effect. The obverse side to this doctrine is, of course, that creatures owe the existence of this very 
principle to God’s existential activities. It is these concepts of participation and efficient causality 
which Daly argued, in The Problem of Speculative Theologv. were conditional to securing the 
possibility of a natural knowledge of God.
It is this view of efficient causality that leads her to favour a view of the social order as 
rooted in some way in the ’metaphysical order’, the order of beingit is precisely because patriarchal 
values are not themselves rooted in the processes which go to preserve and sustain all existence that 
they are dangerous to life (necrophilic) and must be opposed. She maintains, of course, that her set 
of values are rooted in the great force of Nature which itself takes its origin from the transcendent 
ground of all existents (God). However there is the sense that history is working against her. She is 
not naively optimistic, but realises that her work is the result of a situation of extremity.
Another conditional element for the attainment of a natural knowledge of God in Thomism 
is the principle of teleology. As with the concepts of participation and efficient causality Daly 
retains in her writing the sense of our human openness and ordination to the transcendent. Like 
Aquinas and the rest of the scholastics she thinks that we are created with an innate capacity for 
intimacy with God/Being and a corresponding desire for it. For Aquinas ’Man is ordained to God as
101 Bevond God the Father pp. 33-34.
102 Ibid., pp. 28-29. For the notion of participation in Daly’s writings see for examplePure Lust pps. 26, 
87, 147, 292, 393.
103 In Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophv of Jacques Maritain p.60 Daly cites the definition of 
freedom as this has been given by Aristotle and endorsed by Aqiunas in Comm. In Metanh. I, 1.3, n.58 as: 
’That man is properly said to be free who does not exist for the sake of another but for himself.
112
104his origin and end’. There is in other words a natural desire in humankind for God, a desiderium.
105natumle . The desiderium naturale is only possible because of teleology - the idea that all actions
are end-directed or purposive. According to the teleological view actions are judged to be ‘good’ or
‘bad’ depending upon whether they fulfil or attain their goals. The existence of teleology (or final
causality) in the world was one of Aquinas ways to God. For him there is a dialectic between this
world and the supernatural world. The 'telos' of human beings can only lie in another realm, another
order of being. Yet this is a reality now in that it is present and at work. It is the inner subjective
drive which corresponds to the drawing power, the Final Cause, of Be-ing as the Good. Everything
in Aquinas' thought is treated under the aspect of divinity; either because it is God in Godself or
because everything is ordered towards God as the beginning and end of things. God is related to
absolutely everything. All created beings, every event, every nature is thus an object for theology.
All created beings and even historical moments are 'ontologically closed and sealed at both ends' by
the twin aspects of God as Creator and God as the Final End towards which all things tend. The
orientation of this desire or telos for expansion is seen by Daly to be equivalent to the process of
106coming-to-self which she associates with the ultimate happiness. In the Wickedarv the Final 
Cause is defined as 'the indwelling, always unfolding goal or purpose, perceived as Good and
107attracting one to Act, to Realize her own participation in Be-ing'. For Daly feminism is at its
ontological roots an expression of the desiderium naturale in as much as it represents the desire for
the expansion of our being towards the horizon of the infinite. This desire she calls 'Pure Lust', an
108'ontological yearning', a 'Be-Longing'. It is this 'Deep ontological piuposefulness, or telle 
centring' that, she claims, is the target of phallic lust: 'Final causality, in this profound sense, is the
109object of attack within phallocratie society'. The struggle to free women is imaged in terms of a 
religious battle, on a cosmic scale, between being and nonbeing, between good and evil though 
these pairs are not to be construed as opposites because, as Daly writes, Be-ing the Verb is 
'intransitive' and does not require an other over and against itself in order to realise itself. Rather is 
the second half of the pair ontologically dependent upon the first; nonbeing is not a reality in and of 
itself but signifies a lack of reality or Be-ing. This is not to say that the evil of patriarchy is merely 
an illusion nor an ontological lacuna. The reality of the evil lies precisely in the perverse.
104 Sum m a T heologiae  I, i, a.7.
105 For the idea of ’desiderium naturale’ in Aquinas seeSum m a T heologiae  I, 75, 6; Sum m a C ontra  
G en tiles  II, 55.
106 C.f.; the following texts in Aquinas’ work in which the end of this longing is Beatitude: Sum m a  
T heo log iae  1,12; I/II 2,8; 3,8. See also Per Erik Persson, op. cit., pp.263ff.
107 The Wickedarv p.76.
108 Pure Lust p. 318.
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inauthentic or disordered character of the be-ing that is manifested. Patriarchy, then, is un-real in the
strict ontological sense and yet real in its effects, which are disastrous for all be-ing. Her whole
feminist agenda revolves around this desire to break out, to delimit the self in ever expanding
11 0movement toward the Final Cause which is ’always/all ways beckoning’.
This whole edifice also presupposes a certain epistemology. Like Aquinas, Daly thinks it
imperative that philosophy starts with being not with thought or sentiment. That the material world
exists is immediately evident and knowledge is built up on the basis of sense-inforniation. In
Bevond God the Father Dalv argues that we must remove ’the impediments to that realm of knowing
111which is subjective, affective, intuitive, or what the Scholastics called "connatural"’. For it is only
by virtue of our participation in Be-ing that we can know anything at about it: ’Real knowledge
1 1 2implies participation...’. In Pure Lust she explicitly rejects modern variants of ’nominalism’ in 
favour of a version of ’classical realism’ - the idea that ’universals have a real existence outside the
1 13mind. This was the epistemological tradition of Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. The doctrine of 
nominalism was given classic expression in the work of late medieval philosopher William of 
Ockham. For Ockham language is a democratic convention between free individuals who reach 
understanding between themselves on the meaning of each word and concept. Ockham posited the 
real existence of particulars only and denied the reality of universals such as ’tree’ or ’chair’ or ’air’ 
which he saw merely as labels or vocalisations. Daly repudiates nominalist epistemologies 
precisely because they are predicated upon the assumption that ’only the individual has reality’ and
114this in effect, ’negates participation’. She writes: ’To Sin against the society of sado-sublimation is 
to be intellectual in the most direct and daring way, claiming and trusting the deep correspondence 
between the structures/processes of one’s own mind and the structures/processes of reality. To Sin is
115to trust intuitions and the reasoning rooted in them’. From Thomism, then, Daly takes the 
presupposition that we know things because things have the structure of ’being knowable’, that is to 
say that in the process of knowing she presupposes the mutual participation of the knower and the 
known.
To repeat: Daly makes no attempt to justify these ideas in her own philosophical terms but 
simply appropriates them lock, stock and barrel. How is this to be explained given her criticism of
109 Ibid., p. 2.
110 The Wickedarv p.277.
111 Bevond God the Father p. 39.
112 Ibid., p.XV.
113 Though each thinker differs in the version of realism that they uphold. See Pure Lust p. 160-161
114 Ibid., p . 161.
115 Ibid., p .  152.
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Aquinas’ androcentrism and the static worldview that, in her opinion, was spawned from the
classical metaphysical categories with which Aquinas and all the medieval thinkers worked? There
is a sense - paradoxical perhaps - that her criticism of Aquinas is rooted in a mystical ’sense’ for the
dynamism of Being that she first encounters intellectually through her reading of Aquinas. It is as
though she finds hints, or echoes of something in Aquinas which his metaphysical categories fail
ultimately to articulate. Something along these lines is hinted at by Daly in the ’Feminist
Postchristian Introduction’ to the second edition ofThe Church and the Second Sex. Commenting
on her own defence of Aquinas fundamental principles in the book she writes:
... in her plea for Aquinas there is, it seems to me, a kind of positive passion ... It is my guess
that what she adhered to in his thought - Thomistic scholar that she was - was his
ontological sense, his intuition of being. Looking back from the vantage point of our present
stage in history, I think it fair to say that she was struggling to find ontological roots for what
we know today as feminist philosophy of Be-ing. In the better parts of Aquinas’s work she
found hints of what a philosophy of be-ing/be-coming could begin to say. But, of course, as
116prepackaged in his categories, this ontological sense could not be radically liberating.
Further clues are given later, in Outercourse. where Daly meditates upon her former adherence to 
Thomism as this is expressed in the two doctorates. Here Daly expresses her regret at having to 
’make compromises’ in her study of Maiitain’s concept of the intuition of being. For Daly the
117intuition of being ’was a subject of intense interest’. Indeed she writes that she ’cherished this
118intuition, and could see no use in philosophizing without it, perhaps even in living without it’.
She writes that she was aware at the time of writing the thesis of a perceived split between intuition 
which was associated with women and which was deemed inferior to ’reason’ as this was pre­
eminently exercised by men. She contends that she wanted both ’intuitiona/ic/ arduous reasoning
119that is rooted in intuition’. But she could not give her acquiescence to a ’soft’ intuitionism. She 
continues:
I wrestled with Maritain wherever I thought he was in danger of slipping into a kind of ’soft’ 
intuitionism. Although I agreed with him that ’it is this intuition that effects, causes the 
metaphysical habitus,’ I worried that his line of thinking could fall into an easy assumption 
that ’this quasi-mystical intuition could play the role of substitute for thevwr/c of philosophy.
116 The Church and the Second Sex pp. 23-24.
117 Outercourse p.74.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
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The point is that although I cherished this intuition, and could see no sense in philosophizing
120without it, even in living without it, I wanted a clear defence of intellectual rigor/vigor.
It was Maritain’s lack of philosophical rigour that Daly claimed brought him into conflict with the
’authentic Thomism’ to which he professed fidelity. As she notes, for Aquinas ’the existence of God
is discovered at the end of metaphysical enquiry. At the beginning of metaphysics one does not
121presuppose the existence of the first cause’. Yet Daly aigues that Maritain precisely upholds the
intuition of being as a kind of ’pre-philosophicaT knowledge of God, a knowledge that is then
’developed’ and ’unfolded’ through argument and demonstration. Daly views this as a ’reduction’ of
’metaphysical inquiry into the existence of God to a confirmation of certain knowledge which is had
122on a pre-philosophical plane’. She continues: ’it is highly questionable that the truth of the 
analogy of being is grasped in an adequate way before long and strenuous philosophical enquiry. It 
appears, then, that Maritain has not adequately emphasized the exigencies of the genetic order of
123laiowledge’. The compromise that Daly refers to may well have to do with this strict Thomist 
criticism of an essentially mystical concept that was clearly of great personal relevance to her.
In Outercourse Daly rereads The Problem of Speculative Theologv in a similai' way. She
writes:
In my analysis of Thomistic texts, I had found passages suggesting that theological 
knowledge has a ’dynamism to go beyond itself,’ a ’tendency to over-reach itself,’ that is, to 
attain understanding that is beyond reason, but in an inherently rational way. I was arguing 
that theology overreaches blind faith in its seeking for understanding, that it ’tends to a 
certain participation in the vision of God.’ To put it simply, I was fighting for intellectual
124autonomy.
In the context of speculative theology this ’ certain participation in the vision of God’ is the fruit of 
arduous metaphysical reasoning. Indeed one of the main criticisms of Maritain was that he veered 
off the traditional metaphysical route.
Yet Daly falls into the same kind of ’intuitionism’ for which she suspects Maritain. Daly 
might perhaps respond that since she now no longer operates from within a Thomist framework she 
is no longer compelled to follow its rules. This is of course true. Yet it begs the question as to what 
kind of sense her retrieval makes. For in wrenching the concept of the intuition of being from its
120 Ibid.
121 Natural Knowledge of God in the Philosophy of Jacques Maritain p.44.
122 Ibid., p.46. The genetic order of knowledge proceeds from logic, mathematics, natural science, moral 
science and finally metaphysics. Ibid., p.38.
123 Ibid., 46.
124 Outercourse p.69.
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metaphysical framework she deprives it of the context in which it finds its meaning. When the 
Thomist metaphysical framework is removed we appear to be left with a rather vague ’mysticism of 
being’.It seems to be the case, then, that the fundamental intuition or ’sense’ of Being that is central 
to Daly’ s feminist writings is something that Daly has conceptualised partly with, and partly 
against, both Aquinas and Maritain.
Daly’s criticism of the metaphysics of immutable being and her emphasis upon the intrinsic 
dynamism of ultimate reality bears many affinities with the metaphysics of Process philosophy. The 
bone of contention between the kind of ‘classical ‘ metaphysics represented by Aquinas and the so- 
called ‘neo-classical’ metaphysics represented by a figure like Alfred North Whitehead concerns the 
issue of how 'transcendence' relates to 'process' or 'dynamism'. In classical theism the ideas of 
transcendence and process have been generally regarded as contradictory. As we have seen Daly 
criticises Aquinas' dependence upon the Parmenidean equation of true being with immutability and 
puts forward a type of preclassiccil notion of process as the ultimate category for understanding 
reality. The convergences between her own work and Process philosophy centre upon the primacy
125of the category of creativity, the metaphysical unity of being and becoming, the importance of the 
concept of teleology and the idea that everything in the universe is intrinsically related to everything 
else. In Daly's later writings, in which she seems to propound the doctrine that all life forms enjoy a 
psychic aspect (panpsychism) there appears to be an acceptance of something like a Whiteheadian 
'Subjectivist Principle' whereby every real entity possesses a degree of interiority or 'feeling'. Such 
'feeling' only becomes 'consciousness' in the most complex organisms.
Yet for all the structural similarities between Daly's thought and Process philosophy Daly 
never adopts standard Process metaphysics. Though she makes supportive reference to the
126contributions made by Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne to the idea of a developing God, she 
never explores process ideas such as 'bipolar theism', for example, or the possibility of passivity in 
God. This is partly due to the fact that she is primarily interested in listening to women's experience
127rather than working from a pre-defined framework. It may also be, of course, that Daly finds the 
terminology of process thought, despite it's attempts to promote a dynamic understanding of reality, 
unable to 'capture' that reality. And it may be for this reason that Daly makes the decision to switch
125 Pure Lust p.3.
^26 See for instance Outercourse p. 157.
127 C.f.; Daly ’The courage to leave: a response to John Cobb’s theology’ in David Ray Griffin and Thomas 
J. J. Altizer, op. cit.
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to a different mode of philosophising; one which seeks to evoke Be-ing through metaphor and
128symbol rather than to describe and render it in strict metaphysical categories.
We can say that as well as providing the intellectual womb in which her early theology was 
formed, Thomism is one of the hermeneutical keys to her later work such that failure to grasp the 
significance of the intellectual bounty bequeathed by Thomism, can only result in an inadequate 
interpretation of her work in part or as a whole. Daly’s writings do not, however, simply reflect the 
influence of Thomism in a passive sense . The metaphysical concepts of being, causality, the 
Platonic forms and the notion of ontological participation may well be the tools by means of which 
the skeletal structure of her thought is enabled to be organised and constructed. However, the 
meaning of elements within the classical technical vocabulary she draws from is stamped indelibly 
by the way in which she applies them to the situation of women. No major contemporary feminist 
theologian apart from Daly has seriously entertained a critical dialogue with Thomism.
The ontology that underpins her feminist writings has been greatly influenced by Thomism 
in spite of the fact that she continues to criticise the ’masculinist’ elements within it. Yet even as 
she criticises the tendency towards stasis that she sees in Aquinas’ dependence upon the 
Parmenidean concept of immutable Being, there remains a sense in which she still cherishes 
Thomas' fundamental existential intuition. But there is also the sense - paradoxical perhaps - in 
which Daly thinks that the domestication of Being/static worldview which Aquinas’ metaphysical 
categories encourages in some ways runs counter to Aquinas' fundamental sense for the dynamism 
of Be-ing. It is this sense for Be-ing that Daly later explores from the vantage point of feminist 
theory. The line of argument that I wish to pursue here is rather difficult to articulate, obscure. It has 
to do with a mystical or quasi-mystical 'feel' for Being that I believe Daly experiences and which she 
thinks is incapable of being fully 'displayed or rendered in and through any existing or possible 
conceptual system. Indeed it may be one reason why Üie ontological structure of her thought is 
never fully explicitly or stated in 'conventional' philosophical language. There is a sense - not fully 
expressible given the strangeness of the form of Daly’s work in terms of conventional metaphysics - 
in which her thinking remains rooted in that 'sense' of/for being (no other word seems applicable) 
that Aquinas articulated through his strict causal categories but which is ultimately perhaps a 
mystical phenomenon. There are intimations in Daly's later woiic that suggest that the causal
128 Other feminists theorists are not so reticent about the prospects of Process thought for feminism. In the 
United States particularly, the interdisciplinary dialogue between feminism and process thought continues to 
prove fertile ground for a mutual affirmation of shared values. One of the earliest explorations of the 
convergences and divergences between the feminists and Process thinkers was a symposium chaired by 
Sheila Greeve Davaney at in 1975, subsequently published under the title Feminism and Process Thought : 
The Harvard Divinity School/Claremont Center for Process Studies Symposium Papers. Symposium Series, 
no.6. (New York and Toronto: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1981).
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categories in and through which she had learned to think theologically began to frustrate her 
philosophically. What I wish to argue here is that whilst Daly became disillusioned with Aquinas’ 
speculative metaphysics she yet sensed in parts of Aquinas’ thought - perhaps most of all in the 
concept of esse - a certain intrinsic dynamism that, if freed from the encasement of Aquinas’ causal 
categories, was capable of transforming women’s perceptions of themselves, their oppression and 
the potentiality for subjective expansion.
It is interesting to discover that Aquinas himself may himself have come to a similai"
129conclusion about the limitations of his metaphysical approach. The American philosopher John
D. Caputo in his book Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essav on Overcoming Metaphysics takes the 
mystical vision Aquinas enjoyed towards the end of his life (6 December, 1273) and employs it as 
the hermeneutic key to his system. After the experience Aquinas is reported to have said:
’Everything which I have written seems like straw to me compared to what I have seen and what has 
been revealed to me’. Caputo uses this utterance as a principle with which to reread Aquinas’ 
metaphysics, arguing that Aquinas’ thought is trapped within the metaphysical encasement inherited 
from the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Caputo shows that Aquinas does not mediate the simple 
essence of ‘presencing’ (as Heidegger attempted to do) but instead maps out the metaphysical 
dynamics of a thoroughly causal conception of reality. He conceives of Being in terms of maker and 
made, creator and created. He writes: 'St. Thomas does not practice a quiet, meditative savouring of
130the presencing of Being; he has instead reduced presencing to realitas, causalitas, actualitas'. But 
he argues that 'there is more to St. Thomas than metaphysics, and that this metaphysics tends by a 
dynamism of its own in the direction of a non-metaphysical experience of Being. And in this sense
131there is an overcoming of metaphysics in St. Thomas as well'.
It may be the case that one of the reasons for Daly's abandonment of the Thomist 
metaphysical grid proper was that she came to recognise it as incapable of rendering Be-ing. The 
thrust of Aquinas' metaphysics is, as I have already remarked, intellectualist. That is to say, it is 
primarily towards an explication of the boundaries and potentialities for our knowledge of Being 
that Aquinas’ whole system is oriented. Our salvation and our intellectual perfection are 
synonymous for him. Daly too was guided by Aquinas' intellectualism in her Thomist doctoral 
work. Only a few years afterwards, however, her emphasis shifted. Instead of following the 
speculative metaphysical path mapped out by Aquinas Daly engaged in a form of phenomenological 
description of women's experience. The rendering of Be-ing does not take place within an
129 Caputo, John D. Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (N.Y.: Fordham 
University Press, 1982).
130 Ibid., p.248.
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intellectual system but in the practical life in its multiple dimensions - in our know-ing, act-ing, lov­
ing and creat-ing.
131 Ibid.
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Chapter four: Sociology
In this chapter my attention turns to focus upon Daly’s interaction with sociological theoiy in the 
form of Peter L. Berger’s work. Berger’s sociological interests traverse a number of intellectual
areas. He has published widely on topics such as modernity and social policy,' as well as on religion
2and theology, but it is Berger's work in the sociology of knowledge, specifically his theory of social
3construction or 'worldbuilding', that has been taken up and used by Daly in her feminist writings. 
The research that I have undertaken is an attempt to address the lack of scholarly recognition of the
4importance of Bergerian concepts in the evolution of Daly's feminist theory. Daly's concern with 
the creation of socio-cultural meaning and knowledge antedates her creative encounter with 
Bergerian theory. It is evident, in nascent form, in The Church and the Second Sex, in which she 
criticises the meaning-content of certain theological symbols (e.g. God the Father) and their 
(mis)use in bolstering the oppression of women. The impact of Berger's work was essentially (and, 
as Daly later remai'ks 'unwittingly') to provide her with a sophisticated social analysis through which 
she could further explore the question of male domination. In Outercourse she acknowledges that 
the article 'After the Death of God the Father' (1971) - in which she explored the authority
Berger. Peter L. with Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner The Homeless Mind: Modernization and 
Consciousness (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974); Peter L. Berger Facing up to Modernity: Excursions in 
Society. Politics, and Religion (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1977).9 Berger, Peter L. The Precarious Vision: a Sociologist Looks at Social Fictions and Christian Faith (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961); and The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of Religious 
Affirmation (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1979).a A definition of sociology of knowledge from the perspective of Peter Berger is given in Berger with 
Thomas Luckmann The Social Construction of Reality - A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972; first published in the U.S.A. in 1966) p.15. For an explanation of how 
Berger’s understanding of the sociology of knowledge relates to previous formulations of the discipline and 
to related conceptions in nineteenth and twentieth century intellectual history see ibid., pp. 15-30; and James
E. Curtis and John W Petras (eds.) The Sociology of Knowledge: A Reader (London: Praeger Publishers, 
Inc., 1970), pp.7-45.
^ Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza classifies Daly's work under the rubric of the sociology of knowledge, but 
makes no attempt to isolate Berger's influence. See In Memory of Her: a Feminist Theological 
Reconstruction of Christian Origins (London: SCM Press, 1983), pp.21-23.
5 Daly 'After the Death of God the Father: Women's Liberation and the Transformation of Christian 
Consciousness' Commonweal (12 March, 1971), pp.7-11 ; also published in Carol P. Christ and Judith 
Plaskow (eds.) Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader in Religion (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979), 
pp.53-62.
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structures that secure women in their role as perennial social outsiders - was ’in pail inspired by The
Sacred Canopy' (1967), the book in which Berger sought to describe the social processes through 
which human ’worlds’ are constructed and maintained. Daly describes ’After the Death of God the
7Father’ as a ’Breakthrough to a New way of thinking’. In the paper Daly employs Bergerian 
sociological concepts such as ’plausibility’, ’legitimation’and ’externalization’. In response to a letter 
from Daly Berger voiced his disagreement and displeasure at her feminist application of his theory
in her article ’After the Death of God the Father’. At the time Daly was surprised by Berger’s attack 
though later she came to view the encounter as an early and important experience of Dis­
illusionment’. Through her correspondence with Berger, she writes, ’I gained the insight, never to be 
forgotten, that one could write a lucid book such as The Sacred Canopy ... while refusing to 
acknowledge its logical implications. ... patriarchal theorists could know exactly what their society
9was doing to women while at the same time refusing to know this’. After sending a curt reply to
Berger’s letter Daly had no further contact with the sociologist. The episode did not, however, signal
the end of the discursive relationship between Daly’s work and Berger’s texts. For, whilst she claims
that she found Berger’s sociological matrix 'abstract' and 'split off from the realities that informed
10her own and other women's lives, she clearly regarded it as useful and, as a result, she continues 
to 'spring off from his analysis in her feminist theorising: 'playing' with his sociological concepts in 
Bevond God the Father and using what she was to call her 'reversal of his reversal' to great creative 
effect in Gvn/Ecologv and Pure Lust, in which whole patterns of cultural meanings (e.g. sado­
masochism) and the meaning of individual linguistic signs (not just religious symbols) become 
important areas for feminist political engagement.
Yet Berger's theory is rarely addressed directly by Daly in her writings, and when she does 
refer to his work her comments are given in passing, and her treatment is characteristically polemic. 
In a brief allusion to Bergefs theory of social construction in Bevond God the Father, for example, 
she portrays the eminent sociologist as an 'unwitting' accomplice in her acts of theoretical and
methodological insurrection. ' The depiction of Berger as an ignorant ally in her radical feminist 
political project is a familiar rhetorical ploy, the function of which is implicitly to assert Daly’s
Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, N.Y.: 
1967). This book was published in the Great Britain under the title The Social Reality of Religion (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1969). It is to the latter work that I shall refer hereafter.
 ^Outercourse p. 134.
^Ibid.,p.l35.
^ Ibid.
'^Ibid.
 ^  ^ Beyond God the Father pp. 135-36.
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theoretical superiority {she - and not Berger - holds the hermeneutical key to understanding the
processes of social construction), and to cleave her audience closer to her by enrolling us in her
piratical intellectual ventures (for we - the readers - talce pleasure in being let in on the ’secret’ that
the male stream theorist is too myopic to perceive).
The chapter has two objectives. The first objective is to demonstrate that Daly’s
understanding of the nature of sexual oppression in terms of women’s marginalisation in the social
processes of knowledge generation - and the social power of reality definition that it brings - has
been influenced by Berger’s sociology of knowledge, Berger’s writings are not, of course, ’feminist’:
his work does not arise out of an active concern to understand, and struggle to overcome, the
situation in which women occupy a subordinate social position relative to men. Nevertheless,
through a process of critical interaction with Berger’s work - in which Daly interrogates the
’patriarchal’ presuppositions that underpin his inquiry - she gains both a sociological vocabulary and
a framework for comprehending the processes by which patriarchal social knowledge is produced
and maintained as subjectively ’real’. In short, by ’playing’ with Berger’s theory she is able to
formulate her own alternative, feminist sociology of knowledge. The aim of Berger^s sociology of
knowledge is to formulate what he terms a social ’critique of consciousness’. This critique entails
the study of both ’objective reality’ (that is, ’knowledge’ about the world, as this is ’objectivated’ and
taken for granted in society) and its ‘subjective correlates’ (that is, the ways in which this
12knowledge is made credible or 'real' to the individual). It is from within this framework, given 
systematic delineation in The Social Construction of Realitv. that Berger goes on to theorise the 
function of religion, in The Sacred Canopv. in terms of 'legitimation'. From her reading of this 
book Daly grasped that in order to understand sexual oppression the feminist theorist must learn to 
discern the rules and criteria that inform the generation and codification of social 'knowledge', for 
such knowledge structures social reality such that men are enabled to dominate and oppress women 
in everyday life. This, in turn, means paying serious attention to language for, in Bergefs theory, the 
social laiowledge that orders and structures social reality is mediated and built up through linguistic
13structures. The consequent theoretical emphasis upon knowledge generation and the role of 
language in mediating social meanings has proven to be one of the hallmarks of Daly's radical
feminist approach.
12 For a useful summary of Berger’s project see his essay ’Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of 
Knowledge’ in Curtis and Petras, op. cit., pp.373-386.
 ^^  The Social Construction of Realitv pp.49-61.
I do not mean to argue that Daly’s view of language has been informed solely by reference to Berger’s 
work. Daly has been influenced by the linguistic philosophy of Suzanne Langer. See Suzanne Langer 
Philosophy in a New Kev: A Study of the Symbolism of Reason. Rite and Art (Cambridge: Harvard
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The second objective is to discuss Daly’s use of Berger’s theory in terms of the relation 
between feminist theory and male-stream theory. That Bergefs work is properly classified as a 
product of male-stream intellectual culture is not, of course, to be taken as self-evident, and part of 
my aim in what follows is to reconstruct Daly's arguments as to why Bergefs work provides a good 
example of the assumptions and processes of patriarchal theory-making. What, precisely, is the 
nature of Daly's dealings with Berger’s sociology? Daly has described her feminist engagement with 
Berger's work as: 'sorting out nuggets of par tial, i.e., patriarchally distorted, knowledge' and placing
them in a 'Metapatriarchal context, so that they could radiate richer meanings'.*^ The rewards of this 
mining activity, if such they may be construed, have yet to be demonstrated here. Some of the 
questions that will guide and inform the analysis are as follows. Does Daly merely extend Berger's 
conceptual framework so that women, as well as men, can become subjects of human 
'worldbuilding'? Or does she delve deeper into Berger's sociological methodology, so as to question 
the very structure of the theory from a feminist perspective? And, if Daly is doing the latter, of what 
value are Berger's theoretical constructs to feminism?
The material is organised in the following way. I shall begin, firstly, by putting forward a 
summary exposition of Berger's theory of social construction or worldbuilding. Bevond God the 
Father - the book in which Daly engages openly with Berger - contains only the most fleeting 
description of his theory, running to no more than a few paragraphs. We should not be misled, 
however, by the casual manner in which she deals with Bergefs theory. The importance of Bergefs 
sociology of knowledge to Daly’s understanding of oppression is greater than the sporadic and 
indifferent references might suggest. A more detailed account of the theory is therefore necessary in 
order to properly contextualise her criticisms.
I shall proceed, secondly, to examine Daly's criticism of the theory. Daly's strategy is to 
expose several flaws in Berger's method of 'objectivity' (which, as we shall see, have repercussions 
for Daly's feminist utilisation of the content of the theory). Daly's main criticism is that Berger's 
approach is 'gender-blind' and that, in glossing over the different roles played by the sexes in the 
linguistic processes and institutions through which social knowledge is generated and formalised, 
Berger's theory is already inadequate as a description of human 'worldbuilding'. But her feminist 
criticism of Berger goes beyond the mere identification of gaps in the theory of worldbuilding to 
threaten the structural integrity of the theory itself. For, as she sees it, the process of male 
externalisation (a process that includes masculinist sociology) has been predicated upon the
University Press, 1976; first published in 1946). See also Dale Spender ’Defining Reality: A Powerful Tool’ 
in Cheris Kiamarae, Muriel Schulz and William M. O’Barr (eds.) Language and Power (London: Sage 
Publications, 1984) pp. 194-205.
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exclusion of women as subjects of worldbuilding activity. Thus Daly’s criticism exposes the 
existence of a ’masculinist’ perspective in Berger’s theory.
In spite of these criticisms, Daly continues to ’play’ with his concepts and ideas in her later 
books. My third task will be to explore her subsequent proposals for a feminist reconstruction of 
knowledge. As part of this project I shall show how she returns to Berger’s theory in order to spell 
out some of the ways in which the flaws in Berger’s ’masculinist’ or ’male-stream’ methodology 
impact negatively upon the content of his theory. I shall focus upon two elements in Berger’s theory 
of worldbuilding that have since become major preoccupations for Daly in her feminist writings. I 
refer to the respective roles played by language and religion both in maintaining sexual oppression 
and in creating opportunities for liberation.
Before I begin a few words aie in order regarding the primary source material that I have 
drawn upon in my reconstiuction of Berger’s position. Daly makes reference to only two of Bergefs 
writings: The Sacred Canopv: Elements of a Sociological Theorv of Religion and A Rumor of
Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural.'^ However, in fleshing out 
Berger's position I have drawn upon three other works: a meditation on sociological methodology
17entitled An Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective, and two further works that set out, 
in comprehensive and systematic form, the perspective within the field of the sociology of 
knowledge that Berger operates from, namely. The Social Construction of Realitv - A Treatise in 
the Sociology of Knowledge co-authored with Thomas Luckmann, and the essay 'Identity as a
Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge'. These works were originally published before The 
Sacred Canopy. They help to ground an understanding of Berger's ideas in the latter by placing them 
within a wider sociological context.
Without further delay I enter upon my first task, viz., to give a brief description of the main 
points in Berger's account of 'worldbuilding'. Central to Bergefs sociology of knowledge is the
19assumption that 'man' seeks perennially to infuse meaning and order into 'his' world. Berger calls
 ^^  Outercourse p. 157. ’Metapatriarchal’ is Daly’s word for that which is, as it were, ’beyond’ and ’outside’ the 
system of patriarchal domination. See Wickedarv p. 82.
 ^  ^Berger, Peter L. A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971).
17 Berger, Peter L. An Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective ISt. Ives: Penguin. 1991; first 
published by Doubleday in 1963)
In Curtis and Petras, op. cit., pp.373-386
This emphasis upon the human individual and the subjective meaning humans attach to their individual 
actions and their interaction with others reveals Berger’s fundamentally Weberian orientation in 
understanding both sociological method and the nature of modern society. For Berger consciousness is 
always intentional, that is, always directed toward something. That humans do in fact attach meaning to 
their actions implies of course that individual agents are not mechanically determined but are in some sense
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the collective tendency to reach out beyond the self in order to create a meaningful social world
'externalization '. Externalisation is: The ongoing outpouring of human being in the world, both in
20the physical and the mental activity of men’; a process that goes to the very heart of what it is to 
21be human. Like both Hegel and Marx, Berger views externalisation as an anthropological
necessity that derives from the biological and environmental constants that govern man’s life. Man
has no 'species-specific environment', he can exist fruitfully in a range of geographic and climatic
situations. His drives are not so clearly directed or so specialised as the drives that direct other
species; the instinctual apparatus possessed by him, for example, is not as well developed as that of
our fellow mammals and other animals. When we are born, then, we are, in a manner of speaking,
22'unfinished'. 'Man', Berger writes, is 'biologically denied the ordering mechanisms with which
23Other animals are endowed’ and is therefore ‘compelled to impose his own order upon experience'.
In order to survive we must build a stable environment in which to live and thrive because it is not
24provided as for other animals by biological imperatives. It is not our instinctual drives so much as 
our interrelation with the surrounding human and natural environment that delimits and determines 
the formation of socio-cultural structures. Externalisation is, then, fundamentally about the infusion 
of meanings into the world.
25But externalisation is only one ‘moment’ in a threefold 'dialectic' by which the social world 
is constructed by human beings, and through which it comes to possess coherence and
intelligibility. The two other 'moments' of the dialectic are called by Berger 'objectivation' and
at least ’rational’ and ’free’. Such a presupposition is not of course derivable from positivistic science and 
Berger counsels that human activity must be therefore be ’understood’, in the Weberian sense o fversteh en , 
that is they must be in terp re ted  as being meaningful.
The Social Realitv of Religion p.4.
21 The Social Construction of Realitv p. 4
22 A similar position is occupied, from an anthropological perspective, by Clifford Geertz in ’ Religion as a 
Cultural System’ in Reader in Comparative Religion second edition, revised William Les sa and Evon Vogt 
(N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1963), p.209.
The Social Realitv of Religion p. 19.
24 Paolo Freire makes a similar point and uses the idea as an anthropological base for ’problem-posing 
education’. See Pedagogy of the Oppressed translated from the Portuguese by Myra Bergman Ramos 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972) p.57.
25 • •’Dialectic’ in Berger’s vocabulary means simply ’interplay and is not to be confused with other uses of 
the term, notably by Hegel. In Berger’s usage the social construction of the world is dialectic in the sense 
that, once constructed, it is able to act back upon its producers.
The Social Realitv of Religion p.81.1 have mentioned the primary influence of Weberian sociology in 
Berger’s emphasis on culture as a subjectively meaningful phenomenon. But the dialectic of externalisation, 
objectivation and internalisation also shows Berger’s attempt to integrate this approach with the other 
principle approach to sociology, namely, the Durklieimian tradition which stresses culture as an objective 
fact.
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27’internalization’. In the second moment of the dialectic the meanings that are externalised by man 
immediately become objectified in the various artefacts of culture. These artefacts include, amongst 
other things, our belief systems, our moral codes and our social institutions. The process by which 
this occurs is called 'objectivation'. Basically what happens is that the world brought into being as a 
result of the externalisation process comes to attain a quality of ’objective facticity’, it is ’there’ and 
’thing-like’. As Berger explains: The world of social objectivations, produced by externalizing
consciousness, confronts consciousness as an external facticity. It is apprehended as such’.^  ^It is 
thus that the externalised world, ’including that part of it we call social structure, attains for them
29[human beings] the status of objective reality’. Finally, in the third ’moment’ of the dialectic these 
objectified meanings are subjected to 'internalisation'. This is a process by which objectified 
meanings are reabsorbed into consciousness ’in such a way that the structures of this world come to 
determine the subjective structures of consciousness itself. Internalisation occurs through the 
agency of'socialisation'.This is constituted by ’the processes by which a new generation is taught to 
live in accordance with the institutional programs of the society’,  ^an important part of which is the 
individual’s identification with the said institutional agendas such that the world becomes my world. 
Meanings that ai'e internalised form subjectively plausible views or definitions of reality, ethically 
mandated norms of personal and collective conduct, rules and principles of social discourse and 
general guides to everyday living. In Bergefs terms: ’society now functions as the formative agency
31for individual consciousness’. The ’world’ that is thus brought into existence through the dialectic 
is characterised above all by meaning and order: it is intelligible, it makes sense. Berger defines the
32ensuing world as a nomos or ’meaningful ordering of experience’.
Behind the impetus to engage in ’worldbuilding’ lies a ’craving for meaning’ that is the result 
of inescapable anthropological realities. Meaning is expressed through objectivations, which
33function as ’enduring indices of the subjective processes of their producers’. ' That is to say, an 
important function of objectivations is to indicate what is going on in the mind of the person or
27 Berger notes that the terms ’externalization’ (pntaUsserung) and ’objectivation’ Ç/ersachlichimg) derive 
originally from Hegel and were applied to collective social reality by Marx. Berger’s employment of 
’internalisation’ derives its use in American social psychology, particularly the work of George Herbert 
Mead - see for example Mind. Self and Societv (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).
The Social Realitv of Religion p. 15.
Ibid., p. 81.
The Social Reality of Religion p. 15.
Ibid.
32 • •Nomos is simply Berger’s play on Durkheim’s concept of anomie. See Suicide (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 
1951) pp.241ff. Nomos is, of course, the other pole to anomie.
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persons who made it. One of the most ’crucially important’ forms of objectivation is ’signification’ or
34’the human production of signs’. A variety of ’sign systems’ exist in culture: collections of material 
objects, gestures and patterned bodily movements (such as dance) etc. But by far the most important 
sign system is ’language’, defined by Berger as ’a system of vocal signs’. As he points out it is by 
means of language that the ordinary objectivations of everyday life are maintained: ’Everyday life is, 
above all, life with and by means of the language I share with my fellowmen. An understanding of
35language is thus essential for any understanding of the reality of everyday life’.' ' For Berger 
language is the primary medium for the social externalisation, objectivation and internalisation of 
’human’meanings. It is the means by which the ’cognitive and normative edifice that passes for 
"knowledge" in a society’ is built up. Berger does not question the content of the various levels of 
social knowledge, he is merely concerned to describe the processes by which information comes to 
attain the status of knowledge in society. The phenomenon of language is the paradigmatic nomos,
'the great world-building instrumentality of man'.^^ Systems of language are, in one sense, the 
product of the perpetual quest for meaningful order. All empirical languages 'may be said to 
constitute a nomos in the making or, with equal validity, as the historical consequence of the
37nominizing activity of generations of men'. It is thus through language that we order our world and 
make it meaningful; it is through language that we enter human society.
Berger's way of dealing with language is important to note. For it is obviously quite different 
to, say, the treatment of language given by a structural linguist who, instead of emphasising 
language as a vehicle of meaning (as Berger does), focuses upon language as an objective and 
impersonal phenomenon constituted by various rules, patterns and structures. In fact, Berger's 
treatment of language coheres well with his emphasis on culture as a set of meanings that are being 
constantly created, recreated and shared intersubjectively and which are then objectivated in 
material artefacts.
The above account of Berger's theory of social construction is a condensed and highly 
generalised summary of a complex framework. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for the purpose of 
reconstructing and discussing Daly's criticism of the theory. Daly's first major engagement with 
Berger's work occurs in Bevond God the Father. There are few overt references to Berger in her 
later writings, in spite of the fact that the analysis of 'patriarchal' reality, in Gvn/Ecologv and Pure
The Social Construction of Realitv p.49. 
Ibid., p.50.
Ibid., pp.51-52.
The Social Realitv of Religion p. 175. 
Ibid., p. 20.
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Lust is shot through with the themes of socialisation, plausibility structures, social deviance, and 
legitimation.
In Bevond God the Father Dalv’s method is to ’test’ Berger’s theory of social reality from the 
perspective of women. Such an approach implicitly brings women to visibility as potential subjects 
of a sociology of knowledge. This in turn problematises the validity of assertions and assumptions 
in Berger’s theory that are taken as self-evident. She begins by arguing that the theory of 
'worldbuilding' breaks down in the face of sexual domination. For Berger, 'worldbuilding' is a social 
capacity that is exercised by all human beings, regardless of social location. Daly argues, however, 
that women have not been actively participant in this process. Women's capacity to be the agents of 
world-shaping action is hindered and stunted by a dominative socio-cultural system. Women are not 
encouraged to explore and put forward their own experiential perspective on the world. Even if they 
manage to do this, their meanings have not been received as socially valid by the dominant power 
élite. The officially validated cultural products (objectivations) of what Berger calls the 'human' 
process of externalisation are all, without exception, the products of male social activity. Indeed the 
very symbolic forms and conceptual apparatuses (still taken for granted by most women in Western 
culture) through which the flux of 'human' experience has been typified and ordered have been
created and configured by socially privileged men.  ^Daly writes: 'It is not only the case that women 
have been excluded or marginalised in the bastions of public politics, they have also been foreigners 
... to those citadels in which thought processes have been spun out, creating a net of meaning to
39capture reality'. In this scenario 'reality' is a product of male social activity, and the 'world' - as 
both women and men experience it - is a place where male experience is normative. Indeed, rather 
perversely, male experience is equated with human experience. Women's experiences, when they 
differ from men's experience, are not seen as either valid or socially useful. It has ht&nmale 
meanings, and male meanings only, that have been accepted and internalised as the culturally 
ascendant matrix of meaning for both sexes. She continues: '... it is women who are conditioned to
40be the internalizers par excellence, a point which the noted sociologist passes over'. Through the 
socialisation process women have been encouraged to internalise the identity and the roles that men 
have created and sanctioned for them. This identity is 'false' in as much as it is imposed upon 
women, as it were, from outside.
Berger's theory itself emerges from a totalising 'patriarchal' frame of reference. Inspite of his 
intrinsic commitment, as a sociologist of knowledge, to multiple dimensions of reality, Berger's
Bevond God the Father p. 7. 
Ibid., pp.6-7.
Ibid., p. 136.
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description of the processes of social reality generation is, in radical feminist terms,
’ monodimensional ’ in as much as it remains ignorant of the power dynamics that affect the social 
processes of ’worldbuilding’. Daly uses several terms such as ’phallocentric’ and ’patriarchal’ to 
connote the male symbolic order under which women live, an order in which only male-centred 
meanings enjoy legitimacy. The phallocentric symbolic is, in Daly’s words, 'totalising' and 
'monodimensional'. According to its own logic patriarchy is culture, the phallocentric ordering of 
experience constitutes meaning itself. Indeed, the major cultural vehicles of meaning in culture have 
been so structured as to preclude the possibility of women being able to ask fundamental critical 
questions about the way their 'worlds' are ordered. As Daly writes, women have 'screened out 
experience and responded only to the questions considered meaningful and licit within the
41boundaries of prevailing thought structures, which reflect sexist social structures'. Under 
prevailing social conditions, then, patriarchal meanings exclude the possibility of women existing as 
fully autonomous beings. Women are included in the prevailing symbolic, of course, though it is 
'woman through the eyes of man'.
Daly criticises Berger for collapsing together the historically different roles played by the 
sexes in the worldbuilding process. Under patriarchal social conditions, she writes: 'it is indeed me;?
42who do the externalizing, in which case Berger is correct'. Berger does not grasp that his own 
sociological writing is conditioned by a 'male-stream' perspective. The theory - which purports to 
have universal relevance - actually derives from a partial and limited perspective. The fact that 
Berger does not see this is inteipreted by Daly as symptomatic of the theoretical bias that is 
reflected in his use of the conventional but pseudo-generic noun 'man', and its equally pseudo­
generic pronoun 'he', to describe the 'human' subject of worldbuilding, in The Sacred Canopv. Major 
political implications are consequent upon this critical deficiency. For in not addressing the question 
of how the dynamics of sexual power have affected the processes through which reality is actually 
constructed Berger implicitly allies himself with the sexual status quo. His theory is thus woefully 
incomplete, according to Daly's feminist standards, because his method ('objectivity') and his focus 
('man') never extend beyond the parameters of the patriarchal paradigm.
On the basis of this insight Daly is enabled further to theorise the social processes by which 
knowledge is generated and socially validated. A central argument is that women's exclusion from 
the worldbuilding process has occurred as a direct result of male dominance over linguistic 
processes and the power of social definition that they bring. She concurs with Berger's idea that it is 
principally through the medium of language that the human social world is consti*ucted and
Ibid., p.7.
Ibid., pp. 135-6.
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43maintained. As she writes: ’To exist humanly is to name the self, world, and God’. The 
fundamental difference between Daly and Berger centres not upon the nature of language, a point 
upon which they appear to agree, as upon who controls the development and codification of 
language and thus thought and knowledge. The exercise of language by human beings is seen as 
relatively unproblematic in Berger’s work. It is a sex-neutral tool to which all human beings, 
regardless of their social location, are thought to have access. Even the constraints that attend 
language-use are described in similarly universal terms. Thus the statement that: ’When human 
beings invent a language they then discover that both what is able to be said and thought are
44determined by its grammar’ glosses over the question as to who enjoys the power to ’invent and 
control the development of language and thought itself in culture. In place of Berger’s universalist 
view of the instrumentality of language Daly puts forward an alternative theory based upon the 
feminist assumption that there exists a power disequation between men and women in every human 
society and that a major indicator of this situation is the different relation each sex has to language. 
Whilst both sexes enjoy the innate capacity to externalise meaning, to 'name' the world from their 
different perspectives, women’s meanings have not been adopted, classified and indexed in the 
'public' world of the grammarian and the lexicographer. In Dalyian terms women have had the 
power of 'naming' stolen from them - an occurrence that has had catastrophic effects for female 
social power, autonomy and freedom. Women have ‘been entombed in imposed silence, in the gross 
and obvious way of simply being excluded and in the more subtle way of only being allowed to 
echo male words’. It is because women are disadvantaged as speakers and writers, and not because 
of some supposed innate inferiority, that women have played no socially significant part in shaping 
the 'human' understanding of reality.
In Bevond God the Father Daly lays the foundations for a conspiratorial theory in which the 
nomos of language itself has been 'taken prisoner' by men. Women, she writes, 'have had the power 
of naming stolen from us. We have not been free to use our own power to name ourselves, the
46world, or God'. The theme of male conspiracy is taken further in her later writings, reaching its 
zenith in the Wickedarv. Here words themselves are said to be 'confined’, the 'prisoners' of
47patriarchy. Words lie shackled in 'cages and prisons of patriarchal patterns ... beaten down.
Beyond God the Father p. 8. 
Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 151.
Ibid., p.8.
The Wickedarv p.20.
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48banalized, reduced to serving the sentences of father time’. The point that I think Daly is striving to 
make is that the creative, liberatory potentiality of language is stunted when one group assumes 
collective responsibility for naming from a ’human’ perspective. Males have somehow ’usurped’ the 
cultural-linguistic power bestowed by the control of language as a group and have used it to impose 
their own ’naming’ of the world upon women. She leaves open the question of how such a state of 
affairs came about, though she is in sympathy with the argument that matriarchal or matrifocal 
cultures existed at some point in ancient history. Indeed: ’Wickedarians believe that one reason we 
can Dis-cover Webs of Wild Words in the ordinary dictionaries of patriarchy is that these were
49Archaically woven by Wild Women - by our own kind’. This statement would seem to suggest that 
women were the primary bearers of the power of language-making. The hypothesis is wholly 
speculative, however, and Daly does not pursue it.
The ’conspiratorial theory’ suggested by Daly’s rhetoric should not be taken literally. Daly is 
aware of the fact that not all males have enjoyed the privileges bestowed by the power of naming.
To this extent the theme of conspiracy, predicated upon what in Dalyian phraseology might be 
called ’Malevolent Male Machinations’, is inadequate fullyto explain the phenomenon under 
discussion. The serious point that much of the conspiratorial rhetoric tends to cloud is that it is not, 
as with women, on account of their sex that such men have been excluded from active participation 
in the processes of social definition. Rather is their exclusion due to other factors (such as race and 
class oppression) which, in Daly’s theory, are in some sense derived from sex domination which is 
seen as historically the primary and most basic form of oppression. ^
The identification of Berger’s analysis as a productof male rather than ’human’ externalising 
activity allows Daly to recast his ideas, in effect reversing his ’reversal’. Retaining Bergerian 
vocabulary Daly exhorts women to ’uproot’ the prevailing, male constructed, sense of reality by
expelling ’what has been internalised’ ' and moving ’toward externalizing our own being in objective
52social reality’. The only way in which women can dis-possess themselves of what Daly calls the 
’soul shrinking’ internalisations of sex-role conditioning and pour their own meanings forth into the 
world is, of course, to reclaim access to language and thence the power to define reality. Daly argues 
that the liberation of the naming process, indeed the liberation of language itself, must take place as 
a necessary condition for the establishment of a dijferent ordering of reality in which women will
Ibid., p.3.
Ibid., p.4
Bevond God the Father p.46. 
Ibid., p. 136.
Ibid., p. 137.
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not be marginal but central figures. Women must have access to’externalization’ for two principle 
reasons. First, because it is their ’human’ prerogative. In this Daly implicitly accepts at least one idea 
from Berger, namely, that human beings have a major role to play in the construction of what counts 
as social ’reality’. Secondly, because the male-stream cultural order is morally banlaupt. IiBevond 
God the Father and Gvn/Ecologv it is principally women (though she also mentions other 
disadvantaged groups) who suffer from patterns of thought such as ’rapism’. InPure Lust Daly 
identifies ’patriarchal’ patterns of meaning, such as the ’Sado-Ritual Syndrome’, which are 
destructive not only of women and other social ’outsiders, but ultimately of the earth itself and all 
’Her’ creatures'^
As part of the effort to break the ’spell’ cast by patriarchal males over the process of 
knowledge construction (or naming) Daly formulates a methodology for bringing about an 
autonomous female reconstruction of knowledge. The method is described by Daly in terms of the 
metaphor of the ’Labrys’ (the double-sided axe wielded by the legendary Amazon women). The 
strategy of castration-creation then is viewed as a critical ’weapon’ which ’Warrior Women’ may
wield as part of the ’wai"’ against their oppressors. This method has two critical edges: the
castration/exorcism of male meanings and the creation/ecstasy of new ’gynocentric’ meanings.^
Castration/exorcism represents the negative pole, the impetus towards the demystification of 
the phallic world view and its underlying value-system. In general terms the method of 
castration/exorcism’ expresses the need for an ongoing process of demystification, the continual 
critique of the ’ill logic’ and methods of patriarchal thought. In sociological terms this translates as 
an analysis of the ways in which the specificities of context relate to the production of social 
’knowledge’. Hence her unremitting concentration on the processes of knowledge construction.
When dealing with cultural texts - whether these be fairy tales or social anthropological accounts of 
female genital circumcision - she recommends women to ask themselves: just ’whose’ knowledge is 
being depicted, either implicitly or explicitly, as ’reality’? Ultimately a critical space is opened up
between their own perception and experience and what is commonly accepted as ’social reality 
In addressing (and encouraging other women to address) these questions Daly perforates the 
superficial layer of ’objectivity’ and ’value-freedom’ or ’neutrality’ that pervades much scholarship, 
exposing the political interests lurking covertly beneath.
See this thesis p.31.
Daly Gvn/Ecologv p.405.
Daly gets the idea of exorcism of ’the "demons" which are born of the projection-introjection 
mechanisms from Harvey Cox C.f.: The Church and the Second Sex p. 169f.
This transformation is described in phenomenological terms by Sandra Baitky in ’Towards a 
Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness’ Social Theorv and Practice 3 (Fall, 1975), pp. 425-39.
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Thus the first step ’back’ and ’forward’ to reality for Daly ccahsts in becoming conscious of 
the origins and of the obstacles of our knowing and thinking. She asks us to meditate upon the 
operation of our mental processes, upon how we (unthinkingly) think about the world in order to 
identify destructive patterns. Specifically Daly urges women to pare ’away from the self all that is 
alien and confining...we should struggle to detect whatever obstacles we can find, both internal and
external, to this dis-covering of the Self.  ^Women must ’exorcise’ the ’false’ identities imposed upon 
them in patriarchy. Such a commitment entails hard cerebral work. As she comments: ’The Amazon
Voyager can be anti-academic ... Only at her greatest peril can she be anti-intellectual’.^  Breaking 
out of socially sanctioned patterns of meaning may of course be difficult because it requires that we 
challenge the patterns of thinking that we have been coerced into adopting. Nevertheless the very 
fact that the human world is socially constructed is a source for hope. For what we have been 
socialised into learning can be unlearned. Moreover many have already’seen through the Lie’. That 
women are able to deconstruct the ’logic’ of phallocratie reality implies prior knowledge of ’ another 
reality’, a reality perhaps only partially glimpsed, but there nonetheless. Daly maintains that once a 
woman begins, with other women, to analyse her context critical she becomes increasingly 
conscious of the origins and of the obstacles of her own knowing and thinking processes. A woman 
is able to step back and to look at her social reality with new eyes, to consider the way in which her 
own mental processes operate, to ponder the ways in which she views the world. As a result of this 
critical activity women are able to isolate patterns of thinking/acting that are destructive of 
ourselves and others.
Daly practices the method of castration in and through her writings. In Gvn/Ecologv and 
Pure Lust, for example, she probes the language and ’logic’ that pervade fairy tales and other 
children’s literature (including school books, magazines etc.). She argues that such material conveys 
a particular and, from the female point of view, an insidious pattern of meanings. The messages that 
are relayed to women via these conduits include the idea that male domination is ’natural’, and 
sanctioned by the highest orders of ’reality’; that women somehow ’derive’ from males and thus owe 
them their allegiance; that women are weak and prone to the influence of wayward and demonic 
forces; and that men have the power and the authority to ’save’ women from themselves. This 
semantic matrix is there, an already objectified reality before the infant enters the picture. As female 
children are socialised they thus become inducted into phallocracy, drawn into ’accepting’ constraint 
by ’alien’ male systems and patterns of meaning (’alien’ because they have either distorted or elided 
women’s experience) and disconnected from alternative ways of conceiving and ordering the world
Gvn/Ecologv p.381 
Pure Lust p.xiii.
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on the basis of their own autonomous experience. Likewise, she analyses ’the all-pervasive language 
of myth, conveyed overtly and subliminally through religion, "great art", literature, the dogmas of
59professionalism, the media, grammar ’  ^ These media, she argues, convey ’deceptive perceptions’
both ’overtly’ and through ’subliminal messages intended to incapacitate on deep psychic levels’,
60smothering women’s ’Elemental potency’ women’s native (’Original’) power to ’re 
member’/create/transform reality. ’Myth’ in this broad sense both communicates the socio-political 
ethos of patriarchal society - an ethos which is able to maintain itself only by accentuating certain 
aspects of reality whilst blocldng out others. In such a universe of meaning women learn that they 
are of little value apart from their connections with men and the male order. The promulgation of 
messages such as these, through myth, is construed as a form of colonisation or ’Possession’ by 
demonic forces.
It is the task of radical feminist ’metaethics’, as Daly formulates it in Gvn/Ecologv, to locate
’the hidden agendas concealed in the texture of language, buried in mythic reversals which control
61"logic" most powerfully because unacknowledged’. Such a task inevitably involves ’a deliberate
confrontation with language structures of our h e r i ta g e T h is  includes the ’breaking’ of patriarchal 
myths that prevent women from seeing and naming their oppression. Male myths cannot aid women 
directly in the task of self-realization. Such myths however ’contain stolen mythic power. They are 
something like distorting lenses through which we can see into the Background’. It is therefore 
’necessary to break their codes in order to use them as viewers; that is, we must see their lie in order
64to see their truth’. Unlike many of the French feminist writers, then, who are sceptical of women’s 
chances of using language (which they think is intrinsically male) in order to liberate themselves 
from phallocratie discursive structures, Daly believes that women can find reality by destroying the
false perceptions inflicted upon us by the language and myths’ of mem
The second moment of the method of liberation - creation/ecstasy - represents the more 
positive pole, the movement towards the creation of new meanings, sense and values. Daly claims 
that women cannot rest content with castrating sexist language but need to ’wrench back some word-
Gvn/Ecologv p.3.
Pure Lust p. 166-194.
Gvn/Ecologv p.12.
Daly, Bevond God the Father p. 167. This concept was originally formulated by Paulo Freire in his 
educational work with the oppressed of South America. Daly duly notes her debt to Freire in footnote 12 on 
p.200 of Bevond God the Father. For Freire’s formulation of naming see Pedagogv of the Oppressed (N.Y.: 
Herder and Herder, 1970; London: Sheed and Ward, 1972).
Bevond God the Father p.44.
64 Ibid., p.47.
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power’. As she writes: ’Gynocentric Method requires not only the murder of misogynist methods
(intellectual and affective exorcism) but also ecstasy, which I have called ludic cerebration’,^  ^ As 
well as a ’castrating’ of patriarchal language and symbols then the method of naming involves a
67’breakthrough to new semantic fields’, Daly believes in the power of speech, the project of human 
intercourse. She wants therefore to move beyond the view of language as inexorable ’power over’ to 
a view of speech as part of an emancipatory effort. In one sense, then Daly’s feminist 'method' is 
'nothing less than this beginning to speak humanly - a reclaiming of the right to name' for she
believes that the 'liberation of language is rooted in the liberation of ourselves'.^
Women's reconstruction of linguistic forms occurs for Daly in feminist community. Thus 
she writes: the context for women's entry into the symbolic realm 'has its source and its
69verification in the rising consciousness women have of ourselves and our situation'. As Adrienne 
Rich notes, in On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose 1966-78: 'The crucible of a new 
language [is] that primary presence of women to ourselves and each other first described in prose
by Mary Daly'.  ^This change in the meaning of words comes, for Daly, 'from qualitatively new
experience'.^* The kind of experience that Daly thinks will 'transvaluate' the value system 
underlying present patriarchal linguistic structures is not simply women's experience generally but, 
more specifically, 'the women's revolution'. Daly understands the movement for women's liberation
72in terms of a 'history-bearing group' with a 'vocational consciousness' (though its not, as in 
Tillich's analysis, centrally organised). However she thinks feminists 'can hardly be described as a 
group' if by that we mean interest group because their vocation is ultimate: ' the human becoming
73of that half of the human race that has been excluded from humanity by sexual definition'.
The task of finding a way by which to create or externalise new ‘gynocentric’ meanings is 
hazardous and difficult. But Daly refuses to despair and attempts, through her own writing, to 'Spin' 
and 'Weave' 'Original' or 'Elemental' meanings that resonate with a 'metapatriarchal' reality. That 
Daly is only partially successful in this project is due to the nature of language itself. The creation
65 Ibid., p.4.
66 Gvn/Ecology p.23.
67 Bevond God the Father p.8f.
Ibid., p.8.
69 Ibid., p.9.
70 Rich, Adrienne On Lies. Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose 1966-78 (N.Y.: Norton, 1979) p. 250.
7^  Bevond God the Father p.8.
72 Tillich Svstematic Theology Volume III: Life and the Spirit. Historv and the Kingdom of God (Welwyn: 
James Nisbet and Co., 1964, First published by the University of Chicago in 1963) pp.329-333.
72 Bevond God the Father p.35
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of meaning arises from the production of new ways of articulating the ’objective’ codes of language. 
Language is both already ’given’ to individuals as an ’objective facticity’ (as Berger says), a structure
74that predetermines in some way the subjective acts of consciousness; and yet language is also an 
’intentionality of subjective consciousness’, that is expressive and creative of meaning. The process 
of ’weaving’ or ’spinning’ meaning through language is thus an activity in which we are all 
potentially or actively involved, whilst drawing upon those meanings that are already in the social 
semantic reservoir. Daly employs the term ’web’ as a metaphor to describe the twofold nature of 
language as both the process (we recall the verb: ’textere’ ’to weave’) and the product (text, the 
objective ’fabric’ of language). The ’Gyn/ecologicaT meaning of web is both, she writes: ’a fabric as
15it is being woven on a loom or as it appeal's when removed from a loom (a web of lace)’.
Language is not therefore simply a fixed system of signs but that activity by which meaning is being 
continually produced. Whilst absolute novelty is impossible, in linguistic terms, Daly believes that 
the inventive character of language, particularly metaphoricity, is capable of in some way 
transcending the limits that govern linguistic structures. New meaning, in other words, is possible.
Those weaned upon the ’Puritanism’ of traditional theory are liable to be dazed by the 
display of alliteration and word-play which, if anything, intensifies as Daly’s work develops. In 
Gvn/Ecologv, Pure Lust and the Wickedarv she experiments with existing language forms, both 
with the English language and with a stream of myth and imagery deriving from Western culture. 
Words are either invented or de-constructed and given new meanings in order to celebrate the 
positive value of women and the forms and the history of our resistance to patriarchal oppression.
The linguistic strategies she enlists in her battle to re-unite women and words include neologism 
(Archimage); ’unmasking’ deceptive words by dividing them and employing alternative meanings 
for prefixes (Stag-nation); asking us to listen to words in different ways (Positively Revolting Hag); 
and the use of lower and upper cases to stress or to demote words (lesbian, Lesbian).
Daly’s ’poetics’ are predicated upon the possibility of an orcflogical connection between 
words and reality. Using the ’Gyn/Ecological’ method she attempts to re-integrate the fragmented 
connections between women and language, often by discerning an ’older’ system of meanings 
hidden ’behind’ the existing ones. These ’archaic’ meanings, Daly suggests, are originally 
’gynocentric’ but they have been appropriated by the agents of patriarchal culture in various ways; 
for example by reversing, extending or subtracting from their original meanings.
One of the more contentious ways that Daly tries to create new meaning for women is to 
invent words by drawing from dictionary definitions of words as a reservoir of semantic resources.
Spender, Dale Man-Made Language (London: Pandora, 2nd edition, 1992), pp. 141-42.
75 The Wickedarv p. xvii-xviii.
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Her choice of the dictionary form, in the Wickedarv. aims to unmask the selective nature of 
dictionaries and their ideological character. Her attempt to recast the form of the ’dick-tionary’ 
follows from her conviction that these collations encapsulate the products of a host of cultural 
activities - including theology - which have been ’codified’ as part of the process of maintaining 
patriarchal social airangements. The lexicographical device of tracing words back to their ’origins’, 
she contends, is only a smoke-screen that is intended to mask the deep sources from which words 
really spring. The etymologies listed in dictionaries do not take us back to our deep Origins, though
they may ‘contain fragments and clues to our stolen heritage'. ^
Neither 'moment' is sepai'able from the other. As Daly writes: 'The process of exorcism, of 
peeling off the layers of mindbindings and cosmetics, is movement past the patriarchally imposed
77sense of reality and identity. This demystification process, a-mazing The Lies, is ecstasy. In its 
fullness this method represents an attempt both to offset the multiple dilemmas for feminists of 
male patriarchal thought forms and also an attempt to create something original. It embodies an 
ethic of 'double-vision' in so far as it is an attempt to deal with both the present and the future that 
is being actualised.
This 'double-edged' approach is contiguous with the radical feminist theory and practice of 
consciousness-raising. Consciousness-raising is a project involving, on one hand, a criticism of the 
historic and contemporary definitions, roles and representations of women and, on the other, the
creation of new representations of female subjectivity with corresponding social images.
Something like this double-edged strategy remains necessary to feminism because, as Daly sees, it 
is not simply a question of either to continue to be susceptible to patriarchal patterns of meaning or 
escaping from it by creating an alternative system of meanings. As Spender observes, Daly's view
79is 'That we are both governed by the patriarchal system but able to get outside'. For Daly, then, 
both factors apply. Moreover feminists are faced with having to continually 're-invent the wheel' in 
as much as the younger generation of women are faced with the necessity to experience for 
themselves basic insights which have been in intellectual circulation for years.
Some feminists have voiced their concern about the limitations of Daly’s reconstructive 
project, especially her experimentation with language forms and words. This is not to say that she is 
immune from criticism. Daly has been criticised for encouraging the idea that linguistic change 
equals social change. Clearly the generation of new meanings will not automatically lead to the just
Wickedarv p. 43.
77 Gvn/Ecology p. 6.
78 Braidotti, Rosi ’The Politics of Ontological Difference’Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis ed. Fran 
T. Brennan (London: Routledge, 1989) p.90.
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society, to a restructuring of social institutions, to redistribution of wealth or even to increased 
employment opportunities within the present economic system. But equally clearly freedom from 
material want is not the only condition of human well-being. As Dale Spender points out one could
envisage women being economically independent yet without real psychological autonomy:
80women’s minds could still be ’colonised’. The problem with Daly’s work is simply that she creates 
the impression that all women need to do to achieve liberation is to engage in 'ludic cerebration' and 
the 'mindbindings' and 'spiritbindings' that hold them fast will be loosened. Broadly speaking most 
women will find it difficult to embrace cultural 'deviancy' in the way that Daly seems to envision. 
Force of material circumstance may prevent women from exercising their 'choice' to defy patriarchal 
order. It may be that Daly’s proposals are so radical that they fall into utopianism from the 
perspective of those who are most severely handicapped by the patriarchal system. Added to this is 
the criticism that in her increasing preoccupation with lyricism and neologism Daly has made 
herself unreadable and obscure. Deborah Cameron, for example, writes: '[M]any women find it 
elitist and unreadable. Constant wordplay and extensive terminological definitions are not 
immediately accessible devices, and feminists need to consider very carefully the extent they are
politically productive'.^ There are two points to respond to here: the first point concerns the 
accessibility of Daly’s writing; the second point concerns whether her linguistic project actually 
works. I shall take each point in turn.
Firstly, the allegations of the elitism of Daly’s writing are, I think, unfair. Feminists who 
embrace the most opaque and inaccessible contemporary philosophical and linguistic theories are 
often the ones who attempt to stigmatise her for what they see as her unwillingness to alter the form 
of her discourse or to change the presentational format of her work in order to make it more 
manageable for (it is suggested) less educationally privileged women. This attitude displays a quite 
considerable ignorance of the fact that many socially underprivileged women continue to be 
challenged and aroused by her writings. (To this extent the inclusion in the ... edition of 
Gvn/Ecologv of Bonnie Mann's paper on the practical uses of the book in the context of work with 
women survivors of domestic violence is a political masterstroke).
Secondly, with regard to the question as to whether Daly’s project with language works one 
would have to say that the measure of her success is contingent upon the particular criteria for 
'success' and 'failure' that feminists, either consciously or unconsciously, assume. Daly’s project is 
fundamentally asking women to invest the language with their own 'original' meanings, and to
79 Spender Man-Made Language p.208
80 Ibid., p.6.
81 Cameron, Deborah Feminism and Linguistic Theorv (London: Macmillan, 1985) p.80
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repudiate many meanings that are currently accepted as valid. This is an important political task not 
just for women but for all oppressed groups who have been collectively objectified by derogatory 
language and stereotypes. But the process of questioning the whole ’world’ construction of 
phallocracy will be experienced by many men and women as personally threatening. Those who 
advocate rebellion, such as Daly, will often be vilified as part of the backlash against the forces of 
change.
It has also been said that the meanings of words are not changed or altered by individuals 
like Daly or even by groups. As Jean Bethke Elstain notes: ’Meanings evolve slowly as changing 
social practices, relations, and institutions are characterized in new ways. Over time this helps to
83give rise to an altered reality, for language evolution is central to reality’. Likewise Dale Spender 
argues that the problem is not so much with individual words but rather with the semantic rules that 
consign women to a negative position relative to men. She also views the creation of ’new words’ 
with some trepidation because ’while they are also subjected to the existing semantic rule that male 
is positive and minus male is negative, there is reason to believe that when consigned to negative
84semantic pace they too will become pejorated and sexist’. In fairness it should be said that it is not 
simply the meanings of individual words that Daly is quibbling over. Daly realises that words only 
mean to people within the context of their relation to other words in a sign system. Even 
neologisms only make sense because we can interpret them within an already existing pool of
meanings.^' But what Daly is primarily interested in is the creation of new patterns of meaning that 
arise out of women’s experiences. As I have reported, in Daly’s theory a major condition for new 
meaning is the emergence of a new experiential context. Minimally this may mean that a woman 
has broken through to the very first stages of feminist consciousness. Once she comes to perceive a 
discrepancy between her inner subjective experience and the meanings communicated to her 
through her social roles she is able to ’hear’ herself and (if she takes part in consciousness-raising
activity) other women. It is out of this hearing that new words e m e rg e In  Bevond God the Father 
new radical feminist words are understood to be novel not so much in the sense that they are 
neologisms but rather words ’which, materially speaking, are identical with the old become new in a
82 See
83 Elshtain, Jean Bethke ’Feminist Discourse and its Discontents: Language, Power, and Meaning’ in 
Nannerl O Keohane, Michelle Z. Rosaldo and Barbara C. Gelpi (eds.) Feminist Theory: A Critique of 
Ideology (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982) p. 140.
84 Spender Man-Made Language pp.29-30.
85 C.f.: Marilyn Frye’s assessment of Daly’s linguistic project in ’Re-discovering Fire’ inWilful Virgin: 
Fessavs in Feminism 1976-92 (Freedom, CA: The Closing Press, 1992) p.99.
Bevond God the Father p.8.
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semantic context that arises from qualitatively new experience’. This emphasis upon listening to 
our experience is re-affirmed in Gvn/Ecolosv. Daly writes; ’In the beginning was not the word. In 
the beginning is the hearing. Spinsters spin deeper into the listening deep. We can spin only what 
we hear, because we hear, and as well as we hear. We can weave and unweave, knot and unknot, 
only because we hear, what we hear, and as well as we hear’.
It would be a mistalce to reject Daly’s project out of hand simply because her own linguistic 
constructions are perhaps aesthetically unappealing, or inadequate in rendering our experience with 
full integrity. As the American feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye acknowledges: 'Though they are 
in some cases awesome, the new pictures Daly builds in Pure Lust do not entirely suit me. They do 
inspire and encourage me to rejoin the larger project with renewed vigor, and make more pictures of
89my own'. It is undoubtedly the case that, as Frye remarks: 'The new meaning form, like a new art
90form, will arise in the different works of many creators, not by the fiat of one'. Daly has made this 
point herself on a number of occasions. She is urging women (by example) to speak their own 
words, to name their own experiences, to do their own work. To engage in creative intellectual 
endeavour (and here one should not identify intellectual with the narrowly academic) is a mannmoth 
responsibility, particularly so when it is realised that there are no models for women to follow. As 
Daly frames it in Bevond God the Father women are moving into a world without models. This need 
not be threatening. All it means is that women are continually thrown back upon themselves and 
forced to engage creatively with their experience.
In summary: Daly's theoiy of naming allows the feninist theorist to target language as a 
terrain upon which power can be redefined and redistributed. Attention to her own practice can 
instil in the feminist thinker a critical awareness of the ways in which language establishes, 
maintains and reflects an asymmetrical relationship between the sexes. Her texts achieve this by 
encouraging in the reader the development of a certain critical habitus, a tendency or predisposition 
to look at and think about language and its use in a politically discerning way.
The kind of critical manoeuvre that Daly performs on Berger's theory is indicative of the 
castration of the methodology of sociology that, Daly argues, must occur if women are to find their 
own cultural voices within such disciplines. What then are the implications of her practice for what 
might be construed as 'Un-sociology'?
Ibid., p.7.
Gvn/Ecologv p.424. 
Ibid., p.99.
Ibid.
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Daly makes no attempt to explore the implications of her criticisms for the theory and 
practice of academic sociology itself. She does not suggest alternative ’woman-centred’ topics for
91sociological research (such as housework), nor does she make proposals for the transformation or 
reconstruction of sociology as a ’scientific’ discipline. We must look elsewhere, to the professional
92feminist sociologists for that. There is no systematic attempt, on Daly’s part, to reconstruct the 
sociology of knowledge from a feminist perspective. This attitude is in keeping with her analytic 
priorities, which are concerned primarily with listening to women’s experience and using it to test 
potential resources within male-stream theory rather than advancing the development of extant 
disciplinary methodologies, of which she is suspicious. This is not to say that Daly’s criticisms of 
Berger have no substance, however, nor is it to suggest that her appropriation of elements from 
Berger’s sociological theory cannot be critically assessed by feminist sociologists. Indeed, such 
critical activity on the part of feminist scholai's in the field can only aid the task of further clarifying 
the nature of Daly’s challenge to male-stream theory.
On one level Daly may be interpreted as trying to ’include’ women where they were formerly 
missing or excluded from Berger’s account, that is, in the externalisation process.In other words, all 
women have to do is to begin to join with men in the worldbuilding enterprise in order to make it a 
fully ’human’ process, i  another respect, however, Daly is doing something quite different such that 
a full explanation of the nature of Daly’s interaction with Berger cannot be given in terms of the 
project of ’extension’. Such a theoretical approach is inadequate because, as we shall see, she 
believes that the very process of patriarchal externalisation - a process that includes masculinist 
sociology - is predicated upon the exclusion of women as subjects of worldbuilding activity. For 
women are the anomie/chaos over and against wliich men must impose themselves and their 
meanings.Ii: order to explain this point it is necessaiy to refer to Daly’s interplay with another of 
Berger’s concepts: religion as legitimation.
The idea of religion as legitimation has been an organising concept in Daly’s writings since
93the early seventies. Daly’s criticism of Christianity, inBevond God the Father, is founded upon an 
understanding of religion in terms of its function in ’linking the unsteady reality of social constructs
See Anne Oakley Sociologv of Housework (London: Martin Robertson, 1974).
92 Smith has attempted to explore what the term ’a sociology for women’ actually means. She contends that 
it means not ’a sociology exclusively for women’ but rather a sociology that ’addresses society and social 
relations from the standpoint of women situated outside rather than within the relations of ruling’. Such a 
sociology would offer women ’a way of seeing further into the relations organizing their lives’. See Dorothy 
E. Smith The Evervdav World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociologv (Northeastern University Press,
1987), pp.46-47.
93 See Daly 'The Women’s Movement: An Exodus Community' in Religious Education LXVII 
(September-October, 1972), pp327-35; 'A Call for the Castration of Sexist Religion' The Unitarian
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94(objectivations) to ultimate reality through myth’, a statement that recalls Berger’s view of religion 
as a human product, created in order to bolster the ’precarious’ reality eonstruetions that are
95’objectivated’ (Berger’s term) in the course of social activity. Whilst Daly’s understanding of the 
legitimising function of religion is structurally similar to Berger’s aecount, however, the 
understanding of soeial reality that, in Daly’s work, confers meaning upon her use of terms such as 
’religion’, ’alienation’ and ’anomie’ is different to the understanding of social reality in Berger’s 
theory. In a subversive theoretieal manoeuvre Daly asserts that phallocracy itself (including male 
sociology) is a religious legitimation or ’sacred canopy’ that has been erected by men in the faee of 
women who symbolically represent the terror of ’anomie’. I shall eomnience by giving a brief 
description of the theory as it is given by Berger in The Social Realitv of Religion, after which I 
shall move on to analyse Daly’s radieal feminist interaetion with the theory.
In Berger’s theory of social construction legitimations foster ’alienation’, a form of false 
consciousness. In The Soeial Realitv of Religion Berger makes a distinction between the ’socialized 
identity’ and the ’total self. False consciousness occurs when the ’dialectic’ between the two (a 
dialectie that mirrors the dialectieal relationship between human beings and their products) is denied
96and individuals come to associate themselves entirely with their social identity and role.
Individuals may not always consciously realise that social reality to be a human construction. They 
exhibit what Berger ealls, following Sartre, ’bad faith’ when they simply appropriate the social 
’choices’ of previous generations, thus ’forgetting’ their own responsibility to decide. Should ’man’ 
’forget’ that ’the world he lives in has been produeed by himself, that in other words both self and 
world are products of ’his’ own activities, both the social order or world and the socialised self 
’confront the individual as inexorable facticities analogous to the facticities of nature’. The resulting
97State of being is what Berger calls alienation.
Universalist Christian (autumn, 1971).
Beyond God the Father p. 138.
Daly’s statement mirrors, almost word for word, Berger’s characterisation of religion in The Social 
Realitv of Religion p.32.
Berger The Social Realitv of Religion p.94.
97 Alienation (to which a remedy is possible) should not be confused with estrangement which is ’given in 
the sociality of man, in other words,... it is anthropologically necessary’. (Ibid., p. 85). Internalisation 
involves 'diduplication of consciousness, in terms of its socialized and non-socialized components. 
Duplication of consciousness ’has the consequence of setting aside, congealing or estranging one part of 
consciousness as against the rest. Put differently, internalization entails self-objectivation. That is, part of 
the self becomes objectivated, not just to others but to itself, as a set of representations of the social world - 
a "social self", which is and remains in a state of uneasy accommodation with the non-social self- 
consciousness upon which it has been imposed’. (Ibid., p. 83). Duplication ’results in an internal 
confrontation between socialized and non-socialized components of self, reiterating within consciousness 
itself the external confrontation between society and the individual’. (Ibid., 84.) A tension thus emerges
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Alienation frequently serves to bolster the individuals defences against ’anomie’. Anomie 
signifies the experience of the break down or disintegration of the social order by means of which 
the individual was previously enabled to make sense of her/his existence. Alienation protects the 
individual against anomie by virtue of its ability to ’immunize’ the individual from the uncertainties 
which characterise human world-building. Psychologically, then, inner strength is the reward of 
alienation (whilst those who take measures to eschew bad faith and who recognise their own 
productive roles in the determination of social reality are prone to the psychological instability of 
anomie). The alienated individual appears to possess resolution in conduct and certainty and 
confidence with regard to personal identity. In reality, however, the alienated individual is evading 
social facts.
It is here that legitimations enter the picture. For Berger the rationale for legitimations is to 
foster alienation as a way by which to cope with, or ward off, the threat of anomie. As ’socially 
objectivated "knowledge"’ legitimations seek to ’explain and justify the social order’ by providing a
98complete raison d’etre for society's structures. The social world intends, as far as possible, to be 
taken for granted. Indeed, a major index of the success of socialisation is the degree to which this 
taken-for-granted quality is internalised by the individual. To facilitate the achievement of a taken- 
for-granted status nomoi seek to become encompassing orderers of human experience. As Berger 
frames it every nomos is driven by 'an inherent logic' which strives to 'expand into wider aieas of
99meaning'. Even 'if the ordering activity of society never attains to reality, it may yet be described 
100as totalizing'. Summarising this notion Berger writes: 'It is not enough that the individual look 
upon the key meanings of the social order as useful, desirable, or right. It is much better (better, 
that is, in terms of social stability) if he looks upon them as inevitable, as part and paicel of the
universal "nature of things'". For this reason it must be constantly maintained through various 
legitimations,
A distinction is made, in Berger’s theory, between different types of legitimation: 'the level 
of self-legitimating facticity and that of, so to speak, secondary legitimations made necessary by
between two sides of individual consciousness. Internalisation means that only one part of the self is 
objectivated not just to others ’but to itself, as a set of representations of the social world a "social self", 
which is and remains in a state of uneasy accommodation with the non-social self-consciousness upon 
which it has been imposed’. (Ibid.). The creation of ’otherness’ therefore, both internally within 
consciousness and externally in society, comes to be the product of social life. At this fundamental level, 
however, there is little that can be done.
Berger The Social Realitv of Religion p.29
99 Ibid., p. 20. 
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144102challenges to facticity’. The former simply refers to the fact that the socially constructed world 
legitimates itself by virtue of its ’objective facticity’. However, additional legitimations are 
invariably necessary in any society. This necessity is grounded in the problems of socialisation an 
social control. For if the nomos of a society is to be generated from one generation to another, so 
that the new generation will come to "inhabit" the same social world, there will have to be 
legitimating formulas to answer the questions that, inevitably, will arise in the minds of the new
103generation’. So what Berger refers to as secondary legitimations operate at different levels: the 
’pretheoretical level’ (not formal intellectual systems) on which one finds simple formulae expressly 
affirm, as Berger puts it, the paradigm of ’This is how things are done’; ’an incipiently theoretical 
level’ which consists of explanatory schemes which help to direct activity - proverbs, traditional
104wisdom etc. - that may be developed further through legends, folklore, myths; ’explicitly 
theoretical legitimations, by which specific segments of the social order aie explained and justified 
by means of specialized bodies of "knowledge"’; and, finally, ’the highly theoretical constructions by 
which the nomos of a society is legitimated in toto and in which all less-than-total legitimations are 
theoretically integrated in an all-embracing Weltanschauung’. The final level consist of ’symbolic 
universes’, that is, ’bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate provinces of meaning and encompass 
the institutional order in a symbolic totality’.^ Examples of ’symbolic universes’ include religion,
philosophy and science. It is through this level of legitimation, Berger writes, that ’the nomos of a
106society attains theoretical self-consciousness’. It seeks both to describe how things are in reality 
and, on the basis of this, to prescribe how things ought to be. Individuals are liable to internalise the 
illusion allowing them to believe that ’in acting out the institutional progams that have been imposed 
upon them, they are but realizing the deepest aspirations of their own being and putting themselves
in harmony with the fundamental order of the universe’ Human projections are elevated to the 
status of cosmic realities. Berger writes, ’institutional programs are endowed with anontological 
status to the point where to deny them is to deny being itself - the being of the universal order of
things and, consequently, one’s own being within this order'.L egitim ations thus endow the 
nomos with extraordinary power.
Ibid.,p.31 
Ibid., p.30 
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Historically religion has been the most potent instrument of legitimation because it ’reldes
109the precarious reality constructions of empirical societies with ultimate reality’. That is to say, 
religion is able to mystify the roots of human social constructions, making them appear to be written
into the very fabric of the universe. As Berger himself declaies, one can hardly imagine a 
psychologically more effective method by which to tie the individual to the social nomos. For: ’To 
go against the order of society is always to risk plunging into anomie. Togo against the order of 
society as religiously legitimated, however, is to make a compact with the primeval forces of
darkness’. In its function of hypostasising human social projections religion establishes a sacred
cosmos from primeval ’chaos’, serving as a ’canopy’ or shelter from the dreaded anomie.
Daly lays the foundations for her approach to religion as a form of legitimation in Beyond
God the Father. Like Berger, she considers institutional religion in functional terms. However, in
her account the social system that religion functions to maintain is not society in the abstract but
male dominated society. Reading Berger’s theory in the light of phallocratie society Daly makes a
distinction between the anomic experience of men and that of women. Thus she argues that when
the sociologist writes: 'To be in a "right" relationship with the sacred cosmos is to be protected
against the nightmare threats of chaos. To fall out of such a "right" relationship is to be abandoned
on the edge of the abyss of meaninglessness' he is 'quite unaware that he is describing precisely the
112spiritual dimension of feminist consciousness'. Daly believes that religion is able to legitimate 
patriarchal social reality so effectively because it encourages women and men to remain in 'the false 
security of alienation', a state that she discusses largely in terms of ‘self-reduction in sex roles'.' 
Religion mystifies social origins of the roles into which individuals are socialised thus encouraging 
false consciousness. As she explains: 'People attempt to overcome the threat of nonbeing by 
denying the self. The outcome of this is ironic: that which is dreaded triumphs, for we are caught in
the self-contradictory bind of shrinking our being to avoid nonbeing  ^^4 (My emphasis). The 
tendency to retreat into alienation is then characteristic of both sexes.
Daly acknowledges that all human beings are threatened by anomie. But she considers that 
historically the social psychology of men as a collectivity has been different to that of women. Daly 
speculates that a primary shaping force in the social psychology of male externalisation is the
Ibid., p.32.
’ •^Ibid.
* ‘ ‘ Ibid., p.39.
 ^ Beyond God the Father p.141. 
^^^Ibid., p.23.
 ^ Ibid.
146
outpouring of male self-hatred and its projection onto women. She interprets the Christian myth of 
the Fall in terms of this social psychological pathology. The narrative of the Fall, she writes, ’has 
provided legitimation not only for the direction of the self-hatred of the male outward against
women, but also for the direction of self-hatred on the part of women. Because the story forms 
part of a sacred canon of texts both women and men are encouraged to internalise the message of 
female evil transmitted via the mythic figure of Eve. In this way patriarchal religion intensifies ’the 
process through which women internalise the consciousness of the oppressor. The males’ judgement 
having been metamorphosed into God’s judgement, it becomes the religious duty of women to 
accept the burden of guilt, seeing the self with male chauvinist eyes’. W o m e n  in their position vis- 
à-vis male society thus come to be symbolic of the negativity and anomic chaos that threatens to 
engulf men.
In Gvn/Ecologv Daly develops this idea by conceptualising patriarchy itself as a kind of 
universal ’religion’. Not only Christianity and institutionalised religion but all of the ’symbolic 
universes’ created by men together represent a ’sacred canopy’ which has been constructed for the 
benefit, not of human beings genetically, but for socially powerful males in the face of an 
experience of anomie (meaninglessness and chaos) that is in some way connected with ’woman’. She 
writes:
Patriarchy is itself the prevailing religion of the entire planet, and its essential message is 
necrophilia. All of the so-called religions legitimating patriarchy are mere sects subsumed 
under its vast umbrella/canopy. They are essentially similar, despite the variations. All - 
from buddhism and hinduism to islam, judaism, Christianity, to secular derivatives such as 
freudianism, jungianism, marxism, and maoism - are infrastructures of the edifice of
patriarchy.'
All of these ideological frameworks, she maintains, ’are erected as parts of the male’s shelter against
anomie. And the symbolic message of all the sects of this religion which is patriarchy is this:
118Women are the dreaded anomie’. The phallocentric nomos that provides the meaningful ordering 
of experience in patriarchal society is designed to protect men from experiencing the 
’meaninglessness’ and chaos that lies in wait beyond the hinterland of the male symbolic. Daly 
analyses a variety of patriarchal legitimations under the rubric of ’sadospirituality’. This 
phenomenon involves not only religious and other ideologies but a whole cultural ethos and its
‘ *^Ibid.,p.48.
^^^Ibid.,p.49.
 ^  ^^  Gvn/Ecologv p.39 
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thought patterns, including the cultural stock of myth and symbol. Again the fundamental message 
is reinforced by ’ritual’. (In Berger’s theory religious ritual acts so as to perpetually ’remind 
individuals of the connections between social and cosmic reality by making present ’the
119fundamental reality-definitions and their appropriate legitimations’). In Gvn/Ecologv she analyses 
a set of cultural rituals such as footbinding, cliterodectomy or widow-burning (sati ) that
symptomatise the patriarchal struggle to keep women inside the androcentric symbolic by drawing
120them into complicity with their fundamental message. In a move that signals a radical departure 
from Berger’s theory, however, Daly exhorts women to surrender the comforts of alienation by 
smashing the ’sacred canopy’ that, according to Berger’s logic, protects them from the ’terror’ of 
’anomie’. In doing so she emphasises another aspect of Berger’s idea of religion: its capacity to 
facilitate de-alienation.
That religion is a double-edged has long been recognised by sociologists. The Durkheimian 
tradition in sociology has shown that religion is a product of social forces and can function to
reinforce prevailing social structures. Yet, as Weber’s work shows, religion may also affect
122empirical reality in a liberating way. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Weber 
demonstrated that religion can act not so as to reconcile the individual with her alienation but to rise 
up and ti'ansform that state. Acknowledging both research traditions Berger grants that ’religion
123appears in history as both a world-maintaining and a world-shaking force’. He writes:
[It] would be gravely misleading to regard the religious formations as being simply 
mechanical effects of the activity that produced them, that is, as inert ’reflections’ of their 
societal base. On the contrary, the religious formations have the capacity to act upon and 
modify that base. This fact, however, has a curious consequence - namely, the possibility of 
de-alienation itself being religiously legitimated.'^^
In the history of religions the situation of a religion actually fostering de-alienation is quite rare. For 
the most part religion has ontologised human social reality. Emancipatory opportunities do arise 
periodically however. Berger links the propensity of a religion to legitimate de-alienation to its 
ability to conceive of human constructions sub specie aeternitatis. The capacity to view society and 
its mechanisms under the aspect of eternity relativises them, allowing them to be perceived for what
 ^ Berger The Social Realitv of Religion p.40.
Ibid., p. 109.
121 Durkheim, Emile Eiementarv Forms of the Religious Life translated by J.W. Swain (N.Y.: Collier 
Books, 1961; London: Allen and Unwin, 1915).
^ We b e r ,  Max The Sociologv of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968) pp80-137.
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125they are, that is, the products of human activities. ' In terms of religious doctrine those religious 
traditions which stress the radical transcendence of God are more likely to facilitate the process of 
de-alienation than those which emphasise God’s immanence.
Daly appropriates this idea that religion may, under certain conditions, facilitate de­
alienation and transposes it into her alternative feminist theoretical account. In Bevond God the 
Father she considers that whilst the idea of church 'has certain propensities for serving as an escape
from facing the abyss', the notion of some kind of 'space set apart' can be useful to feminists if, 
and only if, such a space is found 'not in the effort to hide from the abyss but in the effort to face it,
127as patriarchy’s prefabricated set of meanings, or nomos, crumbles in one’s mind'. On this 
understanding the sacred space that is discovered 'in the deep confrontation between being and
nonbeing' is 'not "set apait" from reality, but from the contrived nonreality of a l i e na t i o n ' Th e  
space that Daly is talking about here is, of course, feminism itself which she conceives in terms of 
dynamic ontological movement. Women's marginality presents them with an opportunity to 
challenge the prevailing symbolic order. Exposure to the experience of nothingness gives women 'a 
sense of distance and relativity in relation to the symbols prevailing in one's culture. Without it, the 
mind tends to perceive these as literally "true" or at least as permanently adequate for all cultural
129situations, which means that the human mind becomes paralyzed by its own products'. When a 
woman challenges the social role and identity that have hitherto given her life meaning she is able to 
see that these structures are relative, human products and therefore not absolute and ultimate, her
130consciousness is driven 'beyond fixation upon "things as they are'". In some ways then what Daly 
sees as the dynamics of feminist move-ment (the movement from alienation, through confrontation 
with nothing to an awareness of participation in be-ing) reveals 'clues' and 'signals of transcendence' 
which may in turn function to ground a new feminist approach to theology.
The phrase 'signals of transcendence' derives from Berger's work A Rumour of Angels in 
which he explores the constructive possibilities for theology in the light of secularity . Berger notes 
that in the modern world traditional religious beliefs have been emptied of meaning not only in 
lai'ge sections of the general population but even among many churchgoers. Those to whom the
Ibid., p. 96.
Ibid., p. 99.
Bevond God the Father p. 156. 
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supernatural is still meaningful constitute a ’cognitive minority’, that is ’a group of people whose 
view of the world differs significantly from the one generally taken for granted in their society,,. a
group formed around a body of deviant "knowledge"’. Berger’s thesis in the book is that in spite
132of the current ’Geist’ of secularity the supernatural survives ’in hidden nooks and crannies of the
133culture’. He suggests that a profitable avenue for theologians would be to seek out such signals 
’within the empirically given human situation’. He goes on to suggest that ’there are prototypical
134human gestures that may constitute such signals. These gestures are ’phenomena that are to be
135found within the domain of our "natural" reality but that appear to point beyond that reality’." The 
examples given by Berger include the human propensity towards order, play, hope and , humour and 
the phenomenon of damnation.
In Daly’s work the existence of ’God’ is postulated upon the basis of the experience of 
transcendence that, she believes, lies at the heart of feminism. Women’s ’realization of oui- 
exclusion from the world-building process’, represents a kind of ’via negativa’ (here sheipriiigs off 
the analysis of Huston Smith) which whilst it does not ’"prove" Transcendence ... makes room for 
it’. It does this by allowing us to discover ’our previously unknown being, which points our 
consciousness outward and inward toward as yet unknown Being, that some would call the hidden
137God’. She writes: ’...women who are confronting the nothingness that emerges when one turns 
one’s back upon the pseudo-reality offered by patriarchy are by that very act saying "I am", that is,
confronting our own depth of b e i n g T h e  ’sense of transcendence’ arising from such experiences, 
she contends, ’can be seen as rooted in the power of being, which, perhaps for lack of a better word,
139some would still call "God"’. She acknowledges that the Elemental forces are ’always Unlcnown’
140in themselves. Yet she believes that it is not unreasonable to infer the existence of such a deep
Ibid.
132 Berger defines belief in the ’supernatural’ as ’the assertion of belief that there is an other reality, and one 
of ultimate significance for man, within which transcends the reality which our everyday experience 
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reality from the phenomenological data, and she is personally convinced that women ultimately 
Tive, move and have their being’ in transcendent Be-ing.
For Daly then patriarchal religion (which comes to symbolise phallocracy itself) has offered
141women ’the delusory paradise of false consciousness and alienation’ in sex roles. Yet, a ’new 
meeting with the sacred’ is possible through the ’confrontation with nonbeing’ and the ’intuition of 
being’ that is inherent in feminist consciousness. Feminism thus offers women an ecclesial ’space’. 
This space ’may be "dangerous" in that it means living without the securities offered by the
142patriarchal system for docility to its rules’. But ’it offers a deeper security that can absorb the 
risks that such living demands. This safety is participation in being, as opposed to inauthenticity,
143alienation, nonidentity - in a word, nonbeing’. It may also be perceived to be threatening to those 
who ’are fixated upon patriarchal space’, threatening the meanings bestowed by rigid role
144definitions. But it is in reality ’an invitation’ to those thus threatened to confront nothingness also. 
It is ultimately a loving act.
Any attempt by women to move out of the role of the primordial cultural scapegoat is deeply 
threatening to men who require women to function as the repository of their projected negativity.
For if women refused to continue to function as the Other men would be compelled to face their 
own ’nothingness’, a situation that they seek to avoid. In personifying the collective refusal of the 
role of scapegoat, Daly argues, the women’s movement ’represents this terror of chaos and says it
145will no longer be kept at bay’. She surmises that patriarchal males will summon and utilise ’all the 
tools of violence at their command’ in order to suppress any attempt by women to question the
146prevailing order. The ’tools of violence’ that Daly refers to range from indoctrination through 
socialisation, myths and advertising to physical violence, sexual torture (rape) and ultimately, for 
some women, murder. As we have seen, in the phallocratie scenario these phenomena function in 
the manner of ’rituals’ that seek to remind women of the original sacred ’myth’ or story. Reminders 
are constantly necessary, Daly writes, because ’the social reality that they attempt to link with 
"Ultimate Reality" is precarious, and the danger of anomie or of "conversion" is a threat that lurks 
always behind the irrational dogmatism of the High Priests of war. The need for ritual "reminders" 
itself betrays the precariousness of the shields against anomie which these High Priests, both
*"** Ibid., p. 67.
*"*8 Ibid., p. 41.
‘"*8 Ibid.
*"^Ibid.
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147ecclesiastical and civil, wish to keep erect’. Unlike Berger, then, who appears to consider some
148level of alienation necessary for society to operate, Daly wants to see individuals emerge fully 
from the illusion that social roles and identities are fixed for them.
This process of emergence is articulated through the rhetoric of both creation and discovery. 
Daly’s emphasis upon the latter is particularly interesting, for it highlights a central difference 
between her work and Berger's theory. Implicit in Daly’s rereading of Berger's theory of religion as 
legitimation is the notion that the male psyche exhibits a desire to control and manipulate 'reality', 
which is inherently threatening to him. In Berger's theory the social actor is represented as an active 
'maker of choices', an individual with an intrinsic and unquestioned potency to initiate and effect 
change. Fundamentally, however, this idea of the social actor arises from the need for the individual 
to conquer and control 'reality'. As I have described, the desire for control is rooted, in Berger's 
theory, in an in-built anthropological need for security in the face of 'anomie'. For Berger society
149does not present itself as an auto-stabilising entity. It is inevitably 'precarious': there is always the 
possibility that it may, under certain conditions, collapse and come crashing down around our ears. 
Such conditions are given in marginal situations . These 'appear on the horizon of consciousness as 
haunting suspicions that the world may have another aspect other than its "normal" one, that is, that 
the previously accepted definitions of reality may be fragile or even fraudulent. Such suspicions 
extend to the identity of both self and others, positing the possibility of shattering
metamorphoses'. It is the experience or state of being threatened by such situations that Berger 
calls anomie. The most vivid instance of marginality is death. For Berger death generates all our 
efforts to create secure structures and imbues them with anxiety.
Berger's view of the social-psychological importance of personal death and our fear of if s
impending reality is derived from the work of Alfred Schütz.' ' In Schutz's social psychology death 
functions as the 'fundamental anxiety' from which 'spring many the many interrelated systems of 
hopes and fears, of wants and satisfactions, of chances and risks which incite man within the natural 
attitude to attempt the mastery of the world, to overcome obstacles, to draft projects, and to realize
Beyond God the Father p. 143.
* ^ 8 Berger The Social Realitv of Religion p.89.
Whilst Berger’s account of society holds affinities with functionalism (the guiding principle of which is 
that aspects and elements of social life should understood in terms of their contribution to the stability of 
society considered as a whole) this tendency may be qualified somewhat.
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152them’. ' As the feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith shows Schutz’s attitude to death is contestable 
from several perspectives, including feminism. Smith points out that Schutz’s assumption ’is 
grounded in a mode of action in which the power to act and coordinate in a planned and rational
153manner and to exercise control as an individual over conditions and means is taken for granted’.
In reproducing Schutz’s presuppositions about the’fundamental anxiety’ in his own analysis
of marginal situations Berger is open to criticism. Berger’s ideas about death and the threat of
anomie that it poses are in fact highly speculative and it could be argued that they reveal more about
Berger’s presuppositions and worldview than about the situation of humankind. As Peter Lassman
observes Berger’s postulation of death in terms of a Schutzian ’fundamental anxiety’ and anomie as
it’s inevitable accompaniment are ’unexamined postulates’ that ’seem to have the status of "social-
154existentialist" uni versais’. Berger’s work has, of course, been greatly influenced by existentialism
in general and Sartrean existentialism in particular.' The imperative for individuals to build a 
world follows, for Berger, from the existentialist assumption that authentic human life is one which 
seeks to create a ‘world’ out of pre-existent chaos. (To renege on this responsibility to choose and to 
take refuge in the dictates of social institutions, inherited meanings and roles is precisely to fall into 
'bad faith'). Yet are these true 'universais'? Berger's view of death is in fact highly privatistic. Death 
is given meaning in and through socio-cultural contexts; it is not necessarily as terrifying as Berger 
maintains and could be seen simply as part of the cycle of life.
The general impression that one gets from Daly's writings is not that human beings are 
continually threatened by original forces of chaos. There is no sense of the 'absurdity' or
fundamental meaninglessness of life in itself as there is in many of the existentialist w r i t e r s . S h e  
has, by contrast, a strong sense of the purposefulness or finality of human existence. At a number of 
points in her writings she speaks of the 'Journey' into reality both as something that humans 'create 
and something that we 'discover'. The direction of travel is both 'backwards' and 'forwards'.
1 ’On multiple realities’ inCollected Papers (The Hague: Martinus Nijlioff, 1962) 1:228. Cited in Dorothy 
E. Smith The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Northeastern University Press,
1987), p.66.
1 S3 Smith, op.cit., p.64.
*84 Lassmann, Peter ’Phenomenological Perspectives in Sociology’ in John Rex (ed.)Approaches to 
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1974)p.l31.I ss Berger The Social Construction of Realitv pp.203f.
*8  ^One thinks of Camus’s essay The Mvth of Sisvphus (1942) in which the ’hero’ is condemned by the gods 
for eternity to roll a rock up a mountain - when he gets to the top of the mountain the rock rolls down the 
other side and he must go down and start endlessly again. For Camus of course hope and meaning are 
possible even whilst one accepts life as ’absurd’.
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Daly conceptualises the journey to an "original" state of be-ing before the "fall" of patriarchy. This 
original state that does not, however, reside in the historical past, but rather in the ’intuitive 
wanderings of a mytho-historical past’ (Raymond) which has the potentiality for generating for all 
women a future vision of becoming, beyond a gender-defined society. Certainly death does not hold 
the same psychological fascination for Daly that it holds for Berger and the Schutzian tradition of 
social psychology upon which he draws. Like professional feminists sociologists such as Smith,
Daly intimates that far from being universally applicable states of being the preoccupation with fear 
of death and cognate liminal states may in fact be the reflection of a certain masculinist subjectivity.
Berger’s sociology is rooted in the assumption that the ’individual’ automatically has the 
power to create and to name the world, an assumption that is at least questionable from the vantage 
point of women. Women’s work and the ways in which their daily lives are organised do not wholly 
reflect this voluntaristic model. Women have not had the chance to exert ’control’ over ’reality’. But 
Daly goes a step further than Smith when she argues that the attempt to ’master’ reality is always 
doomed to failure. For Berger social reality is always precarious by virtue of the fact that it is not 
given but is actively constructed and perpetually maintained by human beings. Berger is himself a 
practising Christian who views the world as grounded in transcendent Being. In his sociological 
work, however, Berger is solely concerned with the ’world’ or ’reality’ as it is socially constructed. In
159Other words he is concerned with a ’world’ whose ’ontological status’ is bracketed. Daly is not 
hemmed in by any such methodological constraints. In her account it is imperative that human 
beings place their trust in what she calls the ’deep structure of reality’, a structure that originates 
from Be-ing itself. In Daly’s eyes we have no power ultimately over the real, whatever power we do 
possess comes from our participation in be-ing. Cleaily Daly does thinks that the construction of our 
'world' is our human ontological vocation and an ongoing responsibility. When she writes that: 'To 
exist humanly is to name the self, the world, and God' Daly is basically affirming the same idea as 
Berger, that is, that as human beings we are called upon - in the sense of having an ontological 
vocation - to externalise our meanings into the world. But the underlying concept of humanity in 
evidence here is one in which human beings - though enjoying free will - are created with an
•58 Ibid., p.400
* 89 See Berger The Social Realitv of Religion (London: Faber and Faber, 1969) n. I, p.l 89. A key 
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p. 180), for as he goes on to explain: ’Only after the theologian has confronted the historical relativity of 
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inherent ’telos’ towards an other order of being, the ’Super natural’, that is both continuous and yet 
distinct from the natural. For Daly social reality must in some sense cohere or ‘correspond’ with 
what she calls the structure of 'deep' reality, the fundamental ontological order that grounds all 
existents. Culture then grows out of nature. This view is reinforced by the dual emphasis, in her 
writings, upon both the language of social construction and the language o f  discovery . Meaning is 
something that we both create and discover in the course of our social activity. Berger's sociology 
of knowledge is itself a product and reflection of the process of male externalisation, a process that 
does not simply neglect women as subjects of externalising activity, but which is predicated upon 
the exclusion of women as worldbuilding subjects.
In conclusion, then, Berger's work provides Daly with the conceptuality by which to explore 
the idea that 'knowledge' functions as a form of power that serves to keep women in their 
subordinate social position relative to men. On the one hand, Daly clearly considers Berger's 
account of human social construction to be an accurate account of the inherent human social need to 
create models of reality in the course of our engagement with the world. To this extent, his 
description of the social processes by which reality comes to be established is unproblematic. Yet, 
on the other hand, Daly takes issue with Berger over his claim that his report is an 'objective' one. 
For he glosses over the fact that the social processes of worldbuilding are dominated by males - a 
fact that has had catastrophic consequences for women. In one sense, then, Daly thinks that Berger 
is right; worldbuilding is a fundamental human activity engaged in by both sexes. In another sense, 
however, his work is misleading for the evidence suggests that throughout recorded history the 
process has not in fact been inclusive of both sexes. Instead, one sex has come to exert a hegemony 
over the worldbuilding enteiprise. Daly's exposure of Berger's failure to take into account the 
category of sex in his description of worldbuilding need not in itself signify that the fundamental 
categories of the theory require modification. But Daly's criticism of Berger and her analysis of the 
phallocenti'ic culture that it reflects shows that the theory of worldbuilding as it stands, is not able to 
incorporate women on their own terms because the structure of the theory is itself predicated upon 
the valorisation of male experience upon the exclusion of women and their experience. This in turn 
leads Daly to formulate a twin-pronged approach of castration-creation that encourage and enable 
autonomous female knowledge acquisition as part of the feminist political struggle. Such an 
approach, she believes, renders a more accurate account than is given by Berger of the processes 
through which social reality is constructed and maintained. That it is able to do so is due to the fact 
that it begins not from some allegedly 'neutral' Archimedean point, but from the standpoint of those 
who are effectively disenfranchised by Berger's theory.
Daly's reading of Berger is, of course, highly contestable in Berger's sociological terms.Her 
espousal of a self-consciously feminist standpoint signals a fundamental methodological shift away
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from the kind of ’scientific’ approach exemplified by Berger. His method aims afobjectivity’, 
though not the objectivity of the positivist who seeks to report raw facts, but rather an objectivity 
which whilst recognising that values do influence research seeks to control them through a process 
of 'bracketing'. In contrast to Berger, Daly’s method is shaped by her prior and overt commitment to 
women's liberation. Daly is concerned, as is Berger, with what 'is', but she is also concerned, as 
Berger is not, with what 'ought' to be. In as much as Daly's account of social reality is an unfolding 
of what is already 'known' in her presuppositions it cannot be falsified empirically. Such an account, 
in Berger's terms, amounts to ideology.
It must be recognised that Daly's treatment of Berger’s theory lacks the systematic focus, 
technical precision and agility with sociological conceptuality of scholars who are steeped in 
knowledge of the 'canonical' works of the field. Her approach to Berger's writings is thus not on a 
par, nor is profitably compared, with other more formal critiques of sociological theory such as are
to be found in the work of professional feminist sociologists such as Dorothy E. Smi th*and  R.A.
Sydie. Yet it may be that the failure to take the categoiy of sex/gender into account in describing 
the processes by which the social world has been constructed has implications for sociological 
methodology. Daly attempts to expose Berger's value-neutrality as fraudulent and politically 
reactionary. She argues that masculinist assumptions are built into the very structure of Berger's 
theoretical description of social processes and these have the effect of masking the nature of the 
phenomena under investigation. For as Berger's objective methodology makes clear there is no room 
for women's experience in the present structure of sociological thinking. In challenging Berger's 
sex-blind view of worldbuilding Daly reveals women's silencing not only in culture but also in the 
sociological writing and the social relations that mediate it. Her criticism of Berger thus issues a 
challenge to the authority of the male sociological voice. The theory - itself the product of male 
externalisation - represents discourse that conceals the social-psychological factors that condition
its own production. It is an exemplification of what Daly later calls 'writing that erases itself 
This raises the problem of an intellectual world which avows universality, but is in fact built around 
men. Daly's criticism of Berger shows how the rules for knowledge construction in sociological 
theory itself have been predicated upon the valorisation of male experience to the exclusion of 
women and their experience.
In challenging Berger's theory Daly is challenging the traditions that have historically set 
down the rules of discourse between men. As recent feminist research on the history of sociological
Smith, op. cit.
Sydie , R.A. Natural Women. Cultured Men: A Feminist Perspective on Sociological Theory (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1987).
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theory shows, the work of the most prominent sociologists is shot through with patriarchal 
assumptions. Daly’s treatment of Berger’s work issues a direct challenge to existing social theory. In 
her appropriation of Berger’s thought Daly turns his theoretical constructs back upon the tradition of 
masculinist sociology from which they originate. In doing this, I hold, Daly makes a not 
insignificant contribution to the feminist project to unmask ’masculinist’ dominance over Western 
theoretical perspectives and to give women access to knowledge and the power that this represents.
Gvn/Ecology p. 125.
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Chapter Five: Christianity
In this chapter I turn to explore the continuing impact of Christian theology as an influence upon 
Mary Daly’s feminist thought. The history of Daly’s theological positioning relative to Christianity is 
well known in feminist theological circles. As we have seen Daly was a member of the Roman 
Catholic Church until 1971 when she left the Church in the well publicised feminist ’exodus’ out of 
Harvard Memorial Church. Since moving to a ’revolutionary’ feminist theological position she 
appeal's to have rejected the sources and methods of Christian theology. Her anti-Christian rhetoric, 
her evocation of the Goddess and her ostensibly esoteric preoccupation with a ’Metapatriarchal 
Otherworld’ have only fuelled this impression.
In mapping out a position vis-à-vis Christianity Daly has helped, with others, to establish the
critical division between 'revolutionaiy' and 'reformist' approaches (originally categorised by Carol 
1P. Christ). The 'revolutionary' space is occupied by those who, like Daly, now consider many of the 
concepts, structures and symbols of historic and contemporary Christianity to be 'inherently' sexist 
and hence irreformable. Such women have, as a result, taken the decision to leave established 
religious frameworks behind in search of alternative and competing theological discourses which do 
not serve to marginalise women. Counterpoised to the revolutionaries, in this typological scheme, 
are the reformists, who believe that by first demystifying masculinist theological forms and then re­
constructing female and/or feminist perspectives (on religious texts for instance), the current 
hermeneutical and institutional frameworks of Christianity (and other religious traditions) can be 
substantially re-formed or even trans-formed. Christ's typology has been widely acknowledged and 
employed in feminist theology.
In the following narrative I shall observe the structural convention between 'reformist' and 
'revolutionary' feminist theological positions. However, I wish to dispute the adequacy of the 
accepted reading of the history of Daly's theological positioning. In particular, I wish to maintain 
that the reformist-revolutionary classification is critically deficient insofar as it underestimates the 
abiding importance of the Christian tradition to Daly's 'gynocentric' feminist theological thought 
both in its critical and its constructive dimensions. On the basis of an analysis of the nature of the 
criticism of Christianity and her reconstructive theological proposals I shall argue that the relation 
between Daly's thought and the Christian theological tradition is more profitably viewed in terms of
• Christ, Carol P. ’The New Feminist Theology: A Review of the Literature’Religious Studies Review 
volume 3, no.4 (October, 1977), pp.203-212.
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a dialectic. In other words, I shall try to show that her feminist theological thinking manifests a 
’synthesis’ of negation and affirmation of elements in the tradition of Christian thought.
On one level this fact may seem unremarkable. Like other theologians Daly cannot function 
in a theological vacuum. It is predictable that she would continue to draw in some way from the 
traditions through which she first came to think theologically. Yet, on another level, the recognition 
of a dialectical relationship with Christianity may have implications that transcend the particularity 
of her work to encompass the aforementioned current division of labour between ’reformist’ and 
’revolutionary’ feminist theologians. For it may mean, not only that the ’revolutionary’ path is not as 
radical as it may at first appear, but also that there are grounds for a serious and constructive 
theological dialogue between Daly (and those ’revolutionaries’ who have been influenced by her 
work) and reformist (Christian) women.
The chapter is organised in the following manner. I shall begin, firstly, by examining both
the ’reformist’ feminist criticisms of Christianity that were formulated whilst Daly still identified as
a Christian and the ’revolutionary’ criticism of Christianity inBevond God the Father - the book that
’celebrated’her departure from the Church. On the basis of this analysis I shall contend that Daly’s
’revolutionary’ critique of Christian idolatry may be interpreted legitimately, not so much as a radical
disjunction from her Christian past, but rather as a radical development of it. For in both her
’reformist’ and her ’revolutionary’ phase Daly justifies her criticisms largely by an appeal to the claim
that Chi'istianity is guilty of idolatry. As I shall show, the very use of the concept of idolatry owes to
Christianity in as much as it presupposes a particular ’grammar’ of divinity, and rules for theological
discourse, that have been shaped within Christianity (and the other monotheistic traditions of
Western theism). I shall argue, secondly, that this view is reinforced when we look closer at her
attempts to construct a new revolutionary feminist theology. I shall argue that there are indications
to suggest that behind the exotic appearance of Daly’s ’revolutionary’ spiritual path one can again
2discern a ’grammar’ of divinity that is fundamentally co-extensive with that of Christian theism. 
Finally, I shall explore the implications of Daly’s continuing fidelity to certain fundamentals of 
Christian theology for the contemporary debate between feminist reformists and revolutionaries. I 
argue that Daly’s ’revolutionary’ use of themes and concepts that find their roots in the Western 
theological tradition brings into play a critical distinction between ’Christianity’ and ’Western 
theological tradition’ - a distinction that may be of crucial importance to those women who wish to 
reclaim those values concepts and wisdom in the latter tradition that are of continuing importance.
2 I employ the term ’grammar’ to mean the conceptualisation of God as distinct from everything else in 
existence. C.f.: David B. Burrell, C S C. Burrell Aquinas: God and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1979) pp. 1-65; see also Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina. Maimonides. Aquinas (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: Universiy of Notre Dame Press, 1986).
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This in turn opens the door to the possibility of a genuine pluralism in Western theology for Daly’s 
writings illustrate that the theological possibilities open to women who find themselves unable to 
continue within the institutional matrix of Christianity are not exhausted by the choice between 
either Christianity or atheism, and that the vector of theological possibilities can be extended by 
using tools from the broad Western theological tradition.
That the possibility of theological existence in the wilderness of ’postchristianity’ now 
haunts the consciousness of the feminist theologian owes a great deal to Daly’s criticism of 
Christian theology and to her own personal exodus from the Church. It is now over twenty years 
since Daly initiated the ’exodus’ of women (and men) from Memorial Church, in Harvard Yard, 
that symbolically ushered in the era of the postchristian feminist. During the intervening period 
the work of an army of feminist philosophers, poets, historians and theologians has not only 
successfully challenged deeply ingrained cultural and religious prejudices against women, it has 
also enabled the positive re-construction of a multiplicity of non-Christian perspectives on
3religious questions. Many Christian feminists acknowledge the significance of Daly’s 
uncompromising stand against the injustices perpetuated by patriarchal religion. For example, 
Rosemary Radford Ruether writes: ’The great importance of a feminist thinker like Mary Daly is 
... that she insists on taking herself further and further into [the journey into deep alienation and 
anger] and insisting that others who wish to be honest follow her. She lays before our eyes the
4"passion drama" of female crucifixion on the cross of male sexism’. Daly’s ’righteous rage’ 
against Christianity and her will to find what she hopes will be a more liberating theological path 
has an allure for those Christian feminists who themselves sense the ambiguity of their position. 
Daly’s contention that one cannot be both Christian and feminist (one that she holds in common 
with conservative Christians) is found by many Christian feminists to be, in the (under)statement
5of the Christian feminist Marjorie Suchoki, ’disturbing’. Thus Carter Heyward suggests, in a 
comparative study of the theological approaches of Daly and Ruether, that: ’Daly is doing work 
that Christian feminists ... need not only to take seriously but also to share’, in as much as the
3 For a good example of the diversity of positions in feminist spirituality see Weaving the Visions: New 
Patterns in Feminist Spiritualitv Judith Plaskow and Carol P. Christ (eds.) (San Francisco: Harper, 1989). A 
comparison of this volume with Womanspirit Rising, a similar work written fifteen years earlier and edited 
by the same authors, illustrates the increasingly complexity and sophistication of feminist perspectives on 
spirituality.
4 Radford Ruether, Rosemaiy Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (London: SCM Press, 
1983) p.187.
5 Suchoki, Marjorie, op. cit., p.307.
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work of many Christian feminists, including Ruether’s work, ’lacks Daly’s devastating "sparking"
6power - a power critical to fundamental change in the world/church’.
Yet the implications of Daly’s criticism may not be as ’revolutionary’ as some have 
thought. For when one examines Daly’s writings it is evident that fundamentally Daly’s criticism 
of Christianity is a criticism of Christian idolatry with regard to the core symbols of the tradition.
This is, I believe, significant in that the criticism of idolatry presumes a certain theological frame 
of reference, viz., the discourse of monotheism that was itself mediated to Daly through 
Christianity. The claim that I wish to put forward, then, is briefly this; that Daly’s criticism of the 
Church and subsequent exodus may be interpreted legitimately as a radical though ultimately 
’intra-theological’ move. By this I mean that Daly criticises Christian theology in terms of its own 
theological ’grammar’. Her criticism thus represents more a ’protest’ against doctrinal abuse than a 
wholesale abandonment of the Christian tradition. This view of Daly’s positioning relative to 
Christianity will be supported by drawing attention to the direct continuity between Daly’s 
treatment of idolatiy in the ’postchristian’ feminist bookBevond God the Father and the concern 
with idolatry in the Church that mark her earlier Christian feminist writings.
Let us begin to unravel this argument by first examining the theological grounds of Daly’s 
’revolutionary’ feminist criticism of Clnistianity inBevond God the Father. This text brings 
together conveniently all of the main points in the criticism of Christianity that Daly developed
7and refined through a number of eaiiier articles and lectures. Moreover she never fundamentally
deviates from the position set forth in this book and later reaffirms her continuing solidarity with
8its core theses.
As I have previously attested the sociology of knowledge occupies an important critical site 
in Daly’s feminist writings. Nowhere is this more evident than in her treatment of the history of 
male hegemony over the process by which theological knowledge has been produced and 
maintained. She argues that women (as well as other oppressed and ’minority’ groups) have not been 
the ’shapers’ of Christian theological culture. Women’s experience has not been taken into account in 
theology. The discipline has thus represented a partial and (when advertising itself as universal) 
false rendering of the ’human’ response and relationship to God. It is an ’ideological construct’ which
6 Ibid.,p.71
7 See ’After the Death of God the Father’Commonweal March 12, 1971 pp.7-11 ; ’The Courage to See’The 
Christian Century 22 September, 1971, pp. 1108-1111; ’Abortion and Sexual Caste’Commonweal 4 
February, 1972, pp.415-419; ’The Spiritual Revolution: Women’s Liberation as Theological Re-education’ 
Andover Newton Quarterly March, 1972, pp. 163-176; ’The Women’s Movement: An Exodus Community’ 
Religious Education LX’V’II September - October, 1972.
8 Gvn/Ecologv p.xlvii.
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9does not reflect a ’balanced or adequate perspective’. Of particular concern to Daly are the core
Christian symbols. Daly views language, and symbols in particular, as powerful media for the
transmission of cultural meanings. It is by virtue of this symbolic function, she believes, that
Christianity has helped to maintain and reproduce the culture of sexual domination. The disastrous
’message’ communicated by the central Christian symbols, Daly thinks, is that ’the male is God’. The
symbolic divinisation of ’Man’, Daly believes, is idolatrous and has served to support the oppressive
system of sexual power relations.
Central to Daly’s argument is a theoretical distinction between two levels of symbolic/mythic
meaning and significance: the conscious-rational level of meaning; and the level of unconscious
images. On the conscious-rational level of meaning symbols and myths aie somewhat flexible and
may yield multiple interpretations and readings. Thus Christian feminists are able to dispute the
dominant readings of biblical texts. But there is another level of meaning to symbol and myth in
which interpretation is not so openly negotiable, an unconscious layer in which images are potent in
shaping individual and collective values. This is the level of meaning to which Daly refers when she
10quotes Marshall McLuhan’s celebrated phrase ’the medium is the message’. Conscious, literal
interpretations are transcended at this symbolic level because symbols and myths are able to
structure experience independently of any ’rational’, conceptual explanation of their meaning.
It is this second level of symbolic meaning that is privileged by Daly in her criticism of
Christianity. She does not enter into debates in feminist biblical-historical hermeneutics. She does
not trouble to dispute the dominant (oppressive) interpretation on intra-textual or historical grounds.
Instead she applies what she calls a ’pragmatic yardstick’ in order to assess the ’truth’ of theological
statements. So she asks: if a particulai' symbol can be used in an oppressive way, and ’has a long
history of being "used" in that way’, then ’isn’t this an indication of some inherent deficiency in the 
1 !symbol itself?’. The implied answer is affirmative: the truth of a theological formulation is
contingent, at least in pai't, upon its effects.
Working from this foundation, Daly examines the history of the core Christian symbols
and the mythic framework out of which they have emerged. She focuses in particular upon the
ways in which they have been interpreted and re-intei'preted in preaching and theology, analysing
12their continuing effects on the lives and self-understanding of women. She maintains that the
9 Bevond God the Father p.lO.
McLuhan, Marshall Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (N.Y.: 1965), cited in Bevond God 
the Father p.47.
• • Bevond God the Father p.72.
•2 C.f: Elizabeth Clark and Herbert Richardson (eds.) Women and Religion: A Feminist Sourcebook of 
Christian Thought (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1977); Rosemary Radford Ruether (ed.) Religion and Sexism:
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elevation of these symbols has led Christians into idolatry, the raising to divine status of that 
which is not ’God’. All theologies that ’hypostasize transcendence’, she writes, ’...in one way or 
another objectify "God" as a being, thereby attempt in a self-contradictory way to envisage
13transcendent reality as finite’. In particular, the conception of God as h Supreme Being’ 
encourages the conception of God (at least on the level of the imagination) as a kind of entity, a 
super-entity to be sure, but one which is nonetheless a thing in the world alongside other things, 
limited and finite.
Daly’s principb idea is that Christians have anthropomorpised ’God’, expressing and 
representing the deification of ’Man’ (through the symbols of Jesus Christ and God the Father) and 
of male relationality (through the divine Father-Son relationship). The idolatrous objectification 
of ’God’ into ’Man’ has had devastating effects for women living in patriarchal culture. As she
14writes: ’If God is male, then the male is God’: ’God’ has functioned so as to bolster the prevailing
15socio-economic and political status quo. As the Christian feminist theologian Catharina Haulkes
has written, with regard to the central images of deity in the Christian tradition, Daly shows us
16that: ’ "Anthropomorphic" is almost exclusively translated into "andromorphic’.
Let us look at Daly’s criticism of the symbol of God the Father. Immediately the distinction 
between the two levels of symbolic/mythic meaning and significance (the conscious-rational level 
of meaning, and the level of unconscious images) is brought into analytic play. On the level of 
conscious-rational meaning she recognises that: ’sophisticated thinkers ... have never intellectually
17identified God with a Superfather in heaven’. But she thinks it significant that ’even when very
abstract conceptualizations of God are formulated in the mind, images survive in the imagination in
such a way that a person can function on two different and even apparently contradictory levels at 
18the same time’. In the imaginative faculty, beneath every conscious-rational theological 
formulation, lie powerful images. Her claim is that philosophical-theological reasoning 
demonstrating ’God’ to be beyond human sexuality has in fact had little discernible impact upon the 
transmission and interpretation of the core symbols. For, whilst realising that God is not ’really’
Images of Women in the Jewish and Christian Traditions (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1974); Margaret 
Farley ’Sources of sexual Inequality in the History of Christian Thought’Journal of Religion 56 (1976) 162- 
76.
13 Bevond God the Father p. 19.
•4lbid.,p.l9.
15 Ibid.
Halkes, Catharina ’Themes of Protest in Feminist Theology Against God the Father’ in J. B. Metz 
Concilium: God as Father (1981) p. 104.
Bevond God the Father p. 17 
•8 Ibid.
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male, theologians still consistently refer to God as ’He’ and, on the level of cultural imagination, the
imagery conveyed is most definitely that of God as a male/masculine figure. The political power of
the Christian symbol of God the Father stems from its deification of both sex (maleness) and gender
(a certain conception of masculinity).
The socio-political ramifications of an exclusively male symbol of God are not to be
trivialised. As Daly observes: ’If God in "his" heaven is a father ruling "his" people then it is in the
nature of things and according to the divine plan and the order of the universe that society be male- 
19dominated’. In sociological terms, the image of God in ’his’ heaven has served both as a modeb/
divine existence and a model for male domination. In the sex-exclusive symbol of the Father God, a
finite, conditioned reality, man, is raised in the imagination to the level of that which is ultimate and
unconditioned. In symbolically deifying maleness the symbol breaks the fundamental rule of
theological grammar: Deus non et in genere.God cannot be identified with any finite or
compositional entity. Daly is, of course, fully aware of the properly metaphorical and analogical
function of all God-language. Her contention is, however, that on the level of unconscious imagery
such rules have no applicative power.
In addition to the symbolic deification of the male sex, Daly argues, Christianity has
sanctified a certain construal of masculinity in its assimilation of both the Hebrew Scriptures and,
later, Greek philosophy with their references to the ’character’ and attributes of the Father. The
resulting picture of God is, she argues, thoroughly patriarchal. She compares God the Father to the
figure of Don Corleone, the Mafia ’Godfather’ in the film of the same name, someone who unites in
his person a psychpathic tendency towards violence and destruction as well as a capacity for
tenderness and loyalty. This mind-set has manifested itself in the ’often cruel behaviour of
Christians toward unbelievers and toward dissenters among themselves’; a fact that, Daly thinks,
’suggests a great deal not only about the values of a society dominated by that image, but also about
20how that image itself functions in relation to behaviour’. Moreover, this kind of symbolisation of
21deity effectively ’castrates’ or ’robs’ women of their ’potency’Males enjoy a sense of continuity 
between their own gender image and that of God. Women who are already socially powerless are 
made to feel deviant: their gender identity lies, in symbolic terms, in opposition to that of Man/God.
Such a characterisation of deity is, for Daly, clearly ideological in that it is functions to 
reinforce prevailing social arrangements. (That this is the case is revealed by her later question: ’In a
•9 Ibid. p. 13.
Ibid. p. 16. 
21 Ibid. p. 19.
164 22matriarchal or a diarchal society, what credibility would the image of a divine patriarch have?’.
The implied response is, of course, none). The omnipotent ’F a t h e r f u n c t i o n e d  to sanctify the 
system of sexual domination by making it appear ’natural’ and ’according to the divine plan’. This 
strategy has been remarkably successful, and has helped to perpetuate sexism through the two 
millennia in which Christianity has enjoyed a widespread cultural influence.
Let us turn now to Daly’s assault upon Christology. Daly continues to explore the notion of 
’Incarnation’, but in her understanding the concept expresses more an historical-ontological project
for humanity than a once and for all event located in the past. Moreover, one senses that Daly 
stops short at the idea that any human being can be identified with ’God’ - either in the past or in the 
future. What Daly rebels against, I repeat, is the unique identification of the male Jesus with God. 
She writes: ’Exclusively masculine symbolism for God, for the notion of divine "incarnation" in
24human nature, and for the human relationship to God reinforce sexual hierarchy’. Like the symbol
25of God the Father, the myth of Christ has been ’objectified in the structures of political power’. Its
’social extensions’ take the form of male power over women through relationships of domination in
the family, in the Church and in society. Nowhere, however, does Daly rejects priori the
rationality of ’incarnation’ as such. (This appears to me to be a sound approach. For, clearly, whilst
we do not know what it is to be both ’human’ and ’divine’, the doctrine of Incarnation does not
26immediately involve one in contradiction). Instead she concentrates upon the effects of the sex- 
exclusivity of the symbol.
Daly’s criticism of the theological discourse concerning the divinity of the man Jesus , 
follows the approach mapped out in her analysis of the symbol of God the Father. Again she 
emphasises the damaging effects upon human social thought and behaviour of construals of ultimate 
reality through exclusively male images. The problem with the symbol of Christ, she considers, is as 
follows: ’The image itself is one-sided, as far as sexual identity is concerned, and it is precisely on
22 Daly ’The Spiritual Dimension of Women’s Liberation’ in Sneja Gunew (ed.A. Reader in Feminist 
Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1991) pp.335-341, at 337.
23 See ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’The Church and the Second Sex p.39.
24 Bevond God the Father p.4.
25 Ibid., p. 140.
26 As Herbert McCabe writes: ’It may be part of the meaning of man that he is not any creature; it cannot be 
part of the meaning of man that he is not God. God is not just one of the items in some universe which have 
to be excluded if it is just man that you are talking about. God could not be an item in any universe. It 
follows that there is not, after all, the same contradiction in saying that Jesus is both man and God as there 
would be in saying that a circle is a square or that Jesus is both man and sheep’. Herbert McCabe God 
Matters (London: Cassell, 1987) p.56-8. For a more detailed delination of McCabe’s position see in the 
essays ’The Involvement of God’, ’The Myth of God Incarnate’ and ’The Incarnation. An Exchange with 
Professor Maurice Wiles’ in the same volume.
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27the wrong side, since it fails to counter sexism and functions to glorify maleness. This statement 
encapsulates the essence of Daly’s criticism of Christology. The statement makes three assertions; 
firstly, that the image is one-sided; secondly, that the image glorifies maleness; and thirdly, that in 
glorifying maleness it fails to counter sexism.
Let us take the first point, that the image is one-sided. Like the symbol of God the Father, 
the symbol of Christ is sex-exclusive. Unlike the symbol of the Father, however, the male symbol of 
Christ is supposed to symbolise ’humanity’ as well as God. Daly wants to say that a sex-exclusive 
symbol cannot perform this function. (Indeed women in the Roman Catholic tradition - to which 
Daly formerly belonged - have found themselves excluded from Holy Orders for the related reason 
that a woman cannot be said to ’resemble’ Christ - who symbolises humanity). The problem is not 
alleviated by asserting, with Paul in Galatians 3:27-28, that ’Christ’ is somehow devoid of sexuality. 
For as Daly later comments: ’What sense does it make to assert that in Christ "there is neither male
nor female"? Wasn’t ’Christ’ an exclusively masculine symbol, even though somewhat ’feminized’?
28What on earth, then, could the text mean?’
Now let us turn to the second point, namely, that the image ’glorifies maleness’. The problem 
of the symbolic deification of maleness in the Hebrew narratives has been compounded, Daly 
thinks, by Christian fixation with the historical figure of Jesus ’in such a manner that Christian
29conceptions of divinity and of the image of God are all objectified in Jesus’. She notes that ’the 
"particularity" of Jesus’ maleness has not functioned in the same way as the "particularity" of his
30Semitic identity or of his youth’. So neither Gentiles nor those who have entered their fourth 
decade of life have been banned from taldng Holy Orders. Daly accuses Christians of ’Clnistolatry’, 
of making an idol of Jesus of Nazareth by assigning infinite value to one who was ’a limited human
31being’. The implicit message conveyed by the doctrine of the Incarnation is that ’to be human is to
32be male is to be the Son of God’. Thus are males again raised on high. The problem is made more 
intractable by the idea of revelation as located once and for all in the distant past. For orthodox 
Clii’istians the canon is closed, and with it any question of present or future revelation. This, Daly 
argues, is a misrepresentation of God’s saving activities leading inevitably towards a political 
reinforcement of the social and ecclesiastical status quo.
2? Bevond God the Father p.72.
28 ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’The Church and the Second Sex p.22.
29 Bevond God the Father p.79.
30 Ibid.
3  ^ Ibid., p.69.
32 Ibid., p.l39.
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Let us turn, finally, to the third point, that the glorification of maleness is ’precisely on the 
wrong side’ of the division of human sexual identity ’since it fails to counter sexism’. It is precisely 
in its idolatrous deification of maleness that the symbol of Christ is seen by Daly to be 
counterproductive to effecting ’salvation’ for women in patriarchal society. How does this follow? In 
order to appreciate Jesus’ soteriological irrelevance for women, Daly thinks, we must turn our 
attention to the roots of the problem to which Jesus is claimed, by Christians, to be the answer: the 
mystery of sin/evil and its origins. This involves going back to the book of Genesis. Daly’s thesis is 
that the Christian articulation of evil has been skewed and that fundamental errors in this account 
have led to a ’misnaming’ of the mythic ’Fall’ and ’original sin’, and, vitally, to ’a dislocation of the
33Christian "solution"’. Her feminist ’renaming’ of sin reveals the ’inherent deficiencies ... in the
34fabric of Christology’. On one level the myth of the Fall is an attempt to articulate and cope with 
the ’confusion experienced by human beings trying to make sense of the tragedy and absurdity of the
35human condition’. On an ’unconscious’ level, however, the story exposes ’the tragedy of sexual
36injustice’. The ’Fall’ is traditionally viewed as a consequence of personal alienation from God 
(expressed through the sins of pride and disobedience). In Daly’s analysis of the myth the category 
of ’sin’, formerly applied to the personal realm, is seen in socio-structural terms, with sexism at its 
root. The ’message’ that the story ’unintentionally conveys’ is, then, that in patriarchal society women
37are ’the primordial scapegoats’. When we turn to populai’ theological culture to test this reading we 
can see that Eve/woman is portrayed as the originator of sin and evil and the cause of ’man’s’ Fall. 
This ’sin’ is ’original’ in the sense that it is the root of all subsequent hierarchical dualism.
Moreover, women’s status as Other is an ’inherited’ condition, part of the world into which women
38are born, conditioning our range of choices before we are even in a position to act. It is thus 
’woman’ who is the original objectification of evil, the primordial alien that must be destroyed.
This misnaming of Eve/woman, Daly maintains, leads to corresponding misnaming of Adam/man
39(master and ruler of woman and nature), God the Father (warrior king) and, ultimately, Jesus.
33 Ibid., p.47; see also p.7Iff.
34 Ibid., p.78.
35 Ibid., p.45.
36 Ibid., p.46.
37 Ibid., p.47.
38 Ibid., p.76. As I have already intimated, just how this state of affairs came about historically is not fully 
theorised by Daly, though there are indications to suggest that she understands the roots of the problem to lie 
deep in human psychopathology. See this thesis p.76ff.
39 Ironically David Shields attempts to take Daly’s concept of the original sin of Adam (rather than Eve) and 
construct a Christology along the lines of Irenaeus in Adversus Haeresis that Christ must reverse the sins of
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In the first instance, Jesus has functioned as manldnd’s ’most illustrious scapegoat’ (Szasz) 
and in this respect he has been a disastrous role model for women to ’imitate’. For though, in the 
context of ritual, the (male) priest is the one to share in the noble sacrifice which was Jesus’, in 
reality the negative qualities of Jesus’ status as victim are projected onto women. Thus: ’The 
qualities that Christianity idealizes, especially for women, are also those of the victim: sacrificial 
love, passive acceptance of suffering, humility, meekness, etc. Since these are the qualities idealised 
in Jesus "who died for our sins", his functioning as a model reinforces the scapegoat syndrome for
40 41women’. Following Valerie Salving Goldstein, Daly suggests that such an emphasis may be the
42product of male guilt regarding ’the behavioural excesses of the stereotypic male’. The enforcement 
of such a morality, though perhaps fitting for men, has stymied the moral growth of women.
Women have not, on the whole, had the chances to err in the same ways as men. Their social 
powerlessness has not usually provided the opportunity to think themselves more worthy than they 
are in actuality. Pride and self-aggrandisement have not historically been ’female’ sins. Indeed, as 
Salving Goldstein points out, women may have developed a tendency towards a different kind of 
moral failure - the failure to actualise and assert themselves. Goldstein’s thesis is echoed by Daly
43who conceives of women’s ’sin’ as their ’internalization of blame and guilt’. The legitimation by 
Jesus of stereotypically ’feminine’ moral values upon women (and other subordinate groups) has 
therefore been catastrophic. ’The real motivations and values operative in society’ are mystified and
44the confrontation with ’the powers of unjust acquisition’ is hindered.
In the second instance Daly repudiates implicitly the idea that ’salvation’ can be effected by a 
male on a woman’s behalf; an idea that perpetuates what Marjorie Suchoki calls the image of
45’helpless-female-saved-by-male’ that pervades women’s everyday existence. Central to traditional 
Christology is, of course, the idea of atonement - the reconciliation of humanldnd to God through 
Christ’s sacrificial death. Daly’s articulation of this point is characteristically uninhibited. ’The 
dogma of the "hypostatic union"’, she writes, ’is beginning to be perceived by some women as a kind 
of huge joke. Under the conditions of patriarchy the role of liberating the human race from the
Adam. See ’Christ; a Male Feminist View’Encounter 45 (summer 1984), pps. 221-232.
40 Beyond God the Father p.77.
41 Goldstein, Valerie Saiving ’The Human Situation: A Feminine View’Journal of Religion 40 (April, 
1960), pp. 100-12.
42 Beyond God the Father p. 100 
43 Ibid., p.49.
44 Ibid., p.lOl 
45 Suchoki, op.cit., p.311.
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4 6original sin of sexism would seem to be precisely the role that a male symbol cannot perform.
Again, as Suchoki suggests, it may perhaps be that this Idnd of ’saviour’ ’might be a corrective for
47the male psyche...but [it is] certainly destructive for the female’. Far from effecting healing the 
symbol of Jesus Christ accentuates and exacerbates the basic problem of female victimisation. She 
concludes that in the future: ’It w ill... become increasingly evident that exclusively masculine 
symbolism for the ideal of "incarnation" or for the ideal of the human search for fulfilment will not
48do’. She prophesies that as the plausibility of an exclusively male symbol for incarnation loses 
credibility, and eventually dies, so there may arise a greater awareness of ’the power of Being in all 
persons’. Here, then, is a proposal that incarnation may be viewed as an ontological-historical 
project for us all. The point is, finally, not to deny Jesus’ revelatory capacity; the point is rather ’to 
affirm that the creative presence of the Verb can be revealed at every historical moment, in every
49person and culture’. In order to affirm such an understanding of incarnation, however, doctrinal 
statements of Jesus’ uniqueness and super-eminence need to be surpassed.
In summary, I have given an account of Daly’s analysis of the main problems for feminists 
surrounding the dominant Christian religious symbols. Her critique of Christian symbols focuses 
upon the idolatry of anthropomorphic and, what is more, exclusively male symbols for deity. She 
argues that it is not simply the case that, historically, Christianity has perpetuated certain ideologies 
about women (ideologies which, theoretically, could be subject to a programme of demystification), 
but that its founding symbols are inappropriate, indeed counterproductive, to the liberation of 
women in patriarchal society because they deify males/masculinity. And, as we have seen, she 
holds that the ’male’ is, in symbolic terms, soteriologically impotent for women. As Anne Carr notes 
of Daly’s work: it is p r e c i s e l y m a l e  symbols have ’functioned so effectively in histoiy to 
legitimate the subordination of women’ that Daly believe them to be of ’ no help to alienated
50women’. Whilst she is aware of the Christian argument that images and symbols are not to be 
identified with, but merely point towai'd, transcendent reality, Daly insists that ’the medium is the 
message’. Thus the conceptualisation of God through masculine symbolism creates the deep-rooted
46 Beyond God the Father p.72.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p.71.
49 Ibid.
56 Carr, Ann ’Is a Christian Feminist Theology Possible?’ Theological Studies 43 (1982) pp.279-297, at 
p.292.
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51expectation that all significant power and status belongs ’naturally’ to the male. On this criterion 
the idea of a unique male saviour is simply one more legitimation of male rule.
There is, Daly thinks, hope that religious symbols which serve to support vested social 
interests may yet be replaced. For symbols are not ahistorical. They are born from specific socio­
cultural contexts. This means that: ’Religious symbols fade and die when the cultural situation that
52gave rise to them and supported them ceases to give them plausibility’. Whilst the death of once 
meaningful symbols ’generates anxiety’, Daly argues that it is ’part of the risk involved in a faith 
which accepts the relativity of all symbols and recognises that clinging to these as fixed and ultimate
53is self-destructive and idolatrous’. In Bevond God the Father her conviction is that ’the general 
trend toward democratization of society and the emergence of technology’ are changing the context
54out of which the traditional theistic symbols arose. It is, however, the ’women’s movement’ that, in 
her view, ’appears destined to lay the key role in the overthi'ow of such oppressive elements in
55traditional theism’. The impression that is conveyed is that Daly views feminism as capable of 
cleansing and liberating Christian theism itself which, as I have shown, she believes to have fallen 
into an idolatrous attitude with regard to its central symbols.
The key issue is not then whether the images have effects - they clearly do - but whether 
conscious theological re-interpretation of the core symbols can transform the images conveyed in 
such a manner that the symbols become liberatory rather than oppressive. Daly infers, on the basis 
of the analysis of the past and present effects of the core symbols, that the future of Christianity 
cannot be essentially different: the symbols aie irreformable. (The inferential nature and grounds of 
Daly’s argument contra Christianity are important and should be noted. For, other feminists - 
working upon the same material and similar evidence - wish to defend the possibility of different 
forms of Christian feminism). In saying that the symbols are irreformable and that Christianity is 
’essentially sexist’Daly argues that simply rereading the symbols will not be enough to divest them 
of their oppressive effects. Note, for example, her comments about Leonaid Swidler’s attempts to 
reclaim Jesus for feminism. She writes: "[His] assumption that one can extract ’religious truth’ from 
’ time-conditioned categories’ seems to mean that we can shuck off the debris of a long history of
 ^  ^ Martin Soskice, Janet ’Can a Feminist call God Father?’ in Alvin KimelSpeaking the Christian God: the 
Holy Trinity and the Challenge of Feminism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1992).
^2 Beyond God the Father p. 15
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p. 18. Daly’s faith in both ’democracy’ and ’technology’ wanes by the time cGyn/Ecology.
55 Beyond God the Father p. 18.
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5 6oppressiveness and get to return to the pristine purity of the original revelation". Daly does not
57believe that this is an adequate solution. It is inadequate because whilst concepts can be corrected 
and changed, images must either be shattered or exorcised. For Daly, then, it is not enough to 
consciously re-work the symbols - as Christian feminists attempt to do - because this does not alter 
the fundamental images that ai’e transmitted to women living in patriarchal society.
Carol Christ goes some way to articulating the challenge posed to Christian feminists by 
Daly when she writes: ’A serious Christian response to Daly’s criticism of the core symbolism of 
Christianity either will have to show that the core symbolism of Father and Son does not have the 
effect of reinforcing and legitimating male power and female submission, or it will have to
58transform Christian imagery at its very core’. In my view it is difficult to see how such a 
transformation can be achieved. One may, of course, seek to consciously reread the symbols in 
different ways. But it seems highly unlikely, in patiiarchal society, that by simply rereading 
narratives women will be able to dislodge the basic images that exude from the symbols. The 
following illustration shows us why. Feminist theologian and activist Elizabeth Bettenhausen recalls 
asking a class to re-write stories about Jesus as if he were a woman. What Bettenhausen proposes to 
her students is effectively to reread the passion narrative in what seems quite a radical way. One of 
her students duly rewrote the story in terms of the humiliation and gang-rape of the Christ(a). ’Ever 
since’, Bettenhausen writes, ’I have wondered. Would women ever imagine forming a religion 
around the rape of a woman? Would we ever construe gang-rape as a salvlfic event for other
59women? What sort of a god would such an event reveal?’ It is highly significant that what on the 
conscious-rational level appears to be a singularly radical rereading, is in fact just as damaging (in 
the kind of imaginative picture it portrays of women) as the ’original’ reading. As Bettenhausen 
obseiwes, a sex-change did little to alter the effects of the images conveyed in the student’s mind. 
For even a symbolically ’female’ Christ(a) remains mired in the sado-masochistic imagery of 
crucifixion, and the ethics of self-denial and self-loss that have been consequent upon Christ’s 
’acceptance’ of sacrificial death. The attempt consciouslyto reinterpret the central myths of 
Christianity is then problematic as a feminist strategy.
The net effect of Daly’s criticisms is to throw down the gauntlet to Christian women, 
implicitly challenging them either to justify their spiritual and theological allegiances to
56 Bevond God the Father p.83. Daly is commenting on Swidler’s article ’Jesus was a Feminist’ iilThe 
Catholic World Ganuarv. 1971) pp.177-83.
57 Bevond God the Father p.83.
58 Christ ’The New Feminist Theology: A Review of the Literature’ p.205.
59 Bettenhausen, Elizabeth ’Foreword’ to Joanne Carlson Brown and Carole R. Bohn (eds)Christianitv, 
Patriarchv. and Abuse: A Feminist Critique (N.Y.: The Pilgrim Press, 1990; first printed 1989) p.xii.
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Christianity, or else to join the ’exodus’ community of spiritual ex-patriots dedicated to finding 
alternative theological resources and avenues of religious expression. For the implication is that for 
Christianity to become ’anti-’ or ’post-patriarchal’, it would have to surrender or completely trans­
form that which (in Daly’s terms) is ’essential’ to it, that which makes it what it is, namely, the 
central symbols. Yet the symbols themselves could not be changed without Christianity effectively 
transmuting into another religion altogether. What Daly’s criticism of the central Christian symbols 
represents then is a call for what Naomi Goldenberg has called ’a changing of the Gods’, a 
transmutation of the symbols through which we relate in worship to the ultimate.
I turn now to my second major point, which is that Daly’s criticism of Christianity in the 
’postchristian’ boolcBevond God the Father is fundamentally a continuation of earlier Christian 
feminist criticism of idolatry in the Church. In the years immediately prior to leaving the Church
Daly wrote a number of articles on the subject of idolatry in Christian thought and practice. I shall
60 61 review three articles - ’Dispensing with Trivia’, ’Return of the Protestant Principle’ and ’If You
Could One Change in the Church, What Would It Be?’62 - published in the liberal Catholic
journal Commonweal between May 1968 and May 1970.
In ’Dispensing with Trivia’ (31 May, 1968), Daly explores the possibilities for Christian 
renewal in the light of Bonhoffer's idea of 'a world come of age’. She begins by reiterating Aquinas' 
declaration of theological limitation: 'we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not'. She 
then proceeds to argue that in the modern world, with its scientific and technological achievements, 
human consciousness has changed such that it is now difficult if not impossible to accept Christian 
doctrines as they are presented by the Church. She writes: 'In the age of the "death of God" the 
traditional categories of Christian belief and the institutional structures have become meaningless or
63at least irrelevant to most people". The blame for this situation is laid in part upon 'vested
64institutional interests' who have promulgated an out-dated and 'distorted' concept of 'faith', hi 
response she turns to address doctrinal underdevelopment in the Catholic Church, particularly with 
regard to the doctrine of 'faith'. She denounces the prevalent conception of faith as 'an act of 
knowledge with a low degree of evidence' because it leads to the idea that the believer must use 
his/her will to compensate for the lack of evidence. This effectively translates as willing or deciding
60 Daly, ’Dispensing with Trivia’Commonweal 88 (31 May, 1968) pp.322-25.
61 Daly, ’Return of the Protestant Principle’Commonweal 90 (6 June, 1969), pp.338-41.
62 Daly, If You Could Make One Change in the Church, What Would It Be?’ Commonweal 90 (1 May, 
1970) p.161.
63 ’Dispensing with Trivia’ p.323.
64 Ibid.
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6 5to believe what the Church says has been ’divinely revealed’. This notion is, she maintains, the
very opposite of that "faith seeking understanding" which has driven the saint and the mystic toward 
66transcendence’. Daly puts forward a Tillichean concept of faith understood as ’the state of being 
ultimately concerned’. Unlike the more traditional idea of faith, Tillich understands faith to involve 
’risk’ and ’doubt’. She continues: ’It is forever diiving beyond itself and therefore recognizes the 
inadequacy of every formulation. This is not to say that it refuses to see the need for creeds and
67formulae, but it does recognize the need for continual criticism of them’. A purification of ’faith’,
she believes, inevitably leads to a confrontation with shallow conceptions of God. Intrinsic to the
cleansing of faith required for Christian renewal is a purging of shallow conceptualisations of God.
Whilst analogical language of God remains valid, she avers, ’none of our images or concepts are
68adequate to express the reality of God’ who is ’unfathomable abyss’. The image of a tyrannical 
father-god is singled out for special criticism. When it is fortified by the divine attributes of 
omnipotence and immutability, this image communicates the idea of a ’supreme being’ who
69’paralyzes man’s will to transcendence’. Such a perception of God is erroneous at a fundamental 
theological level. Daly’s Thomist background had taught her that, whilst ih&qidd est of God is 
beyond our human knowledge (and thus we do not know what it is to be God), we are able to Icnow, 
through the exercise of reason, that God cannot be like creatures (finite, limited and composite etc.). 
She recognises that the concept of God in scholastic theology is more subtle than the crude ’popular’ 
characterisations of God to which she alludes. She also acknowledges that ’there are strong 
counterbalancing elements, not least of which are the insistence that God is all-loving and that man
70has free will’ that offset the simplistic images promulgated in and through populai* piety. But she 
qualifies this evaluation when she writes that these ’subtleties however logical they may have
7]seemed to theologians, have not been psychologically meaningful’. In other words, the abstract 
intricacies of theological discourse have not filtered through to the level of images which, she 
suggests, can exert influence upon behaviour.
65 Ibid., p.324.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid. Daly states later that she does not wish to give the impression that the classic attributes are 
meaningless theologically, only that their proper meaning will only emerge when theology begins to take 
into account ’recent developments in epistemology, in psychology, and in the analysis of language’. 
’Underground Theology’(response to Aquinas M. Ferrara’s critique of ’Dispensing with Trivia’Commonweal 
88 (9 August, 1968) pp. 532-34, at p.533.
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111 order to move beyond such images a new understanding of faith is required. Daly eneters 
into dialogue with Paul Tillich’s work In ’Return of the Protestant Principle’ she affirms the need for 
a constant interplay between what Tillich terms the ’Protestant principle’ and the ’Catholic substance’ 
that together constitute complementary aspects of the Christian tradition. The latter is described as 
’the concrete embodiment of the Spiritual Presence, that is, the body of religious symbols and
72objectifications’. The Protestant principle is ’basically an attitude of criticism which recognizes the 
relativity of all objectifications of faith, that is, of all symbols, such as sacraments and creeds, and of 
all structures, whether institutional or verbal. It is an attitude of protest against all false securities, 
which implies a radical questioning of prevailing ideas and practices’. It is this attitude of protest 
against idolatry that, she argues, must be actualised by Catholic Christians in the late 1960s so as to 
restore balance to a tradition which, she believes, is in danger of falling into ’demonic idolatry of
73"sacred" doctrines, objects and social systems’.
The main points in both of the aforementioned articles are summed up by Daly in May, 1970
74when she was asked: ’If you could make one change in the Church, what would it be?’. Daly 
replied that since idolatry was the biggest single problem facing the Church she wished to see 
Christians adopting an attitude of iconoclasm with regard to ecclesiastical ’idols’. Explaining her 
position she writes:
I take idolatry to mean treating a finite reality as if it were ultimate. In this caæ one fixes 
one’s ultimate concern upon something limited in itself. This might be a group of 
institutional structures, a set of rituals, verbal formulae of doctrine, or persons identified 
with any of these. In any case there is a short-circuiting of the essential dynamism of faith
75and a fixation upon the temporal.
In her view the Catholic Church participates in ’widespread idolatry’ with regard to its structures.
The appropriate theological response to this phenomenon is, she argues, iconoclasm - ’ a breaking of 
the idols’. This need not mean eradicating ritual, doctrine or ecclesiastical offices. But it does mean 
that believers should view them as ’relative to the infinite reality in which they participate but which
76they cannot fully express’. Changes in attitude toward the mediational structures of Catholic faith 
will, of course, mean ’ abandoning some of the old securities’ such as the sense, order and religious
72 ’Return of the Protestant Principle’ p.338.
73 Ibid.
74 ’If You Could Make One Change in the Church, What Would It Be?’ p.161.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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safety that they bring in favour of ’the quest for transcendence’ as that ’which is what Christianity is
77all about’.
Daly’ s jrion’ criticism of Christian idolatry with regard to the central symbols of the
tradition is therefore prefigured in her earlier Christian feminist writings. Significantly, in both 
phases Daly presumes a certain theological frame of reference, viz., the monotheistic framework 
that Daly inherits from Christianity. The same fundamental grammar of divinity is discernible in 
both Daly’s Christian feminist work and iiiBevond God the Father - a grammar predicated upon the 
recognition of God’s absolute distinction from every thing in existence. Indeed the raison d’etre of 
the latter work as the need to ’de-reify’ the prevailing Christian concept of God is co-extensive with 
Daly’s earlier Christian feminist concern topurify faith by confronting shallow concepts of God. 
There are, moreover, marked continuities between the best in the Christian tradition and 
’postchristian’ existence. As Daly writes:
When women enter feminist postchristian time/space, whatever might have been genuine in 
’doctrine’ is not lost but rather transformed, wrenched out of the old context, as we are living, 
willing, thinking, being our own thoughts. If some reality to which a Christian doctrine was 
trying to point survives this leap into the postchristian context, that is all right, but what
78matters is that we survive and keep moving.
Of crucial importance to Daly throughout is the ’quest for transcendence’, the perpetual movement
7Qand striving toward ’a higher level of existence and toward the hidden but living God’. For Daly 
this quest represents the quintessence of true faith.
The question arises as to the difference between Daly’s Christian feminist criticism of 
idolatry and her ’revolutionary’ criticism? Common to both critical phases is the recognition that 
there exists a deep and pervasive prejudice against women in the Church. The theological rubicon 
that separates Daly’s reformist criticism from her revolutionary criticism isan alternative perception 
and assessment of what is ’essential’ to Christianity. Specifically, what is seen in her Christian 
feminist writings to be ’accidental’ and culturally conditioned is seen in her revolutionary writings to 
be ’essential’ to the Christian tradition.
In the Christian feminist work The Church and the Second Sex Daly argues that the bias 
against women in the Church represents a ’distortion’ of Christian believing. As we saw in chapter 
one whilst Daly acknowledges the perspicacity of Beauvoir’s analysis of the ways in which the 
Church is culpable for masking sexual oppression, she diverges from the philosopher on the
77 Ibid., p. 162.
78 ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’The Church and the Second Sex p.4Q.
79 ’Dispensing with Trivia’, p.325.
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question of whether such ideology is intrinsic to Church teaching. For Daly misogyny and
discrimination stand in contradiction to the ’essence’ of ’authentic’ Christian faith which consists in
80’the equal dignity of all human beings as persons’. The failure to materialise the ’essence’ of
Christianity in and through history is a result of Christian moral failure to practice the fundamental
ideals of the faith and in misinterpretations of the central symbols of the faith and of the thought of
some of Church’s leading thinkers. The history of sexism in the Church is seen, therefore, to be
’accidental’, rather than ’essential’, to Christianity. This hermeneutical model allows her to rescue
what she perceives to be the most important features of the Christian kerygma. In order to get back
into line with ’authentic tradition’, she argues, the ’distortions of faith’ which have led to the current
situation must be exposed. As part of her reformist project in this work she entreats exegetes to
sharpen their critical tools. ’Those who have benefited from the insights of a later age’, she writes,
’have the task of distinguishing elements which are sociological in origin from the life-fostering,
81personalist elements which pertain essentially to the Christian message’. Whilst recognising the 
damage done to women by Church structures, symbols and doctrines, therefore, Daly remains at 
liberty to emphasise the inherent capacity of the Church to renew its understanding of its major 
docti'ines through the application of this critical hermeneutic. Strands within the biblical and 
theological text which do not render particular groups, classes or races in humanist, egalitarian 
terms are to be discounted, on her criteria, as merely the product of primitive socio-political 
arrangements.
In Daly’s revolutionary critique the Christian feminist analysis is turned upon its head: that 
which hitherto represented a distortion of the essential truth of Christianity (exclusion of women 
from the priesthood, the subordination of women to men in the family) henceforth becomes the 
logical conclusion of its central message. She rejects the ’ontological’ distinction between the 
’essential’ tradition and its historical patriarchal ’accidents’. She maintains that the patriarchal 
matrix of all language be taken into account. This means that she must reject all biblical and other 
cultural phallocentric texts; she even goes so fai’ as to separate herself from the history of the
reformist Daly of The Church and the Second Sex. Daly’s conclusion is couched in 
characteristically forthright language. ’The myths and symbols of Christianity’, she writes in an
83article published in 1975, ’ are essentially sexist...’. The prejudice and discrimination against
80 Daly supports this criterion by reference to the creation account in Genesis 1:26f, to Jesus’ dealings with 
women and the Pauline attempt, in Galatians 3:27-28, to transcend the fixed dichotomy of sex-role 
stereotyping. The Church and The Second Sex p. 83.
81 Ibid., p. 84.
82 See ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’The Church and the Second Sex
83 ’The Qualitative Leap Beyond Patriarchal Religion’ Guest: A Feminist Ouarterlv 1/4 (Spring, 1975) pps.
176
women that she had formerly attributed to hypocrisy and double standards is now viewed as 
somehow intrinsic to the logic of Christian knowledge generation.
Daly’s criticism of Christianity is undoubtedly an important contribution to the broader 
feminist assault upon the cultural patterns of androcentric tradition. In bringing to critical attention 
unexamined aspects of Christian myths, doctrines and symbols that contradict the equality of 
persons she helped to ferment a serious theological debate as to what is central and foundational to 
the Christian religion. It is notable that she does not go so far as to question, in any serious way, the 
fundamental theological grammar of Christian believing. Her criticism is thus more in line with 
’prophetic protest’ than with ’revolution’.
The criticism of Christianity marks only one stage of her feminist spiritual quest. That 
the practise of theology is possible and even necessary for Daly after ostensibly abandoning the 
Church owes to the fact that her criticism does not signal the death of ’faith’ in God. As we 
have seen, it was that very faith which precipitated the criticism of Christian idolatry with 
regard to its central symbols which, in turn, led to her departure from Church. Moreover one of 
the most noteworthy features of her work after leaving the Church is a strong and pervasive 
sense of the ’presence’ of God beyond the ’absence’ of god the idol. Daly’s basic faith in the 
’Power of Be-ing’, then, remains undiminished by her critique of Christian idolatry. Indeed on 
one level the way forward is suddenly clearer now that the ’mirror image’ of Man ’writ large’
84has been smashed. For the criticism of the Christian symbolisation of God, coupled with her 
claim that there is no way that the symbols can be cleansed of their oppressive connotations, 
leads her to assert that a whole new symbolic must emerge from women’s experience as a 
precondition for women to theologise effectively. Because women have been trapped 
psychically and cognitively in ’male’ symbolic space we have not been at liberty to name 
toward God from our own unique female perspectives. In confronting this problem, Daly 
thinks, women who have received theological training will find that a complete overhaul of 
theological methodology may be required. Established critical tools, sources and research 
criteria are suddenly revealed to be inadequate to the task of articulating the religious 
experiences of such women.
In Bevond God the Father Daly begins an attempt at theological construction by 
separating her method explicitly from thi'ee approaches which were (and, for the most part, still 
are) the dominant matrices of public theological knowledge: neo-orthodoxy (and orthodoxy), 
objectivity and liberalism. None of these theological models are, in Daly’s view, adequate to 
’express the revolutionary potential of women’s liberation for challenging the forms in which
20 , 21 .
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85consciousness incarnates itself and for changing consciousness’. The matter of a feminist
theological method transcends all attempts to ’reform’ existing theological models because
theological culture has been male culture and because even the usual means of theological
86dissent are too restricted. The only way for women to end what she considers the male 
domination of theology is, Daly argues, for women to begin to ’name’ towards God in ways that 
are in accord with their own experiences.
What is perhaps most striking about Daly’s search for sources and indicators of personal 
transcendence in both periods is the way in which elements from her Christian past condition 
and structure her quest. Christianity continues to be represented, of course, both as the cultural 
backdrop of her philosophy and as the object of her polemic. But this dependence upon 
Christianity for polemic purposes is not what I have in mind here. I argue that there exist 
substantive ’survivals’ of Christian conceptuality even in Daly’s ’separatist’ texts such that the 
form and structure of her discourse remains substantially in debt to Christian theology. Daly’s 
own textual performance reveals the clues. An analysis of her later textual practice suggests 
that, whilst she was not a member of the Church, in either a fideistic or an institutional sense, 
her thought continued to be guided by many of the norms and criteria that govern traditional 
Christian theology. Some beliefs are jettisoned, of course, (the confession of Jesus as the 
Christ), but other beliefs are given creative re-articulation (one thinks of the ideals of 
incar nation and of redemption), whilst yet others remain essentially unchanged (the doctrine of 
creation).
Let us examine the religious symbols that Daly ’plays’ with in her ’postchristian’ phase. 
She argues that because women’s experience is’revelatory’ it can be used to critique extant 
traditions. There may still be intuitions and elements within Christianity that can be brought 
forward in the new religious consciousness but ultimately women’s experience provides the 
final norm for feminist theology. In Bevond God the Father, the symbols that she ’sounds out’ 
in order to render that experience in all its dimensions are more frequently than not plays or 
reversals of Christian concepts. A conscious dialecticism is illustrated through her continued 
use of Christian vocabulaiy (such as ’church’, ’covenant’ and ’sin’). Daly’s aim in drawing upon 
such symbols is to subvert the said vocabulary by re-working their meanings and playing them
87off against the originals which remain embedded in Christian discourse. She gives as an 
example the word ’exodus’ as it is applied to the community of feminists. Exodus is, of course,
84 Bevond God the Father p.28ff.
85 Bevond God the Father p.7.
86 Ibid., p.22
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a word straight out of the Judaeo-Christian context. But Daly argues that when it is used in
connection with feminism: T he word’s meaning is stripped of its patriarchal, biblical context,
88while at the same time speaking to and beyond that context’. She turns the myth of the Fall 
upon its head so that, instead of Eve/woman being responsible for the entrance of (personal)
’sin’ and alienation into the world. Adam/man is deemed culpable for the introduction of the 
paradigmatic (structural) ’sin’ of sexism after which all other forms of oppression are moulded.
At this stage then Daly’s project is about changing the semantic context for theological 
concepts rather than providing a wholly new vocabulai-y. So she defines the women’s 
movement in quasi-Christian terms: it is an ’antichurch’, a ’cosmic covenant’, a ’charismatic 
community’, an ’exodus community’. The phallocractic value system underpinning the biblical 
use of the word is cut away or exorcised.
Since 1975 Daly’s symbolic horizons have broadened by moving from the
89recontextualization of primarily Christian symbols to an attempt to mythologise feminist 
experience. She has developed her theological self-understanding by reference to such terms as ’A- 
Mazing Amazon’, ’Positively Revolting Hag’, ’Witch’ and, lately, ’Crafty Pirate’ - designations which 
aie purported to be rooted in a ’metapatriarchal’, ’Elemental’ feminist matrix that both transcends and 
takes mythic precedence over Christianity. This is not to say that she abandons Christian vocabulary 
altogether. She continues to criticise Christianity and to use originally Christian theological terms to
90make statements about the processes of patriarchal knowledge-legitimation. But in the main her 
purpose is to chart a political-theological map by which to find a way out of the phallocractic ’maze’
91for which Christianity functions as a legitimation. Since ’Patriarchy appears to be "everywhere"’ 
the only way to escape from it is to ’separate’ from it by discovering or creating an ’Other World’.
Here the emphasis is as much upon trying to discover and to Name her own reality as 
upon trying to ’castrate’ sexist thought forms. Gone aie the linguistic reversals of Christian 
concepts such as the Church/antichurch, Christ/antichrist - concepts with which she played, in
92Bevond God the Father, and which showed her to be still in reaction to Christianity. In their 
place are positive, utopian poetics, puns and new word creation. She had spoken earlier about 
the need for new symbolisation, ’ a remythologising of western religion’ in the wake of the
87 ’Feminist Postchristian Introduction’The Church and the Second Sex p.40.
88 Bevond God the Father p.8
89 For the project of remythologisation as applied to Christianity see Sallie McFague Models of God 
(London: SCM, 1987), p.33
90 Consider her employment of the terms ’sanctifying grace’ and ’supernatural life’ iGvn/Ecologv as 
synonyms for the ’fatherly fixes’ that inflate male egos and deflate female egos.Gvn/Ecolosv p.53.
91 Ibid., p.l.
92 Bevond God the Father chapters 5 and 6.
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93becoming of women; in Gvn/Ecology. Pure Lust, the Wickedarv and Outercourse she goes 
part way to providing women with such a narrative re-working. It is a method that originates 
from Daly’s belief that the tendency continuallyto react against Christianity merely commits 
women to continue thinking and working within already existent and oppressive paradigms.
She is more interested in looking to reconstruct present perception so that the ’old’ values cease
94to be plausible or intelligible. In order to emancipate themselves from the patriaichal reality 
conveyed through phallocracy women must therefore try to develop their own ’Original’ female 
symbolics - symbol systems that convey ’biophilic’ rather than ’necrophilic’ values.
By the standards of traditional Christian theology Daly’s attempts at theological 
construction appear to be ’heretical’. Ostensibly Daly flouts the discursive ’rules’ governing 
traditional theological discourse; for example, by flirting with a non-monotheistic 
understanding of divinity in the use of the metaphor ’Powers of Be-ing’by labelling her work
95as a form of ’Nag Gnostic pantheism’, and by reversing the usual ’order of being’ so th£it Christ 
comes to signify the power of demonic possession whereas the ’principalities and powers’ 
become the messengers of the divine ’Goddess’.
However, such a description is not entirely accurate. As Rosemary Radford Ruether notes of 
Daly’s work:
The basic categories of Christian theology continue to operate in unconscious ways. One 
continues to find the basic paradigm of classical theology which connects an original good 
human nature, united to the cosmos and the divine, contrasted with an alienated, fallen, 
historical condition of humanity (sin, evil). Revelatory, transformative experiences 
(conversion) disclose the original humanity and allow one to liberate oneself from the sinful 
distortion of existence. This new humanity is then related to a redemptive community that 
gathers together and announces a prophetic, critical, or transformative mission against sinful
96society.
Certainly the theological grammar of creation-fall-redemption is clearly discernible as is the 
importance of idolatry as a fundamental rule of theological grammar in Daly’s writings. In 
surrendering her Christian allegiances she does not withdraw from a theistic view into 
paganism (as has for example Christ) or into any kind of dualism in which God is seen to 
interact with some other pre-existent material or principle or opposing power. For this would
93 ’The Spiritual Dimension of Women’s Liberation’ iiA Reader in Feminist Knowledge Sneja Gunew (ed.) 
(London: Routledge, 1991) p.339. Originally published in Radical feminism (Quadrangle Press, 1973).
94 Bevond God the Father p. 19
95 Pure Lust p.400
96 Ruether Sexism and God-Talk p.38.
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make God less than ultimate, less than God. Daly seeks to combat the urge towards idolatry in 
this sense by ’de-reifying’ God, that is, ’changing the conception/perception of god from "the
97supreme being" to Be-ing’, the dynamic Verb who cannot, without gross error, be conceived 
as a noun or object in the world. The concept of God remains the crucible of her theology - the 
ultimate, transcendent reality that explicates the coherence and ’implicate order’ of process, an 
order which bestows purpose and meaning to the life of the cosmos and to human beings. As 
creator God is the sole ultimate source of all that exists or that has being. To speak of God as 
creator is not to isolate one attribute among many that God possesses, nor is it to point to one 
activity among others that God engages in. It is simply another way of speaking about God’s 
ongoing and intimate relation to the world, a relation traditionally articulated in terms of the 
doctrine of God’s ’preservation’ of the world.
Daly frequently invokes the Goddess in her many f o r m s T h o u g h  she draws from some of 
the ancient myths surrounding the Goddess she does not look to these sources to legitimate radical 
feminism as the source and norm of truth. Neither does move over to the Goddess in the way that 
one might have thought and in the way that others (e.g. Christ) have done. For example, she has not 
wanted to resurrect a forgotten matriarchy, building upon the work of writers such as Bachofen, 
Briffault and Jane Harrison. Moreover, the theological option for the Goddess poses its own 
problems not least what Daly calls the ’massively passifizing effects of the ...New Age style
99"Goddess Spirituality"’. In Daly’s writings he Goddess is in fact the multi-faceted metaphor for
women’s connection with the’Power of Be-ing’. In other words, the underlying concept of God has
remained essentially unchanged. Thus she states that the Goddess is not to be understood as a mere
female substitute for the male father-god for: ’Be-ing, the Verb, cannot without gross falsification be
100reified into a noun, whether that noun be identified as "Supreme Being" or "God" or "Goddess"’.
Rather does the image of the Goddess ’point metaphorically to the Powers of Be-ing, the Active
101Verb in whose potency all biophilic reality participates’. Behind Daly’s flamboyant language, 
then, there lies a concept of God that derives from a tradition of Clnistian theism - infinite and
97 Bevond God the Father p.xvii
98 For many feminists today the symbol of the Goddess has come to symbolises the emergent power of 
women: including a celebration of the female body and will, women’s bonding and heritage ( in mother- 
daughter genealogies e.g. Demeter and Persephone), and an recognition of our human roots in nature - all of 
which have been consistently denied throughout the course of the Western religious and philosophical 
tradition. Writers such as Carol P. Christ, Z. Budapest, Naomi Goldenberg, Starhawk and Merlin Stone have 
pressed hard for the historical and theological recognition of the Goddess. Whether the feminist claims 
advanced for this religion are warranted, however, is yet to be seen.
99 ’New Intergalactic Introduction’Gvn/Ecolosv p.xviii.
* 00 Pure Lust p.26.
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absolute (because only an infinite God can be a metaphysically adequate ground and explanation of
the world’s being and also religiously adequate), incorporeal (because body is inherently limited and
finite), omnipotent, and omniscient (because there is nothing ’outside’ God to limit God’s power and
knowing). This conception of God is still present in the background of Daly’s theology; itremains
unaffected by her criticism which is focused upon the symbols rather than the fundamental
philosophical concept of God.
There is, clearly, no easy theological escape from the ’reign of the Father’. Undoubtedly for
women turning from the restrictive inheritance of Christianity the quest for new theological
beginnings may involve a period of darkness and silence as we traverse ’a desert of the spirit created
102by the loss of accustomed symbols’. New symbols and images through which to sustain a 
relationship to God will not spring up immediately. Daly project of ’sounding out’ symbols, testing 
them to see if they resonate with women’s collective experiences of feminism, is helpful.
In her analysis of the revolutionary feminists Anne Carr focuses attention upon the idea that
103symbols can be ’ generated at will’. She claims that this idea is in evidence in the writings of 
Christ and Goldenberg. Whether this is true of Christ and Goldenberg is not addressed here. It is 
clear that Daly does not advocate such a facile understanding of symbol generation.. For Daly; ’The 
becoming of new symbols is not a matter that can be decided arbitrarily around a conference table.
104Rather, symbols grow out of a changing communal situation and experience’. It is thus not Daly 
herself, nor any other individual or group, who can formulate symbols to replace the dead and dying 
Christian symbols of Christianity. It is rather the new communal situation, one that is for Daly 
marked decisively by the rising collective consciousness of women, that Daly believes may yield 
new religious symbols. Carr is thus not justified in attempting to convey the impression that a// the 
revolutionaries proceed on a simplistic understanding of the way in which symbols are generated.
In the foregoing argument I have not sought to infer that Daly remains somehow a covert or 
’unconscious’ Christian. That she has moved beyond the parameters of Christian theology is clear 
upon reflection of three basic facts about Daly’s theology. Firstly, the fundamental idea of ’God’ she 
works with is not Trinitarian; secondly, it is not ’personal’ in any traditional sense (’God’ is not seen 
as a ’person’ with whom we may communicate); and finally, knowledge of ’God’ is attained not from 
the historical revelation through Jesus Christ, but from a quasi-phenomenological meditation upon 
the ’intuition of being’. These reasons alone would seem to disqualify Daly from inclusion under the
101 Ibid.
102 ’Impasse and Dark Night’ inLiving with Apocalypse: Spiritual Resources for Social Compassion ed. 
Tilden Edwards (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1984) pp. 95-116.
103 Carr, Anne Transforming Grace p.90
104 Beyond God the Father p. 15.
182
rubric ’Christian’. It is rather that her departure from Christianity did not therefore signal the closure 
of her discursive relationship with the tradition. When we come to consider the relationship of 
Daly’s ’elemental feminist’ discourse to Christian discourse, we discover something important about 
Daly and her approach that she herself does not fully recognise. As I have shown she continues to 
operate in some way in continuity and conversation with Christian theological thought-forms even 
after the rupture with Christianity, and in spite of the disclaimers that her work is discontinuous 
with the discipline of theology as it now stands. This should not be too surprising. It is highly 
improbable that Daly (or any woman whose theological sensibilities have been formed within the 
trajectory of Christianity) could ’leap’ outside the very thought forms through which she came to 
think theologically in the first place. A wholesale attack upon ’tradition’ is philosophical folly and 
leads to intellectual impoverishment. As Carr notes (following Hans Georg Gadamer): ’All real 
understanding (truth as event) is in fact new understanding as it occurs in the dialogue with 
tradition. Thus tradition is conceived as a living address and responsive source for questioning and
105reinterpretation, and it is only within this conversation that tradition itself is understood’. One 
cannot escape from one’s cultural matrix; indeed one might well dispute the wisdom of even trying. 
It is important then that we realise that Daly (or any one else for that matter) cannot function in a 
theological vacuum. We must be aware of the fact that the parameters and rubrics of the theological 
context in which she operates are set by Christianity. The theological context remains determinably 
’Christian’ in the sense that she cannot orient herself to some ’other’ context because there is none 
I turn now to ray third task which is to consider the implications of the continuing impact of 
Western theism upon Daly’s feminist theology for the division of labour between ’reformist’ and 
’revolutionary’ feminists theologiansJf Daly’sfeminist criticism of Christianity is valid, the task of 
attempting to establish a new vector of theological possibilities - the so-called ’revolutionary path - 
has now become imperative for feminists. Some may see such an imperative to signal the death of
theology in the form that it has traditionally taken. Such women may want to explore what Sallie
106McFague calls ’a variety of reflective forms other than constructive theology’. Given the 
widespread disillusionment with traditional theological discourse some may conclude, with
107McFague, that there is ’an improper primacy of theological reflection over other forms’. These 
individuals may turn to religious forms from other continents; others may seek to create their own
105 Carr Transforming Grace p.283.
106 McFague, Sallie Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (London: SCM Press, 
1983) p.ix. C.f.: McFague Speaking in Parables: a Study in Metaphor in Theology (London: SCM Press, 
1983).
107 McFague Metaphorical Theology p.ix.
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forms and expression. Thus have New Age-style spiritualities, Goddess rituals, story-telling and 
parabolic theology talcen root within western feminist spirituality.
Whilst it may indeed be laudatory that alternative forms of religious-theological expression 
other than formal theology be explored and utilised, the question of how a constructive feminist 
theology may be formulated remains. Like every other intellectual form exploited in patriarchy, 
theology cannot be ignored, nor should it be simply rejected. It must be trans-formed. If women are 
to begin to address the gender imbalance that currently persists inside the various sub-disciplines of 
theology (fundamental, practical and systematic) we must seek to bring about radical structural 
change in the way theology is practised. For only then will the discipline be capable of embodying 
and reflecting the experiences of contemporary women in the complexity of our diverse religious 
contexts. Such a project cannot be left to men; it seems unlikely that male theologians will effect the 
methodological modifications in their work necessary to the emergence of sex-inclusive theologies. 
And, in fact, considerable indifference towards feminist efforts to demystify theology and religion 
still persists in the British context. Nor is it simply a case of more women being admitted into 
theological faculties, as both students and teachers (though that is undoubtedly part of what is 
necessary). The mere increment of the numbers of females participating in theology does not, of 
itself guarantee the transformation of the subject. Women, no less than men, embody and enact the 
dynamics of the hierai'chical dualism that lies at the root of the phallocratie economy. A significant 
permutation in the processes by which theological creativity seems most likely to occur, therefore, 
if, and only if, feminist theologians succeed in practising theology in a way that challenges and 
unmasks the phallocratie nature of theological knowledge-generation.
That the questions raised by Daly require clarification and response from each and every 
feminist theologian becomes evident when we consider the two elements of feminist theological 
identity. Firstly, the feminist theologian qua feminist must exercise her critical judgement as to the 
potential of Christianity to either facilitate or hinder feminist women in their struggles to transform 
present social values, relations and structures. In other words she must adopt some perspective or 
other on Christianity in working towai'd the transformation of the underlying values of culture and 
society. For simply to ignore the impact of Christianity as a social phenomenon would be clearly 
theoretically inadequate. One may thus suppose that, given the historical potency of Christian 
forms, the feminist theologian is bound to take the symbolic matrix of Christianity into account as 
part of theoretical analysis of society. Women are culturally (even if not religiously) impacted by 
biblical traditions; for we are historical beings. Indeed one could argue that the history of western 
society is tied indelibly to the histoi'y of Christianity. The transformation of western culture and 
society, on this view, are unlikely to occur without a corresponding permutation of that spiritual 
ethos and worldview in which that society is ’rooted’, in other words, Christianity. Secondly, the
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feminist theologian qua theologian must address the question of her relationship to Christianity on 
an existential level. She must, in other words, come to a decision as to whether Christianity is an 
adequate and appropriate medium thr ough which she, and other women, may sustain a religious 
relationship to ’ultimate reality’ or ’God’. This decision is prompted precisely by the feminist critique 
of Christianity. The impact of the question upon Christian feminists is potentially explosive. As 
Marjorie Suchoki acknowledges: ’We [Christian feminists] do not raise the question; we aie the
question. To resolve the issues presented by Daly is therefore of intense importance to us; who we
108are, and who we can and will become, hangs in the balance’. This decision, vis-a-vis the 
compatibility between feminism and Christianity, logically precedes any discussion of feminist 
theological method and practice. Indeed, the decision may influence, to a considerable degree, the 
nature of the methodological constraints in operation in the theological discourse of a particular
109theologian.
What is at stake here is what is to count as ’theology’. Daly’s theological challenge to 
Christianity renders problematic the discipline of theology as it now stands. For in so far as the 
history of Christian theology has been an extended commentai^ on a revealed religion which is 
thoroughly patriarchal, any attack upon Christian religious ideals constitutes a challenge to the very 
heart of theology itself, its norms, values and categories, as well as to the social privileges Christian 
theologians enjoy. This is a question which Christian feminists do not, on the whole, consider.
The nature of the discipline of theology in western culture has been determined historically 
by the dynamics of Christian thought. The discourse of Christianity continues to hold an unrivalled 
hegemony in the religious and theological institutions of Western culture. Theological space in the 
Western academy continues to be legitimated by the long-standing association of the discipline with 
the notion of a ’Christian’ society and culture. It is still Christianity - rather than any other major 
institutionalised religions (such as Islam, Judaism), or any other mode of non-institutionalised 
spirituality (such as Goddess spirituality and Wicca) - that continues to provide the discipline of 
theology with its ’obligatory rubrics’ (Roland Barthes), its fundamental criteria and methodological 
parameters. Thus, for a particular theology to be legitimated by the institutions whose function it is 
to generate and formalise theological knowledge, it must be faithful to the formal constraints 
attending Christian theological reflection - it must be monotheistic, formulate itself according to the
108 Suchoki op. cit., p. 307.
109 One might cite as a case in point Daphne Hampson’s ’post-Christian’ theology. In Hampson’s thought the 
base conviction that Christianity is ’impossible’ (a belief consequent upon the inadmissibility of any notion 
of a ’unique’ revelation of God) rules out of court any theological approach predicated upon this assumption 
and makes an empirically based approach necessary. See Theology and Feminism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1990).
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grammar of creation-fall-redemption and, most importantly of all, it must orient itself around the
central event of Christian believing - the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ.
Indeed the history of theology is viewed in certain theological circles as ’ a branch of Church 
110history’, with its beginnings in the apostolic community out of which the ’first and permanently
1 1 1normative reflection on the original experience of Jesus of Nazareth’ emerged. The German
Protestant theologian Paul Tillich argues that the claim for Christian hegemony over the generation
of theological knowledge in western culture is ultimately founded upon ’the Christian doctrine that
the Logos became flesh, that the principle of divine self-revelation has become manifest in the event 
112"Jesus as the Christ"’. Tillich goes on to argue that: ’If this message is true, Christian theology has 
received a foundation which transcends the foundation of any other theology and which itself cannot
113be transcended’. Tillich - like other Christian theologians - believes the kerygma about Jesus to be 
true; he is therefore convinced that Christian theology possesses a substructure that is unique and 
unsurpassable.
But it is precisely the question of the truth of the exclusive claims for Jesus’ divine status 
that Daly’s critique problematises. Indeed, Daly has not only cast suspicion upon Jesus’ divinity - 
arguing that he is soteriologically impotent for women - but upon the relevance for women of all the 
other core symbols of the tradition. Reflecting critically upon the social structures of authority and 
domination Daly has put into question both the nature of the religious language that we employ with 
regard to ’God’, and the prevailing concept of our discipline ’theology’. She has shown that the 
history of Christian thought is shot through with androcentric assumptions. She has argued that the 
symbolisation of God, in western theological discourse has, almost exclusively, been the product 
and the preserve of men. She has further argued that the symbolisation of divinity in exclusively 
masculine terms has legitimated the domination of women by men. On the basis of such claims she 
argues that male or masculinist theologians have, in universalising from the experience of a 
privileged minority (socially advantaged males) to the detriment of other social groups (most 
strikingly women), given a false account of the ’human’ understanding of God and, in so doing, have 
brought the discipline of Christian theology into intellectual disrepute. In this respect Daly’s critique 
represents a tear in the fabric of the text of the western theological tradition.
What then are the implications of Daly’s criticism of Christianity and her abiding/ron- 
Christian dependence upon the fundamentals of Western theism? Firstly, her criticism of Christian 
symbols allows us to see that the prevalent discourse in theology has delimited the area of study to
110 Sacramentum Mmidi ’Theology IF p.240.
111 Ibid., p.241.
112 Tillich Systematic Theology Volume I p. 16.
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(male) Christian theology thereby marginalizing both female contributions to Christian theological 
history as well as other non-Christian theological approaches. Many women are now beginning to 
question both the object of theological study as this has been traditionally conceived (’God’) and the 
prevailing concept of ’theology’. (Inhis respect feminist theology has moved in parallel with the
114developments in feminist literary studies and the humanities and social sciences). Clearly the 
emergence of feminism into the public arena presents a bold challenge to patriarchal culture in toto. 
The sound of women’s voices, breaking the silence of the ages, implies a radical re-evaluation not 
just of history itself but of philosophy, ethics, politics, economics, art and religion - in short of all 
the cultural vehicles of human self-expression. As I hope to have illustrated tlii'oughout this thesis 
this is a project to which Daly is committed. With respect to the discipline of theology it may well 
be that the use of the term ’theology’ by Christian thinkers to delimit the field of legitimate 
theological reflection to Christianity alone is contestable. For the relation between ’Christianity’ and 
’western theological discourse’ is not one of simple identity. The first use of the term ’theology’ by a 
Christian occurs in the writings of Origen (d.254), though it was not until the work of Eusebius of 
Caesaiea, in the fourth century, that the term came to be used to refer exclusively to Christian 
revelation. ’Theology’ itself has a complex semantic history, deriving etymologically from the 
coalescence of two Greek terms, 'theos ’ or ’God’, diXiàlbgos ’ or ’word/meaning’. The term literally 
means ’speech’ or ’discourse’ concerning that which is called ’God’. It does not have a Christian 
provenance; theologia was originally used in pre-Christian times, by Plato in the Republic, for 
instance, to signify simply stories about the gods, and by Aristotle as a synonym for first philosophy
115or metaphysics. With the development of Christianity that took place under the Greek Fathers, the
word began to assume something like its present meaning, denoting meditations on the inner
mysteries of God. But even among the scholastics Aquinas makes an important distinction, in his
writings, between 'theologia ’ and 'sacra doctrina ' which is defined as ’a schooling in what God has
116revealed, in addition to the philosophical reseaiches pursued by human reasoning’. Theologia 
directs its gaze towards the same object as sacra doctrina (God) but considers that object under a 
different aspect of knowing, looking at the highest principle ’in the light of natural reason’ whilst
117sacra doctrina proceeds ’in the light of divine revelation’. ’Consequently’, writes Aquinas, ’the
113 Ibid.
114 Macdonell, Diane Theories of Discourse: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; first edition 1986) 
pp.4-7.
115 Aristotle Metaphysics 6.1025a
116 Summa Theologiae 1 a, 1,1.
117 Ibid., la, 1,1, ad. 2.
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theology of holy teaching differs in kind from that theology which is ranked as a part of 
118philosophy’.
It may be that the relatively late development of the word ’theology’ - to denote the 
application of the intellect to a systematically ordered corpus of revealed knowledge about God (a 
development that occurred until the scholastic period) - is a distortion. It is, I suggest, incumbent 
upon the feminist theologian to begin to explore critically the meaning and the implications of the 
phrases ’Christian tradition’ and ’western theological tradition’Certainly on the basis of my analysis 
of Daly’s dealings with Christianity it would seem that some dstinction between western theological 
tradition and Christian theological tradition needs to be made.
If theologia can be wrested/rescued from the grip of androcentric Christianity we may at last 
begin to glimpse the possibility of a reconstruction of theology such that it comes to reflect and 
value the experiences of contemporary women. I am not suggesting that we treat theology as 
’philosophy of religion’. But there seems to be no good reasons why any committed God-talk cannot 
be described as ’theology’. The three characteristics of theology have always been, first, the struggle 
to express in words our wonder at the deepest reality (God) which remains nameless and ultimately 
ineffable in its fullness; second, the framing of questions that have historically haunted human life 
(the existential ’facts’ of death, change, of the human realities of psychic ruption, pain and evil) ha 
also been historically one of the most fundamental tasks of the theologian; and third, and perhaps, 
above all else, theology at its best has acted as a catalyst for the transformation of individuals. 
Moreover, if this is a reasonable (though possibly unorthodox) reading of what theology has 
historically amounted to, one does not, I think, need to stand within an institutional religious context 
to engage in the practice of theology, though the advantages of having centuries ofcommentaiy 
upon spiritual questions at one’s disposal are obvious. Just as viable, and perhaps more palatable 
than institutional religions, like Christianity, to many people in the Western world today, is the 
option to recognise and honour insights into the nature of human existence and reality from 
whatever source they derive. Such an unashamed eclecticism may mean scavenging from the 
ideological store-houses of many diverse religious and philosophical traditions (or even from 
secularity for that matter).
The other major point I wish to make is that Daly’s practice problematises the dichotomy 
between theological reformists and revolutionaries. There is still no consensus of agreement 
amongst feminist theologians as to whether to abandon Christianity or to pour energy into the 
movement for the reform of Christian ecclesiastical and theological structures. The debate, now 
over twenty years old, rumbles on. On Daly’s account the feminist theologian can no longer simply
18 Ibid. This is not to say that theologia comes into conflict with sacra doctrina.
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accept the disciplinary prescription to work ’within tradition’, for ’tradition’ itself is rendered suspect. 
The work carried out by other noted ’revolutionaries’ has since echoed Daly’s conclusion thathe 
exclusively male symbolism of Christianity should be left behind because the images it conveys are 
intrinsically patriarchal. I refer, notably, to the work of Carol P. Christ, Naomi Goldenberg and
119Daphne Hampson. It should be recognised that breaking free from the stranglehold of Christian
Scripture and tradition has been a very positive move for many feminist women to make. Clearly the
images thrown up from the symbols of a male saviour and a father god are, for many women,
fundamentally inadequate in dealing with the inner fragmentation they experience as a result of their
oppressed status in a patriarchal society. Abandoning such symbols is often the first step towards
psychic integration and moral autonomy in its broadest sense. Thus, for Carol P. Christ movement
out of Christianity and into Goddess religion awakened her dormant sense of her own female power,
power which had been suppressed in her association with Christianity.
Christian feminist responses to Daly’s critique have been varied, reflecting the heterogeneity
of the Christian feminist phenomenon. Christian feminists operate from a variety of Christological
and soteriological positions and adopt a variety of arguments to support their call for reform. Some
Christian feminists continue to practice ’Christian’ theology perceiving no necessity to depart from
120the traditional understanding of sin and salvation in personal terms. Such women do not consider 
1 2 1Jesus’ maleness or the ’finality’ of the revelation given through Christ as in any way 
122problematic. Yet many contemporary Christian feminist theologies arise directly from women’s
123 124 125experiences of racism, imperialism and heterosexism. Such diversity issues us with a
119 All of these thinkers stand in the same tradition of ’dissent’ as Daly. Whilst they all critique the 
symbolic network at the heart of Christianity, however, the shape and depth of their respective criticisms are 
quite different - as are their theological backgrounds, interests and spiritualities. Christ is primarily 
interested in Goddess religion, though also in more modern stories and myths: see Christ Diving Deep and 
Rising: Women Writers on the Spiritual Quest (Boston: Beacon, 1980); Goldenberg works in the field of 
comparative religion, analysing dreams, myth and symbols: see Changing of the Gods: Feminism and the 
End of Traditional Religions (Boston: Beacon, 1979); Hampson, though working from a post-Christian 
feminist perspective, is perhaps the most traditionally systematic of all the ’revolutionaries’, though her 
interests are turning increasingly towards modern continental philosophy, including French feminisms: see 
Theologv and Feminism and After Christianitv (London: SCM Press, 1996).
120 E.g. Virginia Ramsey Mollenkott Women. Men and the Bible (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1977) ppl04- 
105. (check)
121 Mollenkott, op. cit., p.47; Patricia Wilson-Kastner Faith. Feminism and the Christ (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1983) p. 115.
122 E.g.Wilson-Kastner, op. cit., p.l 10.
123 See for example Katie Geneva Cannon et al (The Mudflower Collective) God’s Fierce Whimsv: 
Christian Feminism and Theological Education fN.Y.: Pilgrim Press. 1985).
124 See for example Gloria Anzaldua ’Entering into the Serpent’ in Judith Plaskow and Carol P. Christ (eds.) 
Weaving the Visions: New Patterns in Feminist Spiritualitv (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco. 1989) pp. 
77-86.
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reminder that any typology tends to throw up a picture which indubitably homogenises empirically 
complex realities, and thus that the attempt to capture the host of variable historical, theological, 
ontological and anthropological claims evoked by the term ’Christian feminism’ in a single model 
may tend towards a kind of empirical erasure.
Doubtless the future of Christianity, as a patriarchal creation, is uncertain. It has been 
mooted, for example, that there is no absolute guarantee that feminist reconstructions of Christian 
symbols will continue to foster oppression. A certain leap of faith is involved here, for Daly and the 
other revolutionaries cannot be sure that radically reconstructed Christian symbols will continue to 
legitimate a patiiarchal culture. It may equally be the case that to shrink from involvement in the 
slow, messy business of transforming a tradition which continues to influence the cultural values of 
Western society is ultimately more dangerous than the ever-present risk of assimilation.
Yet it remains the case that the Christian traition is (as one Clnistian commentator concedes)
126at the very best ’fundamentally ambiguous for women’ I believe, however, that for the full effects 
of Daly’s challenge to the discipline of theology to be realised would require that more (Christian) 
women open their Selves up to the possibility that their tradition cannot be ’re-formed’ through 
cosmetic change. It would require that they subject their Selves, their spiritual-political allegiances 
and professional affiliations to the most probing of examinations. Whether they choose to take up 
this challenge, in its deepest dimensions, remains as yet to be seen.
This said, the utility of the distinction between reformists and revolutionaries tends to gloss 
over the complexities of feminist theological experiences and identities. The dichotomy of feminist 
theological labour between reformists and revolutionaries has sometimes resulted not only in critical 
disagreements (which are inevitable and, insofar as they contribute positively to public theological
127debate, healthy), but in an intellectualised form of horizontal violence. It could be argued that the 
ongoing ’war’ between the two ’factions’ may be destructive of feminist community insofar as it 
inevitably draws feminist energy and attention away from the real ’enemy’, namely, the political 
matrix of domination-subniission and the role masculinist theology continues to play in its 
perpetuation. Thus the critical accuracy of this conceptual dichotomy in religious scholarship (a 
dichotomy which Daly’s later, more extreme anti-Christian rhetoric exacerbates) breaks down in the 
face of the common struggle of religious feminists to transform theo-logia itself.
125 See for example Carter Heyward Speaking of Christ: A Lesbian Feminist Voice ed. Ellen C. Davis 
(N.Y,: Pilgrim Press, 1989).
126 Loades, Ann Feminist Theologv: A Reader (London: SPCK, 1990) p.4.
127 Examples of the acrimonious conflict between the two faction are: the debate between Ruether and the 
Goddess people in the journal Womanspirit: Fiorenza’s hostility to ’post-biblical feminists’; and Daly’s later 
unhelpful extremist rhetoric about Christianity - rhetoric which often meet with equally violent counter­
polemics.
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Daly too is looking for a usable theological past. One should not be surprised by this fa c t.
Nor should the revelation of Daly’s continued dependence upon the body of Christian discourse be 
an occasion, on the part of Clnistian feminists, to gloat. A recognition of our socio-cultural 
embeddedness does not necessarily imply a commitment to ’reformist’ agendas. It merely implies 
that women must work with what has been given to them, if only to look for ways to subvert their 
cultural forms in order to divest them of their power to oppress. That western culture is ’rooted’ 
spiritually in the matrix of the Judaeo-Christian theism is incontrovertible.
I wish to suggest that Daly’s continued dependence upon the fundamental tenets of western
theism need not be construed as a limitation. On the contraiy; as she writes: to be ’ in the situation of
hearing ... these contradictory messages’ of a life-affirming and a life-negating nature is ’to live in
conflict, refusing the simplistic formulas not only of those who are completely ’inside’ but also of
128those who are ’outside’. Daly’s position then is situated on the boundary of ’acceptable’ theological 
discourse. The boundary is defined as ’the location of new space/time - [and] is understood 
primarily in a psychic sense of woman identified integrity, [though] this is closely associated with 
the claiming of physical space/time by and for women. Such space/time is "on the boundary of all
129that has been considered central"’. The boundary represents the centre of the ’new time/space’ that 
is imperative for women ’to become who we are, in which there are real and significant alternatives 
to the prefabricated identities provided within the enclosed spaces of patriarchal institutions. As 
opposed to the foreclosed identity allotted to us within those spaces, there is a diffused identity - an
130open road to discovery of the self and of each other’. The ’boundaiy’ position represents a critical 
site from which to challenge the androcentrism of Christian theology and yet also to begin to weave 
new non-androcentric theologies within the western tradition. The term expresses the fact that one’s 
work is the product of a quite specific culture and theological situation, and this setting requires 
recognition in so far as it continues to colour analysis and creativity. There may be nothing 
intrinsically important about the label itself, it may be provisional. It does, however, allow a point of 
contact and critique with the dominant form of theology, that is, male and Christian (one might also 
add white and ’middle class’). This is not to say that Daly remains in any way ’Christian’. The 
interpretation of Daly’s theological practice that I propose here is more subtle: I submit that there 
exists, if you will, a certain kinship between Daly’s thought and Christianity. It is to say that she 
remains in essence a theist in the western tradition of theology. There are always parameters in 
which her separatism operates. These parameters involve elements from medieval and modern 
(Christian Catholic) theology and elements from the Western tradition of (male) philosophy.
128 ’The Women’s Movement: An Exodus Community’ p.327.
129 Bevond God the Father ’Original Réintroduction’ p.xx; c.f.: p.40-41,
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A recognition of Daly’s theological existence on the boundary of the Western traditionhas 
repercussions for feminist theologians’ perception of their work in relation to one another. For it 
makes what Carr calls ’the attempt to frame a more inclusive construction of Western theology that
131is sensitive to the experience of women’ an urgent task. I have noted and used Christ’s division of 
theological labour between reformists and revolutionaries. But are the options open to the feminist 
theologian correctly represented in this simplistic binary fashion? If the above account is accurate 
then a new model of feminist theological resistance is required. In this respect, Carr continues, 
’Christ’s distinctions between reformist and revolutionary approaches ... should not be allowed to 
divide women’s religious scholarship and search. Each position has strengths that are important to
132the ongoing debate’. It may be that, insofar as mainstream theology continues to resist a radical 
self-questioning of its basic organisational categories and methodology, feminist theology serves its 
own interests best by maintaining a critical position on the edge or on the boundary of the discipline 
(as Daly characterises it) - at least in those places wherein theology enjoys the privileges bestowed 
by virtue of institutionalised status. In place of the conventional division Carr glimpses a
133’sisterhood of all women who share the concerns of religious feminism’. Indeed, she perceives the 
women’s movement ’in the synagogue, the Christian Church, and the feminist spirituality movement’
134to have ’already developed into a tradition that is ecumenical, pluralist, and academically serious’. 
Jews, Christians and those others who, like Daly, now claim an allegiance to neither tradition share 
the base conviction ’that both feminism and religion are profoundly significant for the lives of
135women and for contemporaiy life generally’. Such an aspiration is, I believe, faithful to the 
insights of the early Daly. Cleaily the question of women’s allegiance to patriarchal structures (such 
as Christianity) is fraught with ambiguity . Whilst clearly wanting to exhort women to break out of 
Christianity, Daly recognises that the timing and the form of women’s movement into the space(s) of 
liberation are ’complex’ questions that can only be decided by individual women in their integrity. 
She never returned to the Church after the ’Exodus sermon’ in the autumn of 1971. But she clearly 
understood the decision of those who chose to stay inside institutional religion. Remaining part of 
Christianity, she writes: ’is based upon the conviction that there are important values transmitted 
through these institutions that make it worth the pain and effort of staying in and fighting the system
130 Ibid., p.40.
131 Carr Transforming Grace p.89.
132 Ibid., n.6, p.221.
133 Heyward ’Speaking, Sparking, Building and Burning: Ruether and Daly, Theologians’ p.95.
134 Carr Transforming Grace p. 95
135 Ibid.
192
136... These are personal choices and no one can set down hard-and-fast rules for everyone to follow.’
137Women leaving Christianity act, Daly observes, from ’very individual reasons’. I think this 
recognition is important in as much as it helps to counter a mistaken, though widespread perception 
about her (negative) attitude towards women who make different choices to herself. To condemn 
those women who, for various reasons, continue to identify Christianity as a site for feminist 
struggle is therefore divisive and insensitive to the positive, liberatory experiences many women 
continue to enjoy as active members of particular Christian denominations. The dilemma she 
depicts between remaining within a sexist tr adition and leaving that tradition to search for spiritual 
resources drawn from women’s community, history and myths - a dilemma which, in her early work, 
she embodies - is an ongoing, often painful reality in the lives of many women.
Whether a serious dialogue will materialise is another question. The prognosis is not good. 
Both sides appear to be dug in behind their defences. Daly’s explicit goals have little to do, 
moreover, with providing resources for any kind of academic feminist theology. Indeed there is 
evidence to suggest that she remains suspicious of theology per se. She describes her own work now 
not under the rubric of theology but as ’Elemental Feminist Philosophy’ (thoughas I have 
suggested, one could argue that her work orients itself naturally towards a theological horizon). She 
continues to set up Christianity as purely a symbolic conduit for misogyny and Christian feminism 
as at best futile and at worst dangerous.
In conclusion: contemporary feminist theology stands in need of a space that empowers 
women critically to renegotiate their theological identities whilst yet, at the same time, recognising 
our ’rootedness’ in the soil of the western theological tradition. In other words we need an alternative 
both to the reformism proposed by Christian feminists, and also to the conviction that we can step 
outside the Christian cultural and theological inheritance at will. Such an alternative is, I argue, 
discernible in Daly’s writing. Dalÿs approach focuses upon the religious analysis of consciousness- 
raising. But she continues to rely upon a religious framework that is the product of the Western 
theological tradition. In so doing she is intervening in order actively to shape that tradition, resisting 
the limitations imposed by Christianity, pushing back the parameters. As I have shown, the 
theological space inhabited by Daly is located neither ’inside’ Christianity nor ’outside’ the western 
theological tradition., but on the boundaiy between Christianity and a world of new theological 
possibilities. It represents a critical site from which to challenge the androcentrism of Christian 
theology and yet also to begin to weave new non-androcentric theologies within the western 
tradition. The last phrase is crucial; one of the principle merits of Daly’s postchristian position is
136 ’The Spiritual Dimension of Women’s Liberation’ pp.335.
137 ’The Women’s Community’ p.333.
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that it does not signify a wholesale critical ’destruction’ of the western tradition, but rather its 
preservation through radical change. Daly’s revolutionary feminist ’moment’ is characterised by 
theologically-informed ’critical reflectivity’, that is, an exercise in which she analyses the Christian 
cultural context and its effects as part of the ongoing process of self-examination and the construal 
of present and future identity. This is achieved as a result of a dialectical movement. Daly’s position 
is both constructed out of elements inherent in the western tradition and yet also capable of re-acting 
or acting back upon it so as to continually transform the tradition. This in turn illuminates the 
potential for constructive relations between ’revolutionary’ feminist theologians, Christianity and the 
broader Western theistic tradition: relations that transcends the usual revolutionary-reformist 
dichotomy in feminist theological scholarship.
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CONCLUSION
It is hoped that bringing Daly’s creative interaction with the various discourses to critical light has
helped to illustrate that Daly’s feminist practice is about ongoing engagement, evaluation, critique
and recovery of Western intellectual forms rather than a simple policy of rejection in the name of
some (illusory) ideal of feminist ’purity’In this respect the extended metaphor of web-text-tapestry
is a particularly important expression of Daly’s conception of the creative processes at work in the
1consciousness raising process. In the Wickedarv the meaning of web is given as:
[A] fabric as it is being woven on a loom or as it appeal's when removed from a loom (a 
web of lace)’. Thus the word Web can convey that this work is not completed/finished - that 
it is always in process. (Clearly, our Elemental association with spiders is also implied). At
the same Time, there is a certain sense of completion, and therefore the word Tapestry also
2applies.
But spinning is only possible because a woman has pre-existing ’material’ and ’threads’ that she can 
draw upon.
Moira Gatens reading of Daly as a theoretical separatist is, I think, somewhat misleading. 
True, Daly is not interested in the transformation of any of the four male-stream theoretical 
frameworks of Thomism, existentialism, sociology or Christianity. In this respect she could be 
labelled a theoretical separatist. But such a phrase is inadequate in as much as it tends to trivialise 
the often complex nature of Daly’s relationship with these theories. To begin with it is hardly the 
case that Daly sees philosophy, like Solanas, as ’necessarily’ masculinist, for she considers 
philosophy (albeit rather unconventional ’Elemental Feminist Philosophy’) to play an important part 
in her own intellectual vocation. She may be seen to stand in line with other more ‘liberal’ feminist 
theologians in that, whilst she holds that knowledge, theory and reason have historically been biased 
against women, they have nevertheless not been intrinsically 'masculine' modes. Daly nowhere 
advocates leaving the western institutions of rational discourse alone; neither does she (as Cixous, 
Kristeva and Irigaray) try to 'speak the feminine'. Unlike Solanas, she acknowledges the necessity 
for a feminist policy of selective appropriation from traditional male-stream theory. 'Amazon 
expeditions into the male-controlled "fields" are necessai-y', she believes, 'in order to leave the
1 C.f.: Daly’s recitation of the story of Mehetabel in Pure Lust pp. 305ff.
2 The Wickedarv p. xvii-xviii; c.f. Gvn/Ecology pp. 22-23.
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ofather’s caves and live in the sun’: They are necessary because male-authored texts ’are conduits to 
the knowledge that has been controlled and contaminated within tombs/tomes of sado-schooling. In
fact, vigorous, independent creativity commands the use of such re-source materials’f  Thus, whilst 
Daly does sometimes reject the work of her intellectual forbears outright, it is more often the case 
that she manifests some measure of agreement with them - even if she only mentions them 
fleetingly. As we witnessed in chapter four, one of the cornerstones of Daly’s theory is the 
presupposition that knowledge and power are contingent upon each other. Hence, feminist political 
struggle must include the retrieval of knowledge from those who use it in order to oppress rather 
than to liberate.
This practice is articulated, in Daly’s writings, in terms of the metaphor of intellectual 
piracy: the feminist must be a ’Crafty Pirate’ who ’Righteously Plunder[s] ti'easures of knowledge 
that have been stolen and hidden from women, and ... struggles] to Smuggle these back in such a
way that they can be seen as distinct from their mindbinding trappings’? The aim of the feminist 
Pirate is to ransack the ’Treasures’ - the methods, concepts and categories - of Western thought in an 
effort to find elements worthy of appropriation. Daly not only considers her work under the 
metaphor of ’piracy’ but also under that of ’alchemy’, the science of turning base metal into gold. 
She writes that after ’Plundering’ gems from the ’Treasure Trove’ of western intellectual history :
I quickly settled down to work in my Cove and Conjured my Alchemical Craft. With this 
Craft I transformed the damaged but partially genuine gems of insight that I had acquired in 
my High Sea adventures. The secret of my Alchemical powers lay in my ability to Dis-cover 
and create an entirely Other setting for these treasures, that is, Radical Feminist
Philosophy.^
It is true that Daly’s refuses to draw from male-stream traditions in dwysystematic or wholesale way. 
She urges women to avoid the temptation to fit their experience into ’theories that might appear
tempting as prefabricated molds’7 Instead of trying to insert ourselves into ready-made constructs, 
women are exhorted to listen to the dynamics inherent in their own and other women’s experiences
and 'to speak these dynamics in our own lives and words'.^ This need not mean that only women's 
experience is admissible or valid as a source for feminist theology. Rather does it mean that many of 
the criteria by which male-stream theories are to be assessed arise out of women's experience. The
3 Gvn/Ecology p.8.
4 Pure Lust p.l 15.
5 Gvn/Ecology p.xxvi.
6 Outercourse p. 157.
7 Beyond God the Father p.37.
8 Ibid.
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crucial feminist problem is then not whether feminists should attempt to reclaim resources from 
male-stream theory, but rather ’how to re-possess righteously while avoiding being caught too long
in the caves’?
By contrast to proponents of the additive approach, which considers theoretical paradigms to 
be basically sex-neutral, Daly frequently draws attention to the problems and dangers that attend 
feminist expeditions into male-stream culture. She writes:
In universities, and in all of the professions, the omnipresent poisonous gases gradually stifle 
women’s minds and spirits. Those who carry out the necessaiy expeditions run the risk of 
shrinking into the mold of the mystified Athena, the twice-born, who forgets and denies her 
Mother and Sisters, because she has forgotten her original Self. ’Re-born’ from Zeus, she
becomes Daddy’s Girl, the mutant who serves the master’s puiposes?^
Daly’s fear is that, in the attempt to ’re-possess’ male-authored discourses, feminists may fall into the 
equivalent of what one critic has aptly termed ’homologation’, that is, inadvertent assimilation into 
very the masculine models of thought and practice (and consequently sets of values) that they are 
trying to escape from. (Tliis is of course much the same point as is made by Gatens in her discussion 
of theoretical separatism). But the presence of this danger does not mean that Daly thinks feminist 
women should necessarily renounce male-authored theory altogether. Once one becomes aware of 
the potential dangers one is faced with a choice. Daly writes: "One either tries to avoid ’acceptable 
deviance’ (’normal’ female idiocy) by becoming accepted as a male-identified professional, or else 
one tries to make the qualitative leap towards self-acceptable deviance as ludic cerebrator,
questioner of everything, madwoman and witch".* * She exhorts women to follow the latter path: 
male-stream theory may be used, but only on the proviso that feminists question ’everything’ and test 
the theory in order to discover the extent to which it will accommodate feminist reality. She 
luaintains that it is only by making our own women’s experience sovereign as a basis for theoretical 
construction that we are then able to be ’free to listen to the old philosophical language ... If some of 
this language, when heard in the context of female becoming, is still worth hearing, we need not 
close our ears. But if we choose to speak the same sounds they will be formally and existentially 
new words, for the new context constitutes them as such. Our process is our process’. B u t  male 
theory is of use only in a secondary sense and, even then, the meaning of its constructs is 
transformed by Daly’s mode of application.
9 Gvn/Ecology p.8.
10 Ibid.
11 The Church and the Second Sex pp. 50-51,
*2 Beyond God the Father p. 189.
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Daly’s view of male-stream theory is therefore more nuanced than Gatens acknowledges. 
Implicitly, what is suggested by Daly’s practice with regard to traditional male-stream theology, 
philosophy, sociology and political theory is that, however critical we may be of ther 
presuppositions and constructions, feminists cannot avoided some level of interaction with them. 
With the exception of a small minority of feminist women there is now, I think, widespread 
consensus on this matter. As Pateman comments: ’ ... it is impossible completely to turn our backs 
on the classics or on contemporary methodology, because all modes of discourse reflect and are
implicated in the past to a greater or lesser degree’. We are all to some degree bound and limited 
by ’patriarchal’ thought-forms; no ’pure’ feminist discourse is possible.
Such a strategy would seem to be eminently reasonable. Feminists have come to mistrust a 
host of discourses and practices, ranging from medicine to theology to technology, that have been 
framed and formed by men, but that does not, and should not, prevent us from insisting that 
medicine respond to women’s needs, from re-claiming spirituality and from exercising active 
responsibility for the proper direction of technology. Clearly feminist theoretical activity cannot be 
confined to those realms of experience and spheres of ’culture’ that have been historically the 
provenance of women, for the list would be very short indeed .
Moreover he reclamation of what is of continuing value from the past is a critical task that is 
neglected at our greatest peril. The French writer and philosopher Simone Weil has emphasised the 
idea of the need for us to acknowledge and constantly reclaim our ’roots’ in the historical past and in 
our cultural traditions. Roots exist, she argues, by virtue of our participation in a certain community, 
and its value structures. From these we draw moral, intellectual, emotional nourishment; our lives 
aie given purpose. Weil writes:
It would be useless to turn one’s back on the past in order simply to concentrate on 
the future. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that such a thing is even possible. The 
opposition of future to past or past to future is absurd. The future brings us nothing, 
gives us nothing; it is we who in order to build it have to give it everything, our very life.
But to be able to give, one has to possess; and we possess no other life, no other living sap, 
then the treasures stored up from the past and digested, assimilated and created afresh by us.
Of all the human soul’s needs, none is more vital than this one of the past.^^
Weil discusses the concept of roots by reference to the socio-cultural conditions of spiritual life and 
the appreciation of value in the context of French history. But it is easy enough to see the 
implications of her basic insight for feminist methodology with regard to male-stream texts.
13 Pateman and Gross, op. cit., p.3.
14 Weil The Need For Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind (London and New York:
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Ironically (in view of Daly’s uncompromising rhetoric) one of the strengths of Daly’s 
practice may well be a willingness to live and struggle with tensions, ambiguities and paradoxes 
with respect to our intellectual heritage. The fact that Daly seeks to challenge rather than ignore 
male-stream theory is implicitly supported by her own decision to continue to work in (or, in Daly’s 
term, on the ’Boundary’ of) the academy. In common with other academic feminist theologians, Daly 
has always chosen to work from within the paiameters of the collegiate or university systems of 
higher education. She remains on the faculty of the theology department at Boston College in 
Boston, Massachusetts where she has taught since the late sixties. Her relationship with the 
authorities at Boston College has always been strained. She now lectures to groups of female 
students only. No men are allowed in her classroom, though she tutors male students individually as 
and when required. Cleaiiy Daly is suspicious of the social privilege accorded to the academy and 
its epistemological claims (which, like many other feminists, she thinks have reflected masculine 
values and experience rather than that of ’humanity’ in general) and its underlying idealisation of 
instrumental rationality and objectivity. Hence her often fierce invective against the values of 
’patriarchal scholarship’!^ Such suspicions notwithstanding, however, the university remains, for 
Daly, a legitimate site for her own feminist struggle. Like Adrienne Rich, she thinks that feminists 
can use the university and its resources as a site for conducting feminist research whose influence 
will permeate far beyond the bounds of the academy.^ ^  In higher education, Daly writes: ’there is 
still a struggle for the life of the mind. These institutions possess important re-sources for the 
stimulation of such life. Therefore, they remain an essential arena - a battleground, in fact - of the 
struggle for intellectual/e-motional autonomy that is feminist separation from the State of 
Separation’.*^  Moreover, since one of the problems that feminists encounter is that of having to 
perpetually ’re-invent the wheel’ with regard to feminist constructs and consciousness, feminist 
pai'ticipation in the academy remains important as a way of transmitting knowledge and values from 
one generation of women to the next.
This is not to say that Daly’s interaction with male-stream theory is wholly unproblematic. 
Daly tends to use 'canonical' authors within different fields - thinkers such as Berger in sociology, 
and Aquinas in theology - to 'think against', such that she both draws sustenance from them whilst 
yet using them in order to think her own thoughts. With regard to this practice she comments:
Ark paperbacks, 1987; first published in London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952) p.48-49.
15 Attacks upon ’patriarchal scholarship’ and its erasure of women permeate Daly’s writings. See, for 
example, Gvn/Ecology pp. 143-52, 170-77, 203-22, 288-92, 306-12. For the definition of ’academentia’ see 
the Wickedarv p. 184.
16 Rich, Adrienne ’Towards a Woman-Centred University’ inOn Lies. Secrets. Silence: Selected prose 
1966-78 (London: Virago, 1980) pps. 125-55
17 Pure Lust p. 373.
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To say that concepts are derivative from the Christian tradition (or from Marxian theoi-y, or 
from Aristotelian philosophy, or from Freudian theory, or from American culture) says little 
about the value of the concepts. To deny the existence of sources would be to deny the 
reality of process and of causality ... I think it is important to be constantly aware that it
matters more where we are going than where we started from.*^
This attitude explains Daly’s failure sometimes to acknowledge thinkers whose insights she tears 
from their original philosophical contexts in order to use them as a springboard for her own ’ludic 
cerebration’. Daly’s reticence to own the contingency of her own ideas upon the efforts of others is a 
trait that we shall encounter on a number of occasions. It possesses great rhetorical merit in that it 
helps to create the impression of Daly’s theoretical originality and novelty. This impression is 
compounded by the way that she often sets up a particular thinker as a ’straw man’, simplifying their
views for the purpose of ’rhetorical disembowehiient’!^ This strain in Daly’s rhetoric seems to 
preclude any criticism of her work. She herself apears to be highly sensitive to criticism. As 
Meaghan Morris has noted, Daly wants to run the game her way: either one has 'ears to heai' her 
message (that is, one agrees with her and is for her) or one is deaf to the message (that is, one 
disagrees with her and is thereby against her). Her rhetorical strategy thus involves a combination of 
recognition and distancing and each, in its own way, functions so as to assert her own eminence: 
her explanations are billed as corrections of error, or as restorations of partial truth.
In piercing the illusion of novelty we were enabled to rectify a number of misconceptions 
about Daly’s writings and clarify some of its more abstruse features. I hope to have shown however 
that an appreciative attitude towards Daly's legacy need not negate the necessity for honest criticism 
of her work where it should prove necessary, that is, where her thought shows inconsistencies, 
where it is unnecessarily opaque or politically divisive. This is important, for only by recognising 
the limitations and historicity of her writing will we then be able to bestow upon her work its proper 
theoretical dignity. Only thus will Daly be able to remain present in a robust feminist tradition and 
culture. As I have shown throughout my thesis Daly often wrenches concepts out of the discursive 
contexts which confer intelligibility upon them, thereby abandoning the cultural, philosophical 
background against which the ideas were originally understood. The meanings she then assigns to 
the concepts she employs are often highly individual, and often they appear somewhat aibitrary.
This approach immediately invites critical response from supporters of these thinkers who may feel 
that Daly does violence to their work by integrating their thought into a theoretical formation that 
they would all undoubtedly have found quite alien. This is undoubtedly one of the hazards of Daly's
18 Daly ’A Short Essay on Hearing and the qualitative Leap of Radical Feminism’ Horizons 2 (1975) 
pp. 122-23.
19 See for example her treatment of Peter Berger in Bevond God the Father pp. 135-136.
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approach. In one respect then the difficulty in dealing with Daly’s thought is not so much in tracing 
its sources, but in identifying a consistency of structure. She draws on many diverse thinkers and 
attempts to pull them all together in her own unique act of feminist synthesis. Whilst it is important 
that her integrative intentions are given due attention, it is sometimes difficult to see how their 
insights, concepts and ideas can gel together or be integrated. Adherents to Thomism or any of the 
other systematic frameworks with which she engages may well consider that Daly would benefit 
from a more faithful rendering of systems. That her meaning is often hard to pin down is due, in no 
small part, to the terminological obscurity and conceptual diffuseness that follows her ’infidelity’ 
with regard to her sources.
Glancing through the secondary literature on Daly’s work, or discussing her claims with 
other feminists, it becomes appai'ent that it is almost impossible to remain neutral as to what Daly is 
saying. I think of one review critic who admits to throwing Gvn/Ecologv across the room in fury 
before later picking it up to read again. My own experience of the sometimes hostile reception given 
to Daly’s work shows me that what she has to say regaiding male-female relationships and 
established religion is deeply threatening to non-feminists and some Christian feminist students. No 
other writer who is classified as a feminist theologian seems to evoke such reactions. Daly is 
undoubtedly both politically outspoken and uncompromising. She appears to be highly sensitive to 
criticism and this can encourage a protective and defensive attitude on the part of her supporters. 
Invariably one encounters Daly in either of these contexts as either a straw figure or else an ’idol 
without feet of clay’. I think one must avoid both of these traps. It is frankly admitted that the 
standpoint of the thesis has been broadly in sympathy with Daly’s agenda, goals and methods.A 
fundamental conviction underlying Daly’s radical feminist ethics is that it possible for women to 
challenge the value-matrix of the system of sexual domination, and to affirm a different set of 
values thi'ough the exercise of choice. It is possible to transform consciousness, it is possible to 
create a revolution in the way in which we see and relate with ourselves, with each other and with 
the stunning array of life-forms that participate in the miracle of God’s continuing creation.As a 
feminist I remain committed to this assumption. Moreover, my own feminist consciousness has 
developed, in large measure, out of my own dialogue with her work. This process - rapturous, 
traumatic and always challenging - was stirred into life by reading Bevond God the Father and 
Gvn/Ecologv and later intensified by meeting her at her home in Boston, Massachusetts.
It is also hoped that this project in clarifying some of the intellectual roots of her position 
has helped to dipel certain familiar (if not tired) criticisms. As I have shown, since the publication 
of Gvn/Ecologv Daly has been the target of allegations centring around issues such as
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’essentialism’7*^ racism^* and classism?^ I believe the charge that Daly has ’fallen’ into ’politically 
incorrect’ stances on these questions to be both ill-founded and politically negative?^ However, my 
attention has focused neither upon defence nor counter-polemic. I do not suggest that her work 
possesses transglobal relevance. Clearly her philosophy is neither attractive nor, it may now appear, 
appropriate to the ’reformist’, ethnic and/or racial agendas of many feminist theologians. Black 
women in particular have already documented the limitations of Daly’s work for their struggle. I 
have not sought, therefore, to engage in a whitewash of Daly in the face of her many critics. I have 
no wish to ’canonise’ Daly, to create ’Dalyian’ theology as though her work could become a standard 
for evaluating everyone else’s. Nor do I overlook the strangeness of some of her insights for 
traditional theologians and philosophers. Feminist theology is fast becoming a more mature 
theoretical corpus, able to withstand and benefit from criticism. It may be that in order for her 
contribution to be properly received by the feminist community the kind of critique that she herself 
performs on texts will have to be performed on her own writings. Indeed, such a process has already 
begun. With Martin Heidegger we may say that a certain ’destruction’ is necessary in order for the 
critical ’retrieval’ or ’re-appropriation’ of Daly’s work for feminist theology to take place.
But, then, is there no theory that is beyond improvement? As Dale Spender has noted:
24’Clearly, [Daly’s] emphasis is on ’cerebration’, and not on particular campaigns’Criticism that 
focuses upon the theological lacunae in Daly’s approach, with what she does not say or address (as I 
have done) may therefore miss the point somewhat. Spender continues: ’...the issue with Mary 
Daly’s work is not where it fails to go, but how fai' it does go, for while much will remain
25unrevealed to one journeyer, that it is possible to journey is the crux of her contribution’. i wish to 
echo this statement: it is what she does say and do that is surely of chief importance in any
assessment of her significance. Daly herself freely admits that her writings are ’not the Last Word4^ 
There is no ’happy closure’ at the end of her account; indeed, there is no ’end’, as such, in sight. The 
point is, as Daly herself would doubtless acknowledge, not to settle down comfortably with her
20 See for example Linda Alcoff ’Cultural Feminism Versus post-Stmcturalism: The Identity Crisis in 
Feminist Theory’ in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1988 vol 13, no.3. pp.405-436.
21 See for example Audre Lorde ’An Open Letter to Mary Daly’ inSister. Outsider (N.Y.: Crossing Press, 
I984X
22 See for example Lynn Segal, op. Git; or Susan B. J. Thistlethwaite, op. cit.
23 For a radical feminist analysis of uses and abuses of the rhetoric of ’poliical corrrectness’ see Marilyn 
Frye ’Getting it Right’ in Willful Virgin: Essavs in Feminist Theory 1976-1992 (Freedom, CA.: The 
Crossing Press, 1992) pp. 13-27.
Spender Man-Made Language p.208.
25 Ibid., p.204.
26 Gvn/Ecologv pps. xxxi, xlii, 22.
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work, but to work through it in order to move beyond it. One cannot, I think, be a disciple of Mary 
Daly nor would she wish any. One can, however, benefit from her intuitions and seek to apply them 
to the art of living in the spirit of Daly herself, reflecting all the while upon our own efforts to live 
and to live in the light of our reflections. This is what I have striven to do.
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